upload_7ubbssqqc4bkgtck4ptwml2ut5.pdf

3

THE "LAST WAR" SYNDROME – STRATEGIC TRAP OR

OPPORTUNITY FOR ADAPTATION?

General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D



(Academy of Romanian Scientists, 3 Ilfov Street, 050044, Bucharest,

Romania, email: secretariat@aosr.ro)

Abstract:

The

last

war

syndrome

is

a

concept

in

strategic

studies

and

military

theory

that

describes

the

tendency

of

political

and

military

leaders

to

prepare for the next conflict on the basis of the experience of the preceding war,

mistakenly

assuming

that

the

future

war

will

have

similar

characteristics.

This

tendency

frequently

leads

to

strategic

misjudgements,

inadequate

investment

in

capabilities, and slow adaptation to new technological and geopolitical realities.

In

a

security

environment

characterized

by

great-power

competition,

digital

transformation,

and

the

emergence

of

emerging

and

disruptive

technologies, strategic advantage will not necessarily belong to the actor that has

learned the lessons of the previous war best, but to the one capable of anticipating

and adapting most rapidly to still-unknown forms of future conflict. This is why, in

defence

planning,

the

emphasis

is

increasingly

shifting

from

preparing

for

a

specific

type

of

war

towards

developing

forces

that

are

flexible,

resilient,

and

capable of evolving rapidly in the face of strategic surprise.

Keywords

:

last

war

syndrome,

concept,

mistakes,

security

environment,

anticipation, adaptation.

DOI

10

.56082/annalsarscimilit.2026.

3

.3

Introduction

Military

history

highlights

a

recurring

vulnerability

of

defence

institutions: the tendency to project future conflict through the lens of the

most recent war. In strategic literature, the phenomenon is associated with

expressions such as “last war syndrome” or “preparing to fight the last war”.

Essentially,

the

issue

is

not

the

simple

use

of

experience,

which

is

indispensable

to

military

learning,

but

the

transformation

of

contingent

lessons

into

generalizable

prescriptions

for

conflicts

involving

different

adversaries, technologies, political objectives, and constraints.

1

The

risk

is

particularly

relevant

in

a

strategic

environment

characterized

by

great-power

competition,

accelerating

technological

innovation, the proliferation of autonomous systems, artificial intelligence,

information and cyber operations, and the expansion of confrontation into



Entitled

Member

of

the

Academy

of

Romanian

Scientists,

President

of

the

Military

Sciences Section, Doctoral Supervisor at "CAROL I" National Defense University, email:

tfunzeti@gmail.com.

1

Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 1–24.

THE "LAST WAR" SYNDROME – STRATEGIC TRAP OR OPPORTUNITY

FOR ADAPTATION?

4

domains such as outer space and the electromagnetic spectrum. Russia’s war

of

aggression

against

Ukraine

has

brought

high-intensity

conventional

warfare back to the forefront, while simultaneously demonstrating that it is

inseparable

from

commercial

sensors,

drones,

electronic

warfare,

digital

networks, open-source intelligence, and civilian infrastructure.

2

Therefore, the strategic problem is not whether we should learn from

recent

wars,

but

how

we

can

prevent

learning

from

one

conflict

from

becoming intellectual dependence on that conflict. The last war syndrome

should thus be understood both as a cognitive and organizational trap and as

a potential stimulus for adaptation.

1. Conceptual Foundations

The

last

war

syndrome

is

not

a

universally

standardized

doctrinal

category.

It

can,

however,

be

used

as

an

analytical

term

to

describe

the

excessive

dependence

of

military

planning

on

the

experience

of

the

preceding conflict. Colin S. Gray emphasizes the simultaneously enduring

and changing character of strategy: certain elements of strategic competition

persist,

while

the

concrete

character

of

warfare

changes

with

technology,

society, politics, and the operational environment.

3

The

phenomenon

can

be

analyzed

through

three

interdependent

dimensions.

The cognitive dimension concerns the way decision-makers interpret

new

information

through

already-established

mental

frameworks.

Experience reduces uncertainty and provides rapid recognition patterns, but

it can also generate heuristics, anchoring, availability effects, and selective

confirmation of already accepted hypotheses. Daniel Kahneman shows that

such mechanisms can influence judgement

even when the decision-maker

possesses considerable professional competence and experience.

4

The

organizational

dimension

derives

from

institutional

inertia.

Armed forces are complex organizations built around doctrines, command

structures,

logistical

systems,

procurement

programmes,

and

military

education institutions that develop over long periods. Stability is necessary

for coherence and efficiency, but the same stability can slow change when

the strategic environment changes rapidly.

The

doctrinal

dimension

emerges

when

operational

experience

is

converted

from

a

contextual

lesson

into

a

model

of

action

regarded

as

universal. The problem is not the existence of doctrine, but its rigidification.

2

U.S.

Army,

“Adapt,

Lead,

Win:

NCO

Lessons

from

Ukraine”,

NCO

Journal,

October

2024,

available

at

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/-

2024/October/NCO-Lessons-from-Ukraine/, accessed on August 12, 2026.

3

Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 15

–

24.

4

Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Allen Lane, London, 2011, pp. 109–145.

General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D

5

Military

innovation

precisely

requires

the

ability

to

transform

experience

into knowledge without confusing experience with prediction.

5

2. Lessons from History

The First World War

Before

1914,

an

important

part

of

European

military

thought

was

influenced

by

the

experience

of

the

Napoleonic

Wars

and

the

Franco-

Prussian

War

of

1870–1871.

Rapid

mobilization,

the

offensive,

and

the

search

for

a

rapid

operational

decision

occupied

a

central

place

in

the

planning

of

the

great

powers.

In

practice,

the

combination

of

firepower,

machine

guns,

artillery,

field

fortifications,

and

the

industrial

capacity

to

sustain mobilization produced a war of attrition on a scale that planners had

not fully anticipated.

The lesson to be retained is not that the offensive or mobility became

irrelevant,

but

that

the

relationship

between

technology,

organization,

terrain, and industrial capacity radically altered the conditions under which

they could be employed.

France and the Maginot Line

The case of French doctrine between the two world wars is one of

the best-known examples of incomplete adaptation. The experience of the

First

World

War

reinforced

the

importance

of

defence

in

depth,

fortifications, and mobilization. The Maginot Line should not, however, be

reduced to the caricature of a “line that lost the war”. The strategic problem

was broader: the French defence system was designed around assumptions

concerning the tempo of operations, likely axes of attack, mobilization, and

the

employment

of

allied

forces.

Germany

exploited

precisely

the

gap

between

these

assumptions

and

its

own

operational

concept,

combining

armoured forces, aviation, communications, and the concentration of forces

to achieve rapid operational effects.

6

Accordingly, the lesson of the French case is not that fortifications

are

useless,

but

that

no

capability

can

compensate

for

a

rigid

strategic

architecture.

A

military

force

may

possess

modern

equipment

and

considerable resources and still be vulnerable if the adversary succeeds in

changing the operational paradigm.

5

Williamson

Murray,

“Innovation:

Past

and

Future”,

in

Williamson

Murray,

Allan

R.

Millett

(eds.),

Military

Innovation

in

the

Interwar

Period,

Cambridge

University

Press,

Cambridge, 1996, pp. 300

–

328.

6

Williamson Murray, Allan R. Millett (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period,

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 1–29.

THE "LAST WAR" SYNDROME – STRATEGIC TRAP OR OPPORTUNITY

FOR ADAPTATION?

6

Vietnam

The

Vietnam

War

illustrates

another

form

of

the

syndrome.

The

United States possessed considerable technological and military superiority,

but

encountered

difficulties

in

transforming

tactical

success

into

strategic

results.

Harry

G.

Summers

highlighted

the

discrepancy

between

the

way

operations were conceived and the political nature of the conflict.

7

The

relevant

lesson

is

not

the

simplistic

formula

that

the

United

States “won all the battles but lost the war”, but rather that the assessment of

military effectiveness must be subordinated to political objectives and the

adversary’s

strategic

logic.

Superiority

in

one

domain

does

not

guarantee

success if the strategic problem has been defined incorrectly.

Soviet Military Operations in Afghanistan

In

Afghanistan,

the

Soviet

Union

encountered

an

operational

environment

radically

different

from

the

one

for

which

it

had

primarily

structured

its

forces.

Mechanized

superiority,

firepower,

and

air-strike

capabilities were insufficient to neutralize an adversary that was dispersed,

adaptable,

and

supported

by

the

geographic

and

social

conditions

of

the

theatre of operations.

The Afghan case shows that transferring a doctrine between theatres

of

operations

cannot

be

achieved

by

simply

replicating

procedures.

Adaptation

must

encompass

the

physical

environment,

the

adversary’s

structure,

political

legitimacy,

the

population,

and

the

duration

of

the

conflict.

Afghanistan and Iraq after 2001

After

2001,

Western

forces

accumulated

extensive

operational

experience

in

counterinsurgency,

stabilization,

force

protection,

special

operations,

and

human

intelligence.

This

experience

was

valuable,

but

it

also

contributed

to

directing

part

of

institutional

attention

towards

low-

intensity conflicts and non-state adversaries.

Russia’s

full-scale

invasion

of

Ukraine,

which

began

in

February

2022,

brought

air

defence,

artillery,

ammunition,

logistics,

industrial

mobilization,

fortifications,

dispersion,

and

mass

back

to

the

centre

of

defence

planning.

At

the

same

time,

the

conflict

has

not

eliminated

the

lessons

of

the

information

age:

drones,

commercial

satellites,

electronic

warfare, digital communications, and information operations have become

structural components of the battlefield.

8

7

Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio Press,

Novato, 1982, pp. 1

–

20.

8

U.S.

Army,

“Adapt,

Lead,

Win:

NCO

Lessons

from

Ukraine”,

NCO

Journal,

October

2024,

available

at

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO

-

Journal/Archives/

-

2024/October/NCO

-

Lessons

-

from

-

Ukraine/, accessed

on

August

12,

2026.

General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D

7

3.

Ukraine:

Genuine

Lessons

or

the

Beginning

of

a

New

Syndrome?

The

Russo-Ukrainian

war

is

a

strategic

laboratory

of

exceptional

importance.

It

combines

high-intensity

conventional

warfare

with

rapid

innovation,

the

use

of

commercial

technologies,

electronic

warfare,

cyber

and information operations, and sustained industrial competition.

The

conflict

confirms

the

importance

of

classical

elements

of

military

power:

concentration

of

forces,

logistics,

artillery,

air

defence,

fortifications, reserves, and societal resilience. At the same time, it shows

that

these

elements

must

be

integrated

into

an

operational

architecture

in

which information

and the speed of adaptation

are becoming increasingly

important.

9

In

Ukraine,

commercial

and

military

drones

have

become

instruments

of

reconnaissance,

strike,

and

battle-damage

assessment;

commercial

Earth-observation

services

have

expanded

access

to

information; digital systems

have accelerated the sensor–decision–effector

cycle;

and

initiatives

such

as

BRAVE1

have

sought

to

reduce

the

time

between

identifying

an

operational

requirement

and

developing

a

technological solution.

10

This

is

precisely

where

the

paradox

emerges.

If

the

lessons

of

Ukraine are treated as universal truths, analysis of the conflict may produce

a

new

last

war

syndrome.

For

example,

the

fact

that

drones

have

had

a

major impact does not mean that all future conflicts will be dominated by

the same types of drones. Similarly, the relevance of artillery and armoured

forces

cannot

be

extrapolated

without

taking

into

account

sensor

density,

electronic

warfare,

air

defence,

terrain,

the

tempo

of

operations,

and

ammunition availability.

Ukraine should therefore be treated as a case study and a source of

hypotheses, not as a prophecy.

4. Psychological and Organizational Foundations

From a psychological perspective, the last war syndrome is fuelled

by

the

human

tendency

to

reduce

uncertainty

through

analogy.

The

availability

heuristic

makes

recent,

vivid,

or

heavily

mediatized

events

appear

more

probable

than

they

actually

are;

anchoring

causes

the

first

relevant information to exert a disproportionate influence on judgement; and

confirmation

bias

favours

the

selection

of

information

compatible

with

existing hypotheses.

11

9

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University

Press, Princeton, 1976, pp. 73

–

124.

10

. U.S. Army, “Adapt, Lead, Win: NCO Lessons from Ukraine”, op. cit.

11

Daniel Kahneman, op. cit., pp. 109

–

145.

THE "LAST WAR" SYNDROME – STRATEGIC TRAP OR OPPORTUNITY

FOR ADAPTATION?

8

At

the

strategic

level,

these

mechanisms

can

be

amplified

by

institutional

success.

A

doctrine

that

has

produced

results

in

one

conflict

generates legitimacy, investment, and careers built around it. Consequently,

change is no longer merely an intellectual problem; it becomes a problem of

resource allocation, authority, and organizational identity.

Graham T. Allison demonstrated, through his analysis of decision-

making

processes,

the

importance

of

organizational

routines

and

institutionalized procedures in explaining governmental behaviour.

12

In the

military

domain,

these

may

manifest

themselves

as

doctrinal

inertia,

budgetary inertia, bureaucratic inertia, and educational inertia.

Williamson

Murray

and

Allan

R.

Millett

showed

that

military

innovation

is

not

a

purely

technological

process.

It

entails

convergent

changes

in

doctrine,

organization,

training,

leadership,

and

the

use

of

technology.

13

From

this

perspective,

an

important

lesson

from

Ukraine

is

that the speed of adaptation can itself become a strategic capability.

5. The Strategic Trap

The

last

war

syndrome

becomes

a

strategic

trap

when

it

produces

doctrinal

rigidity,

unbalanced

resource

allocations,

overestimation

of

a

technology, neglect of surprise, and a reduction in intellectual pluralism.

A competent

adversary will not reproduce the conditions in which

we have prepared to fight. It will seek precisely those courses of action that

circumvent our advantages, exploit our vulnerabilities, and force us to fight

in an environment for which we have no prepared responses.

In this context, the question is not only “What have we learned?”,

but also “What have we failed to learn?” and “Which assumptions have we

become

incapable

of

challenging?”

Strategy

therefore

requires

a

combination of continuity and the permanent contestation of assumptions.

Another vulnerability is the overestimation of predictability. Nassim

Nicholas

Taleb

draws

attention

to

the

effect

of

rare

events

with

disproportionate

impact

and

to

the

tendency

to

construct

coherent

retrospective explanations for events that were not anticipated in the same

form.

14

In

military

affairs,

this

requires

a

distinction

between

anticipating

trends and predicting the exact nature of the next war.

6. The Strategic Opportunity

The

last

war

syndrome

should

not,

however,

be

interpreted

only

negatively.

Operational

experience

is

the

principal

source

of

military

12

Graham

T.

Allison,

Essence

of

Decision:

Explaining

the

Cuban

Missile

Crisis,

Little,

Brown, Boston, 1971, pp. 67

–

102.

13

Williamson Murray, Allan R. Millett (eds.),

op. cit

., pp. 300

–

328.

14

Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd ed.,

Random House, New York, 2010, pp. 1

–

20.

General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D

9

learning.

An

organization

that

fails

to

extract

lessons

from

recent

wars

would be as vulnerable as one that absolutizes them.

The key is to institutionalize a process of critical learning. Lessons

should be formulated as testable hypotheses, not as axioms. They should be

subjected

to

experimentation,

wargaming,

red

teaming,

and

alternative

scenarios. At the same time, military education should develop the ability to

identify the hidden assumptions underlying doctrines and plans.

An

adaptive

strategic

culture

should

include

at

least

five

mechanisms:

1)

permanent

doctrinal

experimentation;

2)

prospective

analysis

and

divergent

scenarios;

3)

institutionalized

red

teaming;

4)

periodic assessment of planning assumptions; and 5) the rapid integration of

operational lessons into training, procurement, and doctrine.

In this respect, the value of a military organization is measured not

only by its ability to execute validated procedures, but also by its ability to

abandon them when the conditions that justified them have disappeared.

7. Implications for Romania

For Romania, the issue is particularly important because its position

on NATO’s eastern flank requires preparation for deterrence and collective

defence in an environment in which the conflict in Ukraine represents both a

major source of lessons and a potential source of analytical bias.

Ukraine’s experience offers relevant lessons for territorial defence,

air

and

missile

defence,

the

use

of

unmanned

systems,

dispersion

and

infrastructure

protection,

logistical

resilience,

reserve

mobilization,

ammunition production, and civil-military integration. These lessons must,

however,

be

filtered

through

Romania’s

geography,

force

structure,

alliances and collective-defence obligations, national infrastructure, and the

likely characteristics of a potential theatre of operations.

For Romania, avoiding the last war syndrome therefore means not

diminishing

the

lessons

of

Ukraine,

but

avoiding

their

mechanical

extrapolation.

Investments

should

pursue

not

only

high-performance

capabilities,

but

also

capabilities

that

are

adaptable,

interoperable,

and

regenerable.

At

the

same

time,

the

transformation

process

must

include

emerging

technologies,

but

also

redundancy,

mass,

logistics,

air

defence,

electronic

warfare,

critical-infrastructure

protection,

resilient

communications,

and

the

ability

to

operate

under

conditions

of

network

degradation.

A

central

objective

should

be

the

development

of

a

“culture

of

constructive

challenge”:

plans,

doctrines,

and

procurement

programmes

should

be

periodically

evaluated

through

scenarios

that

assume

current

assumptions

are

wrong.

This

is

one

of

the

most

effective

ways

of

transforming uncertainty from a vulnerability into an advantage.

THE "LAST WAR" SYNDROME – STRATEGIC TRAP OR OPPORTUNITY

FOR ADAPTATION?

10

Conclusions

The

last

war

syndrome

is

one

of

the

persistent

vulnerabilities

of

strategic thought. It emerges when recent experience ceases to be a source

of learning and becomes a rigid template for anticipating the future.

History

provides

sufficient

examples

to

demonstrate

this

problem:

the

First

World

War

disproved

certain

assumptions

about

short

wars;

the

French case in 1940 demonstrated the limitations of a defensive architecture

insufficiently adapted to the operational tempo; Vietnam demonstrated that

tactical

superiority

cannot

substitute

for

politico-strategic

coherence;

Afghanistan

highlighted

the

limitations

of

doctrinal

transfer

between

operational

environments;

and

Ukraine

simultaneously

demonstrates

the

return

of

high-intensity

warfare

and

the

acceleration

of

technological

innovation.

The

fundamental

lesson

is

therefore

dialectical:

the

past

must

be

studied rigorously, but not absolutized. An army that ignores the lessons of

the

last

war

is

unprepared;

an

army

that

prepares

exclusively

to

repeat

it

may be equally vulnerable.

For Romania and NATO, the strategic objective should be to build

an institutional capacity for continuous adaptation. This requires operational

lessons

to

be

rapidly

transformed

into

experimentation,

training,

and

innovation,

while

also

being

permanently

challenged

through

alternative

scenarios.

The

strategic

advantage

of

the

twenty-first

century

will

not

necessarily belong to the actor that knows the last war best, but to the actor

capable of learning faster than its adversary and adapting its forces before

change becomes a constraint.

The true antidote to the last war syndrome is not forgetting the past,

but refusing to turn it into the sole guide to the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Little, Brown, Boston, 1971;

CLAUSEWITZ

von

C.,

On

War,

ed.

Michael

Howard

and

Peter

Paret,

Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976;

GRAY C. S., Modern Strategy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999;

HOWARD M., The Causes of Wars and Other Essays, Harvard University

Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1984;

HUNTINGTON S. P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of

Civil-Military

Relations,

Harvard

University

Press,

Cambridge,

Mass., 1957;

KAHNEMAN D., Thinking, Fast and Slow, Allen Lane, London, 2011;

General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D

11

MURRAY

W.,

Millett

A.

R.

(eds.),

Military

Innovation

in

the

Interwar

Period, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996;

SUMMERS H. G., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War,

Presidio Press, Novato, 1982;

TALEB N. N., The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd

ed., Random House, New York, 2010;

U.S.

Army,

“Adapt,

Lead,

Win:

NCO

Lessons

from

Ukraine”,

NCO

Journal, October 2024.