

SINGAPORE - THE POWER OF THE SMALL ONE

Professor Alba Iulia Catrinel POPESCU, Ph.D*

**(Academy of Romanian Scientists, 3 Ilfov, 050044, Bucharest, Romania,
email: secretariat@aosr.ro)**

Abstract: *At first glance, Singapore is just a dot on the map of the globe. A port, transformed into a city and a city transformed into a micro-state. And yet, Singapore has enormous geostrategic and geoeconomic importance. This article aims at presenting the geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic resorts that transformed the small British colony of Singapore into one of the "Asian tigers" and the impact of this metamorphosis on the regional geopolitical game. The research model is linear, starting from the objectives, continuing with data collection, analysis and synthesis and ending with the formulation of conclusions. The research methods used are specific to geopolitics and combine data analysis and synthesis with ambispective, statistical and descriptive methods.*

Keywords: *geopolitical analysis, geopolitical nexus, geo-economic hub, micro-state geopolitics, Asia Pacific Region, Malacca Strait, Phillip Channel.*

DOI 10.56082/annalsarscimilit.2025.3.104

Motto: "I was also troubled by the apparent over-confidence of a generation that has only known stability, growth and prosperity. I thought our people should understand how vulnerable Singapore was and is, the dangers that beset us, and how we nearly did not make it. Most of all, I hope that they will know that honest and effective government, public order and personal security, economic and social progress did not come about as the natural course of events." - Lee Kuan Yew (1923-2015), former prime-minister and founder of the modern state of Singapore.

The transformation of the micro-state of Singapore from a small British outpost located in the vicinity of the Strait of Malacca, into today's "asian tiger", surprised many theorists. And yet, Singapore, through its geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic value, was predestined for such a transformation. This article aims to present the geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic sources of this transformation and the impact of this

* „CAROL I” National Defence University, Associated member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists, email: albaopescu1@gmail.com.

metamorphosis on the regional geopolitical game. The research model is linear, starting from the objectives, continuing with the collection of data, their analysis and synthesis and ending with the formulation of conclusions. The research methods used are specific to geopolitics and combine data analysis and synthesis with ambispective, statistical and descriptive methods.

Geopolitical determinants

1. Geographic power sources

Geographical position, shape and size of the state territory

Republic of Singapore - identified latitudinal and longitudinal by the coordinates: 1, 22 N; 103, 48 E ¹ - is located in Southeast Asia, between Malaysia and Indonesia, at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, approximately 137 kilometers north of the Equator (see map in Figure 1).



Figure 1: Latitudinal position of the state of Singapore ²

It is a maritime, archipelagic state, consisting of the main island, Pulau Ujong, in the shape of a diamond, and 62 other atolls and islets located to its south.

With a maritime and land area of 719 km², of which land measures 709.2 km², Singapore is classified as a microstate. To these coordinates is added the air territory of the Singaporean state, represented by the column of air that extends between the maritime and land territory of the state and the lower orbit of the Earth.

¹ CIA WorldFactBook, *Singapore*, available at <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/singapore/>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

² World Atlas, *Singapore Maps & Facts*, available at <https://www.worldatlas.com/r/w1200/upload/c2/b2/32/sg-02.jpg>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

In the north, the main island is separated from Peninsular Malaysia by the Strait of Johor, a narrow channel of over 800 meters (see map in Figure 2). It is crossed by a road and railway built in 1923, which connects the city of Woodlands in Singapore, with the city of Johor Bahru in Malaysia and blocks naval traffic through the strait³.

In the south, the coasts of the Singapore archipelago delimit the western sea front of the Singapore Strait, while the eastern sea front is provided by the coasts of the Indonesian Riau-Lingga archipelago. The Singapore Strait, with a length of 113 km (70 nautical miles) and a width of 19 km (12 nautical miles), joins the Strait of Malacca to the west and the South China Sea to the east, being part of the Malacca Strait system, which provides access between the South Pacific (South China Sea) and the Indian Ocean (Andaman Sea). In the south of the main island, through the Singapore Strait, passes Phillip Channel, the narrowest part of the Malacca-Singapore Strait system, with a width of only 2.8 km (1.5 nautical miles).



Figure 2: Geographical position of the Singapore archipelago ⁴

Relief, climate, resources

The relief of the main island, in proportion to two-thirds, is made up of low plains, less than 15 meters above sea level, interrupted in the central,

³ Richard Olof Winstedt, Annajane Kennard, *Singapore*, available at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Singapore>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

⁴ World Atlas, *Maps of Singapore*, available at <https://www.worldatlas.com/maps/-singapore>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

northwest and southeast areas, by hills with altitudes of maximum 166 meters (Bukit Timah) and low plateau areas. The climate is equatorial monsoon, with two seasons, humid, with high temperatures and constant rainfall throughout the year.⁵.

Resources:

✓ The hydrographic network is provided by permanent rivers which, due to their low gradients, are prone to massive flooding. In the north, the watercourses flow into the ocean through wide estuaries, bordered by mangroves.

✓ The soils are not very fertile and degraded by erosion. There are small agricultural lands where vegetables and fruits are intensively grown and poultry are raised.

✓ The vegetation is tropical, but the rainforest has been largely cleared. The fauna is diverse and includes macaques, lemurs, reptiles, birds. In the coastal areas there are fringing coral reefs, with specific wildlife. There is a small aquaculture industry for hake, sea bass and shrimp. Singapore is a major exporter of orchids and aquarium fish⁶. However, intensive port activities have affected the fish population through pollution.

- Virtually absent mineral and energy resources. The hydrocarbon requirement is met through imports. Natural gas, in volume of 12.3 billion cubic meters (bcm), arrives in Singapore either in liquefied form (4 bcm) from Australia and Qatar, or through pipelines from Indonesia and Malaysia⁷. Crude oil, which provides 64.8% of the country's energy needs, is met exclusively through imports⁸. Currently, the Asian state owns crude oil storage facilities 150 m underground, which house about 9 million barrels⁹. Singapore has also developed green energy production systems (solar panels, wind turbines) and meets its coal needs through imports.

- **Borders**

The state borders are entirely maritime and extend over a length of 193 km. They separate the state from its two maritime neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, and imply the existence of territorial waters, a continental shelf and exclusive economic zones. The maritime border with Indonesia, in the Singapore Strait, has been the subject of several treaties and border

⁵ CIA WorldFactBook, *op.cit.*

⁶ Richard Olof Winstedt, Annajane Kennard, *op.cit.*

⁷ Lucas Romero, *Natural gas industry in Singapore - statistics & facts*, Statista, 02.07.2024, available at <https://www.statista.com/topics/10628/natural-gas-industry-in-singapore/#-topicOverview>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

⁸ ***, *Singapore*, iea, available at <https://www.iea.org/countries/singapore/oil>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

⁹ Meera Senthilingam, Andrew Stevens, *Why Singapore is putting its oil back into the ground*, CNN, 17.06.2015. available at <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/16/asia/going-underground-in-singapore>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

agreements signed in 1973, 2009 and 2014. Currently, the bilateral maritime border extends over 36 nautical miles and delimits the territorial maritime rights of the two states. Both to the east and to the west, it intersects with the maritime border of Malaysia¹⁰. There are no border disputes that would involve the Singaporean state.

- **Capital**

The capital of the state is the city of Singapore (see map in Figure 2). Etymologically, its name comes from the Sanskrit words *simha* – lion and *pur* – city and means “City of Lions”. A paradoxical name, considering that there are no such carnivores on the island. The explanation is folkloric and has several variants. The first claims that in the 7th century, the Indian king Rajendra the Great (971-1044) visited the island and confused a local animal with a lion, which is why he called the island *Singapura* - City of Lions¹¹. Another opinion is that some Buddhist monks named the island in the 14th century. And, a third version claims that the Malay chronicle *Sejarah Melayu* writes that the city was founded by the Indonesian prince (from Sumatra) Srivijayan Sri Buana.¹²

The capital is located eccentrically, in the south of the main island, opposite the natural deep-water harbor of the same name, but relatively central, compared to the entire archipelago territory. Consequently, the **capital exercises in good conditions the function of MittelPunkt**, centripetal, over the national territory, also having a strategic position of the first magnitude opposite the Singapore Strait. With a population of 3,547,809 inhabitants¹³. The capital represents the urban center of the state, which is why it can be said that the Republic of Singapore is a city-state. As can be seen in the map in Figure 3, this urban area is administratively structured into five regions (North, Northeast, East, Central, West) and two watersheds (West, Center). Towards the Malaysian border, near the Strait of Johor, small urban settlements have developed, in fact suburbs of the capital, such as Woodlands, Tampines and Yishun. The expansion of the capital has meant that, over time, the rural areas from the center of the island have been incorporated into the urban space, so that currently, the island's population is completely urbanized and assimilated into the city of Singapore.

¹⁰ ***, *Indonesia–Singapore*, “Sovereign Limits”, available at <https://sovereignlimits.com/-boundaries/indonesia-singapore-maritime>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

¹¹ CIA WorldFactBook, *op.cit.*; Richard Olof Winstedt, Annajane Kennard, *op.cit.*

¹² Richard Olof Winstedt, Annajane Kennard, *op.cit.*

¹³ ***, *Singapore overview*, available at <https://worldpopulationreview.com/cities/-singapore>, accessed on 04.06.2025.



Figure 3: Political map of Singapore¹⁴

2. Source of demographic power

According to the U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, as of July 2025, the total population of the state will be 5,870,750 inhabitants, representing 0.071% of the world's population.

The table in Figure 4 presents the evolution of some demographic indicators during the period 1955-2055. The trend of constant population growth is noticeable, which is currently five times higher than the 1,320,230 inhabitants of 1955, in parallel with the eightfold increase in average density, up to 8,387 inhabitants / km² currently and the median age from 17.9 years in 1955, to 36.2 years in 2025. At the same time, a considerable decrease in the fertility rate is observed, from 6.38 births / woman aged 18-45, to 0.96 in 2025 – the lowest value in Southeast Asia.¹⁵

¹⁴ Singapore map, "Maps of India", available at <https://www.mapsofindia.com/world-map/-singapore/>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

¹⁵ Richard Olof Winstedt, Annajane Kennard, *op.cit.*

Population of Singapore (2025 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Country's Share of World Pop	World Population	Singapore Global Rank
2025	5,870,750	0.66%	38,363	16,892	36.2	0.96	8,387			0.071%	8,231,613,070	115
2024	5,832,387	0.75%	43,297	20,011	35.6	0.95	8,332			0.071%	8,161,972,572	115
2023	5,789,090	2.46%	139,205	26,996	35.1	0.94	8,270			0.072%	8,091,734,930	115
2022	5,649,885	0.26%	14,868	214,842	34.9	0.94	8,071			0.070%	8,021,407,192	116
2020	5,620,150	0.34%	18,962	-145,556	34.5	0.94	8,029			0.071%	7,887,001,292	116
2015	5,525,340	1.71%	89,665	41,852	33.3	0.98	7,893			0.074%	7,470,491,872	115
2010	5,077,014	3.53%	161,730	72,571	32.7	0.93	7,253	99.9%	5,074,252	0.072%	7,021,732,148	116
2005	4,268,364	1.13%	46,624	92,023	32.4	1.07	6,098			0.065%	6,586,970,132	120
2000	4,035,245	2.69%	100,324	55,218	31.2	1.34	5,765	97%	3,913,960	0.065%	6,171,702,993	121
1995	3,533,624	3.06%	98,807	91,947	30	1.44	5,048	98.4%	3,478,779	0.061%	5,758,878,982	126
1990	3,039,591	2.13%	60,912	66,950	28.5	1.58	4,342	99.1%	3,012,953	0.057%	5,327,803,110	129
1985	2,735,030	2.33%	59,507	-31,036	26.3	1.53	3,907	98.9%	2,705,535	0.056%	4,868,943,465	129
1980	2,437,493	1.45%	33,794	42,433	23.7	1.74	3,482	98.9%	2,411,700	0.055%	4,447,606,236	129
1975	2,268,523	1.64%	35,393	4,104	20.9	2.08	3,241	99.6%	2,259,748	0.056%	4,070,735,277	129
1970	2,091,558	2.26%	44,147	4,024	18.7	3.07	2,988	99.1%	2,072,290	0.057%	3,694,683,794	128
1965	1,870,822	2.93%	50,300	4,199	17	4.67	2,673			0.056%	3,334,533,703	127
1960	1,619,322	4.17%	59,818	2,008	17.2	5.76	2,313			0.054%	3,015,470,894	129
1955	1,320,230	5.43%	61,383	25,051	17.9	6.38	1,886	98.9%	1,305,091	0.048%	2,740,213,792	131

Source: [Worldometer \(www.worldometers.info\)](https://www.worldometers.info)Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, [World Population Prospects: The 2014 Revision](https://www.un.org/en/publications/world-population-prospects-the-2014-revision) (Medium-fertility variant).Figure 4: Historical demographic dynamics of the state of Singapore between 1955 and 2025¹⁶

In 2025, according to the same source, the life expectancy at birth of a Singaporean citizen was 84 years, the infant mortality rate was 1.7 deaths aged 0-1 year / 1000 live births and the mortality rate up to the nodal age of 5 years was 2.2 deaths / 1000 live births.

Figures that reflect, on the one hand, a remarkable level of economic and social well-being, translated into an infant mortality rate half the European average (3.3) and five times lower than the situation of this indicator in Romania (6.9)¹⁷, and on the other hand, **a process of population aging** which, over time, will lead to **increased immigration**

¹⁶ ***, *Singapore Population*, Worldometer, available at <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/singapore-population/>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

¹⁷ Inês Trindade Pereira, *EU's infant mortality rates paint an unexpectedly bleak picture across bloc*, "euronews.", 04.06.2025, available at <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/-/2025/06/04/eus-infant-mortality-rates-paint-an-unexpectedly-bleak-picture-across-bloc>, accessed on 04.06.2025.

from neighboring areas. A demographic phenomenon that has also characterized the formation of the Singaporean people, today made up of 74.2% ethnic Chinese, 13.7% Malay, 8.9% Indian.¹⁸ It should be remembered that the Chinese majority is not homogeneous, being divided between speakers of the Amoy (Xiamen) dialect in Fujian and speakers of the Teochew dialect in the city of Shantou in Guangdong province, dialects that are mutually incomprehensible.¹⁹ The linguistic mosaic is less pronounced among Malaysians and is very diverse in the Indian group, consisting of Tamils (more than half), Sikhs, Pakistani and Sinhalese communities.

Ethnic diversity has led to the current recognition of **four official languages** by the Singaporean state: English, Mandarin Chinese, Malay and Tamil, of which English is the main language of communication in administration and economic activity.

The religious structure reflects the ethnic mosaic. Among the majority Chinese community (over 3 million citizens) there are practitioners of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity. Malaysians, Sikhs and Pakistanis practice Islam. Indians and most Tamils are Hindus. In 2020, the religious structure was represented by 31.1% Buddhists, 18.9% Christians, 15.6% Muslims, 8.8% Taoists, 5% Hindus, 20% non-affiliated²⁰.

3. Source of economic power

First of all, Singapore is an important regional economic power, with constant growth in recent decades and positive forecasts for the current decade, as can be seen in the graph in Figure 5. Its economic dynamics, accelerated since the 1990s, have given it the title of "Asian tiger", which it shares with other regional players such as South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong (now a Chinese province). In 2024, the Singaporean state reported a GDP of 547.39 billion U.S. dollars and a GDP / capita of 90,670 U.S. dollars²¹.

Export-oriented industrialization began in the 1960s, when the state's economy was liberalized and free trade zones were created. Today, the industrial sector provides 22.4% of GDP and produces a wide range of goods such as: *"electronics, chemicals, financial services, oil drilling equipment, petroleum refining, biomedical products, scientific instruments, telecommunication equipment, processed food and beverages, ship repair,*

¹⁸ CIA WorldFactBook, *op.cit.*

¹⁹ Richard Olof Winstedt, Annajane Kennard, *op.cit.*

²⁰ CIA WorldFactBook, *op.cit.*

²¹ Aaron O'Neill, *Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Singapore 1980-2030*, "statista", 10.06.2025, available at <https://www.statista.com/statistics/378654/gross-domestic-product-gdp-per-capita-in-singapore/>, accessed on 10.06.2025.

offshore platform construction, entrepot trade"²². Services, on the other hand, provide 72.4% of GDP, and are represented in particular by telecommunications, financial services, tourist services and duty-free trade, port and warehousing services, etc. Financial services are extremely sophisticated and are oriented, through a growing venture capital market, towards supporting entrepreneurship interested in the development of high technologies and technological research. Currently, Singapore is an important international financial center, at which the Asian Dollar Market operates, an international monetary and capital market that also trades currencies other than the Singapore dollar. The predictability and stability of the market have given it the highest rating (AAA) from rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's, Standard & Poor's). In the period 2023-2024, Singapore reported a public debt of 177% of GDP, a positive current account balance of \$96.015 billion, which ranked it in 6th place globally, gold and foreign exchange reserves worth \$365.494 billion, which ranked it in 10th place globally, a low inflation rate of 2.4% and an unemployment rate of only 3.2%.²³.




Figure 5: GDP dynamics in Singapore between 1980 and 2030²⁴

²² CIA WorldFactBook, *op.cit.*

²³ *Ibidem.*

²⁴ Aaron O'Neill, *Gross domestic product (GDP) in current prices in Singapore from 1980 to 2030 (in billion U.S. dollars)*, "statista", 10.06.2025, available at <https://www.statista.com/statistics/378648/gross-domestic-product-gdp-in-singapore/>, accessed on 10.06.2025.

The Port of Singapore, designated by the Menon Consulting agency as the **world's leading maritime capital** in 2012, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2022, 2024, due to its economic attractiveness and competitiveness and performance in Shipping, Maritime Finance & Law, Maritime Technology, Ports & Logistics activities²⁵, represents the central axis of this economic construction. Currently, Singapore is the largest port in Southeast Asia, the largest bunkering port in the world²⁶ and ranks second among the busiest ports in the world in terms of total cargo tonnage, having been surpassed, starting with 2010, by the Chinese port of Shanghai²⁷. There are transshipped through the port of Singapore²⁸ one fifth of all global maritime containers and half of the volume of crude oil transported annually globally²⁹. Transshipment is extremely important economically, as a result of time-saving and cost efficiency. More precisely, "*if every vessel makes a single direct voyage to its destination port, the number of journeys will be significantly higher than if transshipped via Singapore*"³⁰. Also, warehousing activities, which involve the transshipment of goods and their eventual processing or manufacturing in neighboring areas, constitute about a third of the state's exports³¹. For example, Singapore is included among the top three global crude oil trading and refining hubs, with a total crude oil refining capacity of 1.5 million barrels per day (bbl/d)³².

In 2024, the total value of Singapore's exports was \$978.597 billion. The main exported goods were integrated circuits, refined petroleum,

²⁵ Erik W Jakobsen, Sophie Emilie Sundt, Lars Martin Haugland, *The Leading Maritime Cities of the World 2024*, 14.04.2024, available at <https://menon.no/en/projects/the-leading-maritime-cities-of-the-world-2024>, accessed on 01.06.2025; Ann Williams, *Singapore named top maritime capital of the world for 3rd consecutive time*, "The Straits Times", 26.04.2017, available at <https://www.straitstimes.com/business/economy/singapore-named-leading-maritime-capital-of-the-world-for-3rd-consecutive-time>, accessed on 01.06.2025; ***, *The Leading Maritime Cities of the World 2022*, "DNV", available at <https://www.dnv.com/maritime/publications/leading-maritime-cities-of-the-world-2022/>, accessed on 01.06.2025; ***, *The leading maritime capitals of the world 2019*, A Menon Economics and DNV GL Publication, available at <https://menon.no/uploads/images/Maritime-cities-2019-Final.pdf>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

²⁶ Richard Olof Winstedt, Annajane Kennard, *op.cit.*

²⁷ ***, *The Busiest Ports in the World: Navigating the Future Challenge in Container Shipping*, dcsa.org, 15.02.2023, available at <https://dcsa.org/newsroom/busiest-ports-in-the-world>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

²⁸ "Transshipment – the movement of cargo from one vessel to another while in transit to its destination". Vezi: PSA Singapore, *Who are we*, available at <https://www.singaporepsa.com/about-us/our-story/>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

²⁹ ***, *The Busiest Ports in the World: Navigating the Future Challenge in Container Shipping*, *op.cit.*

³⁰ PSA Singapore, *op.cit.*

³¹ Richard Olof Winstedt, Annajane Kennard, *op.cit.*

³² ***, *Oil and Gas – Singapore*, International Trade Administration, available at <https://www.trade.gov/energy-resource-guide-singapore-oil-and-gas>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

machinery, vaccines, gold, and the main export partners were Hong Kong 13%, China 11%, USA 10%, Malaysia 9%, S. Korea 6%³³ imports, on the other hand, reached a value of \$786.02 billion and included integrated circuits, refined petroleum, crude petroleum, gold, gas turbines. Its main import partners were China 15%, Malaysia 11%, Taiwan 11%, USA 10%, S. Korea 6%³⁴. From the brief list above, one can deduce the breadth of warehousing activities, to which is added the transport of raw materials such as rubber, timber and spices from the Southeast Asian region and joint-venture participation in investment projects with Malaysia and Indonesia, such as those on the Indonesian island of Batam.³⁵

As mentioned on the port's official website, Singapore represents *"the world's largest transshipment hub with unrivaled connectivity, facilitating container movements across the world, 24/7 all year round"*³⁶. Since the agricultural sector is insignificant, without any contribution to the GDP structure³⁷, the port is also the gateway for food and resources needed by the population. Consequently, we can say that the port of Singapore is both **the Mittelpunkt of the state**, on whose performance the existence of the population depends, and the **main nodal point of the global production and supply chains, on which the global economy depends!**

Being essentially structured by services, and especially port services, unlike other countries in Southeast Asia, the Singaporean economy is not dependent on the production and export of goods, but is dependent on the investment capital of foreign multinational corporations and the proper functioning of the port.

4. Military power source

From a military perspective, Singapore is a micro-power. The well-known website Global Firepower does not include Singapore in its annual ranking of 145 military powers that it measures based on 60 indicators³⁸. However, the small Asian state spends 3% of its GDP annually on its 55,000 active-duty Armed Forces (40,000 Army; 7,000 Navy; 8,000 Air Force) and the equipment they need to carry out combat missions. The military is made up of career soldiers and conscripts – men aged 18 who are incorporated for three years into compulsory military service³⁹. In addition to the regular army, there are two paramilitary forces: the People's Defense Force, composed mainly of reservists, and the National Cadet Corps, made up of

³³ CIA WorldFactBook, *op.cit.*

³⁴ *Ibidem.*

³⁵ Richard Olof Winstedt, Annajane Kennard, *op.cit.*

³⁶ PSA Singapore, *op.cit.*

³⁷ CIA WorldFactBook, *op.cit.*

³⁸ Global Firepower, *2025 Military Strength Ranking*, available at <https://www-globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

³⁹ CIA WorldFactBook, *op.cit.*

high school students and university students. In addition to these are the police forces and the Civil Defense Force, made up of reservists and volunteers⁴⁰.

However, it should be remembered that, as a member of the Commonwealth, Singapore is part of *The Five Power Defence Arrangements - Cele cinci aranjamente de apărare a puterii*, „established in 1971 as a defensive arrangement between the five member-nations of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom to consult each other in the event of an armed attack against Malaysia and Singapore”⁴¹, format that provides its security dome.

5. Diplomatic dome

In addition to membership in the Commonwealth, Singapore is a member of a number of international organizations, starting with the United Nations (UN) and continuing with The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Pacific Alliance (observer), Arctic Council (observer) and many others.

From the data presented above, it is very clear that the main power assets of the Singaporean state are:

- the exceptional geostrategic position, right next to the Singapore - Malacca strait complex, one of the seven maritime constriction points in the world, through which billions of dollars in goods and services, and especially the hydrocarbons necessary for the economies of Japan, China, and South Korea, transit annually;
- the transformation of the Singapore port into the main hub of global production and supply chains, on which the global economy depends!
- the diplomatic and security dome conferred by membership in the Commonwealth.

On the other hand, ethnic and confessional heterogeneity (especially through the mixing of conflicting confessions in other regions such as Hindu-Muslim or Christian-Muslim), the accelerated aging of the population, dependence on food imports and other resources, the natural predisposition to devastating floods, deforestation of the tropical forest and pollution related to intensive port activities, as well as its positioning at the intersection of the regional domination interests of the superpowers of the moment - the USA, China, constitute so many vulnerabilities.

Short history

The island of Singapore was for centuries a haven for fishermen and pirates and an outpost of the Srivijaya Empire in Sumatra. In various

⁴⁰ Richard Olof Winstedt, Annajane Kennard, *op.cit.*

⁴¹ ***, *Five Power Defence Arrangements*, available at <https://www-fivepowerdefencearrangements.org/>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

Javanese and Chinese inscriptions dating from the late 14th century, the island was called Tumasik or Temasek, from the Javanese word tasek - sea. After Singapore was occupied by the Malay Sultanate in the late 14th century, in the early 19th century, the English East India Company bought up large amounts of land on the island from the local authorities. Following a dispute with the Dutch, in 1824, the Anglo-Dutch Treaty brought Malaya and Singapore under the British sphere of influence. In 1851, Singapore was transferred under the direct control of the Governor-General of India and, in 1867, it became a British colony under the Colonial Office in London. After Singapore's trade was affected by the emergence of British, Dutch, Portuguese and French maritime colonies in the region (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Macau, Saigon, Haiphong) in the mid-19th century, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the development of steamships and the increasing demand for tin and rubber boosted the development of the port of Singapore, transforming it into one of the largest in the world. This new economic status, coupled with its exceptional strategic position, engaged Singapore in the power game of the 20th century. After World War I, the British decided to strengthen the defense of Malaysia and build a large naval base in Singapore. In February 1942, during World War II, the British commander of the island handed it over to the Japanese, who controlled it until September 1945. In 1959, Singapore gained autonomy from the British crown, and in September 1963 it participated in the founding of the Federation of Malaysia. However, the People's Action Party (PAP), in power and led by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, succeeded in separating from Malaysia and declaring independence on 9 August 1965, followed by the complete withdrawal of British troops from the region at the end of October 1971. In place of the Anglo-Malaysian Treaty concluded in 1957, under which Britain was responsible for the defense of the region, a five-power defense agreement came into force, as equal partners, namely the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew resigned as prime minister in 1990, but remained the central political figure of the Asian state until his death on March 23, 2015. His party, PAP, is the main political beneficiary of the decades in which the great Yew built the modern Singaporean state. Lee Kuan Yew's political legacy has translated into the huge electoral success of the PAP, which even today has not been overthrown by the opposition parties.

Reviewing the brief history, we note two aspects:

- the historical destiny of this island was shaped by the competition between its immediate state neighbors – Malaysia and Indonesia, over which the interests of the regional colonial powers, the Netherlands and the British Empire, overlapped. The latter remains today, through the Commonwealth, an active geostrategic player in the region;

Geostrategically, Singapore is a pivot and a bridgehead of exceptional value. The Singaporean pivot is crucial for the permeability of the Phillip Channel (see map in Figure 6), the narrowest and most congested portion of the Malacca-Singapore maritime constriction system. A mechanical or security blockade of this channel could completely interrupt maritime, commercial and military flows between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, decoupling the Far Eastern geoeconomic space from the commodity and hydrocarbon markets of Europe and South Asia. It is enough to recall that the Strait of Malacca has become, in recent years, the maritime artery through which 23.7 million barrels per day are transported, the largest volume of hydrocarbons globally⁴⁴. As a consequence, a blockage of it or an intensification of pirate attacks in the region ⁴⁵ could have a devastating impact on global geoeconomic and financial stability.

On the other hand, the function of a bridgehead is already a historical feature, from the Middle Ages, when the Srivijaya empire used the island as a military outpost and refuge for its ships. Currently, being part of the Commonwealth, Singapore is a British maritime bridgehead in the Malacca-Singapore Straits system, in the immediate vicinity of the strategic space of the South China Sea and the Andaman Sea.

Geoeconomically, Singapore is the most eloquent expression of the concept of geopolitical nexus, that is, of the geopolitical product of an economic activity. In this case, the port with its activities gave birth to and grew the state, giving it not only economic well-being, but also geopolitical and geostrategic importance. An overwhelming importance through port transshipment services, which have transformed it into a nodal point of global production and supply chains. A privileged, exclusive status on the geopolitical map of the world, since the global economy depends on its proper functioning!

At the same time, Singapore is a hub of Indo-Pacific maritime transit routes, as the port hosts not only port berths with storage spaces, but also production and manufacturing spaces, an airport, as well as rapid road and rail transport facilities that connect the island to the Asian continent, through the bridge over the Strait of Johor⁴⁶.

3dlcVZadmlGSm9BMD0=/nhst/binary/f37e8adff79ccdeab72671a95438ec35, accessed on 01.06.2025.

⁴⁴ *** *Strait of Malacca becomes oil market's largest transport artery*, Global Energy Prize, 28.06.2024, available at <https://globalenergyprize.org/en/2024/06/28/strait-of-malacca-becomes-oil-markets-largest-transport-artery/>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

⁴⁵ Karen Ng, *op.cit.*

⁴⁶ *** *Johor Bahru – Singapore Rapid Transit System Link*, Land Transport & Authority, available at https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltagov/en/upcoming_projects/rail_expansion/JB-Singapore_RTS_link.html, accessed on 01.06.2025.

Stakes that shape the geopolitical behavior of the state of Singapore

The stakes that shape the geopolitical behavior of the Singaporean state can be structured as follows:

- Geopolitical:

- ✓ preservation of statehood and the regional status quo in the context of increasingly fierce competition between the Asian, continental bloc, led by China, and the Western, maritime, led by the USA;

- ✓ development of the diplomatic dome (including by joining the OECD⁴⁷) and enhancing the status of a regional geopolitical player;

- ✓ avoiding transformation into a buffer state and entering the gray, unaffiliated security zone.

- Civilizational

- ✓ preserving the status quo and avoiding transformation into a space of civilizational compression.

- Geostrategic:

- ✓ strategic control of the Phillip Channel and the Singapore Straits;

- ✓ ensuring the permeability of the Malacca-Singapore strait system;

- ✓ securing the maritime corridors that intersect in the Singapore nexus;

- ✓ ensuring the permeability of the maritime-continental corridor, Singapore - Malaysia.

- Geoeconomic:

- ✓ preserving the status of the hub of global production and supply chains;

- ✓ preserving the status of the port of Singapore as the world's main maritime capital, the status of the largest port in Southeast Asia, the largest bunkering port in the world;

- ✓ acquiring global supremacy in transshipment activities;

- ✓ ensuring the food, energy and mineral resources necessary for the well-being of the population and the state while preserving environmental conditions.

Stakes materialized by the geopolitical game between the following players:

- regional states - Indonesia and Malaysia;

- extra-regional states - China, the USA and the Commonwealth space;

- regional and extra-regional non-state actors – multinational companies, international organizations (ASEAN, ONU, BRICS⁴⁸, SCO⁴⁹,

⁴⁷ Acronym of “The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development”.

⁴⁸ Cooperation forum of 10 states: Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates.

⁴⁹ Acronym of Shanghai Cooperation Organization in which China is member.

World Islamic Forum, Liga Islamica), military alliances (NATO⁵⁰, AUKUS⁵¹), criminal groups (maritime piracy), Islamist networks (Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood with branches in Malaysia and Indonesia) which act on the Singaporean security complex.

Security complex described by the following scheme of state interactions:

- Singapore – Malaysia axis;
- Singapore – Indonesia axis;
- Singapore – China axis;
- Singapore – USA axis;
- Singapore – United Kingdom – Australia trilateral;
- Singapore – Malaysia – Indonesia trilateral;
- USA – United Kingdom / Commonwealth – China trilateral;
- Singapore – Australia – New Zealand – Malaysia – United

Kingdom pentagon; on top of which are superimposed non-state challenges, generated by the multitude of interests and the competition for economic, military and political supremacy in the region.

The great challenge to the regional status quo is the emergence of China as a superpower and its hegemonic ambitions. Ambitions already expressed. Both through its assertive behavior over some archipelagic and maritime spaces in the South China Sea (the Spratly, Paracel, Natuna and Scarborough atoll islands, see the map in Figure 7) and not only⁵², which it disputes with the immediate neighbors of the Singaporean state, Indonesia and Malaysia, along with Taiwan, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and where it is already building artificial islands and establishing air, sea and land (A2AD) interdiction zones. As well as through the series of global geoeconomic and security initiatives subsumed under the Chinese vision of a future global governance described by the phrase Community of Common Destiny for Mankind.

⁵⁰ Acronym of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which USA and Great Britain are members

⁵¹ Acronym for the tripartite military alliance between the USA, Australia and Great Britain.

⁵² Other disputed territories are in the East China Sea – where China disputes with Japan the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, and with Japan and South Korea the Socotra Islands; the Taiwan archipelago; the Aksai-Chin region in the northern Kashmir, disputed with India. See Alba Iulia Catrinel Popescu, The 'China's dream' - the grand strategy of transforming China into a global Maritime power, "Cogent Social Sciences", No.1, Vol.10, Taylor & Francis Online, 2024, available at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2024.2414873>, accessed on 01.06.2024.



Figure 7: China's disputed territories in the South China Sea ⁵³

A common destiny built on three pillars: two geo-economic ones – Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will be complemented by the air component – Air Silk Road (see map in Figure 10), and Global Civilisational Initiative (in fact an extension of BRI to the Global South) and one security one – Global Security Initiative. Added to these are a series of other technological and cultural initiatives, such as BRI International Green Development Coalition, Belt and Road Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation Action Plan, Global Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance Initiative, Liangzhu Forum. Initiatives complemented by intensive policies of armament and technologization of military capabilities (land, naval, air, space, cyber, cognitive and nuclear), development of maritime identity by building outposts in the coastal space of the Global South, development of blue sea expeditionary corps, merchant fleet and paramilitary fishing fleet, major investments in scientific research - especially in technological research, demographic policies aimed at rejuvenating the population, instrumentalization of strategic mineral resources for political purposes - especially rare earths, policies to

⁵³ Miles Kenny, *Territorial disputes in the South China Sea*, Britannica, available at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/territorial-disputes-in-the-South-China-Sea>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

dedollarize markets, policies aimed at transforming China into the largest and most powerful economy in the world with a financial soundness that is difficult to shake by competitors, etc.

Actions subsumed under the Grand Strategy of the "China Dream" of transforming the Asian colossus into a global hegemon and continental-maritime superpower.

Grand Strategy that comes in frontal opposition to American hegemonic interests in the Pacific, the Global South and Eurasia and which raises concerns not only in Washington, but also in London, Moscow, New Delhi, Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra, Hanoi, Wellington, Manila, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, etc. The USA, whose global dominance seemed unshakable just two decades ago, and which sees itself caught in a true "Thucydides trap", between the obligation assumed in the 1990s as a "universal gendarme" and the economic and financial costs of such a status. The United Kingdom, through the Commonwealth, is a strategic competitor of China and a de facto ally of the USA in the region. The Russian Federation is caught in a geopolitical pincer, between Chinese hegemonic ambitions, competition with the collective West and the Ukrainian impasse it has entered as a result of the expansionist policy that has defined its geopolitical behavior for centuries. An impasse that has shattered, for now, its own hegemonic ambitions for a unified Eurasia around the Moscow-Berlin-Paris axis, and a Pacific Ocean dominated by the Russian fleet⁵⁴. India, with its rising hegemonic profile, is the only real Asian competitor to Beijing's power. A competition amplified by China's "string of pearls" strategy, the construction of naval outposts in the coastal space of the Indian Ocean and the Sino-Pakistani strategic partnership, also materialized by China's operational naval base in the port of Gwadar⁵⁵. Japan, in turn, is directly targeted by Chinese hegemony, both through its negative modern history and through territorial disputes in the East China Sea – the Senkaku/Diaoyu and Socotra islands, through economic competition over emerging markets and, above all, through China's policies of transforming strategic minerals into instruments of state power⁵⁶. As for the smaller states in the Asia-

⁵⁴ Jean Parvulesco, *Vladimir Putin si Eurasia*, Popular University, Chisinau, 2017, pp. 25-31.

⁵⁵ Alba Iulia Catrinel Popescu, *op.cit.*

⁵⁶ Keith Bradsher, *Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan*, "The New York Times", 22.09.2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Keith Bradsher, *China's Rare Earth Embargo Changes Incentive for Toxic Work*, "The New York Times", 29.10.2010, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/30/business/global/30rare.html?ref=rareearths>; Keith Bradsher, *Malaysia Plan Meets Standards, U.N. Agency Says*, "The New York Times", 30.06.2011, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/business/global/01lynas.html?ref=rareearths>, accessed on 12.06.2025.

Pacific region, the Chinese hegemonic emergence translates into territorial and legal disputes, of the law-fare type, through "*coercive maritime diplomacy*" or "*para-gunboat diplomacy*"⁵⁷, tactics applied by Beijing in the disputed maritime spaces of the South China Sea.




Figure 8: Chinese surface-to-surface missile engagement envelope overlaid with anticipated B-21 Raider deployed munitions range⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Alba Iulia Catrinel Popescu, *op.cit.*

⁵⁸ ***, *Chinese surface-to-surface missile engagement envelope overlaid with anticipated B-21 Raider deployed munitions range*, available at <https://preview.redd.it/map-of-chinese-surface-to-surface-missile-engagement-v0-nm3io502t35a1.jpg?width=1080&crop=smart-&auto=webp&s=ac9eab46c7a0f52984eec8e6e5faf7b7e9b53acb>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

Faced with the Chinese hegemonic threat (see map in Figure 8), the states of the Asia-Pacific region have adopted different political strategies (see map in Figure 9). Some, such as Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, and in South Asia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Pakistan have chosen to join the Chinese hegemon and especially its geo-economic projects, a fact highlighted by the increase in the volume of purchases of Chinese military equipment⁵⁹. Others, such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Bhutan, India, Australia and New Zealand, have entered into counterbalancing formats in partnership with the US. And the rest of the regional players – North Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand, Myanmar – have adopted a neutral stance, hoping to “*sneak through*” the traps of this increasingly “*heated*” regional and global power game.




Figure 9: The “Chessboard” in the Asia-Pacific region⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Max Fisher, Audrey Carlsen, *How China Is Challenging American Dominance in Asia*, “The New York Times”, 09.03.2018, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/09/world/asia/china-us-asia-rivalry.html>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

In this geopolitical context, the Singaporean state is caught in a geopolitical “*pincer*”. On the one hand, its civilizational membership in the Chinese space prevents it from adopting a hard line, in opposition to the Chinese hegemon. On the other hand, its security and geopolitical membership in the Commonwealth blocks any alignment with the pro-Chinese camp. In addition, its status as a turning point in global production and supply chains and as a guardian of the Malacca-Singapore Straits system requires it to distance itself from the extremes of this geopolitical behavior. Therefore, Singapore is among the non-aligned states in this power game, a policy that brings it great economic advantages, being both included in the Chinese civilizational master plan of the BRI (see map in Figure 10) and benefiting from the Western security guarantees of The Five Power Defence Arrangements.




Figure 10: Belt and Road Initiative⁶¹

But how stable will the political status quo of the Singaporean state be in the context of the intensifying geopolitical competition in the Pacific between the US and China? Will the small Asian state be able to maintain its neutrality and independence? What will prevail? The majority Chinese identity or its affiliation with the Anglo-Saxon maritime world? Its role as a

⁶¹ Yasiru Ranaraja, *The Non-Aggression Path of Belt & Road Initiative*, BRISL, available at <https://brisl.org/the-non-aggression-path-of-belt-road-initiative/>, accessed on 01.06.2025.

turning point for global production and supply chains or its geostrategic value as a pivot and bridgehead in the Phillip Channel? Will Singapore be able to maintain its geoeconomic assets in the context of an increasingly tense regional security environment? Questions whose answers converge towards what we euphemistically call a "geopolitical barometer". In other words, the geopolitical stability of a microstate of Singapore's geoeconomic and geostrategic importance is the result of the geopolitical balance between the global geopolitical cores. Any imbalance between global players, any loss or gain of influence translates into changes in the political and geopolitical status quo in the world of microstates. Therefore, the stability of the geopolitical status quo of a micro-state like Singapore is an indicator of the stability of the international order.

Conclusions

Although tiny in population and territory, lacking mineral and energy resources and with minimal agricultural activities, Singapore is a major player in the global geopolitical game through its two great assets: the geostrategic one, as a bridgehead in the Phillip Channel, the narrowest portion of the Malacca-Singapore strait system, and the geoeconomic one, as a turntable for global production and supply chains. Liberal economic policies and the strategy of developing and diversifying port activities, especially bunkering and transshipment, have built and consolidated its statehood, Singapore being the classic example of a geopolitical nexus. A nexus located in a space of geopolitical laterality, threatened by the prospect of becoming a buffer space and directly and immediately targeted by the status of the macro-level power game of the superpowers that configure the world order. Therefore, the "Asian tiger" born from the geometry of the Indo-Pacific strategic corridors is a true "barometer" of the stability of the status quo of the international system, a role it also shares with other micro-states such as the Vatican (ecclesiastical superpower), Monaco (gambling superindustry), Nauru (a huge source of phosphates) or Andorra (tax haven).



BIBLIOGRAPHY

- BRADSHER K., *Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan*, "The New York Times", 22.09.2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;
- BRADSHER K., *China's Rare Earth Embargo Changes Incentive for Toxic Work*, "The New York Times", 29.10.2010, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/business/global/29rare.html>;

- [//www.nytimes.com/2010/10/30/business/global/30rare.html?ref=rareearths](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/30/business/global/30rare.html?ref=rareearths);
- BRADSHER K., *Malaysia Plan Meets Standards, U.N. Agency Says*, “The New York Times”, 30.06.2011, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/business/global/01lynas.html?ref=rareearths>;
- FISHER M., CARLSEN A., *How China Is Challenging American Dominance in Asia*, “The New York Times”, 09.03.2018, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/09/world/asia/china-us-asia-rivalry.html>;
- JAKOBSEN E.W., SUNDT S.E., HAUGLAND L.M., *The Leading Maritime Cities of the World 2024*, 14.04.2024, available at <https://menon.no/en/projects/the-leading-maritime-cities-of-the-world-2024>;
- MILES K., *Territorial disputes in the South China Sea*, Britannica, available at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/territorial-disputes-in-the-South-China-Sea>;
- NG K., *Singapore Strait robbery attacks shift westwards to the Phillip Channel*, TradeWinds, 03.03.2025, available at <https://images-global.nhst.tech/image/WEIQck90MG-ltQUV6b2cvQ2xWZ2ZyZ1Vja2FvQ1hTU3dlcVZadmlGSm9BMD0=/nhst/binary/f37e8adff79ccdeab72671a95438ec35>;
- O'NEILL A., *Gross domestic product (GDP) in current prices in Singapore from 1980 to 2030 (in billion U.S. dollars)*, “statista”, 10.06.2025, available at <https://www.statista.com/statistics/378648/gross-domestic-product-gdp-in-singapore/>;
- O'NEILL A., *Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Singapore 1980-2030*, “statista”, 10.06.2025, available at <https://www-statista.com/statistics/378654/gross-domestic-product-gdp-per-capita-in-singapore/>;
- PARVULESCO J., *Vladimir Putin si Eurasia*, Popular University, Chisinau, 2017;
- POPESCU A.I.C., *The ‘China’s dream’ - the grand strategy of transforming China into a global Maritime power*, “Cogent Social Sciences”, Nr.1, Vol.10, Taylor & Francis Online, 2024, available at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2024.2414873>;
- RANARAJA Y., *The Non-Aggression Path of Belt & Road Initiative*, BRISL, available at <https://brisl.org/the-non-aggression-path-of-belt-road-initiative/>;
- ROMERO L., *Natural gas industry in Singapore - statistics & facts*, Statista, 02.07.2024, available at <https://www.statista.com/>

- topics/10628/natural-gas-industry-in-singapore/#topic-Overview;
- SENTHILINGAM M., Stevens A., Why Singapore is putting its oil back into the ground, CNN, 17.06.2015, available at <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/16/asia/going-underground-in-singapore/>;
- TRINDADE Pereira I., *EU's infant mortality rates paint an unexpectedly bleak picture across bloc*, "euronews.", 04.06.2025, available at <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/06/04/eus-infant-mortality-rates-paint-an-unexpectedly-bleak-picture-across-bloc>;
- WILLIAMS A., *Singapore named top maritime capital of the world for 3rd consecutive time*, "The Straits Times", 26.04.2017, available at <https://www.straitstimes.com/business/economy/singapore-named-leading-maritime-capital-of-the-world-for-3rd-consecutive-time>;
- WINSTEDT R.O., Kennard A., *Singapore*, available at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Singapore>;
- CIA WorldFactBook, *Singapore*, available at <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/singapore/>;
- Global Firepower, *2025 Military Strength Ranking*, available at <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php>;
- Microstates, *Singapore*, available at <https://www.microstates.net/singapore.html>;
- PSA Singapore, *Who are we*, available at <https://www.singaporepsa.com/about-us/our-story/>;
- World Atlas, *Maps of Singapore*, available at <https://www.worldatlas.com/maps/singapore>;
- World Atlas, *Singapore Maps & Facts*, available at <https://www.worldatlas.com/r/w1200/upload/c2/b2/32/sg-02.jpg>;
- ***, *Chinese surface-to-surface missile engagement envelope overlaid with anticipated B-21 Raider deployed munitions range*, available at <https://preview.redd.it/map-of-chinese-surface-to-surface-missile-engagement-v0-nm3io502t35a1.jpg?width=1080&crop=smart&auto=webp&s=ac9eab46c7a0f52984eec8e6e5faf7b7e9b53acb>;
- ***, *Five Power Defence Arrangements*, available at <https://www.fivepowerdefencearrangements.org/>;
- ***, *Indonesia–Singapore*, "Sovereign Limits", available at <https://sovereignlimits.com/boundaries/indonesia-singapore-maritime>;
- ***, *Johor Bahru – Singapore Rapid Transit System Link*, Land Transport & Authority, available at <https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/>

- Itagov/en/upcoming_projects/rail_expansion/JB-Singapore_RTS_link.html;
- ***, *Oil and Gas – Singapore, International Trade Administration*, available at <https://www.trade.gov/energy-resource-guide-singapore-oil-and-gas>;
- ***, *Singapore*, *iea*, available at <https://www.iea.org/countries/-singapore/oil>;
- ***, *Singapore map*, “Maps of India”, available at <https://www.mapsofindia.com/world-map/singapore/>;
- ***, *Singapore overview*, available at <https://worldpopulationreview.com/cities/singapore>;
- ***, *Singapore Population*, *Worldometer*, available at <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/singapore-population/>;
- ***, *Strait of Malacca becomes oil market's largest transport artery*, *Global Energy Prize*, 28.06.2024, available at <https://global-energyprize.org/en/2024/06/28/strait-of-malacca-becomes-oil-markets-largest-transport-artery>;
- ***, *The Busiest Ports in the World: Navigating the Future Challenge in Container Shipping*, *dcsa.org*, 15.02.2023, available at <https://dcsa.org/newsroom/busiest-ports-in-the-world>;
- ***, *The leading maritime capitals of the world 2019*, *A Menon Economics and DNV GL Publication*, available at <https://menon.no/uploads/images/Maritime-cities-2019-Final.pdf>;
- ***, *The Leading Maritime Cities of the World 2022*, “DNV”, available at <https://www.dnv.com/maritime/publications/leading-maritime-cities-of-the-world-2022/>.

