

CHINA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE NEW GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ITS KEY-CONCEPTS OF EXTERNAL POLICY¹

Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU*

Abstract. *The present article intends to open a multidimensional window to the international system, since the beginning of the 21st century, beyond the limitation of a single paradigm, albeit it is realist. The complexity, dynamism and interdependencies among the various subsystems and global actors of today's world render it, in our opinion, difficult to analyse from the realist perspective (preferred by a part of the IR doctrine). We chose to bring into discussion concepts such as "the multipolar world", "Connected daguo", "the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", regarding certain key-concepts pertaining to the external policy of China, with roots in its ancient history, concepts which prove the extraordinary ability of China to combine two seemingly opposed visions (without being a player in the Westphalian world, governed by its rules, and in the globalized world, governed by other rules and forms of diplomacy).*

Key-words: contemporary international system, global architecture, foreign policy, China, multipolar world, Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

Motto: *Tao never fights, but Tao always wins*

1. The Contemporary International System: Interpolarity, Multipolarity, Globalism?

The model of the contemporary international system from the early 21st century is the object of constant doctrine-related debate, in international relationships, its nature and dynamics being regard *particularly by the large actors, from the perspective of their specific external objectives*². *There is no*

¹ The present article represents only the personal opinion of the author and it does not involve in any form any other natural person or legal entity. All the rights over the present text are reserved. The quotations from the present text are made by mentioning the author and the complete source.

* Researcher at Romanian Diplomatic Institute.

² According to Hedley Bull, there is a difference between the concept of "international system" and the concept of "international society", with the first entailing the existence of two or several states, with sufficient contact among each other and sufficient impact on the decisions of each other, to compare as parts of a whole, while the second concepts refers to the situation in which "the states in an international system identify common interests and values, conceived as

unanimity concerning the qualification of the contemporary international system. According to certain authors, the period in question is a *post-unipolar period*, in which certain political conditions, stemming from *the cold war period*, reoccur, resulting in the danger of certain strains on the international political framework, among its key-actors³ (the name “large powers” being considered by a part of the doctrine as obsolete and inappropriate⁴; for other authors, on the contrary, it expresses a measurable reality of power, through the various hard and soft criteria⁵, creating a hierarchy among countries). According to other opinions, the nature of the contemporary international system is distinct both from unipolarity and from bipolarity, being considered that the world of the 21st century advances towards a *multipolar organization*⁶.

For others, the paradigm of bipolarity has not ceased to show its concrete effects upon the political, economic and military, as well as ideological relations among the states; far from witnessing the end of history (as well as the triumph of

connected by a common set of rules, with a common culture and civilization and participating in the labour of the common institutions”. In Samuel Huntington, *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor și noua ordine mondială*, transl. Radu Carp, Antet Publishing House, 1997, pg. 78.

³ Certain authors consider that the cold war ended with the signing of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe/1990, by the two superpowers; however, its effects continue to be present in the contemporary geopolitics. See David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton, *Transformări globale. Politică, economie și cultură*, trans. Ramona-Elena Lupașcu, Adriana Ștraub, Mihaela Bordea, Alina-Maria Turcu, Polirom, Iași, 2004, pg. 124. Another part of the RI doctrine tends to consider that we live in a post-imperial age, in which the end of the cold war also means a period in which it was not possible to create a “global American empire”, starting from the management of economic globalization waves. See the thesis of Emmanuel Todd, *Après l'empire. Essai sur la décomposition du système américain*, Gallimard, Paris, 2004, pg. 171-172, 291.

⁴ Because it structures the international system on a logic opposing the spirit of international law (which orders the world of the states regarded as legally equal entities among each other, governed by a set of common principles, reflected in the UN Charter and in other international documents). For example, see Grigore Geamănu, *Drept internațional public*, vol. I, Didactică și Pedagogică Publishing House, Bucharest, 1981, pg. 52-53, 68-69, 132-137. The representatives of the English school of international relations (see Martin Wight, *Politica de putere*, Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad Publishing House, transl. Tudor Florin, ed. ARC, CEUP, Chișinău, 1998, pg. 115-117) consider that the experience of international law in itself is a clue for the existence of an “international society of states”. The concept of “*harmonious society*” is connected to it, concept included in China’s external politics, which connect the traditional concept of “harmony” to the concept of “international society” (subsequently, due to the *global objectives* developed by Daguo, in the global world, with implicit reference, as we see it, to the concept of “*global harmonious society*”).

⁵ Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham, *Dicționar de relații internaționale*, trans. Anca Irina Ionescu, Universal Dalsi Publishing House, 2001, pg. 219-220.

⁶ Jiang Zhuqing China Daily, “*Five Principles*” still shaping global peace, 29.04.2004, www.mofa.gov.mm/foreignpolicy/fiveprinciples.html. For an opposite standpoint (multipolarity, yet a conflictual multipolarity, according to the realist paradigm), see Samuel Huntington, quoted op.

capitalism over communism), we would now be witnessing a strong movement of disputing the regional integration and ultra-liberal ideologies, which have favoured a type of “corporate globalization”, even called a “*neo-colonial*” globalization (corporate or of corporate globalism)⁷, to the detriment of the nation-states and of their citizens. *Alter-worldism* becomes a response of the global civil society to the consolidation of economic power⁸ (with direct effects at national and international political level, triggering a phenomenon of interference between the internal and external politics of the states)⁹ of the non-state actors (corporations, therein).

In the age of globalization, bipolarity becomes a model of organization of the international system, based on the dualist logic, *between corporatism and ultra-liberalism, on one hand* (with proliferation of various regional markets and movements of regional integration¹⁰, as effects) *and alter-worldism* (rather heterogeneous global trend, to which certain movements, trends, tendencies, anti-corporate ideologies in the various forms can be attached, from anti-neo-colonialism to environmentalism, social-democracy, feminism, to spiritual movements and religious cults)¹¹. This type of *postmodern bipolarity* (to differentiate it from the classic bipolarity, during the cold war) *is not perceived as being exclusively a model of the state-based world* (which organizes exclusively the relations among the states), but rather its essence is connected to a *postmodern vision of the world, opposed to the classic vision*, which no longer takes into consideration the rigid, Westphalian organization of the world.

⁷ Certain authors discuss “the Faustian power of multinational companies”, instruments used in the 16th century, the 17th century, until the 19th century, in colonization processes, “with some of the privileges of the colonizing state, on the dependent territory, by virtue of their constituent documents”. Today, they are considered by one part of the IR doctrine to be “neo-colonialism agents, in underdeveloped societies or in societies in transition towards the market economy, displaying a power policy” (with reference to the theories of dependence). See Mohammed Bedjaoui, *Pour un nouvel ordre économique international*, UNESCO, 1978, PUF, Paris, 1979, pg. 37-40.

⁸ David Korten, *Lumea post-corporatistă*, trans. Nicolae Năstase, Antet Publishing House, 1999, pg. 196-202.

⁹ Vasile Pușcaș, *Relații internaționale/transnaționale*, Sincron Publishing House, Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca Institute of International Studies, International University Institute for European Studies, Gorizia/Trieste, 2005, pg. 91.

¹⁰ The thesis of the hyper-globalists and neo-liberalists ((K. Ohmae, 1990, 1995), according to which economic globalization will create new forms of *global organization, replacing the traditional nation-states*, in a post-state age. “The new world order resulting from the economic globalization at its peak will be characterized by a global civilization, the occurrence of global governing institutions and hybridization of cultures”. David Held *et alii*, quoted op., pg. 28. About globalisation, as a tool for a progressive creation of global governance, see Philippe Moreau Defarges, *La Mondialisation*, PUF, Paris, 2004, pg. 85-96.

¹¹ David Korten, *Marea Cotitură. De la Imperiu la Comunitatea terestră*, trans. Mihnea Columbeanu, Antet, 2007, pg. 18-27.

According to other opinions, after the unipolarity period of the American superpower¹², *we return to the period of classic bipolarity* (based on the realist paradigm of the rivalry between two large actors, on the same dualistic logic, that of the null sum game, of creating a barrier, of confrontation between different power centres)¹³.

Geopolitical paradigms, such as Huntington's and Dughin's, continue to be extremely fascinating for a certain part of the political elites from various power centres of the contemporary world. The realist paradigm, which provided the decision-making and political action premises, for the actors during the first bipolarity (the cold war) returns with the beginning of the 21st century, in a new form ("clash of civilizations")¹⁴, which might be construed as a clue that the major actors on the international scene are already caught in a *new bipolar confrontation* (*the second bipolarity or the new cold war*). We discover the same relation to "civilizations/blocks of civilizations" (which have become the key-actors of the contemporary political scene), "in conflict", in Dughin as well, who has a complex approach to the contemporary world, in his works (including the perspective of noopolitics¹⁵).

Similarly, regarding the nature of the international political system, at the beginning of the 21st century, the positions taken by the doctrine are the most diverse: if for some, the contemporary world is a homogenous world or a world which intends to be homogenous, at least from the standpoint of a global culture, from the political viewpoint and more (as a life style), based on a common set of values (democracy, market economy, multi-party system, observing the human rights), values that can be a reason for intervention in the internal politics of the states¹⁶, provided the latter fail to observe them, for another part of the doctrine, today's world seems rather *chaotic and insecure*¹⁷, characterized by the return of

¹² Silviu Neguț, *Introducere în geopolitică*, Meteor Press Publishing House, București, 2005, pg. 109-111.

¹³ See the theory of new bipolarity (neo-Eurasianism versus Antlanticism) by Aleksandr Dughin (in the work *Bazele geopoliticii. Viitorul geopolitic al Rusiei*), Eurasiatica.ro Publishing House, vol. 1, Bucharest, 2011, pg. 110-112.

¹⁴ Samuel Huntington, op. cit., pg. 36-37. Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham, quoted op, pg. 76-77.

¹⁵ Or abyssal geopolitics (Lucian Blaga is considered to be the creator of the research method) or noological geopolitics (in Ilie Bădescu). See Ilie Bădescu, *Alexander Dughin despre imperiu ca "organism soteriologic". Vocația neoimperială a Rusiei*, in Ilie Bădescu, Lucian Dumitrescu, Veronica Dumitrașcu, *Geopolitica noului imperialism. Teorii vechi și noi. Introducere în geoscopia dominației*, Mica Valahie Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, pg. 247-252.

¹⁶ Thesis of the hyperglobalists, of the neoliberalists. In David Held *et alii*, quoted op., pg. 28.

¹⁷ Vision of R. Kaplan (*Sfârșiturile Pământului-Călătorie spre zorii secolului XXI*), who also proposes the phrase "future anarchy" (a world in which the old civil order has disintegrated, a return to nature and to the Hobbesian chaos, with the West African region, as an example). See Mary Kaldor, *Războaie noi și vechi. Violența organizată în epoca globală*, trans. Mihnea Columbeanu, Antet, s.a., pg. 162-163. On the concept of fragmentation of states, during the post-

neo-imperialism, hegemony and neo-colonialism phenomena, developed including through the non-state actors and through soft power methods, which are opposed to the principles of the Westphalian world.

According to other opinions, *far from being homogenous*, the world at the beginning of the 21st century *is divided into several groups of countries*, each following a distinct model of organization and values (Pre-modern world, Modern world and postmodern world)¹⁸. For Parag Khanna, today's world continues to be structured *on the basis of an imperial model* (imperial actors included), in full process of globalization¹⁹; for other authors, *globalization itself is defined as a neo-imperial model*; far from being a phenomenon neutral for politics, it displays as a wave controlled by certain key-actors of the international system, used for the global dissemination of their imperial model²⁰.

Finally, amongst other opinions, at the beginning of the 21st century, the world completely detached from the classic models (unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity), moving towards a distinct paradigm, which we can call *inter-polarity* (also known as interdependence²¹ among actors).

As a consequence of the plurality of perspectives of the key-actors (and not only), on the contemporary international political scene, regarding the nature of the international system, since the beginning of the 21st century, *it is difficult to present a single paradigm as being unanimously accepted*. Far from acting on the basis of a unified vision, globally embraced by the small and medium states or by the large powers, *each of the actors of the contemporary world plays on the basis*

bipolar period, also see Paul Hirst, *Război și putere în sec. XXI. Statul, conflictul militar și sistemul internațional*, transl. Nicolae Năstase, Antet, 2001, pg. 68-69.

¹⁸ Robert Cooper, *Destrămarea națiunilor. Ordine și haos în secolul XXI*, transl. Sebastian Huluban, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, 2007, pg. 42-64.

¹⁹ Parag Khanna, *Lumea A Doua. Imperii și influență în noua ordine globală*, trans. Doris Mironescu, Polirom, Iași, 2008, pg. 13- 17, in which China is considered "already a global centre of gravity", representing "the third model of imperial diplomacy, based on the old Confucianist traditions", in the triad of superpowers (USA, EU and China), "three empires that are rather in a conflict-based relation, over the division of the world" (another version of the realist paradigm, according to Huntington, but which no longer considers that civilizations are the main vectors of the geography, being replaced by empires).

²⁰ Referring the correlation between globalization and cultural imperialist, see Martin Griffiths, ed., *Encyclopedia of international relations and global politics*, Routledge, London and NY, US, 2005, pg. 399-400. In the 21st century, the concept of "empire" refers to a global economic dimension, different from the traditional dimension (as a political structure), to a process of creating a new sovereignty, that over the global market" (existence of a global market, based on economic interdependencies, also imposing a global generation of regulations), in connection to which the "counter-empire" is formed (seen as a "multitude" of heterogeneous forces). See Antonio Negri, *Empire and Beyond*, translation by Ed Emery, Polity Press, UK, 2008, pg. 8-13.

²¹ Vasile Pușcaș, op. cit., pg. 136- 137. Cynthia Ghorra-Gobin, *Dictionnaire des mondialisations*, Armand Colin, Paris, 2006, pg. 208-209. Marie-Claude Smouts, Dario Battistella, Pascal Vennesson, *Dictionnaire des relations internationales*, 2e éd., Dalloz, Paris, 2006, pg. 348-349.

of a distinct paradigm, defined according to their national interests in external policy.

Therefore, in our opinion, there is no sole point of reference, regarding the nature of the contemporary international system, but a multitude of paradigms, defined and applied by the state actors, in their external policy. *This diversity of paradigms is applied to the contemporary international system, by the actors, simultaneously*, thus rendering difficult the endeavour of the researcher to look at the contemporary world, from the standpoint of a single paradigm. Thus, we must avoid ever since the beginning the trap of attempting to define the contemporary international system, *from the viewpoint of the paradigm embraced and applied by a single actor, be it a large power*, not to risk leaving aside *the multi-dimensional, inter-connected reality*, creating by implementing several various paradigms on the world of the early 21st century. We must avoid the risk of erroneously and restrictively defining the nature of this complex international political system.

As a result, its *dynamic* is determined by *the manner of permanent inter-relation among the various paradigms*, which the key-actors (followed by the groups of small and medium states, or not) implement *distinctively and simultaneously*, in the international political field. *There is no dynamic of the contemporary international system, determined exclusively by a single large power*²²; we believe that insisting on a unipolar concept, at the beginning of the 21st century, would represent an alienation from the changing reality, which defines this system of international relations. It's rather a *unique combination of paradigms*, which define postmodern worlds, governed by rules and policies, by specific values and regulations, by chaotic areas, generating insecurity, by developing worlds and modern world, each of them influencing the other, because of the intensity of the globalization phenomenon²³.

Concerning China's role in determining a role specific to the international political system, in the contemporary world, to meet its external policy priorities, distinct from the priorities of the key-actors and of the global system, this role is essentially structured (starting with the analysis of official political discourses and

²² Certain authors consider that the contemporary world is structured on the basis of the coexistence of four international systems: the Occidental system (relations between USA and Occidental Europe and within the Occidental hemisphere); the large powers in Asia; the conflicted world of the Middle East and Africa, all these systems are in various historic stages, hence the difficulties faced by the USA external policy, when harmonizing them on the basis of a universal formula. According to Henry Kissinger, *Are nevoie America de o politică externă? Către diplomația sec. XXI*, trans. Andreea Năstase, Ed. Incitatus, 2002, pg. 14-16.

²³ External political strategies of the USA acknowledge the complexity of today's international world, considering that "the United States of America cannot and should not return to the policies of the cold war and to the policies of the 18th century diplomacy", "a much more differentiated approach" to the contemporary world. Idem, pg. 18.

of the IR Chinese doctrine), based on the paradigm of multipolarity. In our opinion, it is essential to understand correctly and fully the vision of this power centre over the contemporary world and the relations among states, in the 21st century, since its rise can have the highest level of influence on the dynamic of the entire international system.

2. China's Vision of the Contemporary International System: The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Multipolar World

Myanmar, India and China proclaimed the Five Principles, during the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister Chou En Lai' to Myanmar, in 1954. Thus, China and India signed agreements to adhere to this set of principles, in New Delhi, on June 28th 1954 (and China and Myanmar, in Yangon, on June 29th 1954), agreements which set a proto-basis for common interpretation of certain countries in Asia, in the external policies. But, as shown in the Common Sino-Indian Declaration, *these principles should be applied not only in the relations between the signing countries, but also in the general framework of international relations*. In addition, it must be noted that, in April 1955, following the Conference of the 29 independent states in Asia and Africa (Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia), after which the Declaration on Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation was elaborated and adopted, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence²⁴ were included in the set of ten principles of the Bandung Conference²⁵. The Five Principles were subsequently acknowledged and accepted by more and more nations, by international organizations and restated at international meetings, in documents of UNGA, as well as in the documents setting up the diplomatic relations of China, with over 160 nations, in treaties and various other documents, signed by China, with other countries²⁶.

Of Westphalian inspiration (derived from the specific of a world of sovereign and equal states), the Five Principles are the following: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of the other party; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs of the other party; respect for mutual equality and acting for mutual benefit; peaceful coexistence²⁷.

For other authors, peaceful coexistence is regarded *in the context of analysing the role of China in the global context*²⁸ (implicitly, a connection between the Westphalian world and the global world is used, both being regarded

²⁴ www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng

²⁵ www.chinaview.cn, 08.04.2008

²⁶ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm

²⁷ www.mofa.gov.mm/foreignpolicy/fiveprinciples.html

²⁸ Judith F. Kornberg, John R. Faust, *China in World Politics. Policies, Processes, Prospects*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 2005, Boulder London, UBC Press, Vancouver, Toronto, 2005, pg. 211.

from the standpoint of a *post-realist non-conflict paradigm*, concerning a peaceful rise of China). Peaceful coexistence is regarded as constructed on a *model of multipolar world, in which there is however a strong trend towards the development of a “global governing”* (although the latter is not *eo ipso* directly connected, in the Chinese doctrine, with the Five Principles; instead, it is just implied, through reference to “global problems” and “global objectives” of cooperation among nations and particularly among daguo, such as “world peace” and “economic development”²⁹, for example).

Peaceful coexistence (The Fifth Principle) is conceived to ensure the development of a diplomatic line for China, to achieve “equal relations to all” (development of bilateral relations with all the states); yet, at the same time, it expresses the idea of equality among nations and especially of the equal right for all the nations, be they small or large, strong or weak, “to participate in consultations to create international relations/world affairs”. Therefore, this Fifth Principle is a very important one, in order to decrypt correctly China’s vision of the organization of a *harmonious international society* (element essential for the progressive creation of a *harmonious global society*). In other words, *a strategic balance between the two worlds is introduced: the international world (based on the sovereign equality of nations) and the global world (based on cooperation between daguo*³⁰, *in which China acts simultaneously (as well as any other daguo of the 21st century).*

The path to the progressive creation of a *harmonious global society* cannot pass over or ignore *first creating a harmonious international society* (based on exceeding the realistic paradigm) and implementing The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, in international relations. Only by creating a harmonious international society (Westphalian, but post-realist, at the same time), *is it possible to set the basis for the superior stage*, the creation of a harmonious global society (especially through the result of common efforts of all the daguo, at the beginning of the 21st century).

If daguo are not capable of solving their problems and harmonize their interests, in the Westphalian world, according to The Five Principles, how will they be able to operate in the global world, where they have to adjust to certain needs of increased inter-relations, in the management of humanity’s global problems, and to adequately face the risks and challenges of this world?

If daguo (*the large traditional powers and the large emerging powers*, according to the categorization of the Chinese doctrine in IR), are not capable of guaranteeing before all the states, small or large, strong or small, that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are observed, how will they be capable to

²⁹ For example, from the analysis of an excerpt of the speech delivered by Li Peng, before the summit at the UN Security Council, on January 11th 1992

³⁰ Term in the Chinese RI doctrine referring to “great powers”.

observe the Five Principles, at the level of relations among them (inter-daguo relations), and thus implement *the harmonious global society* progressively?

References to the *harmonious society* (the concept of “harmony” being essential in China’s traditional political strategic thinking) exist in the Third Principle of Peaceful Coexistence (“all nations must observe and treat each other equally, to pursuit cooperation for common benefit, *to exist in harmony* and to search for a common ground for solving their disputes”), “*To exist in harmony*” means a clear refusal to operate in the realist paradigm, which concerns large and small, strong and weak political actors, engaged in conflicts and subject to a militarized logic, of perpetual suspicion and hostility.

An analysis of the content of each of the Five Principles (the right of each nation to freely choose its political, economic and social system – thus, enouncing an anti-hegemony policy –; non-interference in the internal affairs of another state, coexistence in harmony of the nations; encouraging the discovery of common ground for the resolution of disputes; solving international conflicts peacefully; the right to participate in consultations in international matters, acknowledged for each country³¹) shows the type of *harmonious society*, in which China intends to operate in the 21st century, *including the support of third world countries (or developing countries)*, to reach a level of balance in the international system, facing the hegemonic temptations of other daguo.

We are talking about a political-diplomatic *harmonization* (balancing) of China, *between two type of worlds, different as a model*: the *Westphalian* world, set up on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states that do not accept supranational authorities and global governing) and the *global world* (set up by bringing in common the sovereignty of states, by forming supranational authorities and global governing). So far, *China has managed to balance the two tendencies and lines of external policy*, requesting that other countries, at international level, observe the First Principle of Peaceful Coexistence (of definite Westphalian nature)³², at the same time, actively engaging in the multitude of organizations, forums and groups of regional and global dialogue, increasing its role in certain financial institutions and regulation systems, such as the World Bank, IMF, WTO³³, with a key role in shaping a global proto-governing system.

At the beginning of the 21st century, as certain authors admit, China adopted a *proactive* political-diplomatic position, deciding to participate in determining regional and global power balance systems, on the principle “if you cannot fight them, join them³⁴”, also increasing its participation level and degree of influence

³¹ Judith F. Kornberg, John R. Faust, quoted op., pg. 211

³² Each country must have the right to freely choose its economic, political and social system, in agreement with its interests (that is, a clear reference to the content of the state sovereignty).

³³ Judith F. Kornberg, John R. Faust, quoted op., pg. 243-244.

³⁴ Idem, pg. 221.

on global and regional policies, without walking into the trap of “Splendid isolation”, by exacerbating a dualist vision of separation from the global world, of “withdrawal within self”. According to certain authors, in the 21st century, China could assume “taking action together with other nations, in order to prevent a state or group of states from dominating the international military or economic system, especially in Asia³⁵” as a security necessity, identifying itself with (and acting as) a regional power, with strategic interests in South-East Asia, i.e. in a fragmented regional system. Thus, from this standpoint, we could not discuss a policy of “Splendid isolation” or non-alignment to alliances, but an *anti-hegemony proactive policy, in agreement with The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (especially, the First Principle)*.

This anti-hegemonic policy must not be construed as China’s opposition to other daguo (with the Second Principle being that of mutual respect among nations and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other nation), or as an opposition marked by a logic of conflict; instead, it must be construed as a diplomatic line, in agreement with the necessities imposed by the globalization of the contemporary world: concepts such as “Peaceful assertion of China”, “New Relation with the Great Powers”, “harmonious society”, all meant to outline the vision of an international, but also of a global policy (among daguo), in which China assumes a role of harmonization, pursuit of dialogue, of the common points of interest, of expanding the global work agenda among nations (especially among daguo), not a role of competitor/challenger of the international system. The concepts of “Peaceful Rise of China” (i.e. not asserting itself as a “hegemonic power”, which would involve a return to the use of the realist paradigm) and “harmonious world”, plus the “New Concept of Security” (analyzed in the following section) outline a global objective, on the long run, that of “universal prosperity and durable peace”³⁶, turning China into “a great power responsible for the fate of the planet”³⁷ (the concept of “peaceful daguo”, connected to the concept of “responsible great power”³⁸).

The idea resulting from the analysis of the content and spirit of The Five Principles is one of China self-regarded as “*independent daguo*” (a great power “which pursues an independent policy of peace”), China defining itself as an “*emerging daguo*” (as compared to the great developed and industrialized powers,

³⁵ *Ibidem*, pg. 25.

³⁶ Xia Liping, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, *New Thinking in China’s National Security Strategy*; source: International Review (Guoji Wenti Luntan, Shanghai), Spring 2004, vol. 34; http://press.anu.edu.au/sdsc/rc/mobile_devices/ch09.html, accessed on June 10th 2014.

³⁷ See for example, for the connection between China’s role as an Asian power, as well as a global power), the speech delivered by Xi Jinping, *Working Together Towards a Better Future for Asia and the World*, at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2013, Boao, Hainan, 7 April 2013, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1030610.shtml

³⁸ Xia Liping, quoted op.

which it considers “*traditional daguo*”), or even as “*a third world country*” (i.e. a developing country, which is not aligned to any block policy or power alliance). Declaring itself carrier of the anti-hegemonic policy flag, according to certain opinions, China intends to send a clear message to its neighbours, that its economic and military rise will not be a threat for the regional stability³⁹ of the latter (return to the respect for the sovereignty of other nations, i.e. the essence of The Five Principles).

The idea of not being aligned to any block policy or alliance (during the post cold war period) must not be interpreted as “splendid isolation” and it is not incompatible with China's strategic game, in the multipolar world or in the global world (of complex interdependences among actors), worlds in which China develops *proactive policies of participation and involvement* (the concept of “*responsible daguo*”), in numerous organizations, mechanisms, structures, regional international and global dialogue forums⁴⁰. It is a *careful and permanent balancing policy*, implemented by China, during the post-cold war period of its external policy, so that *the landmark of the Westphalian world is also respected* (sovereignty of the states), *as well as the requirement of participating in an emerging global world* (to increase interdependences and tame them, not to them dominate it), in which China is interested in encouraging global free trade⁴¹.

At the same time, through The Five Principles, China proposes a model of multipolar world, based on *resetting framework-relations among the daguo* (the great powers of the international system, at a certain point): mutual benefit, cooperation for global peace and stability, respect and non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful coexistence. Opposition to an interventionist policy of the great powers and assertion as protector of the states' sovereignty are two elements considered by certain authors *to prove responsibility and high strategic thinking*⁴².

In a speech at the Kerry Centre, Beijing (May 27th 2014), at the international colloquium commemorating the 60th anniversary of The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, Liu Zhenmin, China's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs presented the content of what China considers “*a great responsible power*” must be (a reference to the concept of “*daguo responsibility*”, without using this phrase

³⁹ Andrew J. Nathan, Columbia University, *Principles of China's Foreign Policy*, citându-se lucrarea lui Andrew J. Nathan și Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security*, NY, W.W. Norton, 1997, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm

⁴⁰ If we read the concept “Peaceful rise”, from the perspective of complex interdependences. Also see Qianqian Liu, *China's Rise and Regional Strategy: Power, Interdependence and Identity*, vol. 5, no. 4, journal.acs-cam.org.uk/data/archive/2010/201004-article7.pdf

⁴⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_co-existence

⁴¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_co-existence

⁴² Andrew J. Nathan, Columbia University, quoting Andrew J. Nathan, Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security*, NY, W.W. Norton, 1997. http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm

directly): a firm defender of state sovereignty; a supporter of international peace and security; an active promoter of social and economic cooperation and of development, as well as an active constructor of the international order and state subject to the rule of law.

In addition, its speech includes references to a suite of inter-related concepts (“harmonious world”, “community with common destiny”, “win-win cooperation”, “peaceful development”- derived from the concept of “peaceful coexistence”), based on The Five Principles⁴³.

The same clear counsel to abandon the realist paradigm and the “cold war” mentality, the null sum game, was also given at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on measures to interact and build trust in Asia (Shanghai Expo Centre, May 21st 2014), by president Xi Jinping, who used the concept of “community with common destiny”, referring to the “great Asian family” and a “comprehensive construction of security in the region” (universal equal and inclusive security, comprehensive security, cooperating security and durable security), meant to define “The New Asian Concept of Security”(NACS), in China’s vision, and to increase the role of CICA⁴⁴ in the region (by turning it into a platform of cooperation and security dialogue, to cover the entire Asia and to contribute to the creation of a regional security architecture)⁴⁵.

Certain Conclusions

In our opinion, the international system at the beginning of the 21st does not reflect a uniform reality, “which can be expressed through a single RI paradigm” (the paradigm of realism, for example). For too long, the realist paradigm, even the ultra-realist one, has been used excessively (moving from the IR doctrine, to the area of political decisions, with influence on the political actions of global actors), in order to explain and illustrate the nature and dynamic of what political actors (the states) consider to be an “international system” (a type of system created by the states, adjusted by the states, through specific mechanisms, from the power balance to the alliances, regulated by regulations set by the states rightful original sovereigns, a Westphalian system, in its essence).

The world of the 21st century is quickly changing, as the state actors are no longer in the situation of regulating exclusively the international system, through the classic power play (hard power). We live in a complex, postmodern world,

⁴³ Where the concept of “community with common destiny” is defined as a community in which “development is achieved and shared by everyone, on the basis of cooperation with mutual benefit, through common development, by exceeding the “clash of civilizations” paradigm and by promoting exchanges among various cultures”. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng, accessed on June 10th 2014.

⁴⁴ Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia

⁴⁵ http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng, accessed on June 10th 2014.

which includes regional subsystems, intra-regional subsystems, transnational subsystems that connect the global and local actors, the state and non-state actors, in a multitude of regimes and post-Westphalian power plays.

In our opinion, it is *a world of interolarity*, one based on complex interdependences among the actors, on global asymmetric threats and on the rise of certain new global actors (both state and non-state or supra-state actors).

However, we shall not commit the error of regarding the world of the early 21st century exclusively from this perspective (of interolarity). From a certain point, we are in a *multipolar world* (characterized by the existence of several economic and civilization power poles), while, on another side of the IR doctrine, unipolarity continues to exist (at least from a hard power point of view, that of the military capacity of the United States, on a position of hyper-power, for example⁴⁶).

It is beneficial though to acknowledge that the realist paradigm is losing ground in the IR doctrine, in favour of other paradigms attempting to explain the complexity of relations, in the dynamic world of the 21st century, which explains a lower trend of the global actors to position themselves in relation to the others according to the game of null sum or to the principles of the realist paradigm.

This very point results in *a greater availability of the global actors (especially) for dialogue, negotiation, meetings at all levels, organizing conferences and forums on problems of common interest*, which shows *the beginning of a fundamental change*, in our opinion, at the level of most of the global actors, in terms of perceiving the world of the 21st century and imagining a positive, constructive role, based on mutual respect, civilization opening to dialogue, tolerance and preventive diplomacy, in this world of complex interdependences.

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⁴⁶ Emmanuel Todd, *Après l'empire. Essai sur la décomposition du système américain*, Gallimard, Paris, 2004, pg. 91-96 and following.

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