THE WHITE PAPER FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE

AND THE REARM EUROPE – READINESS 2030

RE-ARMAMENT PLAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR ROMANIA

Major (ret.) Sînziana IANCU, Ph.D^

Abstract: The White Paper for European Defence and the “ReArm Europe

– Readiness 2030” re-armament plan represent two key instruments designed to

reinforce the European Union’s security and defence posture in an increasingly

volatile strategic environment. While the Strategic Compass provides the

overarching vision for EU security and defence, the White Paper translates this

vision into capability development priorities, whereas ReArm Europe works on the

operational level through industrial, financial and technological measures aimed at

strengthening defence readiness by 2030.

For Romania, positioned on the EU and NATO Eastern Flank, these

initiatives carry significant implications. Firstly, they offer opportunities to enhance

national defence capabilities by supporting investment in critical systems and

encouraging cross-border cooperation in procurement, innovation and joint

development. Secondly, ReArm Europe provides a framework to stimulate the

Romanian defence industry by integrating it into European supply chains and

reducing dependency on external actors. Thirdly, alignment with these instruments

strengthens interoperability with NATO forces, reinforces deterrence against

regional threats and elevates Romania’s strategic profile within the EU.

Ultimately, an effective implementation will depend on the coherence of

national planning, financial commitment and industrial modernization. For

Romania, active engagement in these initiatives is not only beneficial, but necessary

to consolidate its defence posture and contribute to European strategic resilience.

Keywords: The White Paper, EU, NATO, Romania, rearmament, defence,

resilience.

DOI

10.56082/annalsarscimilit.2026.1.38

I. WHY IS THE WHITE DEFENCE PAPER NECESSARY?

I.1. The main security challenges mentioned by the White

Paper

The White Defence Paper reveals the main security challenges that

the EU states are confronting with. It was first published on 19^thof March,

2025. Within the introduction of the document, it is stated that “a new

international order will be created in the second half of this decade”¹. The



Minister Counsellor within the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, corresponding

member of the Academy of National Security Sciences, email: iancu_sanziana@yahoo.com.

1

European Commission, JOINT WHITE PAPER for European Defence Readiness 2030,

page 1, available at https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/-

30b50d2c-49aa-4250-9ca6-27a0347cf009_en?filename=White%20Paper.pdf, accessed on

5^thof November, 2025.

38

Major (ret.) Sînziana IANCU, Ph.D

security threats posed by the non-EU actors have strongly impacted the

European political system, also having a negative approach on economic

growth “as people fear the consequences of a break of the international order

due to the behaviour of hostile actors.”². Hence, Europe must be prepared to

face this kind of challenge and, nevertheless, to become part of this order and

not just merely a witness to changes around the world.

The White Paper identifies Russian Federation and the People’s

Republic of China as states that threaten Europe’s security, although in the

latter case the importance of commercial bonding between the People’s

Republic of China and most of the European states is also emphasized. Thus,

the Russian Federation will continue to scale up its war economy, being

firmly supported by its close allies, such as Belarus, the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea and Iran. Moreover, the Russian Federation has been

“massively expanding its military industrial production capacity with an

estimated spending in 2024 of 40% of the Russian federal budget and up to

9% of its GDP (up from 6% in 2023) on defence. In 2025, Russian Federation

is expected to surpass Member States’ defence spending in purchasing power

parity terms.”³. Subsequently, the Russian Federation has made it clear that,

in their perception, the war with the West is present and ongoing. In the

foreseeable future, the Russian Federation will continue to pose a significant

threat to Europe’s security, especially in what concerns its nuclear posture

and the positioning of nuclear weapons in Belarus. According to the White

Paper, provided the Russian Federation is permitted to attain its objectives in

Ukraine, no one should be surprised if its territorial ambition extends beyond.

Why is this happening? Because it is an authoritarian regime, with historic

aspirations, consistently fuelling instability and tensions in its geographical

proximity, which includes EU’s neighbourhood (whether it is in the Western

Balkans, Georgia, Moldova or Armenia).

In the meantime, the People’s Republic of China is a key trading

partner for the EU, hastily expanding its own capabilities, starting from the

military ones, including nuclear, and going to space and cyber capabilities. In

this context, it is majorly increasing its defence spending, all covered by a

lack of transparency. Currently, it has “the second highest military spending

in the world, surpassing all other East Asian countries combined”⁴.

In terms of EU’s defence expenditure, since 2021 it has increased by

appx. 31%, reaching 1.9% of the EU’s combined GDP (326 billion EUR) in

2024, more precisely – 102 billion EUR. This amount is far lower than the

total US defence spending or Russian Federation’s or the People’s Republic

of China ’s, for that matter. Thus, the process of building a strong European

²Ibidem., page 3.

³Ibidem., page 4.

⁴Idem.

39

THE WHITE PAPER FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND THE REARM EUROPE –

READINESS 2030 RE-ARMAMENT PLAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR ROMANIA

defence will also require “massive and sustained investment, both public and

private.”⁵

The White Paper outlines various measures, which are essential for

Europe’s security, for addressing critical capability gaps and for building a

strong defence industrial base. It proposes ways in which Member States

could make substantial investments in defence, by both acquiring defence

systems and enhancing the long-term readiness of the European defence

industry. Therefore, Europe ought to invest on the continent’s security and

defence levels and continue to alleviate major threats translated in conflicts

on its territory or in its proximity. In this regard, the White Paper highlights

several main courses of action⁶:

* Addressing capability gaps, with a focus on the critical capabilities

identified by Member States.

* Supporting the European defence industry by aggregating demand

and increasing collaborative public procurement.

* Supporting Ukraine through enhanced military assistance and

deeper integration between European and Ukrainian defence industries.

* Deepening the EU-level defence market, including through

regulatory simplification.

* Accelerating defence transformation through disruptive innovation,

such as AI and quantum technology.

* Increasing Europe’s readiness for worst-case scenarios by

improving military mobility, establishing stockpiles and strengthening

external borders—particularly the land border with Russian Federation and

Belarus.

* Strengthening partnerships with like-minded countries around the

world.

⁵SOARE, Andreea, White Paper on Defence: It is time for Europe to arm itself. The United

States believes it is too engaged in European security and is reducing its role as Europe’s

security guarantor (Carta Albă a Apărării: Este momentul ca Europa să se înarmeze. SUA

cred că sunt prea angajate în securitatea europeană şi reduc rolul de garant al securităţii

Europei), in Monitor of Defense and Security (Monitorul Apărării și Securității), 20th of

March, 2025, available at https://monitorulapararii.ro/carta-alba-a-apararii-este-momentul-

ca-europa-sa-se-inarmeze-sua-cred-ca-sunt-prea-angajate-in-securitatea-europeana-si-

reduc-rolul-de-garant-al-1-57964, accessed on 05.11.2025.

6

European Commission, Romanian Representation (Comisia Europeană, Reprezentanța în

România), Comisia prezintă Cartea albă pentru apărarea europeană și Planul de

reînarmare a Europei „ReArm Europe – Readiness 2030”, available at https://romania.-

representation.ec.europa.eu/news/comisia-prezinta-cartea-alba-pentru-apararea-europeana-

si-planul-de-reinarmare-europei-rearm-europe-2025-03-19_ro,

November, 2025.

accessed

on

06^th

of

40

Major (ret.) Sînziana IANCU, Ph.D

I.2. The role of EU’s organisms in defence and Europe

readiness

The White Paper also talks about the global technological race, which

makes it even more necessary for EU’s doctrine and planning process. In a

world full of geopolitical interests and political turnarounds, the never-ending

hybrid threats, such as cyber-attacks, electronic interference in global

navigation and satellite systems, sabotage activities, manipulation and

disinformation campaigns, political and industrial espionage become

priorities when talking about building a safer environment. The question to

be is „How will Member States be able to manage all the threats, risks and

vulnerabilities and what will the measures, solutions, strategies look like?”

“Cooperation, governance, resilience” are the top buzz-words all around the

world, but will they suffice? These are questions that will need to be answered

sooner or later by all of the EU’s states and EU’s officials and governing

structures, as conflicts rise more frequently than not. The terms cooperation,

governance and resilience are necessary, but not sufficient on their own.

Success will depend on sustained defence investment, deeper integration in

procurement and production chains, hybrid defence and cybersecurity

architectures, rapid and common threat assessments, faster decision-making

that is less intergovernmentally constrained and stronger EU - NATO

complementarity.

The EU’s four decisional institutions, as the European Parliament, the

European Council, the EU’s Council and the European Commission⁷are

some of the European main institutions that could manage and apply a three-

pronged fork as strategic guidance, decision-making mechanisms and

resource allocation. While concepts such as cooperation, governance and

resilience have become recurring policy imperatives, their effectiveness will

depend on the depth of implementation, the degree of Member State

convergence and the readiness of political drive and resources, all of which

remain rather uneven across the EU.

The European Council may very well play an important role in

defining collective threat perceptions, steering agreement on investment

priorities (e.g., defence capability gaps, industrial consolidation) and also

strengthening alignment with NATO. The European Parliament acts through

oversight, budgetary authority and political messaging. It can also push for

coherent governance frameworks, demand accountability for defence

expenditure, boost deeper cooperation with NATO and trusted partners /

allies. The European Parliament’s influence remains indirect, but growing

fast, especially in budgetary matters. The Council and the European

7

European Union, Types of institutions and bodies, available at https://european-union.-

europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutions-and-bodies/types-institutions-and-bodies_en,

accessed on 5^thof November, 2025.

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THE WHITE PAPER FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND THE REARM EUROPE –

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Parliament negotiators reached a provisional agreement on measures to

incentivise defence-related investments in the current EU budget to

implement the so-called ReArm Europe plan, an EU initiative to increase

defence spending and strengthen the EU’s military capabilities.⁸The

agreement includes a milestone decision in implementing the ReArm Europe

plan and in the EU’s progress towards increasing its defence readiness by

2030, while also associating Ukraine to the European Defence Fund, thus

emphasizing the EU’s enduring commitment to Ukraine’s security, resilience

and gradual integration into the European defence industrial base.⁹In addition

to

this,

the

co-legislators

decided

to extend

EU

financial

support within Horizon Europe to defence-related companies, while largely

upholding the eligibility rules already present in EU instruments such as

SAFE (Security Action for Europe Instrument) and EDIP (European Defence

Programme).

The European Commission is also able to develop industrial

consolidation instruments (ReArm Europe; EDIP), strengthen dual-use

innovation ecosystems and last, but not least, enhance cybersecurity. Its

biggest challenge will be transforming fragmented national markets into a

genuinely integrated defence industrial base. The Council of the EU is able

to spread on policy through legislative and coordination functions. Its

capacity to respond will depend on integrating national defence planning

processes, refining solidarity techniques in crisis management and also

advancing military mobility, procurement synergies and infrastructure

protection.

Other than that, the EU has established three agencies that perform

technical, scientific and management tasks, with the mission of assisting the

EU Member States in implementing the Common Foreign and Security

Policy. These are:

* The European Defence Agency (EDA) – involved in military

cooperation among EU Member States, the development of defence

capabilities and the promotion of defence-related research and technology;

* The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) –

provides analyses on issues related to foreign, security and defence policy,

contributing to debates on security strategy in Europe and globally;

* The European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) – supplies geospatial

intelligence products through the analysis of data from Earth-observation

8

European Council, EU investments in defence: Council and Parliament agree to support

faster, more flexible and coordinated investments in European defence, - updated press

release on 07^thof November, 2025, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/-

press/press-releases/2025/11/05/eu-investments-in-defence-council-and-parliament-agree-

to-support-faster-more-flexible-and-coordinated-investments-in-european-defence/,

accessed on 07^thof November, 2025.

⁹Idem.

42

Major (ret.) Sînziana IANCU, Ph.D

satellites, issuing early-warning alerts to decision-makers on potential crises,

to support diplomatic, economic and humanitarian action.

Conflicts are occurring more frequently and with hybrid dimensions

that blur the lines between peace and war. Therefore, all the EU’s organisms

become of high importance when dealing with solving problematic incidents

around Europe’s territory, when finding mechanisms for retaliation (e.g.,

economic sanctions etc.) or when fighting with lack of cohesion among

Member States. This requires the EU to move beyond rhetorical alignment

into structural transformation. Sooner rather than later, the EU must decide

whether it aims to become a strategic actor or to remain a strategic arena in

which others act.

The White Paper is of so much importance due to the fact that it had

identified the defence and security needs of EU Member States in order to

ensure effective deterrence against a possible conflict, as follows^{10 11}

:

* air and missile defence: an integrated, multi-layered air and missile

defence system that protects against the full spectrum of aerial threats (cruise

missiles, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, aircraft and UAS);

* artillery systems: advanced combat systems, including modern

artillery systems and long-range missiles, designed to conduct precise, long-

distance strikes against land targets (precision strike);

* ammunition and missiles: building on the European External Action

Service initiative “Ammunition Plan 2.0,” a strategic stockpile of

ammunition, missiles and components, together with a sufficient level of

industrial defence production capacity to ensure timely replenishment;

* drones and counter-drone systems: unmanned systems, including

aerial, ground, surface and underwater vehicles that can be remotely

controlled or operate autonomously using advanced software and sensors,

enhancing the capabilities these technologies provide (e.g., situational

awareness, surveillance etc.);

* military mobility: an EU-wide network of land corridors, airports,

seaports and support elements and services that facilitate the rapid and

seamless transport of troops and military equipment within the EU and to

partner countries;

* AI, quantum, cyber & electronic warfare: defence applications

using military AI and quantum computing; advanced EU-level electronic

systems designed to protect and ensure unhindered use of the electromagnetic

spectrum for land, air, space and naval forces and operations; suppress,

disrupt and deny an adversary’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum; protect

freedom of action in cyberspace and ensure unhindered access to cyber

¹⁰SOARE, Andreea, op. cit.

¹¹European Commission, JOINT WHITE PAPER for European Defence Readiness 2030,

pages 6-7, loc.cit.

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THE WHITE PAPER FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND THE REARM EUROPE –

READINESS 2030 RE-ARMAMENT PLAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR ROMANIA

capabilities. Both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities are needed to

ensure protection and freedom of manoeuvre in cyberspace;

* strategic enablers and protection of critical infrastructure:

including, but not limited to, strategic airlift and air-to-air refuelling aircraft,

intelligence and surveillance, maritime domain awareness, the use and

protection of space and other secure communication assets and military fuel

infrastructure.

The White Defence Paper states that by creating the required standards

to frontload investment in defence sector, providing necessary predictability

to industry and reducing red-tape, the EU will sustain Member States to attain

full readiness by 2030.¹²By setting out a plan to rearm and build up Europe’s

defence in order to tackle the imminent or medium-term threats, the White

Paper highlights several strategies seen as priorities¹³:

* Member States are expected to demand the activation of the

National Escape Clause, by the end of April.

* The Council is expected to assume the proposed draft Regulation on

Security and Action for Europe (SAFE) as a matter of urgency.

* The co-legislators are expected to adopt the European Defence

Industry Programme (EDIP) before summer, including its Ukraine Support

Instrument (USI).

* The co-legislators are also invited to consider with priority the

changes to the European Regional Development Fund that will be proposed

by the end of March 2025. Following the midterm review of cohesion policies,

national, regional and local authorities, they will be able to voluntarily

allocate funds within their current programmes towards emerging priorities

including strengthening defence and security capabilities.

* Member States are invited to swiftly step up collaborative defence

procurement in line with the target of at least 40% proposed by the European

Defence Industry Strategy (EDIS), including under the aegis of the SAFE

instrument.

* Member States are expected to swiftly agree on an ambitious new

military support initiative for Ukraine, including artillery ammunition, air

defence and “train and equip”.

* The Commission will promote the integration of Ukrainian defence

industry into the Single Market, support the extension of military mobility

corridors into Ukraine and explore Ukraine’s access to EU space-based

governmental services.

* The Commission calls on the Board of Governors of the European

Investment Bank to urgently step up support to the European defence

¹²Ibidem., page 5.

¹³Ibidem., page 21.

44

Major (ret.) Sînziana IANCU, Ph.D

industry, notably by further narrowing the list of excluded activities and

increasing the volume of available funding.

* The Commission will immediately launch a Strategic Dialogue with

the defence industry, also calling on the expertise of the EDA or the EU

Military Staff as appropriate.

* The Commission will present, by June 2025, a Defence Omnibus

Simplification proposal.

* The EU will present a European Armament Technological Roadmap

on investment into dual-use advanced technological capabilities in 2025.

* The Commission and the HR will adopt, by end of 2025, a Joint

communication on Military Mobility, accompanied by the necessary

legislative proposals.

The White Defence Paper concludes by stating that a significant

increase in defence spending would generate broad economic benefits,

boosting competitiveness, employment and technological progress across

multiple industries, starting from aeronautics and shipbuilding and going to

steel, space, transport and artificial intelligence. If effectively leveraged, this

momentum could considerably strengthen Europe’s resilience amid an

increasingly threat-rich global environment.

II. ROMANIA’S ROLE WITHIN EU’S AGENDA

In the field of security, the EU seeks to become a more capable and

autonomous actor, particularly by strengthening the Common Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP). Initiatives such as PESCO (Permanent Structured

Cooperation), BUS (Brussels-based Union Security) and the European

Defence Fund are intended to boost defence cooperation among Member

States and reduce fragmentation within the European defence market.¹⁴

Strategic autonomy does not imply a separation from NATO, but rather the

strengthening of Europe’s ability to act independently in its proximity or in

support of the transatlantic Alliance.

For Romania, active participation in these structures represents both

an opportunity to modernize its armed forces and national defence industry,

as well as a political instrument for influencing decision-making processes

concerning European security policies. As an active participant in PESCO

projects, Romania takes part in initiatives aimed at military mobility, the

development of cyber defence and military personnel training. At the same

time, Romania benefits from financial support through the European Defence

14

European External Action Service, The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, A

Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, available at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/-

strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en, accessed on 30^thof April, 2025.

45

THE WHITE PAPER FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND THE REARM EUROPE –

READINESS 2030 RE-ARMAMENT PLAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR ROMANIA

Fund for the modernization of its defence industry and the strengthening of

its own capabilities.¹⁵

In terms of Romanis’s particular role within the White Defence Paper,

everyone knows the fact that geography doesn’t change. Its strategic location

(on the Eastern flank), adjacent to the Black Sea, represents an essential hub

for projecting defence and deterrence, through air/missile defence, mobility

corridors and Black Sea security. Another important aspect regards aligning

national capability planning with EU-wide priorities, which is actually an

opportunity for a direct investment into modernisation of own armed forces,

especially in the context of EU’s capabilities’ shortfalls.

Moreover, with the EU desire for a defence industrial base that is less

fragmented and more scale-efficient, Romania’s defence area possesses the

opportunity to access EU financial instruments (e.g., SAFE, EDF) and join

collaborative procurement efforts for military equipment. Thus, Romania

could accelerate a multi-annual planning, increase equipment acquisition and

participate in pan-European funding mechanisms.

One significant role that Romania might undertake is becoming a

bridge between the Black Sea region and EU institutions. This would

definitely strengthen Romania’s strategic presence within the EU, enhancing

its credibility on the decision-making / negotiation table. By having a dual

presence, within the EU and NATO, Romania is able to synchronize its

defence capabilities to both frameworks, which would well serve both

national and European security objectives.

Nevertheless, Romania should also prioritise growing its resilience,

for instance through logistical hubs, strategic stockpiles, dual-use

infrastructure, thereby becoming a regional resilience node.

III.CONCLUSIONS

The White Defence Paper appears as a strategic response to the

continuous deterioration of Europe’s security and the rise of authoritarian

powers seeking to reshape the global order. It emerges due to the necessity of

finding pragmatic solutions to the intensification of hybrid threats and the

widening of the geopolitical gap between Europe and other global actors.

The Paper identifies the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic

of China as primary strategic challengers, perceiving Russian Federation as

an aggressive actor, having a belligerent nuclear posture and using

destabilizing influence in Europe’s neighbourhood. In the meantime, the

People’s Republic of China is seen as an ambitious actor with an increased

military spending, technological advances and opaque strategic interests.

15

European Defence Cooperation, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), available

at

https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/permanent-structured-

cooperation-(PESCO), accessed on 29^thof April, 2025.

46

Major (ret.) Sînziana IANCU, Ph.D

The White Defence Paper outlines a multilevel plan so to strengthen

European defence through the development of the Member States’ military

capabilities along with the consolidation of the defence industrial base,

boosting the financial and logistical sustenance for Ukraine, reinforcing

military mobility and bringing innovation in disruptive technologies to the

table. Moreover, it highlights key priority areas (precision strike capabilities,

drone, counter-drone, cyber and electronic systems and critical

infrastructure), which are meant to be used, but also protected through

prevention or rapid reactions to hostile actions.

Equally, the White Defence Paper underlines that governance reform

is as important as capability acquisition, especially within the cooperation,

governance and resilience context, which imply faster decision-making,

optimal threat assessment and a healthy EU-NATO interoperability.

The role of the EU’s institutional ecosystem (European Council,

European Commission, Council of the EU and European Parliament)

remains central in determining guidelines, finances, economic policy and

even oversight. Complementing them are the EU’s specialized agencies

(EDA, EUISS, SatCen), which contribute with both technical and operational

support.

For Romania, the White Defence Paper offers both responsibility and

opportunity. Romania’s strategic location on the Eastern flank, bordering the

Black Sea, positions it both on the forehead of the risks and at the forefront

of deterrence and defence. It acts not only as a bridge between the EU and the

Black Sea region, enhancing its strategic relevance and influence within

European institutions, but also as a key partner in developing EU capabilities

in air and missile defence, mobility corridors and Black Sea situational

awareness. Romania’s dual membership in the EU and NATO provides a

unique chance to be part of the interoperability, deterrence and also be an

integrated response to crises.

Lastly, the White Defence Paper stresses that Europe stands at a

decisive juncture. Attaining full readiness by 2030 requires structural

conversion (efficient strategic planning, sustainable defence investment,

industrial integration and strong transatlantic bond). Provided these efforts

are pursued with determination, the EU might significantly improve its

deterrence posture while protecting its neighbourhood and generate wider

economic benefits.

The overarching conclusion is clear: Europe should transition from

reactive adaptation to proactive strategic empowerment. The choice is binary:

become a strategic actor shaping the international order or remain in the

strategic arena shaped by others.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, JOINT WHITE PAPER for European

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Cartea albă pentru apărarea europeană și Planul de reînarmare

a Europei „ReArm Europe – Readiness 2030” available at

https://romania.representation.ec.europa.eu/, 2025;

EUROPEAN COUNCIL, EU investments in defence: Council and Parliament

agree to support faster, more flexible and coordinated

investments

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/, 2025;

EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION, Permanent

in

European

defence,

available

at

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Cooperation (PESCO), available at https://eda.europa.eu/, 2025;

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SUA cred că sunt prea angajate în securitatea europeană şi reduc

rolul de garant al securităţii Europei, in Monitorul Apărării și

Securității, available at https://monitorulapararii.ro/, 2025.

48