86
ROMANIA: FROM “NATO 2.0” TO “NATO 3.0”
- STRATEGIC ELEMENTS OF ROMANIA’S NATIONAL
TRAJECTORY IN THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT –
Major (ret) Sînziana IANCU, Ph.D
Marius BOBOCEA
Abstract:
This paper examines the evolution of the North Atlantic Alliance
from
the
conceptual
paradigm
of
“NATO
2.0”
to
that
of
“NATO
3.0,”
in
the
context
of
the
transformations
affecting
the
international
security
environment,
driven by strategic competition among the major powers, the Russian Federation’s
war
against
Ukraine,
and
the
reconfiguration
of
the
United
States’
strategic
priorities.
The
analysis
highlights
the
implications
of
this
transition
for
Romania,
with
particular
emphasis
on
strengthening
its
role
on
NATO’s
Eastern
Flank,
developing defense capabilities, enhancing national resilience, and leveraging its
geostrategic
position
in
the
Black
Sea
region.
The
conclusions
underscore
that
adaptation to the new security paradigm must be pursued in full alignment with the
objectives of Romania’s National Defense Strategy for 2025–2029, by maintaining
the Strategic Partnership with the United States, strengthening NATO’s European
Pillar, and consolidating Romania’s position as a relevant actor within the Euro-
Atlantic security architecture.
Keywords:
“NATO 3.0,” Euro-Atlantic security, Romania, Eastern Flank,
Black Sea, resilience, Romania - United States Strategic Partnership.
DOI
10
.
56082/annalsarscimilit.2026.3
.
8
6
I. Prolegomena
National
security
is
an
essential
concept
for
the
existence
and
sovereignty of any state, defining its capacity to protect its system of values,
institutions, territory and, above all, its population against threats of either
an
internal
or
external
nature.
Situated
at
the
intersection
of
major
geostrategic interests in the Black Sea region, Romania shapes its security
policy in accordance with the dynamics and evolution of the international
environment.
Thus,
the
Strategic
Partnership
with
the
United
States
and
membership
of
the
European
Union
constitute
two
essential
pillars
of
Romania’s
foreign
and
security
policy.
This
paper
analyses
Romania’s
position in
the transition
from
“NATO 2.0” to
“NATO 3.0,” highlighting
*
corresponding
member
of
the
Academy
of
National
Security
Sciences,
Minister
Counselor
in
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs,
Romania,
email:
iancu_sanziana@yahoo.com.
consular
agent,
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs,
Romania,
email:
bobo.marius169
@
-
yahoo.com;
Major (ret) Sînziana IANCU, Ph.D
Marius BOBOCEA
87
both the areas of convergence and the challenges involved in maintaining an
effective strategic balance.
The international order has undergone significant changes in recent
years. The international system has evolved from the bipolar dynamics of
the Cold War towards a multipolar world in which major powers such as the
United States, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation and
the
European
Union
compete
for
influence
and
power.
The
Joint
White
Paper
for
European
Defense
Readiness
2030
itself
outlines
the
main
security
challenges
facing
EU
Member
States.
The
document
was
first
published
on
March
19,
2025.
Its
introduction
states
that
“a
new
international
order
will
be
formed
in
the
second
half
of
this
decade.”
1
Security threats generated by actors outside the European Union have had a
profound
impact
on
the
European
political
system,
while
also
adversely
affecting
economic
growth,
as
“people
are
concerned
about
the
consequences of the breakdown of the international order caused by hostile
actors.”
2
The White Paper identifies the Russian Federation and the People’s
Republic of China as states posing threats to European security, while also
highlighting
the
importance
of
trade
relations
between
the
People’s
Republic of China and most European countries.
This
constantly
evolving
environment
has
presented
NATO
with
new challenges. Although NATO was originally established to counter the
Soviet threat, it has evolved into an organization which, while preserving its
founding principle of collective defense, increasingly emphasizes Article 3
of
the
Washington
Treaty,
concerning
the
individual
capacity
of
each
member state to defend itself. President Donald Trump’s return to office in
2025, together with his persistent skepticism regarding NATO’s usefulness
and
the
costs
it
entails
for
the
United
States,
led
to
a
fundamental
reassessment of the Alliance. The concept of “NATO 2.0” was developed as
a
solution
aligned
with
Donald
Trump’s
vision,
while
simultaneously
addressing Europe’s growing need for greater autonomy.
II. What does the concept of “NATO 2.0” represents?
“NATO
2.0”
represents
a
reformed
Alliance
that
redefines
the
respective
roles
of
the
United
States
and
Europe.
Its
main
characteristics
include:
3
1
European Commission,
Joint White Paper for European Defense Readiness 2030
, p. 1,
available
at:
https://defence
-
industry
-
space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/30b50d2c
-
49aa
-
4250
-
9ca6
-
27a0347cf009
_en?filename=
White%20Paper.pdf, accessed July 20,
2026.
2
Ibidem
, p. 3.
3
Ingo Piepers, Understanding War Dynamics and Global Developments, “NATO 2.0: A
New
Foundation
for
Transatlantic
Cooperation,”
January
11,
2025,
available
at:
https://global4cast.org/2025/01/nato-2-0-a-new-foundation-for-transatlantic-cooperation/,
accessed on July 20, 2026.
ROMANIA: FROM “NATO 2.0” TO “NATO 3.0”
- STRATEGIC ELEMENTS OF ROMANIA’S NATIONAL TRAJECTORY IN THE
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT –
88
•
Greater responsibility for Europe:
European member states develop
their defense capabilities and assume primary responsibility for their
own
security,
including
countering
threats
posed
by
the
Russian
Federation;
•
A
reduced
but
still
significant
US
role:
the
United
States
scales
back its direct operational involvement in Europe but continues to
provide
support
in
areas
where
Europe
still
lacks
sufficient
capabilities,
such
as
strategic
air
power,
advanced
intelligence
capabilities and nuclear deterrence;
•
Preservation of Article 5:
the collective defense clause remains fully
intact, guaranteeing the security of all member states;
•
A European SACEUR:
the position of Supreme Allied Commander
Europe
(SACEUR),
traditionally
held
by
a
US
general,
would
eventually
be assumed
by a European general.
This
change would
underscore
Europe’s
growing
responsibility
for
regional
security
while maintaining operational continuity;
•
Flexible
cooperation:
Europe
gains
greater
autonomy
in
regional
defense planning, while the United States focuses on its priorities in
Asia
and
the
Indo-Pacific
region,
with
both
sides
maintaining
a
strong transatlantic partnership.
While
the
European
Union
has
traditionally
been
established
and
perceived primarily as an economic instrument, against the backdrop of a
major geopolitical crisis - the war in Ukraine - it has begun to emerge as an
increasingly
significant
military
actor.
This
development
is
partly
attributable
both
to
the
United
States’
new
policy
towards
the
European
security
environment,
characterized
by
a
war
unfolding
on
Europe’s
borders,
and
to
Washington’s
at
least
permissive
relationship
with
the
Russian Federation.
It
also
reflects
the need for EU Member States to
be
adequately prepared in the event of an unwanted expansion or escalation of
the conflict.
II.1. What benefits has “NATO 2.0” brought?
“NATO
2.0”
has
brought
a
series
of
benefits
aimed
at
easing
tensions between the United States and the European Union and providing
the EU with new opportunities to transform in line with its own interests.
The partial reduction of Europe’s military dependence on the United States -
through both the withdrawal of US troops from certain European bases and
the increase in the share of GDP allocated to defense - has strengthened the
capabilities
of
individual
EU
Member
States
and
contributed
to
the
development of a relationship based on
strategic hedging
.
In
this
context,
Europe
is
moving
towards
greater
strategic
autonomy, as it has the opportunity to develop its defense capabilities and
assume
greater
control
over
its
own
security
policies.
This
strengthens
Major (ret) Sînziana IANCU, Ph.D
Marius BOBOCEA
89
Europe’s political and strategic autonomy while preserving the benefits of
US
support
wherever
necessary.
4
At
the
same
time,
the
cost
of
US
involvement
in
European
defense
has
been
reduced,
in
line
with
Donald
Trump’s
“America
First”
agenda.
A
smaller
troop
presence
and
fewer
infrastructure commitments in Europe translate into significant cost savings.
At
the
same
time,
“NATO
2.0”
has
prevented
a
complete
rupture
between
the
United
States
and
Europe
by
preserving
transatlantic
cooperation.
The
Alliance
has
maintained
its
solidarity
and
collaborative
framework while respecting the autonomy and interests of each side. Last,
but
not
least,
the
adaptation
of
roles
was
intended
to
enable
NATO
to
respond more effectively to the complex challenges of a multipolar world.
The
United
States
has
been
able
to
focus,
and
continues
to
focus,
on the
People’s Republic of China, the Indo-Pacific region and, more recently, the
conflict in the Middle East, while Europe continues to manage stability at
the
regional
level.
In
other
words,
this
reflects
a
flexible
approach
to
a
multipolar world. Given their direct impact on Euro-Atlantic security, global
actors
such
as
the
EU
and
NATO
cooperate
closely
with
partners
in
the
region, collectively known as the
Indo-Pacific Four (IP4)
- Australia, Japan,
the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, - to maintain stability and uphold
the
rules-based international order
.
Nevertheless, certain challenges, many of them readily foreseeable,
have emerged and continue to persist.
5
These include the time required to
build capabilities, political divisions within Europe, trust and coordination
among
states
and,
above
all,
domestic
opposition
in
the
United
States.
Europe
requires
time
to
address
its
capability
gaps
in
areas
such
as
air
power, cyber defense and nuclear deterrence. Moreover, not
all European
countries share the same vision regarding autonomy in the field of defense.
Success
continues
to
depend
on
mutual
trust
between
the
United
States and Europe, as well as on effective coordination to avoid duplication
or
conflicting
initiatives.
In
this
regard,
some
US
political
and
military
leaders continue to regard NATO as an essential component of the United
States’
global
primacy.
They
may,
therefore,
oppose
the
transfer
of
key
positions, such as that of SACEUR, to European officials.
II.2. The transition towards “NATO 3.0”
The concept of “NATO 3.0” emerged on 12 February 2026, at the
meeting of NATO defense ministers
6
in Brussels, where the United States
4
Ibidem.
5
Ibidem.
6
This
was
the
first
NATO
Defense
Ministers’
Meeting
of
2026,
held
at
NATO
Headquarters
in
Brussels.
The
US
Secretary
of
Defense
did
not
attend
and
the
US
delegation was led by Elbridge Colby.
ROMANIA: FROM “NATO 2.0” TO “NATO 3.0”
- STRATEGIC ELEMENTS OF ROMANIA’S NATIONAL TRAJECTORY IN THE
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT –
90
was represented by Elbridge Colby, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
who has also been described as the architect of the US National Defense
Strategy.
7
“Now it’s time to
march out together ...
for
a NATO based on
partnership
rather
than
dependency.”
This
message
was
interpreted
as
expressing the US administration’s new approach, according to which the
European
Allies
must
assume
substantially
greater
responsibility
for
the
continent’s
conventional
defense,
while
the
United
States
increasingly
focuses
its
attention
on
the
Indo-Pacific
region,
as
previously
noted.
Elbridge Colby presented the concept of “NATO 3.0” by dividing NATO’s
evolution into three periods:
8
•
The “NATO 1.0” period
- from the establishment of the Alliance in
1949 until the end of the Cold War;
•
The
concept
of
“NATO
2.0”
-
the
redefinition
of
the
Alliance,
including its subsequent rounds of enlargement;
•
“NATO 3.0”
- the stage in which the Alliance either currently finds
itself or is about to enter. Under this concept, the European Allies,
both
within
the
EU
and
across
Europe
more
broadly,
must
be
capable of ensuring the continent’s conventional security, namely its
land, air and maritime defense. The United States, meanwhile, would
remain
engaged,
including
in
the
non-conventional
dimension,
particularly through strategic nuclear deterrence.
Following
the
Summit
of
the
Bucharest
Nine
(B9)
and
Nordic
countries, co-chaired by Romanian and Polish President on May 13, 2026,
particular emphasis was placed on close cooperation between the Allies and
the
United
States
within
NATO.
The
Russian
Federation
was
also
reaffirmed
as
the
most
significant
threat
to
the
North
Atlantic
Alliance.
Accordingly, the participating countries agreed to support the “NATO 3.0”
concept at the NATO Summit in Ankara on July 7–8, 2026. The theme of
the B9 meeting,
“Delivering More for Transatlantic Security,”
once again
highlighted both the conventional military warfare conducted by the Russian
Federation against Ukraine and the hybrid and cognitive warfare it wages
against targeted societies and infrastructure.
In the same vein, the United States completed its plans to review its
troop
presence
in
Europe,
with
US
Secretary
of
Defense,
Pete
Hegseth,
advocating
what
he
described
as
“NATO
3.0.”
Two
months
earlier,
the
7
On
18
th
of June 2026, the second NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting
of the year was held,
also in Brussels. Once again, the United States was represented by Elbridge Colby, who
participated in the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group and in the session of the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) at the level of defense ministers.
8
Radio România Cultural,
Timpul prezent: What Does NATO 3.0 Mean?
-
A Discussion
with
Robert
Lupițu
,
14
May
2026,
available
at:
https://www.
radioromaniacultural.ro/
-
emisiuni/timpul
-
prezent/timpul
-
prezent
-
ce
-
inseamna
-
nato
-
3
-
0
-
o
-
discutie
-
cu
-
robert
-
lupitu
-
id53577.html, accessed 20 July
,
2026.
Major (ret) Sînziana IANCU, Ph.D
Marius BOBOCEA
91
Trump administration had announced the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from
Germany and the cancellation of the planned deployment of a Long-Range
Fires
Battalion
and
an
Air
Defense
Battalion
assigned
to
the
2nd
Multi-
Domain Task Force, a US Army unit focused on multi-domain operations.
9
The Typhon system, operated exclusively by the United States and capable
of launching both Tomahawk cruise missiles and SM-6 air-defense missiles,
is considered a potential capability-gap solution.
10
The subsequent Ankara
Summit focused on managing NATO’s orderly transition into its next phase.
“Our unity, solidarity and collective strength remain the foundation
of
peace,
security
and
prosperity.”
11
Likewise,
“Here
in
Ankara,
Allies
reaffirmed their ironclad commitment to collective defense under Article 5 -
that an attack against one is an attack against all and that we will stand
together. Our unity, solidarity and collective strength remain the foundation
of
peace,
security
and
prosperity.”
These
were
among
the
statements
delivered by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the Ankara Summit on
July 7–8, 2026.
12
According to some analysts, the NATO Summit in Ankara will be
remembered
not
for
what
it
decided,
but
for
what
it
refused
to
discuss:
peace
. Under the grandiose label of “NATO 3.0,” the Alliance announced
the relocation of certain US military production capabilities to Europe, thus
bringing them considerably closer to the Ukrainian front, and an increase in
logistical and financial support for Kyiv. In other words, preparations are
being made not for negotiations, but for a potentially longer war.
Production lines for Stinger, AMRAAM and ATACMS missiles are
being
actively
relocated
to
the
European
continent
through
strategic
partnerships,
for
example,
between
Lockheed
Martin
and
Rheinmetall
in
Germany,
while
supply
chains
are
being
shortened
and
the
target
of
allocating
5%
of
GDP
to
defense
is
turning
European
budgets
into
extensions of the defense industry. Europe is officially becoming the war’s
supply base, while its defense industry remains dependent on US technology
and the approvals issued by the Department of Defense (the Pentagon).
9
Ș
tefana Radu
., Tranziția spre NATO 3.0: SUA vor prezenta la Ankara mai multe măsuri
care să atenueze impactul reducerii forțelor din Europa, available at https://
www.digi24.ro/
-
stiri/externe/mapamond/tranzitia
-
spre
-
nato
-
3
-
0
-
sua
-
vor
-
prezenta
-
la
-
ankara
-
mai
-
multe
-
masuri
-
care
-
sa
-
atenueze
-
impactul
-
reducerii
-
fortelor
-
din
-
europa
-
3845815.
, accessed
on July
20,
2026.
10
Ibidem.
11
Marius
Bâtcă,
“NATO
3.0”
in
Ankara
—
Strengthening
Transatlantic
Unity
,
July
16,
2026,
available
at:
https://
presamil.ro/
nato
-
3
-
0
-
la
-
ankara
-
intarirea
-
unitatii
-
transatlantice/,
accessed
on
July
20,
2026.
12
NATO,
2026 NATO Summit in Ankara
, July
8,
2026, available at: https://www.nato.int/
-
en/news
-
and
-
events/events/
2026/07/overview
-
2026
-
nato
-
summit
-
in
-
ankara
-
,
accessed
on
July
20,
2026
.
ROMANIA: FROM “NATO 2.0” TO “NATO 3.0”
- STRATEGIC ELEMENTS OF ROMANIA’S NATIONAL TRAJECTORY IN THE
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT –
92
III. Romania: from “NATO 2.0” to “NATO 3.0”
Using the terminology that began to take shape before and during the
NATO Summit in Ankara, “NATO 3.0” represents the transition from an
Alliance in which the United States provided most conventional capabilities
to
a
model
in
which
the
European
Allies
assume
substantially
greater
responsibility
for
Europe’s
conventional
defense,
while
the
United
States
remains
the
strategic
guarantor,
particularly
in
the
nuclear
field
and
in
relation
to
high-technology
capabilities. Mark Rutte summarized this idea
with
the
phrase
“a
stronger
Europe
in
a
stronger
NATO,”
stating
at
the
conclusion
of
the
Ankara
Summit
that
“this
is
what
‘NATO
3.0’
is
all
about.”
Over
time,
Romania
has
focused
its
efforts
on
integration
into
Alliance structures, interoperability and participation in military operations
in theatres such as Afghanistan, the Western Balkans and Iraq. Under the
new “NATO 3.0” paradigm, Romania should become a pillar of the defense
of
the
Eastern
Flank,
rather
than
merely
a
state
protected
by
it,
by
developing
national
capabilities
geared
towards
deterrence
and
collective
defense
in
the
Black
Sea
region.
One
strategic
dimension
of
Romania’s
national
trajectory
in
the
current
international
security
environment
is
its
national contribution, measured not only in terms of troop numbers, but also
through infrastructure, industry and resilience.
Although
“NATO
3.0”
entails
Europe
assuming
greater
responsibility,
this
does
not
mean
that
the
Strategic
Partnership
with
the
United
States,
concluded
in
1997,
has
become
less
important.
On
the
contrary,
Romania
should
simultaneously
pursue
the
strengthening
of
its
Strategic Partnership with the United States, the development of NATO’s
European Pillar and the avoidance of any perception of competition between
the EU and NATO.
The Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine has shifted Europe’s
strategic
center
of
gravity
towards
the
Eastern
Flank.
For
Romania,
this
means
consolidating
its
status
as
a
NATO
regional
hub
,
while
also
developing
its
naval
and
surveillance
capabilities.
One
of
the
defining
features
of
“NATO
3.0”
is
the
recognition
that
defense
no
longer
begins
solely
at
the
border.
It
encompasses
energy
security,
cybersecurity,
the
protection of critical infrastructure, efforts to counter hybrid threats and so-
called FIMI activities (
Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference
),
malign foreign influence, continuity of government and other related areas.
For
Romania,
this
means
integrating
the
whole-of-society
concept
into
national planning.
The Ankara Summit emphasized that NATO is seeking not only to
increase
defense
expenditure,
but
also
to
expand
industrial
production,
remove barriers to trade in defense equipment and deepen cooperation with
industry.
For
Romania,
this
may
entail
revitalizing
the
national
defense
Major (ret) Sînziana IANCU, Ph.D
Marius BOBOCEA
93
industry,
integrating
it
into
European
and
transatlantic
production
chains,
expanding
ammunition
production,
developing
drone
and
counter-drone
capabilities,
and
providing
regional
maintenance
services
for
NATO
equipment,
13
among other measures.
Another
aspect
worth
highlighting
is
that
“NATO
3.0”
places
particular
emphasis
on
artificial
intelligence
(AI),
autonomous
systems,
drones, space capabilities, military cloud infrastructure, electronic warfare,
signals intelligence (SIGINT), data and analytics. In this context, Romania
could become a regional center for dual-use innovation and, potentially, a
provider of expertise in the field of cybersecurity. It should be recalled that,
in
2021,
Bucharest
was
selected
to
host
the
European
Cybersecurity
Competence
Centre
(ECCC),
the
first
European
cybersecurity
body
headquartered in Romania.
The
transition
from
the
“NATO
2.0”
paradigm
to
“NATO
3.0”
reflects
the
need
to
adapt
Romania’s
strategic
trajectory
to
a
security
environment characterized by strategic competition, high-intensity conflict
and
hybrid
threats.
In
full
alignment
with
Romania’s
National
Defense
Strategy
for
2025-2030,
Romania
seeks
to
strengthen
national
resilience,
develop its defense capabilities and assume a more active role as a security
provider on the Eastern
Flank and in
the Black
Sea region.
The
National
Defense
Strategy
for
2025-2030
emphasizes
strengthening
resilience,
developing
defense
capabilities,
reinforcing
the
Strategic
Partnership
with
the
United
States
and
deepening
Romania’s
role
within
NATO
and
the
European Union.
14
.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The transition towards the “NATO 3.0” paradigm reflects the North
Atlantic
Alliance’s
adaptation
to
transformations
in
the
international
security environment, characterized by strategic competition among major
powers,
complex
warfare
and
the
proliferation
of
hybrid
threats.
In
this
context,
responsibility
for
Europe’s
conventional
defense
is
increasingly
shifting towards the European Allies, while the United States is redirecting
its strategic priorities towards the Indo-Pacific region, without necessarily
diminishing, or, at least in theoretical terms, renouncing, its commitment to
collective defense.
For
Romania,
the
emerging
security
architecture
represents
both
a
challenge and a strategic opportunity. Its geographical position on the Black
13
Ibidem.
14
Romania’s
National
Defense
Strategy
for
2025
–
2030:
Independence
and
Solidarity
—
Romania’s
Vision
for
a
Changing
World
,
available
at:
https://www.presidency.ro/f
iles/
-
userfiles/
Strategia%20Na%C8%9Bional%
C4%
83%20de%20Ap%C4%83rare%20a%
-
20%C8%9A%C4%83rii%20pentru%20perioada%202025
-
2030.pdf,
accessed
on
July
20,
2026
.
ROMANIA: FROM “NATO 2.0” TO “NATO 3.0”
- STRATEGIC ELEMENTS OF ROMANIA’S NATIONAL TRAJECTORY IN THE
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT –
94
Sea
and
NATO’s
Eastern
Flank
requires
an
accelerated
development
of
military
capabilities,
national
resilience
and
the
defense
industry,
so
that
Romania
may
evolve
from
being
primarily
a
beneficiary
of
collective
security into a regional security provider.
In the new geopolitical
context, security can no longer be defined
exclusively
in
military
terms.
Areas
such
as
societal
resilience,
energy
security,
critical
infrastructure
protection,
cybersecurity,
artificial
intelligence and the countering of hybrid threats are becoming increasingly
important components of deterrence and collective defense.
Strengthening
the
Strategic
Partnership
with
the
United
States
should remain a central element of Romania’s foreign and security policy,
in
complementarity
with
the
reinforcement
of
the
European
dimension
of
defense. Adapting to “NATO 3.0” does not require choosing between the
United States and Europe; rather, it entails simultaneously leveraging both
dimensions of Romania’s Euro-Atlantic membership.
Romania’s successful adaptation to the “NATO 3.0” paradigm will
depend
on
its
ability
to
transform
its
geostrategic
advantages
into
operational capabilities. Implementing the objectives set out in Romania’s
National
Defense
Strategy,
in
conjunction
with
developments
within
the
Alliance, could consolidate the country’s position as a pillar of stability and
a relevant actor within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and the wider
Black Sea region.
At
the
same
time,
the
transition
towards
“NATO
3.0”
should
be
understood
not
merely
as
an
adjustment
of
defense
expenditure,
but
as
a
comprehensive
transformation
of
Romania’s
security
posture.
Increased
investment must generate deployable and interoperable forces, sustainable
logistics, adequate strategic mobility and a national defense industry capable
of supporting both peacetime deterrence and operations in a high-intensity
conflict.
Romania’s
integration
into
European
and
transatlantic
defense
production
chains
could
therefore
strengthen
national
security
while
also
contributing to the Alliance’s overall capacity for reinforcement and long-
term resilience.
Technological
innovation
will
constitute
another
essential
component
of
Romania’s
strategic
trajectory.
The
development
of
capabilities
in
artificial
intelligence,
autonomous
systems,
drones
and
counter-drone
systems,
cybersecurity,
electronic
warfare
and
space-based
services
could
reduce
existing
capability
gaps
and
enhance
Romania’s
contribution
to
NATO.
By
combining
its
expertise
in
cybersecurity
with
investment
in
dual-use
technologies
and
cooperation
among
government
institutions,
the
armed
forces,
academia
and
private
industry,
Romania
could position itself as a regional center for defense innovation.
Finally,
Romania
should
seek
to
play
an
active
diplomatic
and
strategic role in preserving transatlantic cohesion throughout this transition.
Major (ret) Sînziana IANCU, Ph.D
Marius BOBOCEA
95
A stronger European contribution to defense must remain complementary to
NATO and firmly anchored in the transatlantic relationship. By promoting a
coherent
approach
to
the
security
of
the
Eastern
Flank,
supporting
a
sustained
Allied
presence
in
the
Black
Sea
region
and
strengthening
cooperation with regional partners, Romania can help ensure that “NATO
3.0” develops as a more balanced, capable and resilient Alliance rather than
as a framework for strategic disengagement.
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