FUNDAMENTAL CORRELATES OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY  
AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY  
General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D  
(Academy of Romanian Scientists, 3 Ilfov Street, 050044, Bucharest,  
Romania, email: secretariat@aosr.ro)  
Major (ret) University Lecturer Aliodor MANOLEA. Ph.D  
(Academy of Romanian Scientists, 3 Ilfov Street, 050044, Bucharest,  
Romania, email: secretariat@aosr.ro)  
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between preventive  
diplomacy and coercive diplomacy in an international system marked by the  
proliferation of armed conflicts, great-power rivalry, and the expansion of hybrid  
instruments of pressure. Its central argument is that preventive diplomacy remains  
the instrument with the greatest potential to reduce the human, political, and  
economic costs of conflicts, yet its effectiveness depends on political will,  
functioning early-warning mechanisms, and the capacity of multilateral institutions  
to transform information into action. At the same time, coercive diplomacy  
continues to be used as an instrument of limited compellence through threats,  
sanctions, ultimatums, or calibrated demonstrations of force, but its success  
depends on realistic objectives, credible signaling, the availability of negotiated  
exit options, and compliance with international law. From a military perspective,  
the relationship between the two forms of diplomacy is inseparable from credible  
capabilities, resilience, allied interoperability, early warning, and the controlled  
use of military instruments in support of strategic dialogue. In a conflict-dominated  
world, prevention should remain the primary normative and strategic option, while  
coercion should be employed only in support of de-escalation and a viable political  
settlement.  
Keywords: preventive diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, conflict prevention,  
sanctions, international security, crisis management, defence diplomacy,  
integrated deterrence, Black Sea.  
DOI  
10.56082/annalsarscimilit.2026.2.3  
1. Introduction  
The current international order is defined by a high density of crises  
and a visible degradation of the security environment1.  
Entitled Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists, President of the Military  
Sciences Section, Doctoral Supervisor at "CAROL I" National Defense University, email:  
tfunzeti@gmail.com.  
 Associated member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists, Hyperion University, email:  
aliodormanolea@hyperion.ro.  
1
SIPRI. 2025. „Armed Conflict and Conflict Management." În SIPRI Yearbook 2025.  
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, available at https://www.sipri.-  
org/yearbook/2025/02, accessed on 15.05.2026.  
3
     
FUNDAMENTAL CORRELATES OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY  
AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY  
According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2025, in 2024 the estimated  
number of deaths associated with armed conflicts increased to  
approximately 239,000, the highest level in the period 2018-2024, and five  
major conflicts exceeded the threshold of 10,000 victims in a single year2.  
This picture suggests not only the persistence of classical wars, but also the  
return of conventional interstate confrontation, combined with the expansion  
of economic, informational, cybernetic and symbolic pressures.3.  
In this context, the debate about preventive diplomacy and coercive  
diplomacy takes on special relevance. Thus, diplomacy and coercive  
diplomacy, with the modification of the behavior of an actor through threats  
or deliberate costs, without the immediate entry into an all-out war4. If  
preventive diplomacy operates in the register of risk mitigation and  
5
maintaining dialogue , coercive diplomacy operates in the register of  
controlled pressure6. In practice, however, the separation between them is  
less rigid than the theoretical definition suggests.  
From the perspective of the relationship between foreign policy,  
military strategy and defense planning, we can show that, in the Euro-  
Atlantic space, diplomacy can no longer be separated from resilience,  
military mobility, allied interoperability, forward presence and escalation  
control7. Thus, the relationship between prevention and coercion is also a  
relationship between power, strategic signaling, and the ability to retain the  
political initiative without losing military control of the crisis8.  
2 Idem.  
3 Idem.  
4
Sweijs Tim, 2023, The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy, Cham:  
Palgrave Macmillan, available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21303-8, accessed on  
15.05.2026, Mitton John Logan, 2022 „Lessons in Deterrence: Evaluating Coercive  
Diplomacy in Syria, 2012-2019, Journal of Strategic Studies 45 (3), pp. 411-438, available  
at https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1692659, accessed on 15.05.2026.  
5
Ramcharan Bertrand G, 2020, Contemporary Preventive Diplomacy. London and New  
York: Routledge. available at  
https://www.routledge.com/Contemporary-Preventive-  
Diplomacy/Ramcharan/p/book/9780367492342, accessed on 16.05.2025, Verbeke Johan,  
2023, Diplomacy in Practice: A Critical Approach, London and New York: Routledge,  
available at  
https://www.routledge.com/Diplomacy-in-Practice-A-Critical-Approach/-  
Verbeke/p/book/9781032287089, accessed on 16.05.2026.  
6 Sweijs Tim, 2023, op.cit.  
7
NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, available at https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-  
texts-and-resources/official-texts/2023/03/03/nato-2022-strategic-concept,  
16.05.2026, Council of the European Union. 2022, „A Strategic Compass for a Stronger EU  
Security and Defence in the Next Decade", 21 Martie 2022, available at https://-  
accessed  
on  
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-  
stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/, accessed on 16.05.2026.  
8
Wirtz James, Jeffrey Larsen, 2023, „Who Does Deterrence? The Politics and Strategy of  
Integrated Deterrence", The RUSI Journal 168 (6): pp. 14-20, available at  
https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2288133, accessed on 17.05.2026.  
4
             
General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D  
Major (ret) University Lecturer Aliodor MANOLEA. Ph.D  
We believe that, in a world dominated by conflicts, preventive  
diplomacy should remain the main strategic option, since the costs of failure  
are incomparably lower than the costs of managing a war that has already  
started. It is necessary to highlight the fact that, in the absence of a  
minimum of credible pressure, prevention risks becoming purely  
declarative. Symmetrically, coercive diplomacy can produce limited and  
useful effects only if it is subordinated to a realistic political objective and a  
logic of de-escalation, not a punitive or retaliatory logic.  
2. Conceptual landmarks: between prevention and coercion  
When refering to preventive diplomacy, it is more than just an early  
reaction to a crisis. It includes early warning, good offices, mediation,  
special political missions, confidence-building measures, the involvement of  
regional organizations, and maintaining open channels of communication  
between actors in tension. Some authors emphasize that contemporary  
preventive diplomacy must be thought of in relation to human security and  
SDG 16, and others even insist that prevention is not just an institutional  
formula, but a diplomatic practice that involves analysis, persuasion, and an  
understanding of the actors’ own limitations.  
Coercive diplomacy, by contrast, seeks to change an adversary's  
calculus through credible threats and controlled costs. It can take the form of  
sanctions, ultimatums, displays of force, diplomatic isolation, or limited  
actions designed to convey resolve without producing full-scale escalation.  
Indeed, it is shown that ultimatums can remain a core of interstate coercion  
and that their effects differ depending on the type of message and the  
strategic context, which refutes the idea that all ultimatums are necessarily  
irrational or counterproductive.9.  
From a methodological point of view, in the correlative action  
between the two types of diplomacy, three variables should be taken into  
account.  
The first variable is the moment of intervention: thus, prevention acts  
before or in the early stages of the crisis10 while coercion usually occurs  
when belligerent action is already advanced11.  
9 Sweijs, Tim.,2023, op. cit.  
10  
Ramcharan Bertrand G, 2020, Contemporary Preventive Diplomacy. London and New  
York: Routledge. available at  
https://www.routledge.com/Contemporary-Preventive-  
Diplomacy/Ramcharan/p/book/9780367492342, accessed on 16.05.2025, Myl, Malgorzata.  
2021. "Special Political Missions and Their Role in a Preventive Diplomacy: Opportunities  
and Challenges." Eastern European Journal of Transnational Relations 4 (2): 9-25.  
https://doi.org/10.15290/eejtr.2020.04.02.01.  
11  
Mitton, John Logan. 2022. "Lessons in Deterrence: Evaluating Coercive Diplomacy in  
Syria,  
2012-2019."  
Journal  
of  
Strategic  
Studies  
45  
(3):  
411-438.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1692659.  
5
     
FUNDAMENTAL CORRELATES OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY  
AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY  
The second variable is the logic of the instrument: prevention  
reduces uncertainty and creates room for compromise, while coercion  
increases the costs of non-compliance12.  
The third option we bring to your attention is legitimacy. According  
to this, preventive diplomacy enjoys a stronger presumption of legitimacy,  
while coercive diplomacy must be justified much more strictly legally,  
politically and morally13.  
2.1. Political-military correlates of prevention and coercion  
Through an analysis specific to military sciences, we believe that  
preventive and coercive diplomacy must be related to the connection  
between the political level, the strategic level and the operational level14. In  
this context, preventive diplomacy is supported by early warning systems,  
situational awareness, political-military dialogue, military deconfliction  
channels, advanced presence with a reassurance role, and joint exercises  
aimed at reducing mistrust15. On the other hand, coercive diplomacy uses  
the same resources, but in a different logic: signaling intent, increasing costs  
for the adversary, demonstrating capability, and controlling escalation16.  
In military terms, the major difference is not one of instruments, but  
of intensity, purpose and threshold of use. NATO reaffirmed in the 2022  
Strategic Concept that Euro-Atlantic security is based on three core tasks:  
deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative  
security, confirming that prevention and strategic pressure are not separate  
worlds, but are parts of the same security architecture. In the same vein, the  
European Union's Strategic Compass argues that the more hostile security  
12  
Chappell, Brian K. 2021. State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation: The Differential  
Effects of Threat Perception. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-  
030-59801-3.  
13  
Verbeke, Johan. 2023. Diplomacy in Practice: A Critical Approach. London and New  
York: Routledge available at https://www.routledge.com/Diplomacy-in-Practice-A-Critical-  
Approach/Verbeke/p/book/9781032287089, accessed on 18.05.2026.  
14 Wirtz, James, Jeffrey Larsen. 2023. "Who Does Deterrence? The Politics and Strategy of  
Integrated Deterrence." The RUSI Journal 168 (6): 14-20. https://doi.org/10.-  
1080/03071847.2023.2288133.  
15  
NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, available at https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-  
texts-and-resources/official-texts/2023/03/03/nato-2022-strategic-concept,  
accessed  
on  
18.05.2026, Council of the European Union. 2022, „A Strategic Compass for a Stronger EU  
Security and Defence in the Next Decade", 21 Martie 2022, available at https://www.-  
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-  
eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/, accessed on 18.05.2026.  
16  
Blankenship Brian, Erik Lin-Greenberg. 2022. "Trivial Tripwires? Military Capabilities  
and Alliance Reassurance." Security Studies 31 (1): 92-117. https://doi.org/10.-  
1080/09636412.2022.2038662.  
6
         
General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D  
Major (ret) University Lecturer Aliodor MANOLEA. Ph.D  
environment requires a qualitative leap in the capacity to act, resilience and  
investment in defence17.  
It follows that preventive diplomacy and coercive diplomacy should  
be seen as two ways of converting power into political effect. The former  
transforms capability into trust, stability, and diplomatic time, while the  
latter transforms capability into pressure, cost, and a signal of resolve18. In  
both cases, credibility depends on the coherence between political intent,  
military resources and alliance architecture19.  
3. Advantages, tools and limits of preventive diplomacy  
The main advantage of preventive diplomacy is that it intervenes  
before violence becomes systemic20. The costs of preventive intervention  
are usually lower than the costs of post-conflict pacification, reconstruction  
or humanitarian management21. In addition, prevention keeps political  
institutions functioning, avoids the radicalization of actors and can preserve  
a minimum of trust necessary for subsequent negotiation. In the UN's vision,  
reactivating diplomacy and strengthening the capacity to monitor risks are  
indispensable in a fragmented world with multiple sources of instability22.  
Special political missions play an important role23 described as  
flexible instruments of preventive diplomacy, capable of combining political  
presence, field analysis and facilitation of dialogue, but whose effectiveness  
depends on the political and financial support of the organizations that  
mandate them. From this perspective, prevention does not mean passivity,  
but early presence, legitimacy and the ability to act before all parties  
consider violence as the only option24.  
The case of ASEAN and the Myanmar crisis illustrates both the  
potential and the limits of regional preventive diplomacy. Caballero-  
Anthony shows that, despite the Myanmar crisis, tensions in the South  
China Sea, and US-China rivalry, the “ASEAN way,” based on informality  
17  
NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, available at https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-  
texts-and-resources/official-texts/2023/03/03/nato-2022-strategic-concept,  
19.05.2026.  
accessed  
on  
18 Wirtz, James, Jeffrey Larsen, 2023, op. cit.  
19 Blankenship Brian, Erik Lin-Greenberg. 2022, op. cit.  
20  
Ramcharan, Bertrand G. 2020. Contemporary Preventive Diplomacy. London and New  
https://www.routledge.com/Contemporary-Preventive-  
York: Routledge, available at  
Diplomacy/Ramcharan/p/book/9780367492342, accessed on 19.05.2026.  
21  
United Nations Secretary-General. 2023. Our Common Agenda: Policy Brief 9, A New  
Agenda  
for  
Peace.  
New  
York:  
United  
Nations,  
available  
at  
https://-  
digitallibrary.un.org/record/4015374, accessed on 19.05.2026.  
22 Idem.  
23  
Myl, Malgorzata. 2021. "Special Political Missions and Their Role in a Preventive  
Diplomacy: Opportunities and Challenges." Eastern European Journal of Transnational  
Relations 4 (2): 9-25. https://doi.org/10.15290/eejtr.2020.04.02.01.  
24 Idem.  
7
               
FUNDAMENTAL CORRELATES OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY  
AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY  
and consensus, remains the preferred mechanism for regional security  
governance25. This informality provides access and reduces the rigidity of  
negotiation, but can weaken responsiveness when the consensus regime  
blocks firm measures26. In the same logic, it can be shown that the  
negotiations supported by the UN and led by ASEAN represent one of the  
few realistic paths to relaunching a political solution, precisely because they  
combine regional legitimacy with international support27.  
Regarding the limits of preventive diplomacy, it can be observed that  
they become evident when early warning is not followed by political will. In  
many contemporary crises, international actors know the signals of risk but  
hesitate to intervene diplomatically due to geopolitical rivalries, reputational  
costs or fear of failure28. In such situations, prevention fails not because it is  
conceptually weak, but because the political architecture that should support  
it is fragmented29. In other words, preventive diplomacy is less a problem of  
conception and more of implementation30.  
3.1. Defense diplomacy and the role of military structures in crisis  
prevention  
Defense diplomacy, by which we mean the use of military  
instruments for nonviolent purposes, to strengthen cooperation, trust and  
stability31. Direct contributors to preventing strategic misunderstandings  
include military attaches, dialogue between military chiefs, joint exercises,  
naval visits, officer exchanges, joint training, and regional think tanks.  
These  
mechanisms  
can  
provide  
transparency,  
predictability,  
and  
communication channels that reduce the likelihood of miscalculation.  
However, defense diplomacy has an ambivalent character and  
presents a paradox: on the one hand, it aims to build strategic and moral  
trust between states, and on the other hand, it can include competition,  
25  
Caballero-Anthony, Mely. 2022. "The ASEAN Way and the Changing Security  
Environment: Navigating Challenges to Informality and Centrality." International Politics.  
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-022-00400-0.  
26 Idem.  
27  
Barber, Rebecca. 2023. "The Case for UN-Supported, ASEAN-Led Negotiations on  
Myanmar." Australian Journal of International Affairs 77 (3): 325-332. https://doi.org/-  
10.1080/10357718.2023.2197283.  
28  
Ramcharan, Bertrand G. 2020. Contemporary Preventive Diplomacy. London and New  
York: Routledge, available at  
https://www.routledge.com/Contemporary-Preventive-  
Diplomacy/Ramcharan/p/book/9780367492342, accessed on 19.05.2026.  
29 Idem.  
30 Verbeke, Johan, 2023, op. cit..  
31  
Chang Jun Yan, Nicole Jenne. 2020. "Velvet Fists: The Paradox of Defence Diplomacy  
in Southeast Asia." European Journal of International Security 5 (3): 332-349.  
https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2020.16.  
8
             
General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D  
Major (ret) University Lecturer Aliodor MANOLEA. Ph.D  
secrets, demonstrations of power and messages that weaken exactly this  
trust32.  
For strategically sensitive spaces, such as the Black Sea area,  
defense diplomacy must be correlated with transparency, strategic  
communication, and rules for avoiding incidents.  
From a military perspective, the value of preventive diplomacy  
increases when its political components are doubled by credible presence,  
transparently planned exercises, and conflict resolution mechanisms33.  
Prevention does not involve weakening the defensive profile, but using it to  
create conditions of stability and space for negotiation34.  
Artificial intelligence may accelerate warfare, but security  
architecture must also accelerate and deepen at the same pace, building a  
new generation of capabilities.  
The real challenge in military artificial intelligence (AI) is to  
maintain human accountability and political wisdom while maintaining  
technological superiority. Therefore, every technical, legal, and ethical step  
taken today will shape not only the nature of warfare but also the future of  
the international order.  
4. The strategic logic, utility and risks associated with coercive  
diplomacy  
Coercive diplomacy starts from the idea that the adversary can be  
determined to change its behavior without reaching all-out war35. To  
achieve this goal, several conditions are necessary: limited objectives, clear  
demands, credibility, coherent strategic communication and the existence of  
a negotiated exit36. When coercion demands maximalist or humiliating  
concessions, it tends to turn the crisis into a zero-sum game and drastically  
reduce the likelihood of voluntary compliance37. Thus, in an analysis of  
Syria, it is shown that the repeated failures of deterrence and coercion were  
linked to the perceived weakening of American commitment, which  
affected the credibility of the threats made38. So, coercion depends not only  
32 Idem.  
33 Idem.  
34 NATO. 2022. NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, available at https://www.nato.int/en/about-  
us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2023/03/03/nato-2022-strategic-concept,  
accessed on 20.05.2026.  
35 Sweijs, Tim, 2023, op. cit..  
36 Idem.  
37 Alim Eray. 2020. „Decentralize or Else": Russia's Use of Offensive Coercive Diplomacy  
against  
0043820020919907.  
38 Mitton John Logan, 2022, op. cit.  
Ukraine.  
World  
Affairs  
183  
(2):  
155-182.  
https://doi.org/10.1177/-  
9
             
FUNDAMENTAL CORRELATES OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY  
AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY  
on capabilities but also on the reputation of political will, and not  
compliance but an uncredible threat can accelerate the testing of limits39.  
The case of Ukraine is equally relevant. Russia's strategy in Donbass  
was one of offensive coercive diplomacy, backed by force but oriented  
towards political objectives that Ukraine could not accept without  
compromising its sovereignty; the result was the transformation of the crisis  
into a zero-sum conflict40. The conclusion that can be drawn is essential:  
even when coercion is militarily strong, it can fail politically if it demands  
what the targeted party considers existentially unacceptable41.  
Another risk of coercive diplomacy is the temptation of tactical  
ambiguity. In the context of the war in Ukraine, unclaimed coercive actions  
have less leverage than explicitly claimed actions, without necessarily  
producing a significant advantage in controlling escalation. This conclusion  
is important for the era of hybrid warfare: plausible deniability may  
complicate attribution, but it does not guarantee strategic effectiveness42.  
Economic coercion is not without costs and repercussions either.  
States targeted by sanctions can respond with counter-sanctions, reducing  
the effectiveness of the instrument and amplifying the logic of conflictual  
reciprocity43. Furthermore, in proliferation crises, the choice of coercion  
over direct force is influenced by threat perceptions, public support, and  
power projection capacity, which shows that coercive diplomacy is not an  
automatic mechanism, but one deeply dependent on the strategic  
psychology of decision-makers44.  
4.1. Integrated deterrence as a show of force and strategic  
signaling  
In the current strategic environment, coercive diplomacy can no  
longer be separated from the concept of integrated deterrence. The authors  
we cite note that integrated deterrence reflects the current strategic reality,  
but it raises an essential question regarding the actor who articulates and  
coordinates such a complex strategy, a strategy that involves military forces,  
39 Idem.  
40 Alim Eray. 2020, op.cit.  
41 Ibidem.  
42  
Pischedda Costantino, Andrew Cheon. 2023. "Does Plausible Deniability Work?  
Assessing the Effectiveness of Unclaimed Coercive Acts in the Ukraine War."  
Contemporary  
13523260.2023.2212464.  
43  
Security  
Policy  
44  
(3):  
345-371.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/-  
Peksen Dursun, Jin Mun Jeong. 2022. "Coercive Diplomacy and Economic Sanctions  
Reciprocity: Explaining Targets' Counter-Sanctions." Defence and Peace Economics 33  
(8): 895-911. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2021.1919831.  
44  
Chappell, Brian K. 2021. State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation: The Differential  
Effects of Threat Perception. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-  
030-59801-3.  
10  
           
General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D  
Major (ret) University Lecturer Aliodor MANOLEA. Ph.D  
governmental institutions and alliances45. For military analysis, this aspect is  
decisive: coercion is not credible only through political will, but through the  
concrete architecture of capabilities, logistics, mobility, command and  
control, and interoperability.  
Blankenship and Lin-Greenberg show that deterministic signals  
cannot compensate for insufficiency of capabilities, which means that  
symbolic tripwire presences are limited if they are not supported by  
effective force and rapid reinforcement capacity46. For this reason, for  
coercive diplomacy, the credibility of the threat depends on the relationship  
between will, capability and sustainability47. Effective strategic signaling  
requires more than rhetoric: it requires available forces, infrastructure,  
political support, and doctrinal clarity48.  
Furthermore, coercion works better when accompanied by exit  
options and reassurance measures for allies49. In a system of alliances like  
NATO, coercive diplomacy is not just about the adversary, but also about  
maintaining internal cohesion and mutual trust50. This is why deterrence and  
reassurance must be thought of together, not separately51.  
4.2. The Gray Zone, Cyberspace, and Escalation Control  
Contemporary military analysis shows that many confrontations no  
longer take place on the verge of declared war, but in the gray area, through  
informational, economic, maritime, cyber pressures and below the threshold  
of direct conventional engagement52. Some authors define the gray area as  
the space in which the distinction between peace and war becomes blurred  
due to the ambiguity of the tactics used, and actors aim to modify the  
opponent's behavior without explicitly switching to conventional warfare53.  
But activity in the gray area may represent not only a failure of  
deterrence, but sometimes even an effect of it, when the adversary chooses  
limited forms of aggression due to the existence of a credible escalation  
45 Wirtz James, Jeffrey Larsen, 2023, op. cit.  
46  
Blankenship Brian, Erik Lin-Greenberg. 2022. "Trivial Tripwires? Military Capabilities  
and Alliance Reassurance." Security Studies 31 (1): 92-117. https://doi.org/-  
10.1080/09636412.2022.2038662.  
47 Idem.  
48 Ibidem.  
49 Wirtz James, Jeffrey Larsen. 2023, op. cit.  
50 Blankenship Brian, Erik Lin-Greenberg. 2022, op. cit.  
51 NATO. 2022. NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, available at https://www.nato.int/en/about-  
us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2023/03/03/nato-2022-strategic-concept,  
accessed on 21.05.2026.  
52  
Azad Tahir Mahmood, Muhammad Waqas Haider, Muhammad Sadiq. 2023.  
"Understanding Gray Zone Warfare from Multiple Perspectives." World Affairs 186 (1):  
81-104. https://doi.org/10.1177/00438200221141101.  
53 Idem.  
11  
                 
FUNDAMENTAL CORRELATES OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY  
AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY  
threshold54. This observation is important for military thinking, suggesting  
that deterrence does not always eliminate competition, but can push it  
towards more ambiguous and fragmented forms55.  
In cyberspace, cyber operations can be useful not only as classical  
coercive signals, but also as escalation management and accommodative  
signaling tools during crises. This shifts the focus from simply reacting to  
the attack to the broader architecture of attribution, resilience, and  
proportional response56.  
5. Complementarity between preventive diplomacy and coercive  
diplomacy  
A common aspect in the analysis of international relations is the  
treatment of preventive diplomacy and coercive diplomacy as exclusively  
antagonistic options. In reality, the two can form a continuum of  
instruments57. Thus, prevention without the ability to signal costs can be  
ignored58 and coercion without diplomatic infrastructure can only produce  
resentment, adaptation and escalation59. The analytical problem is not the  
dogmatic  
choice  
between  
the  
two,  
but  
their  
sequencing  
and  
proportionality60.  
An integrated strategy can be considered. In its optimal form, an  
integrated strategy should follow four stages. The first stage is early  
warning and opening channels of dialogue61. The second consists of  
concrete preventive measures: political missions, mediation, good offices,  
regional mechanisms and confidence-building measures62. The third  
involves limited and reversible pressure, especially diplomatic and  
economic, formulated with clear conditions and humanitarian exceptions63.  
The fourth stage is political reintegration: negotiating an exit, monitoring  
54 Gannon, J. Andrés, Erik Gartzke, Jon R. Lindsay, and Peter Schram. 2024. "The Shadow  
of Deterrence: Why Capable Actors Engage in Contests Short of War." Journal of Conflict  
Resolution 68 (2-3): 230-268. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231166345.  
55 Idem.  
56  
Lonergan Erica D., Shawn W. Lonergan. 2022. "Cyber Operations, Accommodative  
Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises." Security Studies 31 (1): 32-64.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2040584.  
57  
Ramcharan, Bertrand G. 2020. Contemporary Preventive Diplomacy. London and New  
York: Routledge, available at  
https://www.routledge.com/Contemporary-Preventive-  
Diplomacy/Ramcharan/p/book/9780367492342, accessed on 21.05.2026.  
58 Wirtz James, Jeffrey Larsen, 2023, op. cit.  
59 Mitton John Logan, 2022, op cit.  
60  
Verbeke Johan. 2023. Diplomacy in Practice: A Critical Approach. London and New  
York: Routledge, available at https://www.routledge.com/Diplomacy-in-Practice-A-  
Critical-Approach/Verbeke/p/book/9781032287089, accessed on 21.05.2026.  
61 Ramcharan, Bertrand G. 2020, op. cit.  
62 Ibidem.  
63 Sweijs, Tim. 2023, op. cit.  
12  
                   
General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D  
Major (ret) University Lecturer Aliodor MANOLEA. Ph.D  
implementation, and gradually reducing pressure in exchange for verifiable  
compliance64. Such a logic is compatible with the UN call for the  
revitalization of diplomacy and multilateral capacities for prevention and  
mediation.  
From this perspective, prevention and coercion are neither morally  
equivalent nor functionally identical65. Preventive diplomacy is oriented  
towards avoiding violence and preserving political space66 and coercive  
diplomacy is acceptable only as an auxiliary, limited tool aimed at restoring  
a negotiated solution67. When coercion becomes an end in itself, it ceases to  
be diplomacy and becomes a form of conflict management through  
permanent pressure68.  
Therefore, in a world dominated by conflicts, the major challenge is  
not the lack of tools, but the lack of a coherent architecture for using them.  
Multilateral institutions, regional organizations and middle-sized states must  
restore the link between prevention, legal pressure and political solution69.  
Otherwise, we will witness either the ineffective ritualization of the  
discourse on prevention, or the trivialization of coercion as a strategic  
reflex70.  
5.1. The Black Sea as a space of convergence between prevention  
and coercion  
The Black Sea area offers one of the most relevant strategic  
laboratories for studying the relationship between preventive and coercive  
diplomacy. The Black Sea region is a focal point of the competition between  
Russia and the West for the future of Europe, and political, economic,  
informational and military instruments are used simultaneously here. It is  
highlighted that the security of the Pontic basin must be analyzed in an  
integrated manner, in relation to the strategic, military and economic  
objectives of the relevant actors, as well as to the role of NATO and the EU  
in stabilizing the region71.  
For this reason, in the Black Sea, preventive diplomacy cannot be  
reduced to mediation and dialogue, but must be correlated with maritime  
64  
United Nations Secretary-General. 2023. Our Common Agenda: Policy Brief 9, A New  
Agenda  
for  
Peace.  
New  
York:  
United  
Nations,  
available  
at  
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4015374, accessed on 22.05.2026.  
65 Verbeke Johan. 2023, op. cit.  
66 Ramcharan, Bertrand G. 2020, op. cit.  
67 Sweijs, Tim. 2023, op. cit.  
68 Verbeke Johan. 2023, op. cit.  
69 United Nations Secretary-General. 2023, op. cit.  
70 Verbeke Johan. 2023, op. cit., Sweijs, Tim. 2023, op. cit.  
71  
Novac Valerian, Eugen Rusu. 2022. "The Actual Security Climate in the Black Sea  
Basin." International Conference Knowledge-Based Organization 28 (1): 83-93.  
https://doi.org/10.2478/kbo-2022-0013.  
13  
               
FUNDAMENTAL CORRELATES OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY  
AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY  
surveillance, protection of energy infrastructure, security of trade routes,  
military mobility and credible allied presence72. At the same time, coercion  
is expressed here through blockades, energy pressure, coastal militarization,  
A2/AD and hybrid actions. For Romania, the Black Sea is the environment  
in which prevention and deterrence must be thought of together73.  
The maritime character of the region adds a specifically military  
dimension: freedom of navigation, port security, protection of offshore  
infrastructure, airspace control and coastal surveillance74. Here preventive  
diplomacy needs constant operational support, and coercive diplomacy must  
be calibrated to avoid turning a maritime or energy crisis into a generalized  
conflict.  
5.2. A possible comparative framing: Greenland, Venezuela, Iran,  
Persian Gulf, USA, NATO and Israel  
From a comparative perspective, the cases of Greenland, Venezuela,  
Iran-Persian Gulf and Israel show that preventive diplomacy and coercive  
diplomacy do not operate in isolation, but on a continuum of crisis  
management. The main difference appears in the combination of  
instruments, legitimacy and intensity: some files are dominated by  
prevention  
and  
prudent  
signaling,  
others  
by  
sanctions,  
military  
mobilizations and political pressure. In this framework, the United States  
frequently appears as an actor of economic and military coercion, while  
NATO functions mainly as an architecture of deterrence, reassurance and  
stabilization of the Euro-Atlantic space75.  
In the case of Greenland, the dominant logic remains that of  
preventive diplomacy and the prudent management of strategic competition.  
The renewed geostrategic interest of the great powers in the Arctic has  
increased Greenland's diplomatic and security value, but has produced  
sovereignty games,  
political-strategic repositioning,  
and autonomy  
negotiations rather than classical coercion76. From this perspective,  
Greenland illustrates a case in which external pressure is largely symbolic  
and securitizing, and the effective response lies in maintaining diplomatic  
channels, cooperation formulas, and political control over the militarization  
of the Arctic space77.  
Venezuela, on the other hand, represents a typical case of coercive  
diplomacy based on sanctions, legitimacy challenge and external pressure  
72 Idem.  
73 Idem.  
74 Ibidem.  
75 NATO, 2022, op. cit.  
76  
Jacobsen, Marc. 2020. "Greenland's Arctic Advantage: Articulations, Acts and  
Appearances of Sovereignty Games." Cooperation and Conflict 55 (2): 170-192.  
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836719882476.  
77 Ibidem.  
14  
           
General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D  
Major (ret) University Lecturer Aliodor MANOLEA. Ph.D  
for political change. In recent analyses, the elements highlighted refer to the  
fact that the combined sanctions regime has been accompanied by intense  
disputes over the legitimacy of the actors imposing them, especially when  
the unilateral instrument is perceived as going beyond the logic of  
democratic protection and entering the logic of geopolitical pressure78.  
Furthermore,  
the  
economic  
effects  
of  
coercion  
have  
produced  
informalization, adaptation, and high social costs, suggesting that coercive  
diplomacy can greatly erode the socio-economic base that a sustainable  
political solution should rebuild79.  
The Iranian file and the dynamics in the Persian Gulf most clearly  
express the hybrid nature of the relationship between prevention and  
coercion. The nuclear negotiations have demonstrated that coercive  
diplomacy can produce results when sanctions and pressure are  
accompanied by incentives, such as broad coalitions and negotiated exits, as  
was the case with the P5+180. At the same time, maritime crises and military  
signaling in the Persian Gulf show that the mobilization of forces and  
demonstrations of US presence increase the credibility of the threat only  
when they effectively modify the adversary's strategic calculation, and not  
when they remain simple symbolic gestures81. In this scenario, NATO was  
not the main coercive actor, but its integrated deterrence model remains  
relevant as a conceptual benchmark for coordination between signaling,  
defense, and escalation control82.  
In the case of Israel, a mixed case emerges, in which preventive  
diplomacy, discreet diplomacy and public diplomacy coexist with intense  
recourse to military coercion. On the one hand, the literature on “back-  
channel diplomacy” shows that discreet diplomacy has remained an  
important tool in Israel’s regional relations, including for maintaining  
sensitive political contacts and avoiding premature exposure of  
78  
Palestini, Stefano, and Yancy Villarroel. 2024. "What Gives You the Right? Foreign  
Policymakers' Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Sanctions against Democratic Breakdown  
in Venezuela (2014-2019)." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 37 (5): 665-689.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2024.2351847.  
79  
Bull Benedicte, Antulio Rosales. 2020. „Into the Shadows: Sanctions, Rentierism, and  
Economic Informalization in Venezuela." European Review of Latin American and  
Caribbean Studies 109: 107-133, available at  
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26936905,  
available at 22.05.2026.  
80  
Harris, Benjamin. 2021. "Coercive Diplomacy and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis."  
International Negotiation 26 (2): 218-244, https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-BJA10008.  
Post Abigail S., Todd S. Sechser. 2024. "Hand-Tying through Military Signals in Crisis  
81  
Bargaining." International Studies Quarterly 68 (2): sqae028. https://doi.org/-  
10.1093/isq/sqae028.  
82 NATO. 2022, op. cit.  
15  
         
FUNDAMENTAL CORRELATES OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY  
AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY  
negotiations83. On the other hand, the Gaza war showed that, with the  
intensification of military operations, the emphasis shifted towards strategic  
justification, war communication and narrative competition, actions that  
reduced the space for prevention and increased the weight of coercive  
logic84. Thus, Israel shows how quickly preventive diplomacy can be  
absorbed by military logic when the crisis crosses the threshold of early de-  
escalation.  
Taken together, these cases suggest a useful typology. The  
Greenland case approaches the model of competitive deterrence, in which  
strategic tension is managed through institutions, prudent signaling, and the  
negotiation of autonomy. The Venezuela case illustrates contested economic  
coercion, with limited political effectiveness and high social costs. As for  
Iran and the Persian Gulf, they illustrate the mixed model of negotiated  
coercion, where pressure and dialogue are calibrated simultaneously, while  
Israel shows the rapid transition from discreet diplomatic channels to the  
dominance of coercion and wartime communication.  
Analyzing the role of the US and NATO, it can be concluded that  
Washington appears in these files mainly as an actor of obligation, while  
NATO acts mainly as a mechanism of deterrence and reassurance, which  
may explain why coercive diplomacy and preventive diplomacy should also  
be evaluated according to the institutional architecture that supports them85.  
6. Possible implications for regional security and for Romania  
For Romania, located at the intersection of the Black Sea space,  
NATO's eastern flank and the European Union's security policy, the main  
lesson may be this: effective diplomacy cannot be separated from  
resilience86. Preventive diplomacy should be supported by increased  
analytical capacity, early warning, inter-institutional coordination and solid  
partnerships with multilateral organizations87. In the eastern vecinity,  
83 Jones Peter. 2024. „An Increasingly Corrosive Expedient? Israel's Evolving Relationship  
with Back-Channel Diplomacy." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 51 (4): 695-710.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2022.2156846.  
84  
Hlihor Ecaterina. 2024. "Public Diplomacy in Time of War. Israel's War on Gaza Case  
Study." Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Brașov. Series VII: Social Sciences •  
Law 17 (66), no. 1: 71-84. https://doi.org/10.31926/but.ssl.2024.17.66.1.13.  
85 NATO. 2022, op. cit.  
86 Council of the European Union. 2022. „A Strategic Compass for a Stronger EU Security  
and Defence in the Next Decade." 21 March 2022, available at https://www.consilium.-  
europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-  
security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/, accessed on 23.05.2026.  
87  
United Nations Secretary-General. 2023. Our Common Agenda: Policy Brief 9, A New  
Agenda  
for  
Peace.  
New  
York:  
United  
Nations,  
available  
at  
https://-  
digitallibrary.un.org/record/4015374, accessed on 23.05.2026  
16  
         
General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D  
Major (ret) University Lecturer Aliodor MANOLEA. Ph.D  
prevention also means anticipating hybrid escalations, energy pressures,  
information warfare, and incidents with military potential88.  
At the same time, Romania has a strategic interest in supporting  
forms of coercive diplomacy strictly anchored in international law, allied  
coordination and precise political objectives89.  
Sanctions, diplomatic isolation or collective pressure can only be  
useful when integrated into a broader strategy of deterrence, defense and  
negotiation90. For the Romanian military environment, this conclusion has  
direct relevance: the study of coercion is an integral part of the study of  
strategic signaling, crisis communication and the limits of the use of force91.  
Regarding strategic culture in a deteriorating security environment,  
states on the contact line of geopolitical competition must avoid two  
extremes: the illusion that dialogue alone can stop any aggression and the  
symmetrical illusion that pressure alone can produce peace92. Under these  
conditions, a mature position combines defensive firmness with diplomatic  
openness, legal legitimacy with strategic clarity, and solidarity allied with  
regional initiative93.  
Regarding the implications for Romania in the context of the eastern  
flank and the Bucharest 9 format, we can state that, from an institutional and  
strategic point of view, we can trace the relationship between the military  
instrument, diplomacy and defense planning in a strategic border space.  
Thus, within the B9, Bulgaria and Romania represent the Pontic dimension  
of the eastern flank, and the group's agenda was focused on resilience,  
solidarity, increased defense spending and the assessment of the Russian  
threat94.  
In the opinion of some authors, the Bucharest 9 format emerged as a  
response to the growing insecurity in Eastern Europe and as an attempt to  
transform the concerns of the states in the region into a stronger voice  
within NATO95. In the same register, other authors treat B9 as a strategic  
88 NATO, 2022, op. cit.  
89 Ibidem.  
90  
Peksen Dursun, Jin Mun Jeong. 2022, „Coercive Diplomacy and Economic Sanctions  
Reciprocity: Explaining Targets' Counter-Sanctions." Defence and Peace Economics 33  
(8): 895-911. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2021.1919831.  
91  
Blankenship Brian, Erik Lin-Greenberg. 2022. "Trivial Tripwires? Military Capabilities  
and Alliance Reassurance." Security Studies 31 (1): 92-117. https://doi.org/-  
10.1080/09636412.2022.2038662.  
92 Verbeke Johan, 2023, op. cit.  
93 NATO 2022. op.cit.  
94 Turchyn Yaryna, Olha Ivasechko. 2022. „Challenges for Cooperation of the Participating  
States in the Bucharest Nine Format in the Conditions of the Evolution of Security Threats  
on NATO's Eastern Borders." SHV 8 (1): 7-12. https://doi.org/10.23939/shv2022.01.007.  
95  
Vaida Ovidiu. 2022. „The Bucharest 9 Format Between Rational Ambitious Goals and  
Real Influence." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Studia Europaea 67 (2): 183-197.  
https://doi.org/10.24193/subbeuropaea.2022.2.07.  
17  
               
FUNDAMENTAL CORRELATES OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY  
AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY  
deterrence mechanism on the eastern flank, relevant for strengthening the  
defense posture and for regional adaptation to the Russian threat.96.  
The joint declaration of the B9 Summit and the Nordic Allies in  
Bucharest, of 13 May 2026, confirms the expansion of the strategic  
framework of the Eastern flank from the regional logic of deterrence  
towards an integrated vision, which explicitly links the Black Sea to the  
Baltic Sea and the Nordic and Arctic space. The document reaffirms that  
Russia remains the main direct and lasting threat to Allied security and  
supports the need to consolidate a robust advanced defense posture, by  
increasing defense investments, strengthening military mobility, developing  
air and missile defense, protecting critical infrastructures and expanding the  
transatlantic defense industrial base. For Romania, these conclusions are  
relevant because they reconfirm the strategic centrality of the Black Sea  
region and strengthen Bucharest's role as an actor articulating between the  
Pontic and North-Eastern dimensions of Euro-Atlantic security. At the same  
time, the reaffirmation of support for Ukraine and the deepening of NATO-  
EU cooperation indicate that the B9 is increasingly functioning as a  
platform for strategic convergence, even if the reservation formulated by  
Hungary shows that this convergence is not without political limits.  
For Romania, the implications are clear: preventive diplomacy must  
be connected to early warning, maritime security, air defense, strategic  
infrastructure, military mobility and strategic communication; and coercive  
diplomacy must be thought of in terms of contributing to allied deterrence,  
not of isolated action97.  
7. Conclusions  
Regarding preventive diplomacy and coercive diplomacy, they  
express two distinct logics of international action: the logic of anticipation  
and the logic of pressure98. In a world marked by the increase in the number  
and intensity of conflicts, preventive diplomacy remains the most rational  
strategic option, and coercive diplomacy can only be justified as a limited,  
proportionate and de-escalation-oriented instrument99. Recent experiences  
show that prevention is fragile without political will, but also that coercion  
96  
Banasik Mirosław. 2021. „Bucharest Nine in the Process of Strategic Deterrence on  
NATO's Eastern Flank." The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies 1: 27-53.  
https://doi.org/10.12775/CJPS.2021.002.  
97 Idem.  
98  
Ramcharan Bertrand G. 2020. Contemporary Preventive Diplomacy. London and New  
York: Routledge, available at  
https://www.routledge.com/Contemporary-Preventive-  
Diplomacy/Ramcharan/p/book/9780367492342, accessed on 24.05.2026.  
99  
United Nations Secretary-General. 2023. Our Common Agenda: Policy Brief 9, A New  
Agenda  
for  
Peace.  
New  
York:  
United  
Nations,  
available  
at  
https://-  
digitallibrary.un.org/record/4015374, accessed on 24.05.2026.  
18  
       
General (ret) Professor Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D  
Major (ret) University Lecturer Aliodor MANOLEA. Ph.D  
is ineffective when objectives are maximalist, signals are unreliable or a  
negotiated outcome is lacking100.  
In military terms, the fundamental correlation between preventive  
diplomacy and coercive diplomacy is that both depend on the same strategic  
power base, but use it differently101. The first transforms capability into  
trust, stability, and diplomatic time; the second transforms capability into  
pressure, cost, and a signal of resolve102. For this reason, for states like  
Romania, located at the intersection of the eastern flank, the Black Sea and  
the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, future diplomatic efficiency will  
depend on the ability to integrate strategic thinking, defense diplomacy and  
military training into a unitary framework103.  
Therefore, the real alternative is not between preventive diplomacy  
and coercive diplomacy, but between their intelligent use and their defective  
use.  
We believe that, in the century of interconnected conflicts, success  
will not belong to actors who multiply threats, but to those who manage to  
combine prevention, legitimacy and limited pressure in a coherent security  
architecture104. In this sense, we note that diplomacy is not the opposite of  
power, but its most responsible form105.  
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