

THE PEACE OF BUCHAREST OF 1913: POLITICAL EFFECTS AND DEMOGRAPHIC REALITIES IN SOUTHERN DOBROGEA

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Abstract. In the wake of the 1913 war, Southern Dobrogea became important for the Romanian state for two reasons. On the one hand, the territory constituted the new homeland of the Aromanians from the Balkans, who were now settling in Southern Dobrogea due to border reconfigurations in the wake of the Balkan Wars. On the other, this region was strategically placed for the project of relocation and land endowment of the Romanians from densely populated regions of the Kingdom. Romania was intent on imposing a new type of political culture in the Cadrilater with the aid of Aromanians, who would thus acculturate its various ethnicities

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In the aftermath of the Balkan War of 1912–1913 the region of Dobrogea expanded to the south by including new territory as stipulated by the Treaty of Bucharest of August 1913. This territory, which would be named Southern Dobrogea, was predominantly inhabited by Bulgarians and Muslims, but some Romanians also lived here, namely at and around Silistra. Yet there was more to Romania's involvement in the Balkan events. When in 1883 Romania joined the Triple Alliance, she thereby secured her security and protection should a conflict arise with a powerful neighbour. Nonetheless, at the beginning of the 20th century the process of de-nationalisation by the Hungarian state, which Vienna could not, or would not, inhibit, made Romania move away from the Triple Alliance and towards the Entente.

In effect, Romania's participation in the Balkan War, and especially her signing of the Peace Treaty of Bucharest, meant effectively Romania's breakup with the Triple Alliance, which would be declared officially during the Crown Council of Peleş held in August 1914. Unsurprisingly, historian Nicolae Iorga wrote in 1913: "*Across the Danube, our soldiers are commencing the liberation of Transylvania*".¹

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¹ Nicolae Iorga, *Acțiunea militară a României cu ostașii noștri [Romania's Military Action with Our Soldiers]*, Editura Societății Neamul Românesc, Vălenii de Munte, 1913, p.39. See also Titu

The Romanian state watched particularly intensely the territorial alterations that occurred in the above-mentioned area. When the Treaty of Bucharest was signed in August 1913 in the aftermath of the Third Balkan War, this actually denoted that Romania was becoming an influential actor in the region, as the very choice of the place for signing the treaty pointed out.²

The Peace of 1913 annexed a new territory to Romania, which was named Southern Dobrogea or Cadrilater 7,780 km² in total area, it numbered nearly 280,000 inhabitants, “mostly Turks and other peoples, with the Bulgarians barely around 100,000”.³ Yet G. Murgoci may have got his figures wrong, Ion Bitoleanu has argued recently; the latter historian’s research of contemporary data counts 136,000 (48%) Turks and Tatars, and 121,800 (43%) Bulgarians.⁴ Bitoleanu further contends that statistics may obscure other data, which nevertheless can be regarded as irrelevant in the absence of scientific proof. The Bulgarian state enforced steady Bulgarian settling in Southern Dobrogea, which was similar to the process enforced by the Romanian state in the northern region of Dobrogea annexed to Romania after 1878. In a paper published in 1940, Petre P. Panaitescu maintains that the settling of Bulgarians in Southern Dobrogea had occurred relatively recently: within 35 years, the Bulgarians had settled in villages formerly

Maiorescu, *România, Războaiele Balcanice și Cadrilaterul [Romania, the Balkan Wars, and the Cadrilater]*, Editura Machiavelli, București, 1995, p. 36.

² Yet the position of the signing countries was different. Bound as they were by a treaty, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro were thereby joined in a political and military alliance. On the contrary, Romania had participated in the events without having signed any formal treaty and therefore enjoyed *free rein*, which only made her role as arbiter all the easier while also bringing about the other states’ acknowledgement of her pre-eminent role also as a military factor, not just a political one. Once assembled around the treaty table, the victorious allies were determined to do anything in their power to prevent or at least avoid the intervention of the great powers, especially considering the unfortunate consequences of a past rife in decisions taken without the approval of the south-eastern European states.

Here are the delegates attending the Conference for Peace. The Romanian delegation included Titu Maiorescu, chair of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Alexandru Marghiloman, Minister of the Exchequer; Take Ionescu, Minister of the Interior; C.G. Dissescu, Minister of Education and Cults; General Constantin Coandă, Inspector General of artillery; Col. Constantin Cristescu, deputy Commanding Officer of Army Staff. Save for Bulgaria, whose head of delegation was Dimiter Toncef, Minister of the Exchequer, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro has as their heads of delegation prime-ministers: respectively Elephteros Venizelos for Greece, Nicola Pasic for Serbia, and General Ianco Vukotici for Montenegro; see Gheorghe ZBUCHEA, *România și războaiele balcanice 1912-1913. Pagini de istorie sud-est europeană [Romania and the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Pages of South-Eastern European History]*, Editura Albatros, București, 1999, p.230.

³ George Murgoci, *Țara Nouă. Dobrogea Sudică și Deliormanul [The New Country: Southern Dobrogea and Deliorman]*, București, 1913, p. 82.

⁴ Adrian Rădulescu, Ion Bitoleanu, *Istoria Dobrogei [History of Dobrogea]*, Editura Ex Ponto, Constanța, 1998, p.380.

inhabited by the Turks.⁵ When Southern Dobrogea was surrendered to Romania, the main concern of the Romanian state was to rebalance the demographics of the region. The newly annexed territory was barely inhabited by Romanians due to the intertwined effects of the Ottoman policy to colonize it with Muslim settlers for three years and, after 1878, of the Bulgarian Principality's policy to colonize it with Bulgarians.⁶

In the wake of the 1913 war, Southern Dobrogea became important for the Romanian state for two reasons. On the one hand, the territory constituted the new homeland of the Aromanians from the Balkans,⁷ who were now settling in Southern Dobrogea due to border reconfigurations in the wake of the Balkan Wars. On the other, this region was strategically placed for the project of relocation and land endowment of the Romanians from densely populated regions of the Kingdom.⁸ Romania was intent on imposing a new type of political culture in the Cadrilater with the aid of Aromanians, who would thus acculturate its various ethnicities. More recently, however, various historians have claimed that although the contemporaries contended that the process of Aromanian colonization in the Cadrilater resulted in the establishment of a strong Romanian community there, in fact reality was somewhat different insofar as aromanians had already trickled within Romanian territories. There is no denying that during their history the Aromanians underwent a complex settling experience due to the border alterations in the Balkans in the wake of the three Balkan Wars between 1912 and 1913.

Romania was directly interested in the Balkans since she claimed a large region inhabited by a Romanian population (especially Aromanians), which was crucial to organizing the 1913 Peace Conference in Bucharest.⁹ Although regarded as being of strategic import, the new reconfigurations of the southern

⁵ Petre P. Panaitescu, *Originea Populației din Dobrogea Nouă [The Origins of the Inhabitants of New Dobrogea]*, Editura Casei Școalelor, București, p.102.

⁶ Adrian Rădulescu, Ion Bitoleanu, *op.cit.*, p.432.

⁷ *Ibidem.*

⁸ *Ibidem.*

⁹ The proceedings of the Peace Conference of Bucharest followed the template of the Congress of Berlin, and commenced on 30 July 1913. The Conference would prove to be special as regards both the global regulation of Balkan issues and the development of relations between Romania and any one of the other south-eastern European states. The Treaty assigned Southern Dobrogea to Romania. Article II of the Treaty stipulates the southern Dobrogea border should run thus: from the Danube, following 15 km west of Turtucaia, from Turski-Smil village to South Turtucaia, then running to 12 km south of Bazargic up to the Black Sea, around 8 km south of Ecrene (Kranevo), to a spot which dominated the Balchik area, totalling an area of around 7,500 km². The protocol was signed by Gen. Constantin Coandă, Col. Gheorghe Christescu, Gen. Ficev and Lt. col. Stancioy; Gheorghe Zbucnea, *[Romania and the Balkan Wars 1912–1913]*, p.281. See also Constantin Tudor, *Administrația românească în Cadrilater [The Romanian Administration of the Cadrilater, 1913–1940]*, Ed. Agora, Călărași, 2005, p. 81.

border did not improve Romania's position with respect to guaranteeing security in the region. The act itself was regarded as a classic territorial annexation which, although the contemporary politicians attempted to vindicate, put a terrible strain on the relations between Bulgaria and Romania in the interwar period. With regard to this, a historian of Dobrogea writes: "*the inclusion of the Cadrilater into the Romanian state brought about more trouble than benefits, such as the attacks of the Bulgarian comitags, the issue of Aromanian settlement, subversive communist organizations, and especially the straining of the relations with Bulgaria, as well as the two tragic moments of 1916 and 1940*".¹⁰ The Romanian authorities therefore found it expedient at the time (in 1913) to colonize the new territory with Romanians from the Kingdom and especially with Aromanians from the Balkans. The Romanian politicians had already persuaded King Charles I that the rationale for the Aromanian settlement in Southern Dobrogea was the acculturation of its Bulgarian and Muslim (Turkish and Tatar) population. In turn, this process of assimilation would have secured the territory's socio-political allegiance to the Romanian state, according to the foremost Romanian politicians. Thus, Petre P. Carp contended that any discussion of territorial compensation should also take into account the Aromanian issue: "*we have an ideal to pursue in the Balkans, viz. a nation equal to us, enjoying equal political rights, whose condition as the abode of 400,000 persons should not serve as compensation*".¹¹

In the wake of the First World War, nearly 2 million Aromanians were divided among five neighbouring states of Romania and two ones situated further away in the Balkans. The fate of these Aromanian groups, most of which lived in their homeland, in the neighbouring countries was a major preoccupation of the Romanian state. Within the frame of the treaty signed in Bucharest in 1913, the rights of Aromanians were stipulated in a note concerning the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Titu Maiorescu, and his Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian counterparts, respectively E. K. Venizelos, Nicola Pasici and Dimitri Toncevic.¹² The note stipulated expressly that "*Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia consent to grant the autonomy of schools and churches of the Cutzovlachs residing in Greek, Bulgarian or Serbian territories, and moreover to permit the establishment of an episcopate for the Cutzovlachs on provision that the Romanian government sponsors, under the jurisdiction of the aforementioned states, such existing or future cultural institutions*".¹³

¹⁰ Adrian Rădulescu, Ion Bitoleanu, *op.cit.*, p.383.

¹¹ Gheorghe Zbucnea, *România și războaiele balcanice, 1912-1913 [Romania and the Balkan Wars 1912-1913]*, p.132.

¹² Nicolas Trifon, *Aromânii pretutindeni și nicăieri [The Aromanians Everywhere and Nowhere]*, trans. from the French by Adrian Ciubotaru. Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2012, p. 318.

¹³ Vasile Diamandi Aminceanul, *Românii din Peninsula Balcanică [The Romanians from the Balkan Peninsula]*, București, 1938, p 138.

On July 1917, the Aromanian leaders convened a general assembly which was attended by the delegates of all Romanian localities in Macedonia. The assembly proclaimed their independence and the establishment of a national state under the protectorship of Italy. Soon, however, the Italian armies withdrew from the Pindus Mountains, and the Greek authorities started chasing all Aromanian nationalists, who therefore took refuge to Albania and Italy in order to escape Greek persecution. After the armistice, the Macedo-Romanians petitioned the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, gathered in Paris for the Peace Conference, to request the establishment of an independent state, united with Albania. Their request met with disfavour; nor was it supported by Romania either. Under the rule of four Balkan states, the Aromanians experienced a condition far worse than under the Ottoman rule. Thus, Yugoslavia refused to abide by the terms of the Peace Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, which granted educational and religious autonomy to Aromanians living in Serbian Macedonia. While the Peace of Bucharest (1913) would be inscribed in the Aromanian collective imagination as „*a great national catastrophe*”,¹⁴ the year 1913 itself turned out to be the climax of the so-called *Oriental issue*, with the division of the territories that used to be under the Ottoman Empire, now the “sick person” of Europe. In 1912–1913 the “Balkan crisis” haunted the chancelleries of the Great Powers to such an extent that finding an urgent solution to it became an issue on the agenda of all diplomats. With its military contribution to Greece and Serbia’s war against Bulgaria, Romania not only aided in curtailing the latter’s exaggerated pretence but also benefitted from the outcome by annexing the Cadrilater. The Bulgarians would deem it a grave act of territorial depredation, nothing short of a “*national catastrophe*”, which would fuel serious friction between the two states. Yet with the signing of the Peace of Bucharest on 10 August 1913 certain border reconfigurations occurred such as had not been envisaged by the Romanian political leaders. Ion I.C. Brătianu articulated his concern in a diplomatic letter of 17 January 1914 sent to Romania’s representatives abroad, thus: “*the affairs of Macedonia in particular constitute a constant concern for us, insofar as they relate to the interests of an important segment of population of Romanian stock.... Greece has consented to grant the Aromanians within her territories the autonomy of school and church. Moreover, the Greek state permits the establishment of an episcopate for the self-same Romanians, to sponsor, under its supervision, their present and future institutions*”.¹⁵ On 25 July 1917 the representatives of the Aromanians from the Pindus and Zagor sent from Samarina a telegram to Ion I.C. Brătianu, stating that: “*to affirm its Latinity, the Romanian population can claim greater rights than any other nation, and its defence should*

¹⁴ Nicolas Trifon, *op.cit.*, p. 317.

¹⁵ Vasile Th. Muși, *Un deceniu de colonizare în Dobrogea Nouă, 1925-1935 [A Decade of Settlement in New Dobrogea, 1925-1935]*, Societatea de Cultură Macedo-Română, București 1936, p.13.

*be accomplished in full collaboration and agreement by the Romanians from Dacia and Transylvania who have never forgotten their brothers from Macedonia, Epirus, Thrace and the other Balkan regions”.*¹⁶

In the wake of the war between Turkey and Greece, the Peace of Lausanne stipulated an ethnic exchange between the Greeks in Asia Minor and the Turks in Greece. This exchange of populations resulted in great demographical unbalance in the Balkans, which would reconfigure the region's ethnic map. Thus, as many as 1,500,500 Greeks settled back in Greece, which led to an agrarian reform conducive to the expropriation of all lands. While the ethnic makeup of Greece was thus rebalanced in favour of the Greeks, it also placed “*a great burden on a country with limited resources*”.¹⁷ Furthermore, as their condition worsened in a country which favoured and protected its own ethnic population, the Aromanians turned to Romania for help. As all the peoples that wanted to establish their national states at the time, once they had earned their autonomy from various empires, practised “ethnic cleansing”, the phenomenon of population relocation or transfer had a very real ring to it. About 10,000 Aromanians emigrated from Greece to Romania. Nor only were there religious dissimilarities between the Greeks and Turks, but they also differed mentally and psychologically, which, among others, meant that each people tried to assert its superiority over the other one. However, when the Greek army was defeated in the Asian part of Turkey, the latter sought revenge to such an extent that it rippled from the political to the social and the demographic. By virtue of the Peace of Lausanne, then, Turkey evicted the Greek population from Asia Minor with hardly anything from what they had gained in a lifetime of work. The Greek exodus was described by many contemporaries, yet we have preferred a description as it appears in a passage from Vasile Muşi in a study on the settlement of Dobrogea: “*In the aftermath of their defeat in the Turkish war, the Greeks had to flee Asia Minor. All Christians had to flee from Asia. And how did they do so? Barely clad, famished, with their only hope in Christ. Dozens of boats sailed across the sea. In the harbours of Pireus and Thessalonika and everywhere else sirens whistled, sailors cried to the top of their voices, skippers yelled orders, while the Greek refugees marched to the shore in long files, pale, saddened, dirty and hungry. Distressing and demoralizing spectacle indeed. As many as 1,500,000 Greek refugees swarmed like locusts into a defeated, demoralized, impoverished Greece. The refugees landed from their boats like from a wasps' nest. One could read suffering and despair on their faces, distress and tears in their eyes. They had left behind –*

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p.14.

¹⁷ Theodor Capidan, *Sărăcăciani. Studii asupra unei populațiuni românești grecizate [The Saracaciani: A Study of a Grecified Romanian Population]*, in *Documente Românești - IV*, București, 1924-1926, pp. 925-928.

beyond the seas – their millenary past, their altars, graves, homes and wealth.”¹⁸ Yet to this picture should be added the fact that the Greeks had set out to take over the Aromanians’ lands and gains. Thus, hotels, houses and estates were taken over abusively, and prosperous towns and markets were flooded by crowds of Greek refugees. The Aromanians were despoiled ruthlessly, their homes were seized by force and their households expropriated in the absence of any legal order. Those who lodged complaints with the Greek authorities or tried to protest against such abuse received the answer: “*Salvaging the nation reigns supreme* [of course, the Greek nation]. *The nation is us... whoever dislikes this, let them depart!*”¹⁹ Such words had sounded like an ultimatum ever since the arrival of the Greek refugees in the Balkans, which persuaded the Aromanian leaders that they had to act, since such adversities were not going to be short-lived, but would plague their people for a long while.

We have tried to show so far all the reasons which determined the Aromanians to answer the summons of the Romanian authorities and settle in Southern Dobrogea. There existed, moreover, logistic imperatives²⁰ which did not allow the Aromanians to live in the Balkans any longer. Population density in the two counties of Southern Dobrogea, namely Durostor and Caliacra, was the lowest in Romania at the time.²¹ Besides, the authorities were aware that the Aromanian groups, forming as they did a community of Romanian culture, could be urged to settle in the Cadrilater and thus acculturate the local Turk, Tatar and Bulgarian populations. The Romanian politicians of the time wished to alter the ethnic configuration of Southern Dobrogea by colonizing it with Romanian population from historical Romanian regions (such as Oltenia and Moldavia) yet also with Aromanians who could no longer live in the Balkans. The Aromanians were

¹⁸ Vasile Th. Muși, *op.cit.*, p.15.

¹⁹ Cătălin Negoită, *Țara uitată. Cadrilaterul în timpul administrației românești 1913-1940 [The Forlorn Country: The Cadrilater during the Romanian Administration, 1913-1940]*, Editura Fundației Scrisul Românesc, Craiova, 2008, p.417. See also by the same author, *Între Stânga și Dreapta. Comunism, irredentism și legionarism în Cadrilater 1913-1940 [Between the Left and the Right: Communism, Irredentism and the Legion in the Cadrilater, 1913-1940]*, Editura Fundației Scrisul Românesc, Craiova, 2009, p.119.

²⁰ These imperatives concerned: a) the return of the Greeks from Asia Minor to the Balkans, then inhabited predominantly by Aromanians; b) border reconfiguration of the states newly emerged after 1919–1920; and c) the incidents Aromanians had with the Bulgarians and Greeks in the regions both parties disputed.

²¹ A historian who has studied Southern Dobrogea notes a few figures that can give us an ethnic picture of this region in the interwar period. According to the 1930 census, the counties of Caliacra and Durostor had respectively 166,911 and 211,431 inhabitants. The Romanians in the Cadrilater were 22.6% in Durostor and 19% in Caliacra of the entire population; the Muslim population continued, therefore, to be the majority in Southern Dobrogea in 1930; Cătălin Negoită, *Țara Uitată. Cadrilaterul în timpul administrației românești 1913-1940 [The Forlorn Country: The Cadrilater during the Romanian Administration, 1913-1940]*, p. 276.

interested to live in regions where socio-political arrangements would not disrupt their patriarchal lifestyle. Within the Romanian state, they could maintain unaltered their culture, traditions and political views they had held in relation to the Romanian system. Unfortunately, the politics of colonization was misapplied, as no conditions necessary for such political and social process were met. Furthermore, despite their early favourable intentions, the Romanian authorities did not answer the petitions for supplementary financial support of the administrative institutions created in the region.²² Limited financial resources, therefore, did not permit any steady development in the region. Furthermore, the Great Depression of 1929–1933 also had negative repercussions on the evolution of Romanian political ethos not also due to inflation but especially due to the underfinancing of the logistics meant to support the contemporary institutional culture in Southern Dobrogea.

What is more, after the early administrative organization of the region, the Romanian authorities delayed the implementation of coherent political policies and measures which would conceivably have been conducive to a more efficient presence of the Romanian administration in Southern Dobrogea.²³ In 1935 the lawyer Vasile Th. Muşi, who had been directly involved in the settling process, wrote thus: “*A truly new age commenced for them at that very moment; a national and political ideal became outlined most clearly; a stable home welcomed them in a motherland grounded in the very eternity of the Romanian people from which they had been torn and to which, after long trials and tribulations, they could finally return – redeemed.*” After protracted tentative attempts of the Romanian authorities, Aromanians arrived in Southern Dobrogea, in a country which certain authors in the age deemed the Aromanians’ homeland yet which was unappealing to them either emotionally or economically.²⁴ Constantly looked upon as strangers by the Romanians they lived side by side with, as well as regarded with hostility by the resident Bulgarians and Muslims, the Aromanians were deeply neglected or treated unjustly with respect to their socio-economic concerns. Accordingly, they continued to live in closed communities and refused to mingle with the Romanians, whom they deemed *untrustworthy, false and over-revelling individuals*.²⁵ Not only didn’t anything they had been promised come true on their

²² Direcția Județeană Constanța a Arhivelor Naționale, *fond - Rezidența Ținutului Marea* (National Archives, Constanța County Branch; fund: Inhabitants of the Black Sea Region), file no. 10/1940, f. 13-15.

²³ Constantin Tudor, *Administrația Românească în Cadrilater (1913-1940)* [*The Romanian Administration of the Cadrilater, 1913-1940*], pp.153-157.

²⁴ Mihail A. Blenche, *Românii de peste hotare (Românii din Bulgaria) – martie 1938* [*Romanians Abroad: The Romanians from Bulgaria*], Arhivele M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944. România, vol. 497 – Lucrări și referate 1929-1943, f. 367.

²⁵ Ovid Țopa, *Românii de peste hotare și minoritățile noastre* [*The Romanians Abroad and Our Minorities*], Fond 71/1920-1940, România, vol. 497 – Lucrări și referate 1929-1943, f. 157-158.

arrival in Southern Dobrogea, but their life there turned out to be shot through with hardships. They settled in the Cadrilater in several stages between 1925 and 1935, as they considered Romania to be their country too. Among their set of moral values featured large commitment, industriousness, steadfastness, dignity and honour. Yet the Aromanians were also credulous, which did hardly benefit them under the circumstances.²⁶ Even Nicolae Iorga, who had been actively involved in the colonization process, acknowledged to a certain extent the failure of the Romanian authorities. With respect to the Cadrilater, Iorga wrote: “*In New Dobrogea our duty as a national party would be to support the Macedonians, who represent such an interesting segment of the Romanian people; these people have contributed proportionately enormously to our national civilization; they are individuals who are, as you know, much more capable than us; there is not one of their numbers who would manage under any circumstances; they are the creators of culture across the Balkans; and yet we have uprooted these people from their homes, have shipped them to Romania, have made agriculturists where they were none, have made them townspeople where they were none – we have somewhat messed with their hopes.*”²⁷

The Aromanian settling of Southern Dobrogea failed in the sense that certain planned policies were not observed. While the idea of Aromanian colonization was originally a purely political strategy, in practice it turned out to be an interplay of party politics and partisanships.²⁸ The failure was also due in part to the ambition of the political leaders to cultivate in Southern Dobrogea a national idea based on the necessity to acculturate the local Bulgarian and Turkish-Tatar population; the acculturation process failed, however, since the two major ethnic groups (Bulgarians and Muslims) opposed strong resistance. In the absence of a coherent strategy, the Romanian state had to constantly wage a guerrilla war against the comitagi gangs, yet also against the communist factions which militated for the separation of the entire region of Dobrogea from Romania and its inclusion into a future Balkan republic of communist orientation.²⁹ The answer of the Romanian politicians to the challenge of the Bulgarian comitagis was a policy of Aromanian (as well as Romanian) colonization. If the Romanian settlers coming from the Kingdom, frightened by the comitagi raids, ended up fleeing the

²⁶ Maria Bedivan, *Pe urmele unui colonist aromân [In the Footsteps of a Macedo-Romanian Settler]*, Editura Semne, București, 2003, p. 28.

²⁷ Nicolae Iorga, *Peninsula Balcanică [The Balkan Peninsula]*, revistă lunară politico-literară, an VII nr. 1-2, ianuarie-februarie, 1929.

²⁸ Ioan Vlădescu, *Cadrilaterul, ce este și ce ar trebui să fie, naționalizarea și colonizarea lui [The Cadrilater: What Its Nationalization and Colonization Is and What It Should Be]*, Tipografia Dobrogea Jună, Constanța, 1927, p.57.

²⁹ Cătălin Negoită, *Între Stânga și Dreapta. Comunism, Iredentism și Legionarism în Cadrilater, 1913-1940 [Between the Left and the Right: Communism, Irredentism and the Legion in the Cadrilater, 1913-1940]*, p.15.

Cadrilater, the Aromanians stood steady: they organized themselves and fought the danger, as they had been used to do for centuries. They had formerly fought to defend their territory, be it in Albania, Macedonia or Greece; now they were fighting for the cause of the Romanian state in a region where the authorities had failed to establish social and political order despite the deployment of large numbers of geandarmes and police forces as well as two army divisions. Thus ends an episode in Aromanian history, which many regard as a political and identitary failure since it had not been planned pragmatically and was not supported by consistent logistics and resources.



*Monarhii celor cinci state balcanice semnatare ale Tratatului de Pace de la București.
În mijloc Regele Carol I al României alături de Regele Gheorghe al Greciei; Regele Petru al
Serbiei; Regele Nicolae al Muntenegrului; Țarul Ferdinand de Coburg al Bulgariei.*