64
WARFARE AS AN EXPERIMENT IN MILITARY SCIENCE
Colonel (ret) Professor Engineer Eugen SITEANU, Ph.D
(Academy of Romanian Scientists, 3 Ilfov, 050044, Bucharest, Romania,
email: secreta
riat@aosr.ro)
Abstract
: Rene Descartes developed the principle of the scientific method
as a reasoning that avoids errors of judgment and discovers the truth by respecting
four precepts (critical restraint; rule of synthesis; rule of enumeration) that can be
applied in any science, therefore also in military science. Using this principle, this
article demonstrates that the hypotheses and predictions formulated after the end
of the First World War (the Great War) are verified and validated in the Second
World War. Therefore. the theory of knowledge developed by Descartes can also
be applied in military science.
Keywords
:
military
science,
theory
of
knowledge,
principle
of
scientific
method, hypotheses, predictions.
DOI
10
.
56082/annalsarscimilit.2026.3
.64
Military
science
encompasses
several
fields—such
as
military
history,
military
geography,
military
medicine,
military
psychology,
and
military
topography—collectively
known
as
military
sciences;
these
developed through the integration of scientific findings from other academic
disciplines
into
military
science.
Some
scientists
do
not
accept
military
science as a true science because it does not employ the scientific method of
refuting
hypotheses
through
experimentation,
in
accordance
with
the
principle
of
the
scientific
method
formulated
by
Roger
Bacon.
This
principle was broken down by the English scholar and philosopher into the
following
stages:
1
:
1)
observation
of
the
phenomenon;
2)
formulation
of
hypotheses;
3)
prediction
of
new
events
based
on
those
hypotheses;
4)
verification
or
refutation
through
experimentation;
5)
evaluation
(conclusion). However, we believe that this scientific method can also be
applied to military science, considering war to be a genuine experiment—
with wars serving as experiments, that is, as true research laboratories for
military science. Consequently, the five stages of the scientific method in
military science would be as follows: 1) observation of the phenomenon of
war;
2)
formulation
of
hypotheses;
3)
prediction
of
new
events
based
on
Corresponding member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists, entitled member of the
Romanian
Committee
for
the
History
and
Philosophy
of
Science
and
Technology
(CRIFST) of the Romanian Acad
emy, email: esiteanu@yahoo.com.
1
Francois
Reynaert,
Vincent
Brovielle,
Le
Petit
Larousse.
Cultură
generală,
Litera
Publishing House, Bucharest
, 2020, p. 317.
Colonel (ret) Professor Engineer Eugen SITEANU, Ph.D
65
these hypotheses; 4) verification or refutation of the hypotheses through the
next war (or subsequent wars); 5) conclusion(s).
Much like Roger Bacon (1214–1292), René Descartes—in his work
*Discourse on the Method*—formulates the principle of scientific method
as a reasoning process that must adhere to four precepts to avoid errors of
judgment
and to
discover the truth in
any science. These precepts
are:
1)
never
accept
anything
as
true
unless
it
is
evidently
known
to
be
so;
this
precept
is
called
critical
reserve;
2)
divide
each
research
difficulty
into
several
parts
in
order
to
resolve
them
correctly—that
is,
to
resolve
them
better;
this
precept
is
called
the
rule
of
analysis;
3)
guide
thought
in
an
orderly
fashion,
proceeding
from
the
simple
(the
simplest
objects)
to
the
complex
(gradually
ascending
to
the
knowledge
of
the
most
complex
objects);
this
is
the
rule
of
synthesis;
4)
conduct
comprehensive
enumerations and reviews each time to ensure nothing is omitted; this is the
rule of enumeration. Thus, Descartes developed a new theory of knowledge
(comprising
critical
reserve,
analysis,
synthesis,
and
enumeration)
that
is
also applicable to
military science
2
.
Thus, it is
benefiting from a genuine
scientific
revolution
that
is
transforming
it
into
an
autonomous
and
self-
sufficient
academic
discipline
3
.
We
will
now
present
several
examples
of
wars—that is, military experiences—analyzed through the five stages of the
scientific method for researching
the phenomenon of war, or by applying
the theory of knowledge developed by Descartes.
Observing the war that unfolded during the First World War (1914–
1918), we find that industrialized societies underwent massive militarization
(total troop numbers exceeded 50 million, with nine million killed on the
battlefield)
and
that
new
weapons
were
tested
during
the
conflict:
tanks,
armored
vehicles,
aircraft,
submarines,
new
warships
(including
aircraft
carriers), radar, and so forth. Thus, the First World War was a mass-scale
conflict that went global and assumed apocalyptic proportions, characterized
by static fronts, the loss of mobility, and the massive use of firepower, all
involving
complex
plans
with
ambitious
objectives
and
unfolding
across
vast
territories.
It
encompassed
28
belligerent
states
with
a
combined
population
of
over
1.5
billion
people.
All
these
concepts
align
with
Descartes's precept of critical caution.
In addition to our existing hypotheses, we must consider the fact that
the
technical
-
tactical
characteristics
of
new
weapons
are
continuously
improving and evolving, thereby driving innovation in military science. To
analyze the evolution of new weaponry and the advancement of military art
and science, we will employ Descartes' analytical method, which advocates
breaking
down
the
research
problem
into
smaller
components.
2
Ibidem
, p. 281.
3
Ibidem
, p. 317.
WARFARE AS AN EXPERIMENT IN MILITARY SCIENCE
66
Consequently,
we
will
examine
the
specific
contribution
of
each
new
combat asset to the development of military art and science. We begin with
aviation
and
the
emergence
of
air
strategy,
focusing
on
how
aviation
transformed the configuration and nature of warfare by introducing a three
-
dimensional
theater
of
operations.
Italian
Air
Force
commander
General
Giulio Douhet (1869
–
1921) authored *The Command of the Air*, in which
he articulated the future role of aviation and the aerial dimension of warfare,
as
well
as
the
necessity
of
aircraft
production
and
an
air
fleet
capable
of
defending
national
territory
against
air
attacks
and
supporting
land
and
maritime
operations.
He
predicted
that,
in
the
future,
the
skies
would
be
filled with thousands of combat aircraft; indeed, everything he foresaw as
early as 1909 has come to pass. "In preparing for national defense, we must
follow a completely new path, for the nature of future wars will be radically
d
ifferent from that of wars past
"
4
.
So
, the
re
is a new prediction.
William
Mitchell
(1879
–
1936)
was
also
a
visionary
regarding
the
role of aviation: "Humanity stands on the threshold of the aeronautical era,
during
which
the
destinies
of
all
nat
ions
will
be
decided
in
the
air
"
5
.
He
wrote that "air power is the ability to do something in the air or across the
air, and since the air covers the entire world, airplane
s can be anywhere on
the planet
"
6
.
Aircraft compress time and eliminate distances and borders. They fly
over
all
nations
from
every
direction,
both
day
and
night.
Alongside
maritime and ground personnel, flight crews have emerged. Aerial strategy
has developed, dealing with the preparation and employment of air forces
(force
-
based aerial strategy) and air assets (asset
-
based aerial strategy), as
well as the planning and execution of offensive actions and defense against
attacks from the ground, sea, and air (operational aerial strategy). Aviation
is an offensive weapon; the appearance of aircraft in the strategic space and
on
the
tactical
battlefield
offers
a
vast
array
of
opportunities
and
possibilities.
Air
supremacy
is
a
key
factor
for
success
in
future
warfare.
This is yet another prediction.
The
goal
—
and
the
outcome
—
of
operational
aerial
strategy
is
the
achievement and maintenance of air supremacy. This principle of the art of
war will never be challenged. However, not all states can build an effective
and efficient air power, as creating such a fleet requires: 1) patriotism and
love of country, enabling pilots to stoically endure the heavy losses incurred
during
wartime;
and
2)
a
robust
industry
and
sufficient
raw
materials
to
4
Gerard Chaliand, Anthologie mondiale de la strategie des origiones au nucleaire, Edition
Robert Laffont, Paris, 1990, p. 1139.
5
Ibidem
, p. 1140.
6
Popescu M., Arsenie V., Văduva G., Arta militară de
-
a lungul mileniilor, Vol. 2, Centrul
-
Tehnic Editorial al Armatei, Buc
harest
, 2004, p. 169.
Colonel (ret) Professor Engineer Eugen SITEANU, Ph.D
67
manufacture
aeronautical
equipment,
engines,
and
aircraft.
If
a
state
with
global ambitions were to gain an early aerial advantage in a future war, it
could dominate the planet even more easily than any nation in the
past ever
dominated a continent
7
.
British Marshal Hugh Trenchard (1873
–
1956) created the Royal Air
Force, thereby realizing the visions of his predecessors and contemporaries.
The Air Staff held that the objective of air operations was to paralyze the
enemy's
war
-
munitions
production
centers
and
disrupt
its
entire
transport
and
communications
network.
In
the
new
Royal
Air
Force
manual,
this
objective was defined as follows: "the mission of the air force is to crush the
enemy's
means
of
resistance
through
attacks
on
targets
selected
as
best
sui
ted
to
achieving
this
objective
"
8
.
It
was,
therefore,
a
new
method
of
defeating the enemy. Trenchard held the view that bombing enemy military
targets was not illegal, regardless of where they were located. The advent of
aviation
completely
transformed
the
philosophy
of
warfare
—
not
only
by
expanding the theater of conflict (the battlespace) but also by severely and
irreversibly affecting the entire population, effectively drawing it into that
sphere.
With
the
rise
of
national
armies,
the
entire
population
became
involved in war in one way or another, because:
-
national
armies
require
the
contribution
of
the
whole
nation
to
generate
the
manpower
and
material
resources
needed
to
prepare
for
and
wage war;
-
wars could no longer be launched over just any issue, but only to
defend vital national interests;
-
armed conflict transcends the battlefield, as the objective of war is
to
defeat
the
enemy
state
—
not
merely
its
army
—
using
every
possible
means.
Thus,
air
power
emerged
as
the
third
dimension
of
warfare;
it
compressed
time
and
incorporated
economic
targets
(including
industrial
facilities),
transport
networks,
and
telecommunications
infrastructure
into
the theater of operations. Air strategy revitalized warfare, opened up new
horizons, and expanded the scope of military art and science. These were
some of the hypotheses and predictions concerning the role of aviation.
The era of armored warfare (tanks)
was ushered in by World War
I and became known as the age of "iron warfare." The first armored vehicles
were armed with a machine gun even before the outbreak of the war, as the
transition
to
an industrial
society had already taken place. These armored
vehicles
weighed
2.5
–
3
tons,
featured
6
–
8
mm
armor
and
a
30
–
40
horsepower
engine,
and
ran
on
solid
rubber
tires.
The
French
army
was
equipped with the Charon Mle 1904 armored car; it carried two 1.6
-
meter
7
Ibidem
, pp. 170
-
171.
8
Ibidem
, p. 171.
WARFARE AS AN EXPERIMENT IN MILITARY SCIENCE
68
steel bars for crossing trenches. Following the Battle of the Marne, several
civilian
vehicles
were
up
-
armored
and
fitted
with
machine
guns.
The
Russians
demonstrated
ingenuity;
the
Tsar's
chauffeur
invented
a
track
system for movement across muddy terrain, snow, and the like. The front
wheels were steerable, while the tracks were located at the rear. In winter,
the front wheels were replaced by a pair of skis (skates).
The British used the American Holt tracked tractor to build the first
tank.
In
France,
General
Joffre
procured
400
Schneider
and
400
St.
Chamond (tracked) tanks. Meanwhile, the British manufactured the Mark I
tank
(the
first
tank).
Subsequently,
they
produced
several
tank
models,
culminating
in
the
Mark
V.
In
contrast,
the
French
manufactured
the
Renault FT
—
the first tank with a turret; it weighed 7 tons, featured 6 mm
armor (20 mm at the front), and was powered by a 35 hp engine. This tank
was equipped wit
h a 37 mm caliber gun and reached a speed of 7.7 km/h.
The French produced 3,144 Renault FT tanks, while the British produced
over a thousand tanks. Tanks were necessary to destroy field fortifications,
ensuring that infantry had powerful, continuous fire support throughout their
advance. Thus, the tank served as a means of infantry support and a tool for
destroying
and
terrifying
the
enemy,
while
remaining
invulnerable
to
infantry weaponry.
Regarding
the
confrontation
between
tanks
and
artillery,
the
odds
favored the guns if tanks attacked in isolation; however, if they attacked in
massive
formations,
field
artillery
stood
no
chance
against
the
tanks'
mobility.
Because
the
Renault
FT
featured
a
rotating
turret
(360°),
it
is
considered
the
true
ancestor
of
the
modern
tank.
After
the
war,
Renault
received numerous tank orders from various nations. The tank had a small
turret that accommodated only the tank commander. The first tank
-
versus
-
tank b
attle took place on April 24, 1918, when three Mark V tanks engaged
an A7V; the latter, armed with a 57mm gun, destroyed two of the Mark V
tanks. Subsequently, the third Mark V
—
also equipped with a 57mm gun
—
destroyed the A7V.
The
Germans
had
neglected
tank
production,
though
they
did
manufacture a few dozen tanks toward the end of the war
—
but it was too
late.
The
British,
on
the
other
hand,
introduced
tanks
into
battle
prematurely
on
September
15,
1916,
though
the
tank's
true
effectiveness
was
demonstrated
later.
During
the
First
World
War,
the
tank
was
used
solely to support the infantry. Tanks were equipped with machine guns and
short
-
range
cannons,
and
their
speed
was
comparable
to
that
of
an
infantryman (5 km/h). By 1918, it was realized that, beyond providing fire
support, tanks could also assist with logistics by transporting water, food,
and
ammunition.
I
n
1917,
Fuller
(1878
–
1966)
organized
a
surprise
tank
attack
at
Cambrai,
marking
the
first
combat
deployment
of
armored
Colonel (ret) Professor Engineer Eugen SITEANU, Ph.D
69
vehicles. Tank forces reshaped the philosophy of mobile warfare (mobility)
on
a
new
foundation.
They
transformed
the
nature
of
the
battlefield
—
a
process
that
began
in
the
First
World
War
and
reached
its
zenith
in
the
Second.
Fuller
argued
that
tactics
—
the
art
of
moving
troops
on
the
battlefield
—
evolve
in
response
to
available
weaponry
and
means
of
transport; every new or improved weapon and method of movement alters
the
art
of
war.
The
advent
of
the
tank
revolutionized
this
art
by:
1)
increasing mobility, 2
) enhancing protection, and 3) boosting offensive and
destructive power, while allowing for operation across all types of terrain
(thanks to caterpillar tracks).
As the tank was further refined, it substantially altered the theory of
combat
tactics.
Tanks,
supported
by
aviation
and
motorized
infantry,
revived
the
war
of
movement.
The
"tank
terror"
at
Cambrai
and
Amiens
precipitated
the
German
defeat
on
August
4,
1918.
Tanks
were
the
land
forces' most effective offensive weapon, thanks to their armor, mobility, and
firepower.
On
September
15,
1916,
during
the
Battle
of
the
Somme,
the
British
deployed
48
tanks
distributed
among
12
divisions
(two
divisions
received 10
tanks each, six divisions received 2 tanks each, and the others
received 3 or 4 tanks each). Each division advanced a distance proportional
to the number of tanks it had received as reinforcements.
On April 16, 1917, the
Allies deployed 132 tanks on the Craonne
plateau along a 40
-
kilometer front. Fifty
-
seven were set ablaze, and 12 were
severely damaged. Only 35% of the tanks remained operational, yet infantry
losses were lower in divisions equipped with tanks compared to those that
were not. It was concluded that tanks should be used en masse on a limited
front
—
creating a multitude of targets
for
enemy artillery
—
while the tank
guns focused primarily on neutralizing that artillery. Each tank was to
be
accompanied by infantrymen whom it would protect, and who would assist
the tank crews by pointing out enemy targets requiring destruction.
The
submarine
was
invented
by
Robert
Fulton,
yet
his
invention
was
adopted
by
neither
France
nor
the
UK.
Napoleon
III
supported
the
construction
of
a
400
-
ton,
42
-
meter
-
long
prototype.
By
1914,
50%
of
French
submarines
were
steam
-
powered,
though
they
also
featured
diesel
engines. In 1899, a 200
-
ton submarine was built featuring two engines
—
one
for
surface
travel
and
the
other
for
submerged
operation
—
a
speed
of
12
knots (8 submerged), a range of 100 miles, and two torpedo tubes. Starting
in 1900, the USA buil
t 20 submarines. In 1902, the UK built the *Holland*
submarine,
followed
by
the
construction
of
C
-
class
(coastal)
and
E
-
class
(semi
-
oceanic) submarines.
Germany began submarine production in 1901, though the first *U
-
9* series was produced in 1910. Subsequently, it built coastal and oceanic
submarines with a range of 25,000 nautical miles.
WARFARE AS AN EXPERIMENT IN MILITARY SCIENCE
70
In
1912,
the
Italian
Navy
built
several
300
-
ton
*Meduza*
-
class
submarines, followed by a 510
-
ton vessel in 1915. Russia produced its first
submarine
in
1911.
In
1917,
German
submarines
inflicted
such
massive
losses on the Allied merchant fleet that their ability to continue the war was
jeopardized.
World War I was thus marked by four characteristics: 1) the use of
railways
for
the
mass
transport
of
troops;
2)
the
use
of
automobiles
and
early
armored
vehicles;
3)
the
use
of
submarines
and
4)
the
advent
of
aviation
—
and thus the third dimension of warfare. These would continue to
develop and rapidly become more sophisticated.
All the aforementioned hypotheses and predictions were brilliantly
verified and validated during the Second World War.
While
tanks,
aircraft,
aircraft
carriers,
and
submarines
were
first
tested
during
the
First
World
War,
it
was
in
the
Second
that
they
demonstrated the capabilities predicted during and after the Great War. The
Second World War was a continuation of the First in almost every respect
—
military policy, strategy, means of combat, and so on. However, this time,
instead of mere tank subunits, armored divisions
—
massively supported by
air power
—
were employed.
If the First World War was an industrial
-
style conflict driven by an
unprecedented technological revolution, the Second was of the same nature,
with that technological revolution continuing to unfold.
World War I, like World War II, was revolutionary in terms of the
technology employed and the scale of the theaters of operations. No prior
conflict had generated as much innovation in weaponry and its application
as the two world wars. By 1918, France possessed 5,200 pieces of heavy
artillery and 5,600 75mm guns. During the offensive at Verdun in August
1917, three million shells were fired, while on September 26, 1918, 1.375
million 75mm projectiles were fired
—
representing 75% of the entire 1914
stockpile
.
These
quantities
were
vastly
exceeded
during
World
War
II.
While there were no tanks at the beginning of 1914, France had 3,400 by
1918, and tens of thousands were deployed during World War II. This major
revolution in weaponry shaped tactics and strategy throughout both world
wars,
with
technical
surprises
constantly
emerging
in
the
theaters
of
operations. A key difference was the frequency of offensives: there were far
more in World War II than in World War I, which saw only two or three
offensives in 1
918. Although the frontal breakthrough maneuver
—
achieved
by
combining
the
actions
of
artillery,
infantry,
aviation,
and
tanks
—
was
utilized
in
the
First
World
War,
it
became
a
frequent
tactic
during
the
Second. Thus, the character of the Second World War was foreshadowed
during the First, based on breakthrough operations that made massive use of
artillery
and
the
tank
-
aircraft
combination.
In
both
wars,
fronts
stretched
across
hundreds
or
even
thousands
of
kilometers,
and
the
clashes
were
Colonel (ret) Professor Engineer Eugen SITEANU, Ph.D
71
terrifyingly
ferocious,
resulting
in
millions
—
indeed,
tens
of
millions
—
of
deaths.
Both
conflicts
involved
grand
coalition
strategies,
necessitated
by
the vast theaters of war. The difference was that, from September 1914 to
March 1918, the Western Front remained static, largely because the defense
effectively balanced the offense.
After the Battle of Verdun, aviation raised the prospect that future
victory would hinge on air superiority. Pétain believed that air power should
extend
the
reach
of
artillery
strikes
by
continuously
targeting
objectives
deep behind enemy lines
—
such as troop and logistical columns, reserves,
and depots
—
while also demoralizing enemy forces. This prediction would
prove
true
in
the
major
war
that
followed.
Thus,
the
new
aerial
warfare
strategy was being prepared.
In conclusion, the hypotheses and predictions formulated during the
First World War were validated during the Second World War.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CHALIAND
G.
,
Anthologie
mondiale
de
la
strategie
des
origiones
au
nucleaire, Edition Robert Laffont, Paris, 1990
;
POPESCU
M.,
ARSENIE
V.,
VĂDUVA
G.,
Arta
militară
de
-
a
lungul
mileniilor, Vol. 2, Centrul
-
Tehnic Editorial al Armatei, Buc
harest
,
2004
;
REYNAERT
F.,
BROVIELLE
V.,
Le
Petit
Larousse.
Cultură
generală,
Litera Publishing House, Bucharest, 2020.