ACADEMY OF ROMANIAN SCIENTISTS

Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists

Series on Philosophy, Psychology and Theology

ISSN 2067 – 5690

Volume

13

, Number

1–2

/

2025

48

BETWEEN LOGOS AND ALGORITHM: A PHILOSOPHICAL

JOURNEY THROUGH SPIRITUAL AND SCIENTIFIC WORLDS

Daniela GIFU

*

Abstract.

Human communication unfolds between Logos and algorithm, always marked by

a structural gap between intention and interpretation. This paper offers a 2025 assessment

of

uncertainty

in

public

discourse,

with

emphasis

on

the

Romanian

political

sphere.

It

integrates

philosophical

and

linguistic

perspectives

with

recent

analyses

of

populist

and

sovereigntist rhetoric. The study examines the cognitive and discursive mechanisms that

generate ambiguity, their strategic use by political and media actors, and the ways digital

acceleration and geopolitical pressure transform communication into a field of permanent

tension.

Romania

holds

resources

for

navigating

this

ecology

of

uncertainty,

yet

risks

persist as linguistic degradation and representational crises erode shared meaning.

Keywords:

communicative

uncertainty,

interpretive

frameworks,

political

discourse,

populist rhetoric

DOI

10.56082/annalsarsciphil.2025.1.48

1. Introduction

In 2025, Romania experiences a communicative paradox: never has more

been

said,

and

never

has

less

been

understood.

From

the

press

conferences

of

ministers across the political spectrum to the televised interventions of prominent

figures,

and

from

populist

rhetoric

to

technocratic

bureaucratic

statements,

the

public

sphere

is

saturated

with

messages

that

promise

clarity

yet

generate

confusion and polarization [1–4].

The

central

question

guiding

this

study

is:

How

does

the

structural

uncertainty of language intersect with the degradation of political communication

in

Romania,

producing

what

may

be

described

as

a

genuine

“crisis

of

public

meaning” in 2025?

To address this question, the article examines:

•

the

theoretical

foundations

of

communicative

uncertainty

(Maiorescu,

Wittgenstein, Ducrot, Sperber, Cornea, etc.) [5–11];

•

the

ways

in

which

this

uncertainty

is

instrumentalized

in

recent

Romanian

political

discourse—populist,

sovereigntist,

technocratic,

and

media-

driven [1, 3, 4, 12–22];

•

a

2025

assessment

of

the

ecology

of

uncertainty

within

digital

and

geopolitical contexts [23–30].

*

CS II habil., Academia Română, Filiala Iași; Membru Asociat la Academia Oamenilor de Știință

din România; conf.univ.dr.habil. Universitatea “Petre Andrei” din Iași.

Between Logos and Algorithm:

A Philosophical Journey Through Spiritual and Scientific Worlds

49

Following Edelman’s view of politics as symbolic management [12] and

Van

Dijk’s

analysis

of

discourse

as

a

privileged

tool

of

manipulation

[13],

the

Romanian case raises a deeper issue: not merely

what

politicians say, but

what

kind

of

semantic

world

they

construct,

and

how

stable

that

world

remains

for

citizens.

2.

Theoretical Foundations of Uncertainty in Communication

Before

entering

the

conceptual

architecture

of

uncertainty,

it

is

worth

noting a simple fact: recent

communication crises in

Romanian politics are not

accidents

but

symptoms

of

deeper

mechanisms

inherent

to

language.

From

the

tensions surrounding USR’s entry into government to the contradictory messages

within the current PSD–PNL coalition, the public sphere offers daily examples in

which

words

circulate

without

stable

semantic

anchors.

Terms

such

as

reform,

stability,

transparency,

or

national

interest

are

used

simultaneously

by

different

political actors, yet with divergent—sometimes even opposing—meanings.

This

discursive

volatility

is

not

merely

a

rhetorical

problem

but

an

expression of the constitutive uncertainty of natural language. To understand why

communication

so

easily

becomes

a

terrain

of

conflict,

manipulation,

or

confusion, we must return to several fundamental theoretical landmarks.

2.1.

Titu

Maiorescu:

Language

as

Generalization

and

the

Loss

of

the

Individual

While

the

current

Minister

of

Foreign

Affairs

struggles

with

vague

formulas

about

“alignment

with

European

values”

or

“a

complex

geopolitical

context,”

Titu

Maiorescu

had

already

analyzed,

in

the

19th

century,

the

relationship

between

language,

logic,

and

reality

[5].

He

argued

that

language

operates with general concepts rather than individual realities: the word

professor

does not designate a specific person but an abstraction.

This

structural

generalization

produces

a

first

form

of

uncertainty:

we

communicate through abstractions, yet we live in particulars. When a Minister of

Education

speaks

about

students

,

performance

,

or

equity

,

the

concrete

meaning

depends on the institutional, ideological, and media context in which these words

are

placed.

Without

such

context,

we

remain

in

the

realm

of

“forms

without

substance,” precisely what Maiorescu denounced [5, 11].

2.2. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Language Games and the Incompatibility of

Political Registers

Wittgenstein moved from the illusion of a perfectly logical language to the

idea that the meaning of a word is given by its use within “language games” [6].

In Romania 2025, several political language games coexist:

50

Daniela

Gifu

•

the

technocratic

game

(statements

from

the

Ministry

of

Finance,

the

National Bank, or certain USR/PNL ministers, saturated with terms such as

fiscal

sustainability

,

resilience

,

European benchmarks

);

•

the

populist game

(slogans like “We will not sell our country!”, “Down

with the traitors!”, “Romania for Romanians!”) [17, 25];

•

the

sovereigntist-identity

game

,

blending

nostalgia,

religion,

and

geopolitics [27–29];

•

the

diplomatic-bureaucratic game

, where standardized formulas often

conceal the absence of real positioning [26, 23].

These

language

games

are

not

interoperable:

what

counts

as

“structural

adjustment”

in

technocratic

jargon

becomes,

in

populist

rhetoric,

“Brussels’

diktat.” In Wittgenstein’s terms, the family resemblances between these linguistic

practices are minimal, and uncertainty grows precisely from the impossibility of

constructing a shared game [6, 4].

2.3. Oswald Ducrot: Meaning Between Dictionary and Situation

Ducrot

distinguishes

between

signification

(the

codified

meaning)

and

sense

(the

effective

meaning

in

a

given

situation)

[7].

In

Romanian

political

practice,

this

distinction

becomes

significant.

When

a

PSD

or

PNL leader

says

reform

, the basic meaning refers to structural change; the situational meaning may

instead imply clientelist rotation or the discursive rebranding of an old policy.

Classic

examples

such

as

“the

horse

is

ready”

[10]

show

that

without

context, we do not know

which

horse or

ready for what

. In 2025, formulas like

“Educated

Romania,”

“Digital

Romania,”

or

“Sovereign

Romania”

function

exactly

like

“the

horse

is

ready”:

they

sound

appealing

but

say

nothing

determinate without a clear pragmatic frame [12, 20].

2.4. Dan Sperber: Fast Inference and the Illusion of Transparency

Sperber

explains

communicative

efficiency

through

inferential

mechanisms:

the

receiver

deduces

the

speaker’s

intention

from

message

and

context through a rapid, largely unconscious process [8]. When a minister says “it

is late” during a government meeting, the meaning may be: “we are closing the

discussion,” “no further changes,” or “we must go to the press conference.”

In

the

Romanian

public

sphere,

this

inferential

mechanism

is

systematically exploited:

•

ambiguous

statements

(“we

do

not

exclude

any

option,”

“we

are

analyzing all scenarios”) shift the burden of interpretation onto the public;

•

crisis communications (pandemic, war, inflation) are formulated to allow

later retractions, maintaining a zone of strategic ambiguity [22, 13, 21].

Uncertainty becomes not merely a side effect but a political resource: if

the message is vague enough, interpretive responsibility shifts to the receiver.

Between Logos and Algorithm:

A Philosophical Journey Through Spiritual and Scientific Worlds

51

2.5. Paul Cornea: Pre-Understanding, Emotion, and Worlds of Belief

Cornea argues that understanding is filtered through

pre-understanding

, a

set

of

prejudices,

values,

and

historical-cultural

experiences

[11].

In

Romania,

these worlds of belief are deeply fragmented:

•

an urban, educated public aligned with European discourse;

•

a

rural

or

precarious

public

receptive

to

nationalist,

religious,

or

anti-elitist messages;

•

a

young,

digitalized

public

exposed

to

memes,

TikTok,

and

political

influencers [3, 1, 18].

The

same

sentence,

“Romania

must

defend

its

interests”,

will

be

interpreted differently across these universes: as a call for diplomacy, as an appeal

to

isolationism, or as

a

campaign slogan. Uncertainty

is

not

only

linguistic but

also cultural and affective [4, 24, 23].

3.Instrumentalized Uncertainty: Political Discourse and Populism,

and Sovereigntist in Romania

Uncertainty

becomes

truly

dangerous

when

it

is

deliberately

instrumentalized. Romania in 2025 offers a dense laboratory of such practices.

3.1. Sovereigntist as an Exploitation of Nostalgia and Ambiguity

Romanian

sovereigntist

discourse—articulated

by

parties

and

leaders

invoking

“tradition,”

“faith,”

and

“the

nation”—feeds

on

the

nostalgia

of

an

idealized

past

and

on

the

ambiguity

of

concepts

such

as

sovereignty

,

national

interest

, or

the West

[27–29].

Through

the

resemanticization

of

historical

figures

(Kogălniceanu,

Maiorescu, Eminescu),

a symbolic legitimacy is constructed that often masks a

precarious or contradictory political content [12, 26]. In Van Dijk’s terms, these

are discursive strategies of manipulation that exploit the mental representations of

the public [13].

3.2. Populism and the Crisis of Representation

The

crisis

of

representation

described

by

Carp

[23]

and

analyzed

in

the

broader European context by Müller [17] and Ghica [26] manifests in Romania

through:

•

the constant delegitimization of “elites,” “experts,” and “technocrats”;

•

the promise of a direct relationship between “the people” and the leader,

bypassing institutions;

•

the radical simplification of complex problems (“three-point solutions”

to structural crises).

In this context, uncertainty becomes twofold:

•

citizens no longer know who represents them;

52

Daniela

Gifu

•

citizens no longer know what

representation

means within a democratic

system [23–25].

•

3.3. Technocratism and the Opacity of Expert Language

At the opposite pole of populism, technocratism, visible in the discourse of

ministers

of

finance,

economy,

or

digitalization,

produces

another

form

of

uncertainty: opacity. Terms such as

fiscal consolidation

,

structural optimization

,

or

macroeconomic resilience

are often incomprehensible to the general public [3,

4].

Here, manipulation is not necessarily intentional, but the effect is similar:

a

widening

gap

between

institutional

language

and

the

language

of

citizens

[1,

21]. In Ducrot’s terms, situational meaning remains inaccessible to those who do

not share the same “language game” [7, 6].

3.4. Media, Social Networks, and Symbolic Violence

Analyses of electoral and media discourse show how the press and social

networks amplify uncertainty through:

•

sensationalist, decontextualized headlines;

•

conflict-driven narrative frames (“us vs. them”);

•

excessive personalization of politics [14–20, 21, 13].

The

concept

of

symbolic

violence

applied

to

electoral

discourse

[20]

demonstrates that uncertainty is not merely a cognitive effect but also a tool of

domination: whoever controls the interpretive frame controls public reactions [12,

1, 4].

4.2025 Assessment: The Ecology of Uncertainty in the Digital and

Geopolitical Era

In 2025, communicative uncertainty in Romania is amplified by at least

four major dynamics that overlap with existing internal fragilities.

4.1. Speed, Fragmentation, and the “Regime of Discursive Urgency”

Online communication, from

Facebook and X to TikTok and Telegram,

produces

a

regime

of

discursive

urgency:

messages

must

be

short,

fast,

and

emotional [3, 1]. Context is lost, nuance disappears, and ambiguity increases. In

this

environment,

conspiracy

theories,

rumors,

and

alternative

narratives

spread

easily, as Sunstein shows [22]. Romania is no exception: from fake news about

the EU and NATO to delirious interpretations of the war in Ukraine, the public

sphere becomes a semantic battlefield [25, 26].

Between Logos and Algorithm:

A Philosophical Journey Through Spiritual and Scientific Worlds

53

4.2. Intercultural Scale and Identity Tensions

Romania’s membership in the EU and NATO, large-scale migration, and

exposure to global media create a complex intercultural ecology. The worlds of

belief described by Cornea [11] diversify even further, while their compatibility

decreases.

Kundera

[29]

speaks

of

a

“kidnapped

West.”

In

Romania,

this

metaphor

takes

on

a

paradoxical

form:

part

of

society

feels

“kidnapped

by

the

West,”

another

part

“kidnapped

by

the

East.”

Sovereigntist,

populism,

and

Euroscepticism feed on these tensions [27, 28, 26].

4.3. Information War and the Vulnerability of Inferences

The

war

in

Ukraine

and

the

narrative

competition

among

geopolitical

blocs

turn

Romania

into

a

vulnerable

node

of

information

warfare.

Russian,

Western, and regional narratives intersect within the same media space [26, 25].

In Sperber’s terms

[8],

public inferences become easily manipulable:

without a

stable

shared

background,

any

message

can

be

“pulled”

in

one

direction

or

another. In Van Dijk’s framework [13], control over context becomes the primary

weapon.

4.4.

The

Crisis

of

Epistemic

Authority

and

the

Fragmentation

of

Expertise

Carp [23], Fiume [24], and Ghica [26] show that we are facing a crisis of

epistemic

authority:

experts

are

contested,

knowledge

institutions

(universities,

institutes, organizations) are suspected of partisanship, and “informed opinion” is

placed

on

the

same

level

as

“a

Facebook

comment.”

In

this

context,

projects

aimed

at

crisis

anticipation

through

discourse

analysis

[21,

22]

or

volumes

dedicated to communicative uncertainty [30] demonstrate that sophisticated tools

exist for understanding

and managing

communicative risk. The problem

is

that

they are not systematically integrated into political decision-making.

5. Conclusions

The analysis developed in the previous chapters shows that uncertainty is

not

only

a

property

of

natural

language

but

also

a

political,

institutional,

and

cultural condition of contemporary Romania. In 2025, communicative uncertainty

is

amplified

by

three

major

dynamics:

(1)

Internal

discursive

fragmentation

–

incompatible

political

languages

coexist:

technocratic,

bureaucratic,

populist,

sovereigntist, diplomatic. They do not translate into one another, do not meet, and

do

not

negotiate

meaning.

The

result

is

a

semantic

misalignment

between

institutions, parties, and the public. (2) Digital acceleration – the speed of online

communication, its reactive nature, and the absence of context turn any message

into

a

potential

generator

of

confusion.

Romania

lives

under

a

regime

of

discursive

urgency,

where

meaning

is

consumed

before

it

is

understood.

(3)

54

Daniela

Gifu

Geopolitical and informational pressure – Romania is simultaneously exposed to

conflicting external narratives, regional tensions, and a global erosion of epistemic

authority.

In

this

context,

public

inferences

become

vulnerable,

and

cultural

pre‑understandings radicalize.

These three dynamics converge into what can be described as a crisis of

public meaning. Not only are messages uncertain, but so are the institutions that

produce them. Not only are words ambiguous, but so are the intentions attributed

to them. Not only are interpretations divergent, but so are the worlds of belief that

sustain them.

The

central

question

of

this

study

now

finds

its

answer:

the

structural

uncertainty of language (generalization, language games, contextual dependence,

inference, pre‑understanding) becomes dangerous when combined with: populism

that

brutally

simplifies;

sovereigntist

that

exploits

nostalgia

and

fear;

technocratism

that

obscures;

media

and

social

networks

that

accelerate

and

fragment; the crisis of epistemic authority that relativizes all knowledge.

Romania is not facing merely a communication crisis, but a crisis of the

shared

interpretive

framework.

Language

games

no

longer

share

“family

resemblances,”

forms

circulate

without

substance,

and

situations

generate

not

meaning but collisions of meanings.

The

2025

assessment

is

not

a

verdict

but

an

inflection

point:

either

we

continue along the path of fragmentation and discursive cynicism, or we transform

uncertainty

into

a

critical

resource,

by

acknowledging

it,

understanding

it,

and

managing it lucidly.

In

a

world

where

meaning

fragments,

the

most

important

political

and

democratic competence becomes the capacity to reconstruct meaning: to negotiate

significance,

to

rebuild

bridges

between

worlds

of

belief,

to

re‑professionalize

public communication, and to restore to words the dignity of being, once again,

the beginning of a shared contract rather than the prelude to rupture.

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Ideas.

Simon

&

Schuster.

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