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Gabriel Vasilescu, Maria Dima, Denisa Tudor, Augustin Semenescu
1. Introduction
Instability challenges across reactor classes - nuclear reactors, whether
pulsed research reactors, conventional power reactors, or Small Modular Reactors
(SMR’s), exhibit oscillational power fluctuations during start-up and ramp-up
phases, load-following operations, transition between natural and forced
circulation, reflector or control rod positioning transients.
Power production reactors typically exhibit small fluctuations (20 times
smaller than those of fast pulsed facilities), however their smaller class homologues,
SMR’s intentionally have tighter operational margins in order to maximize
economic competitivity. This renders SMR’s more susceptible to instability-
reactivities and control challenges.
Nuclear- and industrial-security context - from the instability perspective,
unanticipated power oscillations create nuclear security vulnerabilities:
─
reactivity margins: fluctuations reduce the effective margin for emer-
gency shutdown thresholds,
─
proactively,
─
control system stress: automatic regulators compensate reactively, not
redundancy degradation: repeated instability episodes stresses protec-
tion systems,
─
SMR-specific: reduced on-site staffing means automated predictive se-
curity becomes essential.
In turn, industrial security (focusing on cyber-physical security and control
system integrity) is susceptible to nuclear-instabilities, which feed into the its
industrial control systems (ICS) and SCADA platforms - as early warnings.
2. SMR particularities
SMR’s introduce unique challenges that make prediction of instabilities
particularly important:
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tighter operational margins: designed for economic competitiveness →
less buffer against fluctuations,
─
reduced staffing: advanced automation → fewer human operators to
catch anomalies early,
─
load-following duty: many SMR designs anticipate load-following →
frequent power changes → more instabilities,
─
Passive safety reliance: while passive systems handle accidents, opera-
tional instabilities still challenge control systems
─
Digital I&C proliferation: SMRs rely heavily on digital instrumentation
and control → cyber-security and process security converge
Therefore, for AI control systems to capture the wealth of signals and
features, a unified method for quantifying those from raw data stream is needed —
to power future NARX-based TAG (Tool-Augmented Generation) agentic models.