TACTICAL VICTORY, STRATEGIC FAILURE?  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REALPOLITIK  
Colonel (ret.) Doru - Constantin TOCILĂ, Ph.D  
Abstract: The article analyzes the relationship between the tactical  
effectiveness of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their capacity to generate  
durable strategic outcomes when employed as instruments of realpolitik. Using a  
multiple case study design, it compares the intervention of U.S. SOF in Somalia  
(1992-1993) with the use of Russian SOF in Chechnya (1994-1999), validated  
through controlled contemporary replications in the Sahel and Ukraine. The  
analysis suggests that repeated tactical success does not automatically translate into  
strategic advantage, as this conversion is mediated by political constraints,  
institutional structures, and decision-making logics.  
Keywords: Special Operations Forces; realpolitik; tactical success;  
strategic outcome; comparative case studies.  
DOI  
10.56082/annalsarscimilit.2026.1.63  
1. Introduction  
Since the end of the Cold War, Special Operations Forces (SOF) have  
acquired a privileged status within the strategic thinking of major powers.  
Flexible, discreet, and capable of producing disproportionate tactical effects,  
they are frequently presented as suitable instruments for managing conflict in  
an environment marked by strategic ambiguity, political constraints, and  
aversion to the costs of conventional warfare. Within this logic, SOF appear  
to offer decision-makers the promise of employing force without major  
escalation and with limited political costs. The extent to which this promise  
is, in practice, robust nevertheless remains an open question.  
The scholarly literature has emphasized the operational advantages of  
Special Operations Forces in post-Cold War conflicts, highlighting their  
capacity to reduce the immediate political costs associated with the use of  
force. At the same time, as reliance on SOF has intensified, numerous studies  
have identified a structural tension between the tactical success of special  
operations and their capacity to generate durable strategic outcomes. In the  
context of contemporary realpolitik, this disjunction is further amplified by  
domestic political and institutional constraints, with SOF operating at the  
intersection of strategy, politics, and public perception. Assessing them  
exclusively through the lens of operational performance therefore risks  
Email: doructin_tocila@yahoo.com, phone number: +40722500738.  
63  
 
TACTICAL VICTORY, STRATEGIC FAILURE? SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REALPOLITIK  
obscuring the problematic relationship between tactical efficiency and the  
political meaning of the use of force.  
From this tension emerges the central question of the article: can  
tactical victory, under certain conditions, produce strategic failure? Although  
this dilemma recurs in theoretical reflections on strategy, the concrete  
relationship between the use of Special Operations Forces as instruments of  
realpolitik and strategic outcome remains insufficiently examined from a  
comparative and process-oriented perspective, particularly with regard to the  
role of political structures in mediating this relationship.  
To address this problem, the article analyzes the use of Special Operations  
Forces by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, two  
actors that have invested heavily in these capabilities but operate within  
different political-institutional frameworks. The analysis focuses on two  
cases from the 1990s - the U.S. intervention in Somalia (1992-1993) and the  
use of Russian SOF in Chechnya (1994-1999) - a period of strategic transition  
in which the role of military force is being redefined. In both cases, SOF  
demonstrate high tactical effectiveness, yet with divergent strategic effects.  
To move beyond the limits of a strictly historical analysis, these case  
studies are integrated into a multiple case study research design based on the  
logic of analytical replication, validating the identified patterns through  
reference to the contemporary use of U.S. SOF in the Sahel and Russian SOF  
in Ukraine. The central objective is to demonstrate that Special Operations  
Forces cannot substitute for political strategy: their intensive use may  
generate the illusion of strategic control, while long-term consequences  
depend on how tactical performance is absorbed and managed by the political  
structure of the state.  
2. Theoretical and Methodological Framework  
2.1. Research Design and Analytical Framework  
The present article adopts a multiple case study research design with  
an explanatory purpose, appropriate for investigating how and why questions  
concerning the relationship between the use of Special Operations Forces and  
the strategic outcome of state action. This methodological choice is  
determined by the contextual and causal character of the phenomenon under  
examination, which involves complex political and institutional processes  
that are difficult to capture through quantitative methods or statistical  
comparisons. The study seeks to identify recurring causal patterns susceptible  
to analytical generalization, rather than to provide an exhaustive description  
of individual cases.  
The research strategy relies on the logic of replication rather than  
sampling. The primary cases - the use of Special Operations Forces by the  
United States in Somalia (1992-1993) and by the Russian Federation in  
Chechnya (1994-1999) - are treated as deliberate replications, selected in  
64  
Colonel (ret.) Doru - Constantin TOCILĂ, Ph.D  
order to test the same causal relationship within different political-  
institutional contexts. External validity is reinforced through complementary  
analytical replications, deliberately limited to the contemporary use of U.S.  
SOF in the Sahel (2013–2022) and of Russian SOF in Ukraine (2014–2022),  
in order to ensure analytical comparability and to avoid uncontrolled  
expansion of the empirical field.  
The analysis combines the correlation of empirical patterns with  
theoretical propositions (pattern matching), progressive explanation building,  
and process analysis, allowing for a causal reconstruction of the relationship  
between tactical success and strategic outcome in terms of contextualized  
analytical generalization rather than predictive inference. Within this  
framework, the unit of analysis is deliberately defined as the use of Special  
Operations Forces as instruments of realpolitik, rather than the individual  
military operation, campaign, or conflict as a whole, in order to avoid  
conflating tactical performance with strategic outcome. From a conceptual  
standpoint, the study operates with a clear distinction between the tactical,  
operational, and strategic levels of the use of force,1 situating the analysis at  
the latter level, where convergence or disjunction between tactical success  
and the political objectives pursued becomes manifest.  
This delimitation requires a rigorous operational definition of  
realpolitik, employed here not as a theory of international relations but as a  
practical logic of political decision-making. Realpolitik denotes the manner  
in which state decision-makers manage power and risk in a competitive  
environment by prioritizing strategic interest and power relations,  
independently of normative or ideological constraints.2 Operating at the level  
of governing practice, realpolitik explains the use of available instruments as  
a function of context, costs, and anticipated political effects, and is  
characterized by the primacy of political objectives over means, instrumental  
flexibility, and the management of domestic constraints that limit the  
conversion of tactical success into durable strategic advantage. In relation to  
offensive realism, realpolitik is treated as a compatible but distinct logic,  
useful for explaining how systemic pressures are concretely managed by  
decision-makers in specific historical contexts.  
2.2. Theoretical Positioning and Case Selection  
Within this study, the relationship between realpolitik and offensive  
realism is treated as one of functional convergence rather than theoretical  
equivalence: offensive realism explains the structural pressures that push  
states toward power maximization in an anarchic international system, while  
1 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 69-81.  
2 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed.  
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 4-16.  
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TACTICAL VICTORY, STRATEGIC FAILURE? SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REALPOLITIK  
realpolitik describes the concrete manner in which decision-makers manage  
these pressures within specific political and institutional contexts.3  
Realpolitik does not derive mechanically from offensive realism, but it is  
compatible with it insofar as it operates at the level of practical decision-  
making, where domestic constraints, political costs, and tactical opportunities  
mediate the conversion of military power into strategic outcome. This  
distinction allows for the explanation of a recurrent dynamic: the use of  
Special Operations Forces becomes a privileged instrument of realpolitik  
precisely because it offers decision-makers the ability to respond to systemic  
pressures through limited, politically controllable actions that may  
nevertheless remain strategically insufficient in the absence of a coherent  
political vision; in this sense, offensive realism provides the explanatory  
framework of competition, while realpolitik accounts for the selection and  
use of instruments, including the tendency to privilege immediate tactical  
success at the expense of consolidating a durable strategic advantage.  
This theoretical logic also informs the selection of the case studies, as,  
from a realpolitik perspective, Special Operations Forces are employed as  
flexible political instruments capable of generating rapid tactical effects  
below the threshold of strategic escalation and of providing decision-makers  
with an enhanced degree of control over political costs and engagement risks.4  
The attractiveness of SOF derives from their capacity to produce visible  
results with a reduced footprint and to enable fine-grained calibration of the  
use of force in the gray zones of strategic competition, in accordance with  
internal and external constraints. In this sense, SOF do not substitute for  
political strategy but become its preferred vehicles where conventional  
options are considered too costly or too escalatory; nevertheless, this  
instrumentalization favors a structural asymmetry between tactical success  
and strategic outcome, as the limited, discreet, and politically controllable  
character of special operations can encourage the accumulation of tactical  
successes without durable strategic conversion, transforming realpolitik into  
a logic of short-term risk management rather than the construction of a  
coherent strategic advantage.  
2.3. Analytical Strategy and Research Validity  
Within the logic of realpolitik, strict political control over Special  
Operations Forces tends to privilege the attainment of rapid and manageable  
tactical successes at the expense of a process of strategic internalization  
capable of transforming operational experience into long-term doctrinal  
3 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton &  
Company, 2001), pp. 29-46.  
4
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05: Joint Doctrine for Special Operations  
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 22, 2020), I-1–I-14.  
66  
   
Colonel (ret.) Doru - Constantin TOCILĂ, Ph.D  
adaptation and political clarity.5 SOF thus become ideal instruments for the  
management of immediate risk; however, this function as a “political safety  
valve” constrains strategic learning, as decision-making remains focused on  
maintaining control and avoiding escalation rather than on the reformulation  
of political objectives. The repetition of tactical success can reinforce the  
illusion of strategic effectiveness, masking the persistence of the disjunction  
between action and political end state and reducing pressure for structural  
adjustment; within this framework, the accumulation of positive operational  
results may coexist with the progressive degradation of the state’s strategic  
position, transforming tactical performance into a substitute for strategy  
rather than a multiplier of it.6  
The closure of this analytical framework allows the use of Special  
Operations Forces to be treated as a political and strategic process rather than  
as a sum of isolated military actions, integrating realpolitik as a practical logic  
of decision-making within the constraints described by offensive realism.7 By  
combining the multiple case study approach with the logic of analytical  
replication, the correlation of empirical patterns with theoretical propositions,  
and progressive explanation building, the analysis delineates the mechanisms  
through which tactical success is absorbed, distorted, or neutralized at the  
strategic level, creating the conditions for the comparative evaluation of the  
selected cases and preparing the transition to the empirical analysis of  
outcomes in Somalia and Chechnya.  
3. Special Operations Forces and the Dilemmas of realpolitik  
3.1. U.S. Special Operations Forces (U.S. SOF) in Somalia (1992-  
1993): Tactical Success and Political Constraint  
The U.S. intervention in Somalia quickly highlighted the capacity of  
Special Operations Forces to generate precise tactical successes in a  
fragmented and volatile environment, where ground-level intelligence,  
mobility, and direct action provided a clear operational advantage. U.S. SOF  
functioned as an efficiency multiplier within a mission initially defined by  
limited objectives, and their performance fueled political expectations of  
controlling violence without strategic escalation. Yet this very performance  
5 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New  
York: Free Press, 2002), ebook, chap. 1, “The Unequal Dialogue.”  
6
Linda Robinson, Special Operations Forces and the Strategic Context, Council Special  
Report no. 66 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013), pp.14-15. 17-19, available  
at  
https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2013/03/Special_Operations_CSR66.pdf  
accessed on February 1, 2026.  
7
Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods, 6th ed.  
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2018), ebook, chap. 1, “Getting Started: How to  
Know Whether and When to Use the Case Study Method”; chap. 2, “Designing Case Studies:  
Identifying Your Case(s) and Establishing the Logic of Your Case Study.”  
67  
     
TACTICAL VICTORY, STRATEGIC FAILURE? SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REALPOLITIK  
was absorbed into a restrictive political logic, in which tolerance for human  
and symbolic costs remained low, and the conversion of operational success  
into a coherent strategic gain became dependent on public opinion and the  
domestic decision-making calendar.8  
The breaking point was not one of military incompetence but of  
political incompatibility: the tactical effectiveness of SOF coexisted with a  
fragilization of political will, while strict civilian control transformed  
acceptable risk into a paralyzing constraint. Rather than facilitating strategic  
adaptation,  
tactical  
successes  
reinforced the illusion of conflict  
manageability, until an operational shock triggered withdrawal and  
neutralized any accumulated strategic capital. The Somali case thus illustrates  
how, in a democratic context highly sensitive to costs, a realpolitik grounded  
in limited actions can produce convincing tactical results that remain  
strategically insufficient, raising the question that structures the subsequent  
comparison: what happens when the same logic is applied within a regime  
characterized by far more limited domestic political constraints?  
3.2. Russian Special Operations Forces (Russian SOF) in  
Chechnya (1994-1999): Coercion, Escalation, and Strategic Control  
In Chechnya, the use of Russian Special Operations Forces unfolds  
within a coercive logic explicitly oriented toward the restoration of strategic  
control over a contested periphery, where tactical performance is  
subordinated to the political objective of domination. Russian SOF act as  
vectors of controlled escalation, integrated into a broader apparatus of  
selective violence, intimidation, and demonstrations of force capable of  
converting operational successes into cumulative political pressure. In  
contrast to the U.S. case, tactical effectiveness is not constrained by  
comparable domestic political sensitivities, and human and symbolic costs  
are absorbed within a centralized decision-making framework conducive to  
the continuity of action.9  
This integration of SOF into a strategy of escalatory coercion allows  
for a more direct conversion of tactical success into immediate strategic  
effect, albeit at a structural cost: the normalization of violence as an  
instrument of governance and the externalization of long-term instability. The  
control achieved does not result from strategic internalization or reflexive  
doctrinal adaptation, but from the saturation of political space through force,  
producing apparent stability rather than durable resolution. The Chechen case  
thus demonstrates that, within a regime characterized by reduced internal  
8
John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections  
on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press,  
1995), pp. 115-148.  
9 Mark Galeotti, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2014), pp.  
35-41.  
68  
   
Colonel (ret.) Doru - Constantin TOCILĂ, Ph.D  
constraints, realpolitik can facilitate short-term strategic effectiveness  
through mechanisms that accumulate long-term vulnerabilities, raising the  
question of the continuity of this model when replicated in different contexts.  
3.3. Controlled Contemporary Replications: U.S. SOF in the Sahel  
(2013-2022) and Russian SOF in Ukraine (2014-2022)  
The contemporary replications are used exclusively as tests of  
analytical robustness rather than as autonomous case studies, in order to  
verify the persistence of patterns identified in the 1990s across different  
strategic contexts. In the Sahel (2013-2022), the use of U.S. SOF is oriented  
toward assistance, advising, and support to local partners, maintaining a high  
degree of political control and a reduced operational footprint; although this  
approach generates repeated tactical successes and locally degrades insurgent  
networks, their conversion into durable strategic effect remains constrained  
by the fragility of local actors and by the domestic political constraints of the  
intervention. In Ukraine (2014-2022), the employment of Russian SOF  
follows a logic centered on operations within a zone of strategic ambiguity  
(the gray zone), combining clandestine action, coercion, and plausible  
deniability in order to produce rapid political effects without overt  
conventional engagement; this use allows the attainment of an initial strategic  
advantage but accumulates structural tensions that erode the sustainability of  
the model over the medium term. Taken together, these replications confirm  
that SOF function effectively as instruments of short-term risk management  
within the logic of realpolitik, but that the limits of converting tactical success  
into strategic outcome remain dependent on political structure, the capacity  
for strategic internalization, and the institutional context of the state.10  
Viewed comparatively, the contemporary replications suggest that  
differences between the American and Russian approaches do not negate the  
existence of a shared pattern of strategic limitation. In both cases, Special  
Operations Forces function as privileged instruments of political decision-  
making precisely because they enable action below the threshold of  
conventional escalation, yet this very quality simultaneously becomes a  
strategic trap: the reduction of immediate risk diminishes pressure for the  
clarification of political objectives and for the assumption of the costs  
associated with a durable solution. As a result, SOF tend to stabilize unstable  
situations temporarily without transforming them structurally, while the  
10 Nina Wilén, “The Impact of Security Force Assistance in Niger: Meddling with Borders,”  
International  
Affairs  
98,  
no.  
4
(2022):  
pp.  
1410-1414,  
available  
at  
https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac119; Chad Borgman, “The Risks of Reducing U.S. Special  
Operations in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 13, 2018, available at  
https://www.cfr.org/articles/risks-reducing-us-special-operations-africa,  
accessed  
on  
February 1, 2026); Mark Galeotti, The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the  
New Way of War (London: Yale University Press, 2022), ebook, chap. 3, “Soldiering-Plus  
and Gig Geopolitics.”  
69  
 
TACTICAL VICTORY, STRATEGIC FAILURE? SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REALPOLITIK  
realpolitik they serve remains oriented toward crisis management rather than  
crisis resolution, thereby explaining the persistence of tensions and the re-  
emergence of conflict in adapted forms.  
In support of this comparative interpretation, Figure 3.1 visually  
synthesizes the multiple case study logic employed in this article. The vertical  
columns represent the processual sequence of the use of Special Operations  
Forces in each analyzed context, from initial engagement and tactical success  
to strategic conversion and final political outcome, without assuming  
automatic causal determinism between these levels. The dotted horizontal  
lines indicate relationships of analytical replication in the sense of Yin’s  
methodology rather than direct causal interactions between cases: at the level  
of tactical success, literal replication is highlighted, while at the level of  
strategic conversion, theoretical replication appears, reflecting systematic  
variation determined by different political-institutional frameworks.  
Figure 3.1 The use of Special Operations Forces as instruments of realpolitik: analytical  
replication logic and divergent strategic outcomes  
Through this representation, the figure highlights that similarity in  
tactical performance does not imply strategic convergence and that  
differences in outcome are explicable through the political mediation of  
operational success. Observable convergence at the tactical level thus coexists  
with persistent divergence at the strategic level, driven not by intrinsic  
differences in capability but by distinct political-institutional architectures  
that filter and exploit SOF operational effectiveness in different ways. This  
disjunction constitutes the point of departure for the analysis of comparative  
patterns and causal mechanisms developed in the following subsection.  
70  
Colonel (ret.) Doru - Constantin TOCILĂ, Ph.D  
3.4. Comparative Patterns and Causal Explanations: Strategic  
Convergences and Divergences  
The comparative analysis of the cases reveals a convergent pattern at  
the tactical level and a persistent divergence at the strategic level. In both the  
use of U.S. SOF and Russian SOF, high operational effectiveness enables the  
attainment of rapid results that are politically controllable and adaptable to  
context, confirming the attractiveness of SOF as privileged instruments of  
realpolitik. Yet the mechanisms through which tactical success is converted  
differ structurally: in the American case, domestic political constraints and  
sensitivity to costs limit strategic internalization, whereas in the Russian case,  
centralized decision-making and a high tolerance for escalation facilitate  
short-term strategic control while accumulating long-term vulnerabilities.  
Thus, tactical convergence masks causal divergences generated by distinct  
political-institutional architectures rather than by intrinsic differences in  
military capabilities.11  
From an explanatory perspective, the identified patterns indicate that  
realpolitik mediated by SOF functions effectively as a mechanism for risk  
management and for managing competition below the threshold of  
conventional escalation, but quickly reaches its limits when employed as a  
substitute for political strategy. In the absence of strategic internalization -  
understood as doctrinal adaptation, clarification of political objectives, and  
the assumption of costs - tactical successes tend to reproduce strategic  
fragility, either through withdrawal and abandonment (the American case) or  
through escalatory coercion with cumulatively destabilizing effects (the  
Russian case). This causal explanation supports the central thesis of the  
article: tactical victory can become strategic failure when realpolitik  
prioritizes immediate control at the expense of constructing a durable  
strategic advantage.  
The comparative patterns further indicate that the central problem  
does not reside in the performance of Special Operations Forces as such, but  
in the manner in which they are absorbed by the political architecture of  
strategic decision-making. When realpolitik privileges immediate control,  
risk management, and the avoidance of escalation, tactical success acquires  
autonomous political value and tends to substitute for the clarification of  
long-term objectives, transforming operational efficiency into a sufficient  
criterion for action. At this point, a fundamental tension emerges: instruments  
designed to expand strategic options can end up narrowing the decision-  
making horizon, temporarily stabilizing unstable situations without  
transforming them structurally. This ambiguity does not invalidate the utility  
of SOF, but it calls into question the capacity of realpolitik to produce durable  
11 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966),  
pp. 15-24.  
71  
 
TACTICAL VICTORY, STRATEGIC FAILURE? SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REALPOLITIK  
strategic outcomes when practiced predominantly as crisis management  
rather than as a coherent political project.  
4. Conclusions  
The comparative analysis of the use of Special Operations Forces by  
the United States and the Russian Federation reveals a strategic regularity that  
cuts across doctrinal and institutional differences between the two actors:  
tactical success, even when repeated and visible, does not automatically  
translate into a durable strategic advantage. In Somalia and Chechnya, as well  
as in the contemporary replications in the Sahel and Ukraine, Special  
Operations Forces function as privileged instruments of political decision-  
making, capable of producing rapid effects below the threshold of  
conventional  
escalation,  
yet  
insufficient  
to  
generate  
structural  
transformations of the strategic environment.  
The study demonstrates that this disjunction does not stem from an  
operational deficiency of SOF, but from the manner in which they are  
embedded within the logic of state realpolitik. In both cases examined, the  
use of force is mediated by domestic political constraints and by aversion to  
the costs associated with strategic commitment, favoring the accumulation of  
tactical successes in the absence of a clear articulation of final political  
objectives. The resulting realpolitik is oriented predominantly toward risk  
management and crisis handling rather than crisis resolution, transforming  
SOF into instruments of temporary stabilization of instability.  
The differences between the American and Russian approaches do not  
invalidate this conclusion but rather nuance it. In the case of the Russian  
Federation, more centralized political control and a higher tolerance for  
escalation allow a more coherent strategic conversion of tactical success,  
albeit at elevated political and normative costs. In the case of the United  
States, institutional constraints and sensitivity to domestic political costs limit  
the capacity for strategic transformation, even in the presence of superior  
tactical performance. The divergence in outcomes thus reflects not the  
intrinsic superiority of one model over another, but the different ways in  
which state political structures filter the use of force.  
The principal contribution of the article lies in demonstrating that  
Special Operations Forces cannot substitute for political strategy. Their  
intensive use, in the absence of a coherent political vision, can foster an  
illusion of strategic control in which the accumulation of tactical successes  
masks stagnation or degradation of the state’s strategic position. Figure 3.1  
synthesizes this logic, showing that similarity in tactical performance does  
not imply strategic convergence and that differences in outcome are  
explicable through political-institutional variables rather than through SOF  
capabilities as such.  
72  
Colonel (ret.) Doru - Constantin TOCILĂ, Ph.D  
From a theoretical perspective, the article supports the utility of  
realpolitik as a distinct analytical variable, compatible with offensive realism  
yet better suited to explaining how systemic pressures are concretely managed  
by decision-makers. Realpolitik does not explain why states seek to maximize  
power, but how they choose to exercise it, with which instruments, and at  
what costs assumed or avoided. In this sense, Special Operations Forces  
emerge not as a strategic solution in themselves, but as a symptom of a  
political strategy that is cautious, fragmented, or deliberately ambiguous.  
Finally, the limitations of the study derive from the choice of a  
multiple case study design and analytical generalization, which deliberately  
restricts the empirical field and claims explanatory relevance conditioned by  
context. Yet this limitation also opens avenues for future research. Real-world  
decision-makers do not “belong” to a single theory of international relations;  
rather, they employ theories as flexible registers of justification and  
interpretation. In this sense, Special Operations Forces illustrate a form of  
strategic hybridization: realist in execution, liberal in justification, and  
constructivist in legitimation - an expression of calculated decision-making  
pragmatism in which tactics may function flawlessly while strategy remains  
postponed, delegated, or replaced by its own efficiency.  
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