

## **POSSIBLE LESSONS TO LEARN FROM THE WAR STARTED BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGAINST UKRAINE**

*Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Associate Professor  
Constantin MINCU, Ph.D\**

**Abstract:** *The author considers that the topic of this article is of interest to active politicians and military of all ranks.*

*In the context of the Russian Federation's unreasoned and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine (on 24.02.2022), the concerns of Romania and other countries, historically unlucky to find themselves in what the Russians call their "close vicinity", have increased dramatically. The concerns get bigger as no one knows where this „vicinity" ends, in Berlin or in the Atlantic!?*

*The paper presents some events and facts of the war's preliminaries and outgoing, which could be used by those with responsibilities in the field of defence in Romania to draw some conclusions and generate accordingly measures.*

*Let's hope that NATO and the EU have gain some terms with reality and have finally understood who Putin's Russia is and what it wants. Urgent and firm measures are needed to counter the aggressor.*

**Keywords:** *Ukrainian War, Russia, Ukraine, NATO, EU, Romania.*

### **1. Introduction**

In the last four years I have published several articles in the Romanian **Journal of Military Sciences** on the policies of the Russian Federation towards the West, but also towards other state actors in the immediate vicinity and in other parts of the world (articles will be presented in the bibliography). According to some political statements by Russian officials, Ukraine was on the top of list. It turned out, on February 24, 2022, that Putin and his siloviki-oligarchic regime had resorted to unmotivated and unprovoked aggression against its western neighbour.

Despite clear signs that aggression will take place (since 2004), Western leaders have paid little attention to Russia's real preparations for war.

---

\* Entitled member of Romanian Scientists Academy, member of the Honorary Council of the Romanian Scientists Academy, Vice-President of Military Sciences Section. Phone: 0722303015. E-mail: mincu\_constantin@yahoo.com.

**In August 2021, in Policy Brief No. 124<sup>1</sup>**, a group of historians and political analysts from several Western countries published under the auspices of the prestigious British Chatham **House** institute a lucid analysis of preconceptions and naiveties affecting the response to the overtly aggressive actions of Russia.

I believe that the **analysis** helps enormously to understand as accurately as possible the policy of Russia in the region and in the world, for example towards Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Moldova and the Baltic States, as well as the aggressive actions **in the Black Sea Basin** (in full swing after 24.02.2022 and until now - 21.05.2022, the date on which I submitted my article to the Publishing House).

The material mentioned above dismantles, with solid arguments, 16 of the most widespread myths and prejudices that shape the perception of Russia in the West today, clarifying the detrimental and dangerous impact they have on Western policies. For each of **the 16 myths**, it is shown how the West should critically (if it wants to) reassess its position in order to respond more rationally and effectively to Russia's aggressive actions.

**The main argument** in the material is that although many Euro-Atlantic politicians and decision-makers tend to take their wishes for granted, in fact, **there is no prospect of Russia becoming a cooperative and constructive partner for Western governments in the near future. It is worth noting, however, that Putin's Russia has a Hidden Agenda** that it is pursuing with determination in all economic, financial, military and other matters, promoting destabilizing policies and actions, without any trace of restraint, firstly against neighbours and then against EU and/or NATO member countries. The direct aggression against Ukraine was like a cold shower for almost every country in the world and it took some time for the US and EU/NATO countries to react in a coherent and coordinated manner in support of the invaded state.

It can be concluded that well-intentioned efforts are doomed to failure because Russia's geopolitical goals, animating values, and conceptions of state relations differ radically from those of the West.

Because in my article "The current policy of the Russian Federation - a mystery hidden in an enigma" published in the Journal of Military

---

<sup>1</sup> *Policy Brief* no. 124/2021, analysis available at: [www.expertforum.ro](http://www.expertforum.ro).

Sciences no. 4/2021<sup>2</sup> I referred extensively to Russia's narratives grounded on its worldview, there is no need to resume, but I invite those interested, military and civilian, to read the indicated material.

**In the context of the war in Ukraine**, Russia's conception that its Empire must ensure its security through political, economic and military influence in neighbouring states is reaffirmed. **Its military establishment grew with the idea that Russia must always wage defensive wars outside its own borders.** For domestic consumption, Putin and his clique support the myth of the **"besieged city"** from all directions, and do not shy away from grossly falsifying history, for example, by saying that Poland is to blame for the outbreak of World War II.

**We must also remember** that long before the aggression against Ukraine was launched, Putin and his aggressive propaganda prepared the ground for the domestic and foreign audiences that **"the peoples of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia form a single nation"**. It did not take long for this starting to be materialized.

## **2. Review of information about the Russian Federation and Ukraine**

### **2.1. Russia**

In order to assess as accurately as possible the demographic, economic and military potential, I consider it useful to recall some significant data in the context of the current war of aggression against Ukraine.

**Russia has an area of 17,074,400 km<sup>2</sup>** (1<sup>st</sup> rank in the world). It has an ocean coast and seas of **37,000 km**, the population is estimated (2017) at **144 million inhabitants** (8<sup>th</sup> rank), of which 81% Russians, and the remaining 19% belonging to 160 ethnic groups.

**The dominant religions** are Orthodox (16-20% of Russians declare themselves Orthodox), and an important part are Muslims and Buddhists.

---

<sup>2</sup> General Lieutenant (Ret.) Associate Professor Constantin MINCU, „Politica actuală a Federației Ruse - un mister ascuns într-o enigmă”, *Revista de Științe Militare*, no. 4/2021.

The total **gross domestic product** (GDP) in 2013 was USD 2,553 billion (now in 2022 it is likely to be about \$ 200 billion higher), returning a GDP/capita of USD 18,800.

Russia has huge energy resources, so it ranks 3<sup>rd</sup> in the world in oil and 2<sup>nd</sup> in gas. This reality also has a high potential for blackmailing the West, which lacks these vital resources.

**The military forces**, structured in five categories, were in 2019: personnel - 2,100,000, of which 1,136,000 soldiers, being able to mobilize another 3-5% of the population when needed.

**Russia has 8,500 nuclear weapons (ranked No. 1 in the world)** and has no qualms about threatening to use them, including smaller countries that do not have such weapons. The blackmail potential of these weapons is huge and has an effect on major Western capitals.

Regarding the main armament, I will present only the estimates for tanks and other armoured vehicles - 28,000, fighter planes - 3100, attack helicopters - 1655 etc.

The defence budget in 2019 was \$ 95 billion, a significant number to support the military effort with clearly aggressive tendencies.

The above data, in fact only a brief summary, highlights the overwhelming gap of military potential with Ukraine. However, in the field, in battle, there were surprises, unfigured by specialists before the invasion.

## **2.2. Ukraine**

Ukraine has an area of 603,700 km<sup>2</sup> (rank 44 in the world), has a sea exit of 2,782 km. The population of Ukraine in 2013 was 47,725,000 (rank 26), of which 77.8% were Ukrainians, 17.3% were Russians (especially in the east and southeast), 0.85% were Romanians, and the rest about ten more ethnic groups.

Religion - Orthodoxy (30%), Catholicism (8%), Protestantism, Judaism.

Ukraine has significant mineral resources, significant agricultural potential and a modernizing manufacturing industry, including for the manufacture of defence weapons.

**The Armed Forces** are structured into three categories. The active staff was before the invasion of 159,000 people, and recently President

Volodymyr Zelensky signed a Decree to increase the staff to 361,000 people. The reservists are estimated to be around 1 million fighters.

Defence spending in 2020 was \$ 4.3 billion, a number that increased in the context of the war to about \$ 10 billion, plus massive financial assistance from the United States and some Western countries.

The United States and almost all NATO countries have provided defensive weapons, mainly anti-tank and anti-aircraft, as well as modern systems for command and control of defending troops.

### **3. Actions carried out by Russia in the period preceding the invasion of 24.02.2022**

After the year 2000, under the strong hand of President Vladimir Putin, **the Russian Federation** began an extensive process of arming and preparing for aggressive war, which was initially launched against Ukraine.

Russia has also developed and is developing complex means of pressuring and influencing neighbouring countries and other countries of the world (political, economic, technological, informational, cyber and military in the so-called “**hybrid war**” category).

In the current political and geostrategic context, it is necessary to recall the complicated files of the frozen conflicts presented in detail, by Professor Stan Petrescu, Ph.D., in the *Geopolitics* journal no. 73 (1/2018)<sup>3</sup>. Without going into details, we limit ourselves to naming them: Russia - Ukraine, Russia - Georgia, Russia - Baltic States, Moldova and the case of Transnistria, Chechnya, Russia - Armenia - Azerbaijan, Russia's hybrid war in Crimea, ending with the annexation of the peninsula.

These frozen conflicts can be activated at any time by order of the Kremlin, with the direct involvement of its military forces and the actions of mercenaries in private armies (actually GRU forces).

Following the annexation of Crimea, Russia intensified its efforts to consolidate its power in the Black Sea area, taking advantage of Turkey's double play.

---

<sup>3</sup> Professor Stan Petrescu. Ph.D., „Rusia, de la conflictele înghețate la războiul hibrid”, *Geopolitics* journal, no. 73 (1/2018).

There is a strong arming of the peninsula, as well as an increase in warships deployed in Russian ports on the Black Sea. For details, I think you can consult the article “The evolution of the balance of power in the Black Sea Region”<sup>4</sup>.

In the view of the current leaders of the Kremlin, an important objective is the strategies to block and hijack the evolution of the European Union and, in this context, to undermine and weaken its Member States. Energy blackmail plays an important role in undermining EU unity through violent propaganda and violence. The case of Hungary is significant in this situation.

We also note intense propaganda, misinformation, false news, and massive cyber-attacks on the economic and financial infrastructure of the EU Member States and the United States. Russia’s involvement in the US presidential election, the Brexit process and the elections in Germany, France, Italy and other countries (including actions against Romania) is well known.

Moscow leaders develop and implement, without hesitation, complex actions in the class called “Hybrid Warfare” by analysts, unscrupulously using territorial, economic-financial, religious and political disputes between some European and Middle Eastern countries<sup>5</sup>.

In this context, we must take note of Russia’s involvement in acts against Romania coming from the Hungarian Government, led by Viktor Orbán. Of course, countermeasures should be applied on all levels.

It should be noted that the rather timid attempts of NATO and some Eastern European countries to defend their territory (actions carried out until 24.02.2022), in the face of daily threats from Moscow, arouse the unjustified anger of the Russian political-military leadership.

For those interested, I recommend that we review the analysis made by Brigadier General Gheorghe Văduva, Ph.D, in his article “Russia is Russia and that's it”<sup>6</sup>. The material makes a correct x-ray, without partisan

---

<sup>4</sup> Marius Roșu, „Evoluția balanței de putere în Regiunea Mării Negre”, *Geopolitics* journal, no. 73 (1/2018).

<sup>5</sup> Vasile Simileanu, Ph.D., „Războiul hibrid - abordări geopolitice, geostrategice și de geointelligence”, *Geopolitics* journal, no. 73 (1/2018).

<sup>6</sup> Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Văduva, Ph.D., „Rusia este Rusia și atât”, *Geopolitics* journal, no. 73 (1/2018).

passions, of the actions of the last years of the **Euro-Asian Empire** in the East, actions that threaten every day the peace of the world and of course the security of Romania.

Since 2018 and until the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, numerous warnings have been issued by political leaders and politico-military analysts regarding Putin's Russia aggressive intentions and actions.

**Thus, the Swedish Defence Research Agency**<sup>7</sup> has come to the conclusion that Russia is preparing for a new world war. Why this serious conclusion? Because the Russians organize and carry out actions that lead to this situation:

- They switched to offensive military applications from 10,000 in 2017 to 300,000 in 2018;
- An intensive training action has been and is taking place for the reservists;
- Many new weapons are produced and tested;
- Deliberately and cynically violated the "Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)" by developing and positioning 64 SSC-8 cruise missiles (with nuclear or conventional warheads) with a range of 2,400 km;
- They sent "green people" to Syria, Libya, Venezuela and probably other countries;
- They intensified propaganda, misinformation, and cyber-attacks against EU and/or NATO countries and on other countries classified as unfriendly.

**Former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo** said in Slovakia on 12.02.2019: "Russian President Vladimir Putin poses a threat to democracies around the world"<sup>8</sup>.

---

<sup>7</sup> „Suedezii au ajuns la concluzia că Rusia se pregătește de un război mondial”, available at: <https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/rusia/suedezii-au-ajuns-la-concluzia-ca-rusia-se-pregateste-de-un-razboi-mondial-1080071>, accessed on 18.05.2022.

<sup>8</sup> „Putin reprezintă o amenințare la adresa democrațiilor din toată lumea”, available at: <https://newsmaker.ro/mike-pompeo-in-slovacia-putin-reprezinta-o-amenintare-la-adresa-democrațiilor-din-toata-lumea/>, accessed on 18.05.2022.

**Adviser to the US Embassy in Romania, David Schlaefer:**  
“Russia has a strategy to weaken Romania and its ties with the West”<sup>9</sup>.

**Retired American General Ben Hodges**, former Commander of the US Forces in Europe and Chief of NATO Forces in Europe, said in Prague that Russia could occupy Odessa and then attack and occupy Romania<sup>10</sup>.

Warnings and red flags about the atavistic aggression of the Russian Federation were also issued by some Romanian politico-military analysts, through articles and studies published in various journals, through books on geopolitics and geo-strategy and by taking positions on various media vectors:

- The Head of the *Military Sciences Section of the Romanian Scientists Academy*, General Teodor Frunzeti;
- The former Chief of the General Staff, General Eugen Bădălan (full member of the Romanian Scientists Academy);
- The former Chief of the General Staff, General Constantin Degeratu;
- Lieutenant General Virgil Bălăceanu, President of the Association of Military Staff in Reserve and Retirement;
- Brigadier General Gheorghe Văduva, Ph.D. (member of the Romanian Scientists Academy);
- Colonel Vasile Simileanu, Ph.D. (member of the Romanian Scientists Academy).

The list of Romanian authors is much longer, but I will stop here.

It turned out that until the beginning of 2022, when it became clear that Russia would attack Ukraine, NATO and EU officials did not pay much attention to these dangerous developments. However, the cold shower came on 24.02.2022.

---

<sup>9</sup> „Rusia are o strategie sofisticată țintită spre România”, available at: <https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/diplomat-american-suntem-ingrijorati-rusia-are-o-strategie-sofisticata-tintita-spre-romania-1087675>, accessed on 19.05.2022.

<sup>10</sup> „General american: Rusia ar putea invada România”, available at: <https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/general-american-rusia-ar-putea-invada-romania-1098015>, accessed on 19.05.2022.



**4. The war in Ukraine started in 24.02.2022, at this date (21.05.2022) in full swing**

**The Russian Federation, through the voice of President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin**, announced on the morning of February 24, 2022, the initiation of the so-called “special military operations” for an embarrassing and deeply lying scoundrel called “denazification and demilitarization” of neighbouring Ukraine.

For this purpose, troops and armaments estimated at 180,000 soldiers and hundreds of armoured vehicles, artillery systems and unguided and guided missiles were massaged at the northern, eastern and south-eastern borders of Ukraine. They also hired a large air force (fighter jets and attack helicopters and observation and attack drones).

I do not intend to refer to the conduct and outcome of the fighting because many Romanian and foreign military commentators and analysts do this on a daily basis.

What is certain is that Putin and his aggressive siloviki have overestimated their military capabilities, considering that they will occupy all of Ukraine in just a few days after the occupation of Kiev and the removal of the government and President Zelensky. To their surprise, the Russians were not greeted with flowers, but with great resistance from the leaders of the attacked country, the army and civil society.

In the following I will refer to some issues regarding the **Command and Control** of troops and those related to operational and tactical communication systems, based on what is known so far (21.05.2022).

**Russia has spread** its forces over a very large area, mainly ignoring the difficulties of a single and efficient command of rather heterogeneous troops, along with relatively well-trained professional soldiers, acting recruits brought from Siberia, unprepared and with low morale.

Inter-force and inter-category cooperation communications were ignored, causing huge losses among combatants.

**Surprisingly**, after Putin began a massive arms program in 2000, only 30% of communications units have modern digital equipment with an acceptable level of encryption. The tactical radio stations did not reach to the fighters and crews, depriving them of the exercise of command and control in real time.

**The mix of units and subunits** equipped with old unencrypted analogue equipment, with the few equipped with digital stations and with encrypted frequency hopping required everyone to work at the level of the old ones, with the risks that came from here.

**Tactical Command Points** (Battalion, Regiment, and Division) were pushed too far ahead of normal tactics, being unmasked and unprotected from research by observation satellites, drones, planes and helicopters. In addition, the locals and the Ukrainian military provided location data for the enemy using the means of communication in public networks (not destroyed by the Russians!?) and military radio stations, and artillery, aviation, drones and other means of action were able to act effectively and lethal.

**Here is what former CIA chief Retired General David Petraeus told CNN:**

- *“Their communications were blocked by the Ukrainians. Their secret communications did not work. They had to go on one channel, that it can be blocked. And that is exactly what the Ukrainians did. They (Russians) use mobile phones. The Ukrainians blocked the prefix for Russia, so they did not work. Then they downloaded 3G. They literally steal cell phones from civilians to communicate with each other”.*

**Other comments on the topic:**

- **The large scale of the invasion** only made things worse. Coordinating operations along a 1,600-kilometer front requires *“extensive communication capabilities and command, control and intelligence resources that the Russians simply do not have”*, said retired US military analyst Lieutenant General Mark Harthing.
- *“I do not see anything that makes the navy coordinated with what the air or ground forces do”*<sup>11</sup>, said retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, a former US Army Commander in Europe.

**About the Russian Armed Forces’ unlearned lessons in Georgia:**

---

<sup>11</sup> „Comunicațiile tactice ale armatei ruse - unul din factorii majori care a dus la blocarea invaziei Rusiei”, available at: [https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-razboi\\_ucraina-25449334-comunicatiile-tactice-ale-armatei-ruse-unul-din-factorii-majori-care-dus-blocarea-invaziei-rusiei.htm](https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-razboi_ucraina-25449334-comunicatiile-tactice-ale-armatei-ruse-unul-din-factorii-majori-care-dus-blocarea-invaziei-rusiei.htm), accessed on 20.05.2022.

- Russia's five-day war in Georgia in August 2008 in two separatist regions of Georgia that Moscow has since occupied has revealed some of the most pressing issues on the Russian military's battlefield - tactical communications. Some units could not communicate with the control structure. Mobile phones and even courier services were used instead of military radio stations.
- A Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, Evgheni Meichik, responded in 2009 with an announcement that, on the orders of the then President of Russia, Dimitri Medvedev, the Ministry of Defence will completely review its military command and control system ... "And in particular communication systems". He promised that "*by the end of 2011, we intend to bring a radio station to every military, every fighting vehicle*"<sup>12</sup>.
- This did not happen and is very clear** in the Russian war in Ukraine, where only a third of the number of Russian troops deployed there had new equipment.

**The realities mentioned above result in a whole series of lessons for the armies of NATO member states, including the Romanian Armed Forces.**

#### **5. Some conclusions and lessons for political and military leaders in Romania**

**Russia's aggressiveness** demonstrated by the invasion of Ukraine but also by other gestures towards some NATO and/or EU member states should lead to rapid reactions and measurable actions to remedy some shortcomings in the equipment and training of Romanian Armed Forces' troops.

I hope that the local political and military leaders will not be too upset by what is said below, based on the knowledge and expertise they still have.

---

<sup>12</sup> Idem.

**Certain conclusions<sup>13</sup>:**

- After 1990, **the Romanian Armed Forces** suffered major amputations, the dismantling of military units and the destruction of weapons, without a serious politico-military analysis, regarding the risks and threats in our region.

**In 1989**, there were 340,000 soldiers **in the army**, and the reserve consisted of 820,000 people capable of serving in the event of a crisis or war. **Now, in 2022**, there are 75,000 soldiers on paper and in reality only 65,000 (the politician does not want to replenish the troops in peace, for unknown reasons), and in the position of reservists there are only 80,000, poorly trained, because they have not been called for training. The culmination is that some of these derisive numbers (0.30% of the country's population) seem too large.

- **The political factor**, whatever it was (President, Parliament, Government, Minister of Defence), as well as **the military** represented by the Defence Staff treated with disinterest and great superficiality the real problems of the Armed Forces (personnel, training, weapons systems, life conditions etc.). There have been long periods in which no one has spoken out in defence, and consequently no reasonable and necessary effort has been made to put things right. Now, after 24.02.2022, the shortcomings cannot be remedied overnight.

- **Defence budgets** were on paper between 0.4% of GDP (Văcăroiu Government) and 2% of GDP since 2017. In reality, the real allocated budget did not exceed 0.9-1.3% of GDP, without anyone looking disturbed (Supreme Council of National Defence, Parliament, Government, Ministry of Defence, etc.)

- **As a result**, the main endowment programs for the period 2017-2021 have been cancelled or postponed in the uncertain future (the case of Corvettes for the Navy, but also weapons and equipment for the Land and Air Force, including C4ISR systems).

- **The local industrial base for Defence** was destroyed in a planned manner, in good faith and in bad faith, leaving small islands and entities of

---

<sup>13</sup> Lieutenant General (Ret.) Constantin Mincu, Ph.D, „Îngrijorări justificate pentru elita politică și militară a României”, *Revista de Științe Militare*, nr. 1/2019.

marginal products, but also these remnants are left to die slowly and certainly.

- **The so-called continuous reform of the Army** was reduced to one dimension: the destruction of many military units (some under the pressure of real estate “sharks” who took over, with political support, the ceded land) and the massive reduction of troops.

- **No new systems and combat equipment were provided**, only marginally and without serious effects in strengthening the Defence.

- **The active and reserve military** are attacked and insulted daily by some politicians and media representatives. It started in 2010 (President, Prime Minister) and continues today.

- **In the top military positions in the Army** (but also in other state institutions) are being promoted more and more aggressively, obedient people with political support, instead of professionals and those who still believe in patriotism and moral values.

- **It has been obsessively repeated** since 2002 that we no longer need a large army, that NATO is defending us. In the current situation, this idea is very stupid. NATO, as a defensive organization, will defend us if we are able to defend ourselves for at least a week. In addition, it seems that we have to guard our backs. We should wake up to reality!

- Older or newer **weapon systems and equipment** are deprived of normal maintenance and repair work, rapidly approaching collapse. The reason given - there is no money!

- **The main provisions of the “National Strategy for Country’s Defence”** and the organic laws on national defence are not systematically followed, with a pen in hand, to see what has been achieved and what has not (and who are the political and military officials considering the documents simple papers).

- **The “Guide of the Country’s Defence Strategy”** for the period 2015-2019 remained a theoretical document, an essay, without any practical relevance.

- **The multi-year endowment plans** are a myth, a legend, and have never worked. Every government and every defence minister after taking in charge the job changes everything and starts from scratch. Or it is known that a complex system of weapons or equipment cannot be achieved in a

single year. For some it takes 10-15 years, with rhythmic budget allocations, at the level required by plans and projects. No one wants to understand this simple reality, applicable in any serious army.

- **The Romanian Armed Force** is very bad at important chapters for the ability to deter and retaliate, for example: new multi-role fighter jets, attack helicopters, anti-tank means, tanks and armoured personnel carriers with increased capabilities for fighting and survival in combat, frigates and other naval means in the Black Sea. Also, the equipment of the fighters is still outdated (I mean the whole squad) and far from modern standards.

- **The development of C4ISR systems** and modern communication networks, including RTP (RMNC) is vital in the given conditions and, in my opinion, requires a separate approach, based on information gradually coming from Ukraine.

**In conclusion, one may find, based on data and information from various sources that some of our neighbours do not sleep, but they are intensely preparing from a military and logistical point of view for possible aggressive actions. I believe that in 2022 and beyond, serious preparation should also work for Romania to defend the country “against any aggressor”.**



## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

\*\*\* *National Strategy for Country's Defence for the period 2020-2024*, Official Gazette, Part I, no. 574 of July 1, 2020 (In Romanian: *Strategia Națională de Apărare a Țării pentru perioada 2020-2024*, Monitorul Oficial, Partea I, nr. 574 din 1 iulie 2020);

Documents from public sources on the websites of the Presidency, the Parliament, the Ministry of National Defense and other institutions in the country and abroad;

Documents and statements from public sources presented on the Internet, including those relating to the war in Ukraine;

*Journal of Military Sciences of the Romanian Academy of Scientists*, from 2015-2022;

- Geopolitics* journal no. 73 (1/2018) and no. 74 (2/2018), available at [www.geopolitic.ro](http://www.geopolitic.ro);
- Russia and Ukraine, Wikipedia, the free Encyclopaedia;
- GOȘU A., Interviu, 06.11.2017, [www.hotnews.ro](http://www.hotnews.ro);
- MINCU C., „Federația Rusă și restul lumii”, *Revista de Științe Militare*, nr. 3/2017;
- MINCU C., „Îngrijorări actuale justificate pentru elita politică și militară a României”, *Revista de Științe Militare*, nr. 1/2019;
- MINCU C., „Agresivitatea politico-militară globală a Federației Ruse”, *Revista de Științe Militare*, nr. 2/2019;
- MINCU C., „Haos geopolitic global”, *Revista de Științe Militare*, nr. 4/2019;
- MINCU C., „Turbulență geopolitică globală I”, *Revista de Științe Militare*, nr. 2/2020;
- MINCU C., „Turbulență geopolitică globală II”, *Revista de Științe Militare*, nr. 4/2020;
- MINCU C., „Armata Română și Apărarea Națională între teorie și practică – un punct de vedere”, *Revista de Științe Militare*, nr. 1/2021;
- MINCU C., „Politica actuală a Federației Ruse – un mister ascuns într-o enigmă”, *Revista de Științe Militare*, nr. 4/2021;
- MINCU C., „Rolul și locul sistemelor și tehnologiilor informaționale în conflictele militare actuale și viitoare”, *Revista de Științe Militare*, nr. 1/2022;
- PETRESCU S., „Rusia, de la conflictele înghețate la războiul hibrid”, *Revista Geopolitica*, nr. 73 (1/2018);
- SIMILEANU V., „Războiul hibrid – abordări geopolitice, geostrategice și de geointelligence”, *Revista Geopolitica*, nr. 73 (1/2018);
- ROȘU M., „Evoluția balanței de putere în Regiunea Mării Negre”, *Revista Geopolitica*, nr. 73 (1/2018);
- VĂDUVA G., „Rusia este Rusia și atât”, *Revista Geopolitica*, nr. 73 (1/2018);
- „Comunicațiile tactice ale armatei ruse - unul din factorii majori care a dus la blocarea invaziei Rusiei”, [https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-razboi\\_ukraina-25449334-comunicatiile-tactice-ale-armatei-ruse-unul-din-factorii-majori-care-dus-blocarea-invaziei-rusiei.htm](https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-razboi_ukraina-25449334-comunicatiile-tactice-ale-armatei-ruse-unul-din-factorii-majori-care-dus-blocarea-invaziei-rusiei.htm);

- „Suedezii au ajuns la concluzia că Rusia se pregătește de un război mondial”, <https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/rusia/suedezii-au-ajuns-la-concluzia-ca-rusia-se-pregateste-de-un-razboi-mondial-1080071>;
- „Putin reprezintă o amenințare la adresa democrațiilor din toată lumea”, <https://newsmaker.ro/mike-pompeo-in-slovacia-putin-reprezinta-o-amenintare-la-adresa-democratiilor-din-toata-lumea/>;
- „Rusia are o strategie sofisticată țintită spre România”, <https://www.digi24.ro/-stiri/externe/diplomat-american-suntem-ingrijorati-rusia-are-o-strategie-sofisticata-tintita-spre-romania-1087675>;
- „General american: Rusia ar putea invada România”, <https://www.digi24.ro/-stiri/actualitate/general-american-rusia-ar-putea-invada-romania-1098015>.

