VULNERABILITIES OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION

IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

Senior Researcher Mirela ATANASIU, Ph.D^*

(Academy of Romanian Scientists, 3 Ilfov Street, 050044, Bucharest,

Romania, email: secretariat@aosr.ro)

Abstract: In a democracy, the military organization has a specific set of

characteristics. The democratic framework, at the one hand, it provides a series of

strengths rooted in legitimacy and resources, and, on the other hand, it triggers

vulnerabilities related to the civil-military gap, political constraints, and the

complex nature of modern security challenges.

In the present paper the analysis is focused on the later topic, namely the

vulnerabilities risen from the democratic condition of the state wherein the military

organization must remain subordinate to civilian authority, serving the state's

democratic values by upholding the law and constitution, without dominating

politics. The research is undertaken through the lens of civil-military relations and

the mechanisms of civilian control, as well on the antinomy among democratic and

authoritarian regimes.

Keywords: democracy, civilian control, militaries’ political neutrality,

democratic control.

DOI

10.56082/annalsarscimilit.2026.1.25

Introduction

The relationship between regime type and military effectiveness has

been a central debate in security studies and international relations for several

decades. Early scholars’ research focused on discovering whether

democracies are inherently more peaceful than authoritarian regimes^1,2, while

later scientific works examined how democratic institutions shape the

conduct, constraints, and vulnerabilities of military organizations.

The main discussion comes from the paradox „On one hand,

controlling the military by imposing severe civilian control, weakens the

military and increases the possibility of external threats. On the other,

*

Senior Researcher within Centre for Defense and Security Strategic Studies/ “Carol I”

National Defense University, Bucharest, Romania, Associate member of the Academy of

Romanian Scientists, Bucharest, Romania, and Associate Researcher within Doctoral School

for Safety and Security Sciences, Obuda University, Budapest, Hungary. E-mail:

atanasiu.mirela@unap.ro.

1

Michael W. Doyle, „Liberalism and World Politics”, in The American Political Science

Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, Dec., 1986, pp. 1151-1169.

²Bruce Russett, Christopher Layne, David E. Spiro and Michael W. Doyle, “The Democratic

Peace”, in International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring, 1995, pp. 164-184.

25

VULNERABILITIES OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION

IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

strengthening the military to fight against external threats can diminish

civilian control, reducing internal security and stability”³.

A major strand of the literature argues that democracies are often more

effective in long wars, compared to authoritarian landscapes, due to their

legitimacy, economic mobilization, and professionalized armed forces⁴.

However a parallel body of research highlights that democratic militaries are

structurally constrained by political accountability, legal norms, transparency

and societal oversight – constraints that authoritarian regimes largely avoid⁵.

Moreover, these constraints, particularly in asymmetric, hybrid, and

information-centric conflict environments, generate specific vulnerabilities to

the military organizations, where adversaries deliberately exploit democratic

norms by using the very principles of open societies⁶, because their

conventional structures are often ill-suited to counter unconventional,

ambiguous threats that target non-military aspects of a nation’s security.

1. Vulnerabilities’ place in the security and resilience equation

From an organizational perspective, vulnerability is defined as a

weakness or gap in an organization's systems, processes, people, or resources

that could be exploited by internal or external threats to cause harm,

disruption, or failure. Briefly explained, vulnerability describes the degree to

which an organization is susceptible to negative consequences⁷.

In the security equation, vulnerabilities are weaknesses that, when

combined with a threat, determine the overall risk to an organization’s

function and assets⁸. Thus, vulnerabilities are a foundational component of

the security equation and have an inverse relationship with resilience:

3

Tarini Nath, „The Un (Objective) Civilian Control Model”, in Arts and Social Sciences

Journal, Volume 9, Issue 5, 2018.

⁴Dan Reiter, Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War, Princeton University Press, 2010; Stephen

Biddle and Stephen Long, „Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look”, in The

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Aug., 2004), pp. 525-546.

⁵Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military

Relations, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,

London, England, 2000; Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-

Military Relations, Harvard University Press, 2009.

⁶European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,

the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions

on Defence of Democracy, COM(2023) 630 final, Strasbourg, 12.12.2023, available at

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023DC0630,

accessed on 21.12.2025.

7

Splunk. CISCO Company, Vulnerabilities, Threats & Risk Explained, July 25, 2024,

available at

https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/learn/vulnerability-vs-threat-vs-risk.-

html#:~:text=By%20Chrissy%20Kidd,mitigating%20the%20most%20

critical%20risks,

accessed on 10.12.2025.

8

David Puzder, Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Risks Explained, Office of Information

Security, Washington University in Saint Louis, available at https://informationsecurity.-

wustl.edu/vulnerabilities-threats-and-risks-explained/, accessed on 10.12.2025.

26

Senior Researcher Mirela ATANASIU, Ph.D

vulnerabilities are weaknesses that increase susceptibility to harm, while

resilience is the capacity to absorb and recover from that harm⁹. Therefore,

security aims to reduce the risk associated with these vulnerabilities, while

resilience dictates the capacity to cope when those security measures fail.

Thus, vulnerabilities are a critical component for calculating, prioritizing, and

managing security risk.

In Romanian National Defence Strategy 2025-2029, vulnerabilities

are defined as „structural functional-systemic deficiencies that can be

exploited or can contribute to the materialization of a threat or risk, causing

the weakening of the state’s ability to mitigate the impact of events with the

potential to seriously affect the normal functioning of its institutions, the life

and physical integrity of citizens and the organization of human communities,

as well as the ability to defend and promote national security values, interests

and objectives”¹⁰. Concomitantly, for the EU – political construct wherein all

the member countries are democracy promoters – security resilience means

“reduced vulnerabilities, increased capacities and improved well-being”¹¹.

A highly resilient system has fewer critical vulnerabilities or robust

mechanisms to manage them when they are exploited. Therefore, in essence,

increasing resilience is largely achieved by reducing vulnerabilities and

increasing the capacity to adapt and cope.

2. Characteristics of military organization in a democratic state

The primary role of the military organization in a democratic state is

providing national defence and internal security under strict legal oversight.

In order to achieve this role „the sound governance of the security

sector is essential for democratic consolidation and for sustainable economic

and social development”¹². Concomitantly, „an accountable security sector

that is subject to democratic civilian control, respects the rule of law, upholds

human rights and is gender-responsive ensures trust among the entire

9

Barry Charles Ezell, Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Model (I-VAM), Research

Gate, 6 august 2025, pp.3-5.

10

Administrația Prezidențială a României, Strategia Națională de Apărare a Țării pentru

perioada 2025-2030. „Independență și solidaritate – viziunea României pentru o lume în

schimbare”, 2025, p. 18, available at

https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/-

Strategia%20Na%C8%9Bional%C4%83%20de%20Ap%C4%83rare%20a%20%C8%9A%

C4%83rii%20pentru%20perioada%202025-2030.pdf, accessed on 24.01.2025.

¹¹European Commission, Monitoring resilience in the EU, Evidence from the 2023 edition

of the Resilience Dashboards, JRC Publication Repository, 20.11.2023, p. 3, available at

https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC135043, accessed on 09.12.2025.

12

N Ball, T Bouta, L Van de Goor, Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security

Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework, Applied Knowledge Services, 2003,

available at https://gsdrc.org/document-library/enhancing-democratic-governance-of-the-

security-sector-an-institutional-assessment-framework/#:~:text=Sound%20governance%

20of%20the%20security,change%20must%20be%20well%20managed,

19.12.2025.

accessed

on

27

VULNERABILITIES OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION

IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

population”¹³. Thus, democratic institutions shape military organizations by

ensuring their subordination to elected civilian authorities, which influences

military behavior through legal, budgetary, and societal oversight

mechanisms. These institutions constrain military action by prioritizing

political legitimacy and caution, while simultaneously introducing

vulnerabilities related to transparency, public scrutiny, and potential

politicization during crises.

In this respect, the relationship between democracy and the military is

defined by the core principle of civilian control, explained in Samuel

Huntington’s classic definition to be „the proper subordination of a

competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by

civilian authority”¹⁴. Moreover, an effective system of democratic control is

characterized, among others, by civilian control and democratic

governance¹⁵. Hence, ”civilian authorities have control over the military’s

missions, composition, budget and procurement policies”¹⁶and „democratic

parliamentary and judicial institutions, a strong civil society and an

independent media oversee the performance of the military”¹⁷. Therefore, the

armed forces are subordinate to the democratically elected government and

not a self-serving political actor, which triggers for the main objective on the

institutional level of the state to be the development of „a system of civil-

military relations, which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice

of other social values”¹⁸. The relations among these concepts are included in

Figure no. 1.

13

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Sector Governance and Reform,

Vienna, January 2022, p. 11, available at https://www.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/-

documents/2/4/512470_0.pdf, accessed on 08.12.2025.

¹⁴Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military

Relations, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,

London, England, 2000, pp. 2-3.

¹⁵Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Democratic Control of Armed

Forces,

05/2008,

p.

2,

available

at

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/55845/17_-

bg_dem_control_armed_forces.pdf, accessed on 19.12.2025.

¹⁶Idem.

¹⁷Idem.

¹⁸Idem.

28

Senior Researcher Mirela ATANASIU, Ph.D

Figure no. 1 - Evolution of the military-society relationship¹⁹

Derived from the key aspects of the relationship between civil

authority and armed forces, the so-called CIMIC relations, there can be

identified some characteristics for military organizations as presented below.

Civilian supremacy is represented by the fact that, in a democracy, the

ultimate authority for defence and security policy rests with civilian

leadership²⁰, in terms of executive and legislative structures, who are

accountable to the electorate. Therefore, the military’s role is to implement

these policies, not create them or intervene in the political process and “The

good governance of military and security forces is essential for the effective

defense of a nation or alliance and for fostering their democratic evolution”²¹.

Apolitical stance is another reasonable characteristic in democratic

systems as the military is expected to be a politically neutral institution, loyal

to the constitution and laws of the state rather than a specific political party

or individual leader²². Moreover, its personnel are generally restricted from

using military positions or symbols in political events.

Hierarchical structure and professionalism is a characteristic derived

from the fact that the military organization maintains its own intrinsic and

disciplined structure, which is necessary for effective command and control

of the operations, especially during conflict. Still, this operational necessity

can sometimes create an inherent tension with the democratic norms of debate

and transparency.

¹⁹Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Democratic Control of Armed

Forces, 05/2008, p. 2, available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/55845/17_bg_-

dem_control_armed_forces.pdf, accessed on 19.12.2025.

20

Kenneth W. Kemp, Charles Hudlin, „Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and

Limits”, in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Fall 1992), pp. 7-26.

21

Todor Tagarev, Philipp Fluri, “From Civil-Military Relations to Resilience: The Fifth

Wave of Strengthening Democracy through Research and Education”, in Connections QJ 24,

no. 1 (2025), pp. 73-90.

22

U.S. Office of Special Counsel, Guidance on Political Activity and DoD Support 2020,

2020, available at

https://dodsoco.ogc.osd.mil/Portals/102/Documents/Political%20-

Activities%20Docs/2020%20Political%20Activity%20Update%20v1.pdf?ver=2020-08-14-

124805-053, accessed on 29.01.2026.

29

VULNERABILITIES OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION

IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

Another characteristics of sound civil-military relations is that it

requires a strong adherence to the rule of law, ensuring that everyone,

including the security services, is treated equally under the law and is

accountable to the public.

The military organization has an important role in transitions from an

authoritarian type of regime. Actually, the military’s stance can be critical

during democratic transitions owed to the fact that the armed forces of a state

can either facilitate democratization by accepting civilian rule or uphold

authoritarianism or even intervene in fragile democracies through coups.

Democratic control over the military body is maintained through

mechanisms like parliamentary defence committees and public scrutiny,

which ensure transparency in military affairs, budget allocations, and

operations²³. This oversight helps prevent waste and encourages efficiency.

Hence, a strong, established democracy requires the military

organization to be positioned under civilian leadership and submit

to democratic control, to be politically neutral, to avoid tensions

between the rigidity of military hierarchy and democratic norms,

and to be the subject to oversight and the rule of law. Under these

circumstances, a basic paradox comes to fruition, namely, a

hierarchical, authoritarian institution must function inside a

democratic, open and pluralist system and this structural tension

generates specific vulnerabilities.

3. Types of vulnerabilities in the democratic states’ military

organizations

Western democracy is being threatened more acutely by hybrid

interference. Using liberal democratic values and infrastructure for cover,

authoritarian actors use a panoply of covert, non-military means to subtly

drive wedges between democratic societies and undermine their internal

cohesion (Finnish Institute for International Affairs, 2019).

Democratic regimes create specific, structural vulnerabilities for

military organizations due to the inherent requirements of civilian control,

public accountability, and legal constraints. These regimes, while providing

legitimacy, often introduce challenges related to a widening gap between

civilian and military cultures, political interference in professional judgment,

and the difficulty of applying traditional military force to modern, complex

security threat. Thus, the vulnerability of the military organization in

democratic regimes is emphasized by the complex nature of modern security

challenges.

23

Inter-Parliamentary Union for democracy for everyone, Democratic checks, military

balances: Parliamentary oversight in an era of rising military expenditure, Issue Brief,

October 2025, pp. 1-8.

30

Senior Researcher Mirela ATANASIU, Ph.D

Key aspects of civil-military relations in a democratic formula include

robust civilian oversight provided by parliamentary/governmental control,

professional norms ensuring non-partisanship, and public trust, often fostered

through roles like disaster relief or by embodying citizen participation in the

military organization. Therefore, democratic systems can face vulnerabilities,

such as potential delays in decision-making due to public debate and

legislative processes²⁴. The political nature of democracy can also be a

challenge in wartime, where national consensus might be harder to achieve

and maintain compared to autocratic regimes²⁵.

The primary vulnerability in civil-military relations in democracies is

maintaining effective civilian control over the military without undermining

the military’s professional expertise and effectiveness (Vindman, 2024). This

delicate balance can be threatened by various factors, which risk military

intervention, undue influence on policy, or a disconnect from the society they

serve. Still, ‘While civilian control of the military is a sine qua non condition

for liberal democracy, the degree and type of such control vary according to

the system of government, historical traditions and cultural values, and

different perceptions of threat”²⁶.

Public accountability is crucial for democratic control, but it can

create friction with the secrecy, speed, and hierarchy required for military

success. Thus, while democratic oversight ensures that armed forces remain

subordinate to elected leadership, excessive transparency can hinder

operational security, while a lack of it invites corruption and inefficiency²⁷.

To manage this specific vulnerability, many democracies have established

mechanisms to balance these conflicting needs. Thus, Parliamentary

committees often review defence budgets behind closed doors, allowing for

accountability without public disclosure providing the institutional

oversight²⁸, conditional transparency is achieved by adopting principles that

24

Merle Maigre, Theories of Civil-Military Relation, International Centre for Defence and

Security, Estonia, 2010, available at https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Civil%-

20Military%20Theories_Akadeemia_sept%202009_Merle %20Maigre.pdf, accessed on

22.12.2025.

25

Rudolf Joo, „The democratic control of armed forces”, in Chaillot Papers, No. 23,

February 1996, available at https://www.iss.europa.eu/ sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp-

023e.pdf, accessed on 12.12.2025.

²⁶Ergun Özbudun, Study on democratic control of armed forces, Venice Commission, Study

no. 389 / 2007, p. 3, available at https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/-

default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-DEM(2007)005-e, accessed on 02.02.2026.

²⁷Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman, Balancing transparency and national security,

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 29 January 2014, available at https://-

www.sipri.org/node/405#:~:text=Military%20forces%20are%20key%20instruments,oversi

ght%2C%20accountability%20and%20resource%20allocation, accessed on 12.01.2026.

28

Christopher Koliba, „Liberal democratic accountability standards and public

administration” in Public Administration Review, 5 April 2024, pp. 21-29, available at

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/puar.13831, accessed on 15.01.2026.

31

VULNERABILITIES OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION

IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

define when secrets are necessary, rather than allowing broad, blanket

exemptions for the defense sector and proactive information is release by

militaries using social media and official communication channels to increase

transparency about non-sensitive, large-scale exercises, fostering trust

without compromising operational capability.

Under the complex nature of modern security challenges, military

organizations in democracy face a wide range of vulnerabilities that span

across multiple domains, including cyber, physical, operational, and human

factors, and are increasingly targeted by hybrid warfare tactics. These

weaknesses can be exploited by various threats, from hostile nation states and

terrorist groups to insider threats and environmental hazards.

Military

organizations

in

democracies

face

unique

cyber

vulnerabilities stemming from their inherent openness, extensive digital

infrastructure, reliance on complex weapon systems, and the nature of hybrid

threats that target public trust²⁹. These vulnerabilities are often exploited by

authoritarian adversaries who synchronize technical attacks with information

warfare. Thus, „these attacks target both military systems and the democratic

processes and critical infrastructure of their nations”³⁰.

Adversaries exploit the open information environment specific to

democracies through disinformation campaigns, propaganda, and the

manipulation of social media platforms to influence public opinion, sow

discord, disrupt elections, and undermine social cohesion³¹. Thus, democratic

states’ military organizations face unique cognitive vulnerabilities stemming

from core democratic principles like open information ecosystems, civilian

control, and internal ethical frameworks. These features, while foundational

to a free society, can be exploited in modern cognitive warfare by adversaries

seeking to manipulate perceptions, disrupt decision-making, and erode trust

from within. On this background, insufficient Civilian-Military Cooperation

(CIMIC) can be a major factor.

In terms of physical vulnerabilities of the military organization and

functionality in democracies, the existent civil-military national critical

infrastructure dependence - power grids, communication networks, and

transportation systems – is one of the factors. The same is available for

29

Mehmet Calkayis, „Contemporary Information Warfare, Artificial Intelligence, and

Challenges for Democracies”, NAVI White Paper, October 26, 2025, available at https://nato-

veterans.org/contemporary-information-warfare-artificial-intelligence-and-challenges-for-

democracies/, accessed on 22.12.2025.

30

Elsa Neeme, Critical infrastructure at risk: A call for revised security strategies, e-

Governance Academy, October 6, 2025, available at https://ega.ee/critical-infrastructure-

risk-call-revised-security-strategies/, accessed on 20.12.2025.

31

Jelena Vicic, Richard Harknett, „Identification-imitation-amplification: understanding

divisive influence campaigns through cyberspace”, in Intelligence and National Security,

Volume 39, 2024, available at

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0268-

4527.2023.2300933, accessed on 18.12.2025.

32

Senior Researcher Mirela ATANASIU, Ph.D

undersea cables and defence supply chains that are susceptible to disruption

and the infiltration of compromised components. Concomitantly, extensive

reliance on interconnected and often privately-owned critical infrastructure

(e.g., power grids, telecommunications) presents a wide attack surface that

can be targeted to disrupt military readiness and civilian life. A good example

of this vulnerability is „loss of power from an APT³²cyberattack could result

in loss of life and the possibility of creating digital chaos”³³.

A military’s reliance on complex weapon systems creates significant

vulnerabilities across operational, logistical, and strategic domains. These

systems, while offering advanced capabilities, introduce a paradox where

increased effectiveness is often coupled with heightened fragility. In terms of

operational vulnerabilities „the deployment of offensive cyber capabilities by

democratic states presents profound ethical, legal, and strategic dilemmas,

fundamentally conflicting with core democratic principles such as

transparency, accountability, and adherence to the rule of law”³⁴. For

example, as concerns the so-called `killer robots` there were identified at least

nine vulnerabilities of their use (digital dehumanisation, algorithmic biases,

loss of meaningful human control, lack of human judgement and

understanding, lack of accountability, inability to explain what happened and

why, lowering the threshold to war, a destabilising arms race)³⁵.

Military organization’s personnel in democracies face a unique set of

vulnerabilities stemming from the inherent tension between professional,

hierarchical military structures and democratic, egalitarian civilian

governance³⁶. While democracies generally have superior civilian control,

they face risks such as the politicization of the officer corps, the strain of

32

Advanced Persistent Threats are stealthy multi-step attacks, often executed over an

extensive time period and tailored for a specific attack target. Source: Doney Abraham, Siv

Hilde Houmb, Laszlo Erdodi, „Cyber-Attacks on Energy Infrastructure—A Literature

Overview and Perspectives on the Current Situation”, in Applied Sciences, No. 15, 2025, p.

9233. available at https://doi.org/10.3390/ app15179233, accessed on 12.12.2025.

³³Idem.

34

Paul A. Eisenmann, „The Lawful Losers? Why Democracies Struggle to Deter Cyber

Aggression”, in Journal of Advanced Military Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2025, p. 85, available

at

https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/JAMS_Fall%202025_16_2_Eisenmann.pdf,

accessed on 21.12.2025.

³⁵***, Problems with autonomous weapons, Stop Killer Robots Campaign, 2025, available

at https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/stop-killer-robots/facts-about-autonomous-weapons/#:-

~:text=3.,be%20used%20with% 20real%20control, accessed on 12.12.2025.

36

Harald Müller, Marco Fey, Sabine Mannitz, Niklas Schörnig, Democracy, the Armed

Forces and Military Deployment: The ‚Second Social Contract’ is on the Line, PRIF-Report

No. 108, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2011, available at https://www.prif.org/-

fileadmin/Daten/Publikationen/Prif_Reports/2011/prif108.pdf, accessed on 19.01.2026.

33

VULNERABILITIES OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION

IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

„multi-functionality” (taking on non-defense roles)³⁷, and risks to personnel

mental health.

These vulnerabilities, if exploited by a threat, can lead to security

incidents, financial loss, reputation damage, and operational disruption.

Conclusions

Vulnerabilities are fundamental to the security and resilience equation,

as they are the weaknesses that threats exploit to cause harm. Security efforts

aim to eliminate or mitigate these vulnerabilities, while resilience is the

capacity of a system to endure and recover when an attack or disaster occurs

despite security measures.

In

a

democracy,

military

organizations

are

fundamentally

characterized by their subordination to civilian political authority (by the so-

called civil military relations and civilian control) and their commitment to

political neutrality and the rule of law (in terms of providing the respect for

the Constitution and laws of the state). Therefore, vulnerabilities of military

organizations in democratic societies stem primarily from the inherent tension

between the hierarchical, non-democratic nature of the military and the open,

liberal values of the society it serves. Concomitantly, the modern security

landscape, characterized by asymmetric threats, cyber warfare, and rapid

technological change, also places immense pressure on democratic control

mechanisms.

Democratic military organizations are not inherently less capable than

authoritarian ones, however, there are structurally more constrained by

political accountability, legal norms, societal oversight, and transparency.

These constraints generate specific vulnerabilities that can be exploited by

less constrained adversaries, particularly in asymmetric and hybrid conflicts.

The efforts to exploit democratic organizations are frequently categorized

under hybrid warfare or “gray zone” operations, designed to degrade

operational effectiveness without escalating to open kinetic conflict.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

***, Problems with autonomous weapons, Stop Killer Robots Campaign,

2025, available at https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/stop-killer-

robots/facts-about-autonomous-weapons/#:~:text=3.,be%20used%-

20with% 20real%20control;

37

Rafa Martínez, Military multifunctionality and democracy: a dangerous coexistence,

Barcelona Center for International Affairs, July 2022, pp. 1-7, available at https://-

www.cidob.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/277_RAFA%20MARTI%CC%81NEZ_ANG.-

pdf, accessed on 19.01.2026.

34

Senior Researcher Mirela ATANASIU, Ph.D

ABRAHAM, Doney; Houmb, Siv Hilde; Erdodi, Laszlo, „Cyber-Attacks on

Energy Infrastructure—A Literature Overview and Perspectives on

the Current Situation”, in Applied Sciences, No. 15, 2025, available

at https://doi.org/10.3390/ app15179233;

Administrația Prezidențială a României, Strategia Națională de Apărare a

Țării pentru perioada 2025-2030. „Independență și solidaritate –

viziunea României pentru o lume în schimbare”, 2025, available at

https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Strategia%20Na%

C8%9Bional%C4%83%20de%20Ap%C4%83rare%20a%20%C8%

9A%C4%83rii%20pentru%20perioada%202025-2030.pdf;

BALL, N.; Bouta, T.; Van de Goor, L., Enhancing Democratic Governance

of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework,

Applied Knowledge Services, 2003, available at https://gsdrc.-

org/document-library/enhancing-democratic-governance-of-the-

security-sector-an-institutional-assessment-framework/#:~:text=-

Sound%20 governance%20of%20the%20security,change%20must-

%20be%20well %20managed;

BIDDLE, Stephen; Long, Stephen, „Democracy and Military Effectiveness:

A Deeper Look”, in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No.

4 (Aug., 2004), pp. 525-546;

CALKAYIS, Mehmet „Contemporary Information Warfare, Artificial

Intelligence, and Challenges for Democracies”, NAVI White Paper,

October

26,

2025,

available

at

https://nato-veterans.org/-

contemporary-information-warfare-artificial-intelligence-and-

challenges-for-democracies/;

DOYLE, Michael W., „Liberalism and World Politics”, in The American

Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, Dec., 1986, pp. 1151-1169;

EISENMANN, Paul A., „The Lawful Losers? Why Democracies Struggle to

Deter Cyber Aggression”, in Journal of Advanced Military Studies,

Vol. 16, No. 2, 2025, available at https://www.usmcu.-

edu/Portals/218/JAMS_Fall%202025_16_2_ Eisenmann.pdf;

European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the

European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and

Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Defence of

Democracy, COM(2023) 630 final, Strasbourg, 12.12.2023,

available

at

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/-

HTML/?uri= CELEX:52023DC0630;

European Commission, Monitoring resilience in the EU, Evidence from the

2023 edition of the Resilience Dashboards, JRC Publication

Repository, 20.11.2023, available at https://publications.jrc.ec.-

europa.eu/repository/ handle/JRC135043;

EZELL, Barry Charles, Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Model (I-

VAM), Research Gate, august 6, 2025, pp. 3-5;

35

VULNERABILITIES OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION

IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

FEAVER, Peter, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military

Relations, Harvard University Press, 2009;

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Democratic

Control of Armed Forces, 05/2008, available at https://www.-

files.ethz.ch/isn/55845/17_bg_dem_control_armed_forces.pdf;

HUNTINGTON, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State. The Theory and

Politics of Civil-Military Relations, The Belknap Press of Harvard

University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England,

2000;

Inter-Parliamentary Union for democracy for everyone, Democratic checks,

military balances: Parliamentary oversight in an era of rising

military expenditure, Issue Brief, October 2025;

JOO, Rudolf, „The democratic control of armed forces”, in Chaillot Papers,

No. 23, February 1996, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/-

files/EUISSFiles/cp023e.pdf;

KEMP, Kenneth W.; Hudlin, Charles, „Civil Supremacy over the Military:

Its Nature and Limits”, in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 19, No. 1

(Fall 1992), pp. 7-26;

KOLIBA, Christopher, „Liberal democratic accountability standards and

public administration” in Public Administration Review, 5 April

2024, pp. 21-29, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/-

epdf/10.1111/puar.13831;

MAIGRE, Merle, Theories of Civil-Military Relation, International Centre

for

Defence

and

Security,

Estonia,

2010,

available

at

https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Civil%20Military% 20-

Theories_Akadeemia_sept%202009_Merle %20Maigre.pdf;

MARTÍNEZ, Rafa, Military multifunctionality and democracy: a dangerous

coexistence, Barcelona Center for International Affairs, July 2022,

available at https://www.cidob.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/277-

_RAFA%20MARTI% CC%81NEZ_ANG.pdf;

MÜLLER, Harald; Fey, Marco; Mannitz, Sabine; Schörnig, Niklas,

Democracy, the Armed Forces and Military Deployment: The

‚Second Social Contract’ is on the Line, PRIF-Report No. 108, Peace

Research Institute Frankfurt, 2011, available at https://www.-

prif.org/fileadmin/Daten/Publikationen/Prif_Reports/2011/prif108.

pdf;

NATH, Tarini, „The Un (Objective) Civilian Control Model”, in Arts and

Social Sciences Journal, Volume 9, Issue 5, 2018;

NEEME, Elsa, Critical infrastructure at risk: A call for revised security

strategies, e-Governance Academy, October 6, 2025, available at

https://ega.ee/critical-infrastructure-risk-call-revised-security-

strategies/;

36

Senior Researcher Mirela ATANASIU, Ph.D

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Sector Governance

and Reform, Vienna, January 2022, available at https://www.osce.-

org/sites/default/files/f/documents/2/4/ 512470_0.pdf;

ÖZBUDUN, Ergun, Study on democratic control of armed forces, Venice

Commission, Study no. 389, 2007, available at https://www.-

venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=

DEM(2007)005-e;

CDL-

PUZDER, David, Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Risks Explained, Office of

Information Security, Washington University in Saint Louis,

available at https://informationsecurity.wustl.edu/ vulnerabilities-

threats-and-risks-explained/;

REITER, Dan; Stam, Allan C., Democracies at War, Princeton University

Press, 2010;

RUSSETT, Bruce; Layne, Christopher; Spiro, David E.; Doyle, Michael W.,

‘The Democratic Peace”, in International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4,

Spring, 1995, pp. 164-184;

Splunk. CISCO Company, Vulnerabilities, Threats & Risk Explained, July

25, 2024 available at https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/learn/-

vulnerability-vs-threat-vs-risk.html#:~:text=By%20Chrissy%-

20Kidd,mitigating%20the%20most%20 critical%20risks;

TODOR Tagarev, Philipp Fluri, “From Civil-Military Relations to

Resilience: The Fifth Wave of Strengthening Democracy through

Research and Education”, in Connections, QJ 24, no. 1 (2025), pp.

73-90;

U.S. Office of Special Counsel, Guidance on Political Activity and DoD

Support 2020, 2020, available at https://dodsoco.ogc.osd.-

mil/Portals/102/Documents/Political%20Activities%20Docs/2020

%20Political%20Activity%20Update%20v1.pdf?ver=2020-08-14-

124805-053;

VICIC, Jelen;a Harknett, Richard, „Identification-imitation-amplification:

understanding divisive influence campaigns through cyberspace”, in

Intelligence and National Security, Volume 39, 2024, available at

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2023.-

2300933;

WEZEMAN, Pieter D.; Wezeman, Siemon T., Balancing transparency and

national security, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,

January 29 2014, available at https://www.sipri.org/node/-

405#:~:text=Military%20forces%20are%20key%20instrumentsove

rsight%2C%20accountability%20and%20resource%20allocation.

37