

UNION OF THE ROMANIAN PRINCIPALITIES AND THE COLLECTIVE GUARANTEE OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS*

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Abstract: This study reveals a very specific issue in the field of the international relations history. As a matter of fact, the Romanian State's emergency presupposed an international regime exposed through the joint guarantee of the European Great Powers, as signing parts of the Peace Treaty of Paris, from the 30^s March 1856. The readings of that Treaty and of the many other papers proved the fact that the Guaranteeing Powers were the six European Great Powers, as France, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sardaigne. The Ottoman Empire, as suzeraine Court on the Romanian Principalities Moldavia and Wallachia, as well on Serbia, it was a guaranteed, and not a guaranteeing part. These revealings permitted some pointed understandings of the both international impact of the Romanian international acts, as, for example, the Union of the Principalities in 1859, and significations of the diplomatic European deliberations, as the Great Powers Concert on the Romanian Question.

Keywords: Romanian Principalities Moldavia and Wallachia, Guaranteeing Powers were the six European Great Powers, as France, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sardaigne.

The guarantee clauses reinforce the practical/enforceable dimension of international acts (treaties, agreements), which is a compulsory requirement. They are clauses *in spe*, i.e. with explicit reference to their subject matter, whether simple or multiple. In the Treaty of Paris of 30 March 1856 such clauses were distinctly concerned with the Ottoman Empire, the Romanian Principalities and Serbia. *Collective guarantees* were assumed by the European powers in regard to each of the three 'cases' by means of *special clauses*. As a result, any analysis of one or other of the three guarantees, from a historiographical perspective, could appear to be purely rhetorical, with a pre-existing answer, expressed *strictly in terms of the clauses* of the treaty of 30 March 1856 and its subsequent acts. However, all these acts, and especially the first one (the Treaty of 30 March), did not give the impression of being very clear, as they contained contradictory formulations, which seem to convince us once again that political-diplomatic deliberations were usually conducted under the auspices of compromise.

Among the formulations (expressions) which allow a first instance evaluation of the role the Ottoman power had regarding the politico-diplomatic situation of 1856, those contained in Articles VII, XXII, XXV and XXVIII of the Treaty of 1856

* See Gheorghe Cliveti, *România și Puterile Garante, 1856-1878*, second edition, revised and largely appended, Iași, Editura Junimea, 2020, p. 25-123.

should be noted. Article VII provided for *the admission of the Sublime Porte to participate 'in the advantages of public law and European understanding'*, the other signatory powers (France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Sardinia) committing themselves "each individually to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire" and "to jointly guarantee the strict observance of this commitment, considering any act likely to undermine this principle as a matter of general interest...". According to the same article, the Ottoman Empire was explicitly reserved the quality of a *guaranteed party*, a status implicitly recognised by Articles XXII and XXVIII. The first of these stipulated that "The Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia shall continue to enjoy the privileges and immunities which they possess under the suzerainty of the Porte and under the guarantee of the contracting powers. No exclusive protection shall be exercised over them by any of the guarantor powers. There shall be no private right of interference in their internal affairs". As for the 28th article, it stipulated that "the Principality of Serbia shall continue to enjoy from the Sublime Porte all the privileges and immunities as established and determined by the hattı-sheriffs henceforth placed under the collective guarantee of the contracting powers". From the contents of both articles it appears that the Ottoman power was guaranteed "suzerain rights" over Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia. The three 'provinces' were guaranteed autonomy, where appropriate, within the framework of 'privileges and immunities'. However, the provisions of Articles XXII and XXVIII, not to mention Article VII, which is described above, do not in any way imply that Turkey as a *guaranteed party* also had the attributes of a *guarantor power*.

Some things could be inferred, though, from a reading reduced to its essence of Article XXV of the Treaty of Paris, according to which the "final agreement with the suzerain power" (an agreement relating to the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia) was to be "enforced in a convention signed in Paris¹ between the high contracting parties', 'a hattı-sheriff in accordance with its stipulations' was to constitute 'the definitive organisation of the two provinces, henceforth placed *under the collective guarantee of all the signatory powers*' (emphasis added, G. C.). This wording (phrase) has led and still leads various and very knowledgeable specialists in international relations² to consider that Turkey had the quality of a guarantor

¹ Treaty of Paris of 30 March 1856; *Acte și documente relative la istoria renascerei politice a României*, ed. D.A. Sturdza *et. all*, vol. II, București, 1900, p. 1075-1084.

² In their quasi-totality, the specialists in modern history of the generation of the treaty *Istoria României*, vol. IV, București, 1964; for edification, on p. 266 it is mentioned that, "by the Treaty of Paris, the Principalities had received an international legal status, based on the collective guarantee of the seven powers"; see A. Oțetea, *L'Accord d'Osborne (9 August 1857)*, in *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, III, 1964, no. 4, p. 677-696; see also Gr. Chiriță, *România în 1866. Coordonate ale situației interne și internaționale*, în „*Revista de istorie*”, XXXI, 1978, p. 2197-2219; L. Boicu, *Diplomația europeană și cauza română, 1856-1859*, Iași, 1978, p. 112; Dan Berindei, *Epoca Unirii*, București, 1978; idem, *Societatea românească în vremea lui Carol I (1866-1876)*, București, 1992, p. 10; I. Bulei, *Scurtă istorie a românilor*, București,

power, at least over the Romanian principalities and Serbia. In various contributions by the respective scholars, we find the phrase "seven guarantor powers", a phrase which, interestingly enough, had been adopted by the militant Romanian spirits since the "era of the Unification of the Principalities", for G. Sion, for example, the European guarantee meaning no more and no less than the fact that "Seven emperors of the world want to know what we want"³. What animated such spirits was, of course, the *national cause*, the acts and actions aimed at consecrating its *triumph*, "an event of the greatest edification in terms of the law of nations", towards which the great powers would have assumed, in the form and content of the collective guarantee, the role of a *European areopagus*, having a moral, generous intentional⁴ connotation, rather than a political-legal one, marked by obligations and deliberative responsibilities. The fiery plea in the name of the Romanian national cause instantiated the "collective reason" of the great powers in the manner presented above and the High Porte was believed to have subscribed to those imperatives, in order to certify its condition under the auspices of European public law⁵. Against the backdrop of the "1857" moods prompted by the "desire" to prove "to Europe *the internal unanimity* on the question of the Union", it was not really possible to make room in this plea for the binomial of guarantor powers - suzerain power (court). This fact has led to a certain inconsistency in the perception of the applicable part of the collective guarantee regime, inconsistency that reverberated, with time, in all the historiographical approaches that have studied the issue of the relationship between the guaranteed parties and the guarantors, so that it was not by chance that the obligations assumed by the "high courts" in 1856 with regard to the Romanian part - and not only the Romanian part - came to be understood even in the parameters of a *protectorate*⁶. The situation could be put down to the assessments of the Treaty of Paris in fragmented views, with strict references to the Romanian question, the Serbian question, the question of the Ottoman Empire or to any other subject of the international act. It could also be attributed to some shortcomings in the legal interpretation of the "value" of the guarantee in the context of relations between states.

1997, p. 230; see also the new treaty on *Romanian History*, vol. VII/1 (coord. Dan Berindei), București, 2003, p. 434 ff; see, interesting fact, and some foreign specialists, including Barbara Jelavich *The Great Power Protectorate and Romanian National Development. 1856-1877*, in "Revue des études sud-est euro péennes", XIV, 1977, 4, p. 681-690, and, recently, Keith Hitchins, *Români. 1774-1866*, București, 1996, p. 357.

³ Cf. L. Boicu, *works cited*, p. 112.

⁴ *Acts and documents*, vol. VI/1, București, p. 492-497.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Gh. I. Brătianu, *Politica externă a lui Cuza vodă și dezvoltarea ideii de unitate națională*, în „Revista istorică română”, II, 1932, 2, p. 113; T. W. Riker, *Cum s-a înfăptuit România. Studiul unei probleme internaționale, 1856-1866*, translation from English by Alice Bădescu, București, 1940; Barbara Jelavich, *works cited*; Keith Hitchins, *works cited*, p. 348.

It would, of course, be too much to attempt to elucidate everything related to the issue of the guarantee. This would require a wide-ranging debate involving specialists from various fields, with priority being given to the field of "international law" and the history of international relations. We have sought to answer the question of whether Turkey was a guarantor power by starting from a reading *sans oeillères* of the European political-diplomatic text of 1856-1878, which involved the status of deliberating or contracting party of the High Porte. The Ottoman diplomacy fully displayed this quality during the Paris Peace Congress of 1856 and, to varying degrees, in the meetings or negotiations that took place in the aftermath of that Congress.

From the very first meetings (on 25 and 28 February February)⁷, the atmosphere of the congress, which was far from being a mere "recording room" for the "five points" of the *preliminary project of the peace talks*⁸, became heated due to the discussion of the "joint obligations" of the powers participating in the deliberations. After the Russian representative Baron Brunnow had reiterated the "observations of Petersburg" - formulated by Gorceakov during the Vienna conference of 1855 - on the use of the term *protectorate* for the regime that the 'great northern court' had implemented over the Romanian Principalities under the Adrianople Treaty of 1829, and after the Austrian Chancellor Buol 'pointed out' that "the protectorate was in fact and in situation", Aali Pasha, the Ottoman plenipotentiary, put forward the proposal that "the cessation of any *private protectorate* should naturally exclude any idea of *collective protectorate*" and that "the intervention of the powers" should be "circumscribed within the limits of a simple guarantee"⁹. Taken literally and, above all, in spirit, the proposal highlights from the outset the detachment of the condition of the Ottoman Empire from the guarantor powers in what concerns the "Romanian question" and, implicitly, the Serbian question, which under the auspices of the European concert have assumed *collective commitments*, based not on isolated obligations for each of them, but on „*une seule obligation solidaire et indivise qu'elles se sont engagées d'observer non seulement à son égard mais en commun l'un envers l'autre*"¹⁰. As for a detachment based on the treaty, considered as a whole, this could not even come into question, as by instrumenting obligations that are par excellence active, the condition of guarantor for the passive would have been contrary to nature. The collective guarantee applied primarily to the Ottoman Empire with explicit reference to its integrity and independence, and then to the Romanian or Serbian Principalities, to the relations of the 'provinces' mentioned

⁷ Protocols No. 1 and No. 2 of the Congress; *Proceedings and Documents*, vol. II, pp. 999-1001 and 1003-1007.

⁸ A. Debidour *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe, depuis l'ouverture du Congrès de Vienne jusqu'à la fermeture du Congrès de Berlin, 1814-1878*, vol. II, *La Révolution*, Paris, 1891, p. 149.

⁹ *Acts and Documents*, vol. II, p. 1005.

¹⁰ Serge Goriainow, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, Paris, 1910, p. 141.

with the High Porte. It was, therefore, a "complicated game of guarantees", which placed the intention assumed by the plenary of the congress aiming at "the consolidation of the Ottoman Empire" in deep dissonance with the full autonomy of the Romanians and Serbs, even from the perspective of the clauses of the treaty of 30 March 1856. Realising fully well that such a dissonance would inexorably result in the weakening of the Porte's suzerainty, Stratford Canning, the British ambassador to Constantinople, warned, not only on account of his reputation as a supporter of the "Ottoman cause", that he would rather have cut off his right hand than have signed the aforementioned treaty¹¹. In order to quench the dissatisfaction and fears of the Porte or its supporters, it was also necessary to draw up a *special guarantee convention*, applied to the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire and signed by Great Britain, France and Austria in Paris on the penultimate day of the congress (15 April)¹². This, however, happened in a different setting, in parallel with the works of the treaty, but after the peace treaty had already been signed.

It follows, therefore, from the contents of the diplomatic acts produced in 1856 in Paris, from the very logic of the active (contractual, synallagmatic) stipulations, that Turkey could not be a guarantor for itself (on the passive side!). And such a result means that the synonym *guarantor powers - signatory (contracting) powers* of the treaty of 30 March has been emptied of its content, a synonym that has "stolen" the meaning of the expression "seven guarantor powers" from most of those who have used it. It remains to be seen, then, from the sources and the background facts, whether or not this expression could have had any coverage in the political and legal reality with reference to the Romanian Principalities (The Unified Principalities, by virtue of the convention of 19 August 1858), whose more often than not tense relations with the "high courts" have known moments of particularly clear relevance in relation to what we have proposed to observe. For the sake of illustration, we consider it sufficient to point out that while in the case of Serbia such relations only involved conferences in Constantinople of the ambassadors of the "six" and the Ottoman ministers, in the case of Moldo-Wallachia it was necessary for conferences of *European* openness to be held in Paris (in 1858, 1859, 1866), where the quality of the deliberating parties was more accurately illustrated.

As is well known, the Treaty of 30 March 1856 did not legitimise the "definitive solution"¹³ regarding the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, a "solution" that would involve not only the realignment of the international political status of the two small Romanian states, but also their "future organisation". The Treaty of 30 March envisaged the end of *Russia's exclusive protectorate* and the placement of

¹¹ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Histoire des Roumains de l'époque romaine à l'achèvement de l'unité*, Paris, 1937, p. 271.

¹² *Acts and Documents*, vol. II, p. 1089.

¹³ The phrase has found its way into the diplomatic deliberations in Paris.

Moldova and Wallachia under the collective guarantee of the European powers, the two principalities remaining under Ottoman suzerainty¹⁴. At the same time, with regard to the "future organisation", the same international act only envisaged the manner in which a "solution" would be reached. In this sense, in Iași and Bucharest *ad hoc assemblies* were to be held, convened by a sultan's firman and 'called to express the will of the people regarding the definitive organisation of the Principalities', a 'pronouncement' which was to be the subject of a report by a special commission 'convened without delay in the capital of Wallachia' and made up of representatives of all the "contracting parties", whose "final agreement /.../ will be stipulated in a convention signed in Paris", applied "to the two provinces" by a hattı-sheriff of the Porte¹⁵. All these provisions did not, let us admit, clearly show the condition of the Ottoman Porte in relation to the system of collective guarantee, which made it possible to include the "suzerain court" as an active part of the respective system, if only by taking into account the above-mentioned Article XXV of the treaty of Paris, according to which "the two provinces" were "henceforth placed under the collective guarantee of all the signatory powers".

The impression that the High Porte was included as a *subject* by the system of collective guarantee may have also emerged from the attitudes and moods that had to give expression to "the will of the population concerning the definitive organization of the Principalities". Relying on *their suzerain rights* in a manner that betrayed the obtuseness of those clauses of the Treaty of Paris which reserved to them only the power to "enjoy privileges and immunities under the suzerainty of the Porte", the Romanians gave the *ad hoc assemblies* of 1857 a *deliberative - representative* character rather than a *consultative* one, within the limits prescribed by the *Instructions of the Congress of 1856 for the special commission of the Principalities*¹⁶. The "first, greatest, most general and most national desires of the country", proclaimed by the *ad hoc assemblies*, could therefore have the character of a vigorous *fait accompli*¹⁷. "Desires" relating to autonomy, union, foreign princes and representative government were proclaimed as points of reference of the national programme, and "all these - let us reiterate this - under the collective guarantee of the powers which subscribed to the Treaty of Paris". By applying the collective guarantee to the condition of *the European areopagus*¹⁸ for reasons which we do not consider necessary to return to, the exponents of the national party had to comply with the letter of Article XXV of the Treaty of 30 March 1856, thus making it clear, by the very fact that the Porte was among the guarantors, that the regime applied to the Principalities differed completely from that applied to the

¹⁴ Treaty of 30 March 1856, art. 22.

¹⁵ Idem, Art. 23, 24, 25.

¹⁶ *Acts and Documents*, vol. II, pp. 1067-1070.

¹⁷ Dan Berindei, *Epoca Unirii, passim*.

¹⁸ *Acts and documents*, vol. VI/1, p. 427.

Ottoman Empire, and not in subsequence of the latter. That conformity was evidenced by the *report of the commission of the ad hoc Assembly of Moldavia for the settlement of relations between the Principalities and the guarantor powers*, which expressly stated that "Article XXV of the Treaty of Paris placed the Principalities under the collective guarantee of all the subscribing powers"¹⁹ ; as was also proved by the *act of thanksgiving* of the same ad-hoc assembly *to the guarantor powers*, an act whose reading given by Kogălniceanu generated "lively and repeated acclamations of *Long live the guarantor powers! Long live the Union!*"²⁰ It was a compliance which, evaluated from the perspective of the eminently positive good intentions of the Romanians, could be found, we believe, as the main argument in support of the opinion that, at least with regard to the Principalities, the "guarantor courts" would have been seven in number. Perhaps this is precisely why the expression "seven guarantor powers" has found its way into the literature on the "Romanian matter". The Convention of 19 August 1858 legitimised the "definitive solution concerning the Principalities" in a much more restrictive sense than that illustrated by the political-national programme of the ad hoc assemblies. This would profoundly mark the way in which the Romanians related to the collective guarantee of the great powers. The Romanians expected it to be applied only to the "political being" ("exterior")²¹ of their national state, ensuring them the free exercise of a *right to be* (suzerainty), while the "high courts" agreed to impose on them a *way of being* (an organisation from a political-state perspective). The Romanians' reaction to the "demi-measures"²² adopted by the great powers under the title of "definitive solution regarding the Principalities" - "a hybrid and unnatural mixture of union and separation", as A. D. Xenopol labeled it - would consist in the *energetic policy of the fait accompli*²³ , whose main spurts (in 1859, 1864 and 1866) would lead to the *establishment of Romania*²⁴ . Each great *fait accompli* was to involve the challenge of *the collective reasoning of the guarantors* and, consequently, the disposition in real terms of the 'high courts' in the diplomatic conferences of 1859 (in Paris), 1861 and 1864 (in Constantinople.), 1866 (in Paris), all devoted to the "Romanian matter".

It should be noted, however, that the real disposition of the "high courts" had to take shape as early as the Paris conference of 1858. Thus, the meeting of 15 July²⁵ was

¹⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 425-427.

²⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 492-496.

²¹ This is proven by the attitude of the ad hoc assembly of Wallachia, which limited itself to submitting to the future conference of the great powers only the "four points" of the national political programme; *ibidem*, vol. VI/2, pp. 133-144.

²² R. W. Seton-Watson *works cited*, p. 294 et seq.

²³ Paul Henry, *L'abdication du prince Couza et l'avènement de la dynastie de Hohenzollern au trône de la Roumanie*, Paris, 1930, pp. 81-87.

²⁴ T. W. Rikerop. *cit. passim*.

²⁵ Conference Protocol No. 10; *Proceedings and Documents*, vol. VII, pp. 283-285.

devoted to deliberations on 'the relations /.../ which the suzerain court, the Principalities and the guarantor powers will have to maintain'. It first recognized or legitimized "the right of the suzerain court to receive tribute, to confirm the election of the lords of (each principality), to combine (establish) with the Principalities the measures for the defence of their territory in case of aggression from abroad and to bring about an agreement with the guarantor powers in case of necessity, for the maintenance of order in the Principalities, in a word, the right of the suzerain court to apply to the Principalities the international treaties in all that does not affect the immunities of the country"; then, "the right of the Principalities to regulate, without the interference of the suzerain court, the entire internal administration within the limits stipulated by the agreement of the guarantor powers with the suzerain court and the right of recourse to the suzerain and guarantor powers in case of violation of their immunities"; and last but not least, "the right reserved to the guarantor powers to regulate, by diplomatic means and by an agreement with the Porte, any dispute that may arise between it and the Principalities...". And such rights or principles were to be the subject of *specific* clauses of the Convention of 19 August 1858, article 9 of which stated that "in the event of a violation of the immunities of the Principalities, the Lords shall appeal to the suzerain power, and if their complaint is not redressed, they may have it forwarded, through their agents, to the representatives of the guarantor powers in Constantinople"²⁶.

We could make multiple analyses on the provisions introduced by the protocol of the meeting of 15 July, as well as on the clauses with special reference to the guarantee or the whole convention of 19 August 1858. However, for any new analysis it would be difficult to avoid the reality of the binomial guarantor powers - suzerain court, and the fact that the latter was not included in the provision of those who assumed the "solidary and indivisible obligation of the collective guarantee". And the veracity of such a finding could be reinforced with references of the utmost relevance to the political-diplomatic text of the relations between the guaranteed parties and the guarantors up to 1878. Thus, in the protocol of 6 September of the Paris Conference of 1859, intended to deliberate on Al. I. Cuza's "double election", it was stated that "the Sublime Porte, taking into account the *recommendation made by the six guarantor powers*, exceptionally confers the investiture of Colonel Cuza for this one occasion only as Hospodar (Lord, tr. Note) of Moldavia and Wallachia, it being well understood that for all future elections and investitures of the Hospodars, the procedure will be strictly in accordance with the principles laid down in the convention of 7/19 August 1859"²⁷; in the *Firmanul pentru organizarea administrativă a Principatelor Unite Moldova și Valahia* of 7

²⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. VII, pp. 306-308.

²⁷ D. A. Sturdza, *Însemnătatea europeană a realizării definitive a dorințelor rostite de Divanurile ad-hoc în 7/19 și 9/21 octombrie 1858*, în „Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice”, s. II, t. XXXIV, 1912, p. 771.

December 1861, the Sultan mentioned the agreement reached between "the suzerain court and the great guarantor powers"²⁸, so that, in his *proclamation to the country* of 15 December the same year, the ruler Cuza would stress that "the High Porte and all the guarantor powers have adhered to the Union of the Principalities"; in the protocol of 28 June 1864 of the Constantinople conference and in the *Additional Act to the Convention of 19 August 1858*, the position and signature of the Porte appear dissociated from those of the 'Six'; likewise in the Protocol of 10 March 1866 of the Paris Conference when Safvet Pasha the Ottoman representative, "declared that he was ready to examine and regulate, in the name of the High Porte, in common agreement with the plenipotentiaries of the guarantor powers, all questions arising from recent events in the Principalities" (the forced abdication of the prince Cuza - n.ns., G. C.)²⁹; the same dissociation was also apparent in the act of international recognition of Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen as ruler of Romania in 1866, an act which consisted of a *direct Romanian-Ottoman arrangement* to which the guarantor powers then subscribed³⁰; as is also apparent from the failed attempt of the 'six guarantors' in 1876-1877 to mediate the bloody conflict between the High Porte and the Christian insurgents in the Balkans, a failure which betrayed the inevitability of the war of 1877-1878, the implications of which were to be the subject of the deliberations of the Berlin Peace Congress. In conclusion, we feel confident in arguing that Turkey was a *signatory* or a *contracting party* to the Paris Treaty of 1856 and its subsequent acts, but not a *guarantor* power; also that the guarantor powers were six and not seven - a conclusion necessitated by clarifications not only of a quantitative but also of a qualitative nature regarding some particularly interesting aspects of the development of international relations in the 19th century. Some of these aspects were also revealed in connection with the "energetic acts" of the Romanians on 5 and 24 January 1859.

The "unionist achievement" of the Romanians on 24 January/5 February 1859, which began, even if only in a subtle way, on 5/17 January of the same year, had a strong European resonance³¹, catching *à l'instant et spécialement* the attention of

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 774.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 793.

³⁰ Gh. Cliveti, *Recunoașterea internațională a lui Carol de Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen ca domnitor al României (Principatelor Unite)*, în vol. *Istoria ca lectură a lumii. Profesorului Alexandru Zub la împlinirea vârstei de 60 de ani*, Iași, 1994, p. 239-250.

³¹ Gh. Plato, *Lupta românilor pentru unitate națională. Ecouri în presa europeană (1855-1859)*, Iași, 1974; idem, *Ecoul internațional al Unirii Principatelor Române*, în *Cuza vodă. In memoriam*, coord. L. Boicu, Gh. Platon, Al. Zub, Iași, 1973, p. 147-231; Aurel Filimon, *Documente diplomatice belgiene despre Unirea Principatelor*, în „*Revista de Istorie*”, XXVII (1974), p. 85-95; *Românii la 1859. Unirea Principatelor Române în conștiința europeană*, vol. II, *Texte străine*, coord. Ion Ardeleanu, V. Arimia, Ionel Gal, Mircea Mușat, București, 1984, *passim*.

the guarantor and suzerain powers³². The consuls of the European powers in Iași or București recorded and reported to their "superiors", each with their own peculiarities of style or impression, on the conduct of the "prince's elections" in the "two capitals" of the Principalities, which, through the convention concluded diplomatically, under the auspices of a *concert of great politics*, in Paris on 19 August 1858 as *United*. The reports of the French consul Victor Place from Iași and Louis Béclard from Bucharest were of primary historiographical interest, especially the former's, for some of the most inspiring words on the election of Cuza for the throne of Moldavia as a "triumph of the national principle"³³. Although he had supported the candidatures of Grigore Sturdza and Petre P. Mavrogheni³⁴, most likely under the approval of the French Embassy "near" the High Porte, after the Franco-British agreement of Osborne of August 1857 and the signature of the Paris Convention "by all powers", on 19 August 1858, the consul of Place showed a very warm willingness to interpretation or recognition of the national legitimacy of the Principalities Union. Immediately after the elections for the Assembly of Iași that were "to give a ruler" the consul of "the most acclaimed guarantor power" by the inhabitants of that capital city signalled the strength of the "national sentiment", likely to bring about "the return of the Moldavians to the foundations laid by the ad hoc Divans under the Treaty of Paris and to proclaim again, in a definitive manner and in agreement with the Wallachians, the Union and the foreign prince"³⁵; in "the election of Colonel Cuza", he perceived "the full triumph of Unionist and liberal ideas against the old system of corruption which had run its course"³⁶; he saw, in "the person of the elected", the guarantee for the respect of the thanks given by the Moldavian deputies to the guarantor powers and the strength of the "desire" expressed by them, at once with the "national candidate" and before they had proceeded to vote him as a ruler, "of Union under a foreign prince"; he noted the lofty significance of the oath taken by the "elected on the rostrum and proclaimed a prince"; he noticed the purely formal nature of the letter of the deputies of Moldova addressed to the High Porte on the election of the new ruler³⁷; he pointed out, in an extensive report for Walewski that the election of

³² Nicolae Corivan, *Unirea țărilor române în cadrul politicii europene*, in "Studii", XII (1959), no. 1, p. 159-190; Dan Berindei, *Constituirea statului național român în context european, în Cuza vodă. In memoriam*, p. 113-146; Leonid Boicu, *works cited*, p. 33-148.

³³ Nicolae Iorga, *Victor Place și Unirea Principatelor*, în „Revista istorică”, IX (1922), p. 53-65; Marcel Emerit, *Victor Place et la politique française à l'époque de l'Union*, București, 1931; Victor Slăvescu, *Domnitorul Cuza și Victor Place*, București, 1942.

³⁴ Mihai Cojocariu, *Partida națională și constituirea statului român (1856-1859)*, Iași, 1995, p. 200-220.

³⁵ *Acts and documents*, vol. IX, p. 191 (Place v. Walewski, Iași, 3 January 1859); *Documents on the Union of the Principalities*, vol. VI, *French Diplomatic Correspondence (1856-1859)*, collection by Grigore Chiriță, Valentina Costake, Emilia Poștăriță, București, 1980, p. 265 (same doc.); *România la 1859*, vol. I, p. 298 (same doc.).

³⁶ *Acts and documents*, vol. IX, p. 232 (same c., Iași, 18 January 1859).

³⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 230-232 (same doc.); *România la 1859*, vol. I, pp. 299-302 (same doc.).

Cuza "represents the most brilliant triumph of French politics", without any reason to suspect the interference of any agent of the Second Empire in the Romanian event; also that, although the pronouncement of the colonel's name as a candidate seemed "a coup de theatre", his election was "the truest expression of national sentiment", and was "a solemn consecration of the policy followed in the Principalities by the government of the Emperor Napoleon III"; that, in such a pure choice of a gentleman, it was possible to see 'a true promulgation of a constitution', in keeping, if only in spirit, with the provisions of the Paris Convention of 19 August 1858 concerning 'the rights of autonomy of the Principalities'; that this election was a 'message of public solidarity', since the 'separatists' and even 'the two Sturdzas', Mihail and Grigore went to congratulate the new prince'; finally, that it was important for the Emperor and the government in Paris to take note of the intention of the "new prince", a former revolutionary of 1848 and "a perfect French speaker", to organise his country "on the model of France", which he also asked for "specialists" ³⁸.

Consul Victor Place also wished to inform Ambassador Thouvenel in Constantinople - where the chargé d'affaires A. Lallemand, under the impression of the "opinions" of the representatives of other powers "near the Porte", wondered whether the number of 49 deputies present at the "meeting of the election of the prince" corresponded to the "requirement of $\frac{3}{4}$ plus 1" of the total members of the Moldavian Assembly³⁹ - that the success of Colonel Cuza's candidacy was "a real thunderbolt for the Austrians and the Turks", but, on top of that, an event likely to give full satisfaction to "French politics"⁴⁰. Somewhat discreetly, perhaps absent, Place seemed to be faced with the difficulties of the beginning of the "new reign" in Iași. The "local" documentary editions do not really include reports from the French consul on the entry of the prince "into office" in the manner of a *fait accompli*, before he had received his "investiture from the High Porte", on the delay of some ten days in the appointment of a government by the "nationally elected"⁴¹, or on the "Polish plot" aimed at overturning the vote of 5/17 January and "securing the throne of Moldavia" for Grigore Sturdza". This "plot" was "discovered" by the Moldavian security forces a few days after the vote. The "conspiratorial attempt" involved mainly Polish volunteers - according to some estimates, 1,200 from

³⁸ *Acts and documents*, vol. IX, p. 242-247, 247-249 (same c. same, Iași, 24 ianuarie st.n. 1859; in the annex, a copy of the act of the Elective Assembly of "thanks for the guarantor powers" and a new expression of the "desire to unite under a foreign prince", one hour before Cuza's election); *România la 1859*, vol. I, p. 314-318, 318-320 (same doc. And its annex).

³⁹ *Documents on the Union of the Principalities*, vol. VI, p. 434 și urm. (Lallemand c. Walewski, Péra, 19 ianuarie 1859); *România la 1859*, vol. I, p. 304 și urm. (same doc.).

⁴⁰ *Documents on the Union of the Principalities*, vol. VI, p. 175 ff. (Place v. Ed. Thouvenel, Iași, 25 January 1859); *România la 1859*, vol. I, p. 326 ff. (same doc.).

⁴¹ Mihai Cojocariu, *Alexandru Ioan Cuza: câteva aspecte privind alegerea și primele zece zile de domnie*, în vol. *Zimbrul și Vulturul. Cercetări privitoare la unirea Principatelor*, Iași, 2010, p. 147, 149-151.

Moldova and 2,400 from Wallachia - led by Count Vincent Nieceja Wierbicki⁴². More than the fact of the "plot" itself, the fear that it was incited by a "neighbouring power and adversary to the Romanian cause" will have put the "new officials" in Iași to the test. Wierbicki (Murat Bey) had been an aide to Grigore Sturdza (Muhlis Pasha) during the 'Crimean War' and was 'known' for his 'relations with numerous Moldavian-Wallachian noble families' and as 'a man of Michal Czajkowski, "anti-unionist at the time"⁴³ .

By his reports to the Foreign Office in Paris or to the French Embassy in Constantinople, Louis Béclard, supporter of Barbu Știrbei's candidacy for the throne of Wallachia⁴⁴, also proved to be insufficiently informed about Cuza's "first experiences" as ruler of Moldavia. The French Consul in Bucharest did not show himself to be in close contact with Cuza's election on 24 January/5 February and as ruler of Wallachia. Surprisingly, he communicated to Walewski only "a few rather "dry facts" about the "double election"⁴⁵ , without any inspiring comments, like those of Victor Place, albeit a bit "extravagant", as T. W. Riker appreciated them⁴⁶ ; he critically observed, in agreement with consuls of other guarantor powers, the gesture of the Wallachian Assembly of inviting Cuza immediately after the vote of 24 January/5 February to take over "the reins of government" in Bucharest, which ran the "risk" of contravening "Article 44 of the Organic Regulations" (!), according to which, "until the investiture given by the High Porte to the ruler, it was up to the kaymakams to continue to exercise their functions"⁴⁷ ; he also observed that,

⁴² The fact of the "plot" was doubted by A. D. Xenopol in the monograph *Domnia lui Cuza Vodă*, vol. I, Iași, 1903, p. 41 ff., as well as by N. Iorga in a booklet published in 1921, in București, *Polonais et Roumains. Relations politiques, économiques et culturelles*, p. 93. It was considered as truthful by T. W. Riker in *works cited*, p. 190, and, on some documentary basis, by Gheorghe Duzinchevici in *Beizade Grigore Sturdza și polonii*, București, 1941, or in the study *Quelques aspects des relations roumano-polonaises au XIX-e siècle*, in *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, XX (1973), no. 4, pp. 731-755; P. P. Panaitescu, *Unirea Principatelor Române. Cuza Vodă și polonii*, in "Romanoslavica", V (1962), p. 71-84; Leonid Boicu, *works cited*, p. 270-278; Dumitru Ivănescu, *De la revoluția pașoptistă la întregirea națională*, Iași, 2004, p. 165-185; Mihai Cojocariu, *works cited*, in loc. cit., p. 153 et seq; Liviu Iulian Roman, *Presa din Moldova și problematica Unirii Principatelor (1855-1858)*, Iași, 2014, p. 407 ff. For reservations on the veracity of the fact, see Barbu Berceanu, *Aspecte ale luptei politice pentru Unire. Grigore M. Sturdza's candidacy for the rule of Moldavia (1859)*, in "Revista de Istorie", XXXVII (1984), no. 2, p. 167-184, and, more recently, Simion-Alexandru Gavriș, *Viața și opiniile prințului Grigore Mihail Sturdza (1821-1901)*, Iași, 2015, p. 137-156, with specified historiographical references and documentary appeal.

⁴³ Leonid Boicu, *works cited*, p. 271.

⁴⁴ Mihai Cojocariu, *Partida națională și constituirea statului român*, p. 363.

⁴⁵ D. A. Sturdza, *Însemnătatea Divanurilor ad-hoc din Iași și București în istoria renașterii României*, in "Annals of the Romanian Academy. Memoirs of the Historical Section", series II, volume XXXIV (1911-1912), p. 274 (Béclard v. Walewski, București, 7 February 1859).

⁴⁶ T. W. Riker, *works cited*, p. 190.

⁴⁷ *Documents on the Union of the Principalities*, vol. VI, p. 295 (Béclard v. Walewski, București, 16 February 1859).

following "the example of Moldova", Cuza appointed a government, presided over by I. A. Filipescu, also holder of the Justice portfolio, and with N. Golescu as minister of the Interior; also, that, having assumed the duties of ruler of Wallachia, Cuza announced his arrival in Bucharest for 19 February st.n.; that, personally, he was "impressed" by Barbu Știrbei's "resignation" from the post of deputy of Râmnic, as well as Gheorghe Bibescu's "departure for Vienna"⁴⁸; he was "particularly impressed" by the congratulatory message sent by Miloș Obrenovici, who had just been elected prince of Skupșcina from Belgrade, to the Wallachian Assembly for the vote of 24 January/5 February ("*Dieu veuille que le vot soit confirmé!*")⁴⁹; he also sent to the Foreign Ministry of France copies of the "telegrams exchanged between Bucharest and Iași for four or five days" following the election of 24 January/5 February, some of them concerning the dismissal of N. Aristarchi (the representative of the Romanian rulers at the Ottoman Porte, tr. note) and the appointment of C. Negri with the title of "agent of the United Principalities", and also "a copy" of the address of the Wallachian Assembly to Cuza (concerning his election in Bucharest as well - n.ns., G. C.), the "act of thanks", voted by the same Assembly, to be sent to the guarantor powers, the "double ruler elected" agenda given to the Wallachian army, the proclamations of the Minister of the Interior N. Golescu⁵⁰; he "saw the double election" as having taken place against the backdrop of "fierce disagreements and rivalries between the candidates to the throne"⁵¹ and took a rather "cold" note of an "enthusiastic" telegram from E. Poujade to D. Brătianu, published by "all the Wallachian journals" ("*Vive satisfaction... Fait accompli... La Roumanie s'est élevée très haut!*")⁵²; he refrained like "other consuls", especially in agreement with the Russian one, Giers, from entering into relations with the "new authorities" in Bucharest before "paying a formal visit" to Cuza who arrived in Bucharest on 18/20 February⁵³. Bécлар's as well as the French chargé d'affaires in Constantinople's "cold perception" of the act of 24 January/5 February was to be "warmed up" by instructions from Count Walewski after which, beyond the "invitation for the new administration of the United Principalities" to follow the "path of moderation", the

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 296-298.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 297 (words attributed to the Serbian prince).

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 299; see also *România la 1859*, vol. I, pp. 384-387 (same doc.).

⁵¹ *Documents on the Union of the Principalities*, vol. VI, p. 301-304 (same c., București, 24 February 1859).

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 304 (Poujade's words). For that telegram, see also *Acts and Documents*, vol. VIII, p. 716; see also *România la 1859*, vol. I, pp. 406-408, for Bécлар's report v. Walewski, of 24 February 1859).

⁵³ *Documents on the Union of the Principalities*, vol. VI, p. 300 (Bécлар v. Walewski, București, 23 February 1859). The French consul was also "in agreement" with the Austrian consul, Edernot, to enter, "before a due term", into relations with the "authorities" in București; *România la 1859*, vol. I, pp. 384 and 386 (same c., report of 16 February 1859).

fait accompli by the Romanians was finally recognised by a diplomatic conference⁵⁴. The French consul will therefore have taken on board, in a positive sense, what his "Austrian colleague", Eder, had "critically" signalled to him, namely that in Bucharest, the Minister of the Interior, N. Golescu, had ordered "new passports" to be printed under the suzerain title ("*We, Alexandru Ioan I, by the mercy of God and national will, Lord of Moldavia and of the Wallachia /.../*")⁵⁵, or he "had found out" himself that, at the proposal of the begzade George Știrbei the Assembly of Wallachia had decided, on 25 January/6 February, that 24 January was a *national holiday*⁵⁶ and that the "population" of Brașov ("*.../ comme celle de toute la Transylvanie, presque entièrement roumaine*") had received "enthusiastically" the news of the "double election" of Cuza⁵⁷. And from Paris were also sending "encouraging signals" for the reign of the United Principalities. In a letter to Cuza, in reply to one he had sent to Emperor Napoleon III, the French Foreign Minister expressed his suzerain's "pleasure" at the "philo-French sentiments of the double-elected prince"; he confirmed to the prince the "wish" of the Emperor of France that "the Romanian nation should benefit from institutional structures appropriate to its aspirations", as well as "the confidence of the suzerain of the Second Empire" in the way in which "the people of Moldavia and Wallachia were worthy of achieving more than the still imperfect institutions" of 1859, but constituting "real progress" compared to the past⁵⁸. It was a heartfelt exhortation that Romanians should follow the path of national emancipation ("*.../ des vœux vous accompagnent dans l'accomplissement de cette noble et difficile tâche*")⁵⁹. It was also advisable, however, for "both cabinets" of the United Principalities to demonstrate, in European circumstances that were about to become very tense, "prudence", a capacity "for expectation"⁶⁰. In fact, however, as Béclard noted from Cuza's "words", although it was necessary for the moment not to convene "the two Assemblies of the Principalities" in Focșani, especially at the "wish" of the Moldavians, the ruler reserved the right "to do justice to his country, for the extreme and unforeseen case when a new national demonstration would become necessary"⁶¹.

⁵⁴ *Documents on the Union of the Principalities*, vol. VI, p. 305 ff. (Walewski v. Béclard, Paris, 25 February 1859); *Români la 1859*, vol. I, p. 411 et seq. (same doc.).

⁵⁵ *Români la 1859*, vol. I, p. 386 (Béclard v. Walewski, București, 16 February 1859).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 386.

⁵⁸ *Acts and Documents*, vol. IX, p. 283 (Walewski v. CuzaParis10 February 1859); *Romanians in 1859*, vol. I, p. 363 (same doc.).

⁵⁹ *Acts and Documents*, vol. IX, p. 283 (doc. cit.).

⁶⁰ *Documents on the Union of the Principalities*, vol. VI, p. 304, 305 ff. (Walewski v. Béclard, Paris, 25 February 1859, two notes of the same date).

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, p. 300 (Béclard v. Walewski, București, 25 February 1859).

The French immediate acknowledgement of Cuza's "elections" of 5/17 January and 24 January/5 February 1859, was emulated, as attested and demonstrated⁶², by Sardinia, with the exception of the Kingdom of Naples⁶³. The position of Sardinia was, of course, based on "racial sympathies", as well as on a certain "political strategy", with its fulcrum in *Risorgimento*, regarding national-state transformations at the European level, which presented "specific features" for the south-east of the continent⁶⁴. Even the Neapolitan representative in Constantinople, Edmondo Targioni, after noting that, by the act of 24 January/5 February, the Romanians had circumvented the Paris Convention, was forced to recognize the pursuit of a national policy by Cuza, who was pressured by the "radical party" to convene the Principalities Assemblies and to appoint a "single government", so that, after the political-administrative union of the two small state entities, he could ask the guarantor powers for a "foreign prince"⁶⁵. It was what the Prussian cabinet also supported, as a solution similar to what the Emperor Napoleon III and his foreign minister "promoted", as being part of a "natural resolution of the Romanian matter". After Manteuffel's "neutral policy"⁶⁶, which in 1856 became benevolent to the Franco-British alliance, adapting in particular to the "diplomatic solutions" initiated by the *Quai d'Orsay* to the "oriental crisis", inflamed during the years 1853-1856, the new Prussian foreign minister, Alexander von Schleinitz admitted, in 1859, a course of the "Romanian matter" that could be adapted to Napoleon III's "projects" of geographical reconfiguration guided by the "principle of nationhood" of Central and Eastern Europe⁶⁷. Prussia's position was clearly delineated in 1859 from that of Austria on the question of the Union of the Principalities, the latter being a

⁶² *Il Carteggio Cavour-Nigra. 1858-1861*, vol. I-II, Bologna, Zanichelli, 1926, *passim*; Carlo Santonocito, *Il contributo della diplomazia e del governo piemontese alla causa dell'Unità Romana*, Napoli, 1964.

⁶³ Pasquale Buonincontro, *L'unione dei Principati Danubiani nei documenti diplomatici napoletani*, Neapoli, 1972.

⁶⁴ Raluca Tomi, *Constituirea statelor naționale român și italian, ianuarie 1859 – martie 1861*, în „Studii și materiale de istorie modernă”, XVI (2003), p. 23-48; Francesco Guida, *L'unifi cazione italiana e il Risorgimento delle nazioni del sud-est europeo*, in vol. *Italia e Romania verso l'unità nazionale*, edited by Francesco Guida, București, 2011, pp. 9-21; Alberto Basciani, *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l'Italia e i Principati Romeni dalla Mica Unire al Congresso di Berlino (1861-1878)*, in vol. *Italia e Romania verso l'unità nazionale*, pp. 74-90.

⁶⁵ Pasquale Buonincontro, *works cited*, p. 191 et seq., 193 et seq. (Targioni v. Luigi Carata, Director of the Foreign Office of the Republic of the Two Sicilies, Constantinople, 9 and 16 February 1859).

⁶⁶ *Preussens auswärtige Politik 1850-1858*, hrsg. von Heinrich von Poschingervol. I-III, Berlin, 1902, *passim*, especially vol. III.

⁶⁷ *Die auswärtige Politik Preussens. Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, hrsg. von E. Brandenburg, O. Hoetzsch, H. Onckenvol. I and II, Berlin, 1932..., *passim*; Stela Mărieș, *Die preussische Diplomatie und die Vereinigung der Rumänischen Fürstentümer. Bemerkungen aufgrund unveröffent licher deutscher Unterlagen*, in "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie "A. D. Xenopol", Iași, tome XVIII, 1981, p. 35-67; v. and idem, *Mărturii inedite din arhivele germane privind Unirea Principatelor Române*, in "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie "A. D. Xenopol", Iași, tome XVI/1, 1989, p. 49-87.

declared opponent of the Romanians' *fait accompli* ⁶⁸. When, on 25 January, the Austrian envoy extraordinary to Berlin, August von Koller, "reminded" Schleinitz that, since the Prussian cabinet, frequently disavowing "direct interest" in the "Oriental question", had supported, under the invocation of the "will" of the German Confederation, the Habsburg policy of the '*nach Süd-Osten*', the Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of the Hohenzollerns ruled out the possibility of pursuing a course of action which, 'if it merely echoed that of Vienna', would, with regard to "a national case", such as the Romanian one, be "losing influence and prestige"⁶⁹. Confirmation of the "Schleinitz line" of foreign policy reached Vienna from the French capital as well, where Baron Hübner was given to understand that Prussia, just like Sardinia, Russia and Great Britain...acknowledged the competence of a diplomatic conference in Paris not Constantinople on the implications of Cuza's 'double election'.⁷⁰ Prussia, "called" since 1848-1849 to be the dynamic state factor of the German national cause, was for at least the years 1859-1861 in a position close to that of France and Sardinia in favour of European recognition of the Union of the Principalities.

Russia was considered, if not merely claimed to be in agreement with France on the matter of Cuza's "double election". Guided more by the sonority of certain expressions in Russian diplomatic documents than by the grasp of their real, rather "hidden" motives, quite a significant number of historians have considered Russia as a "power favourable to the union of principalities", forming, with France, Sardinia and Prussia the "group"/"camp of pro-unionist guarantor courts"⁷¹. An attempt was also made, of course, to understand Russia's "pro-unionist" position by referring it to the "strategic interests of the great northern court", to its "tradition" and its tendencies regarding the "Romanian matter"⁷² in 1859. By that account,

⁶⁸ *România la 1859*, vol. I, p. 307 (Koller v. Buol, Berlin, 20 January 1859).

⁶⁹ R. V. Bossy, *L'Autriche et les Principautés Unies*, București, 1938, p. 197 (Koller v. Buol, Berlin, 25 January 1859); see also *ibid.* pp. 204 et seq., 208 (same v. same, Berlin, 8 and 10 February 1859).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 210 (Hübner v. Buol, Paris, 11 February 1859).

⁷¹ Andrei Oțetea, *Marile puteri și Unirea Principatelor*, în *Omagiu lui Ioan Lupăș*, București, 1943, p. 667-679, a reference for the "grouping" of "pro-unionist" and "anti-unionist" powers; see also N. Corivan, *Atitudinea Rusiei față de Unirea Principatelor Române (1855-1857)*, in *Studii privind relațiile româno-ruse*, vol. III, București, 1963, p. 115-131; Vasile Maciu, *Diplomatul C. Basili și Adunările ad-hoc*, in „Studii”, XXV (1972), nr. 3, p. 485-510; idem, *S. I. Popov și luptele politice din Moldova în octombrie-noiembrie 1858*, in „Studii”, XXVI (1973), nr. 1, p. 5-31; Marian Stroia, *Rusia și românii. De la războiul Crimeii la Unirea Principatelor. Sinteza unei atitudini*, in „Revista istorică”, XVI (2005), nr. 1-2, p. 69-82; idem, *România în contextul politic european. De la Unirea Principatelor la căderea lui Cuza Vodă (1859-1866)*, București, 2007 etc.

⁷² T. W. Riker, *works cited*, pp. 205-211; Barbara Jelavich, *Russia and the Romanian National Cause, 1858-1859*, Bloomington - Indiana University, 1959; idem, *Russia and the Double Election of Alexander Cuza, 1858-1859: the Letters of S. I. Popov to N. Giers*, in "Südost-forschungen", XXIV (1965), p. 119-137; V. N. Vinogradov *Rossija i obie dinenie Rumynskih Knjažestv*, Moscow 1961; see also idem, *Cu privire la rolul diplomației ruse în Unirea țărilor române*, in „Studii”, XII (1959), nr. 2, p. 407-458; E. E. Certan,

Russia's position does not appear to be consistently favourable to the Romanian cause. Russian diplomatic documents somehow testify to Russia's position 'on the side of France' on the 'Romanian matter' in 1858-1859. In August 1858, during the Paris Conference, Russia had rallied to France's position on the Union of the Principalities, but on condition that the Romanian political-state transformation did not take place "under a foreign prince". The reluctance to make such a condition also blocked the willingness of the Russian power to align itself even militarily with the French one, "for the benefit of international affairs"⁷³. In Petersburg flourished the "belief" that France "had promised" to annul the "anti-Russian" clauses of the Treaty of 30 March 1856 in Paris⁷⁴. The Russian diplomacy had "intended" as early as September 1857, at the meeting of Emperors Alexander II and Napoleon III in Stuttgart to propose the annulment of these clauses to the French Government⁷⁵. So, the Russian cabinet declared itself "on the side of the French cabinet" towards the Romanian Principalities only in direct proportion to how much could be "promised" from Paris for the "benefit" of Petersburg⁷⁶. Following such a "diplomatic logic", Gorceakov "declared" to the French chargé d'affaires in Petersburg, Frédéric d'Aymard Chateaurenard, that Russia would leave "it to Emperor Napoleon's government to judge the course of events in the Principality"⁷⁷. When Walewski wanted "to know immediately" the position of the Russian government on Cuza's "election as ruler of Wallachia by a unanimous majority of votes"⁷⁸, he got the confirmation that Petersburg followed a "calculated wait" of the opinion of "other great cabinets", particularly the French one, on the act accomplished by the Romanians⁷⁹. It was important for the French Foreign Minister 'to know' that the 'Tsar's court' shared 'the opinion of Emperor Napoleon' that 'the investiture of Cuza could only be refused by the Porte following an agreement between all the powers'⁸⁰. However, this "high sharing of opinion" was, strictly speaking, only "simulated" by Tsar Alexander and his 'ministers', in the 'hope' or under the pretence that Emperor Napoleon and his 'cabinet' would allow the 'anti-Russian clauses' of the Treaty of 30 March 1856 in Paris to be circumvented. With that "hope" or "pretence", the Russian side "engaged" in negotiations with the French side on a

Relațiile ruso-române în anii 1859-1863, Chișinău, 1969, pp. 73-109; Leonid Boicu, *works cited*, p. 33-60 etc.

⁷³ Ion Varta, *Unirea Principatelor Române (1855-1859). Documente inedite din Federația Rusă, Ucraina și Republica Moldova*, Chișinău, 2005, p. 663 ff. (Gorceacov c. ambassador of Russia in Paris, Kiselev, Petersburg, 1 August 1858).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 605 et seq. (same c., Petersburg, 8 November 1858).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 290-296 (a summary by Kiselev before the "meeting of the emperors", 8 September 1857).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 666 (Gorceacov v. Kiselev, Petersburg, 8 November and 29 December 1858).

⁷⁷ *Românii la 1859*, vol. I, p. 292 ff. (Chateaurenard v. Walewski, Petersburg, 29 December 1858).

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 338 (Walewski v. Chateaurenard, Paris, 5 February 1859).

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 348 (Chateaurenard v. Walewski, Petersburg, 6 February 1859).

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 376 et seq. (Chateaurenard v. Walewski, Petersburg, 14 February 1859).

treaty on the concreteness of which the "documentary evidence" did not seem conclusive enough⁸¹. And until they "saw" whether that 'circumvention of clauses' would be admitted in Paris, the Russian cabinet was seeking, among other things, to ensure, through a 'position favourable to the Principalities, in accordance with the wishes of Emperor Napoleon', that the Franco-British alliance 'during the Crimean War' would be broken off."⁸². Only after that alliance was broken off, could the Tsarist cabinet "have hoped" to circumvent the "neutralisation" of the Black Sea and the return of the Russian border on the Chilia arm of the Danube Delta⁸³. It could even "hope" for a Franco-Russian agreement on the Holy Places, the "question" of which had been at the heart of the "European crisis" of 1852-1853, as a "forerunner of the Crimean War".⁸⁴. It is therefore evident that Russia "simulated", in 1859, a position close to that of France on the Union of the Principalities, not out of a generous or "sympathetic" attitude towards the Romanian cause, but in order to take advantage of its European implications for a return to the pre-1853 alignment of "Eastern affairs". The fact that Russia's position was at odds with the 'national course of the Romanian matter' was also obvious from the Tsarist cabinet's concern to regain its influence over the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia by inoculating 'all the other' great European powers with the 'conviction' that the proper application of the Paris Convention for the two small state entities, "separate or possibly unified", was to be "on the model of the Organic Regulation"⁸⁵. Moreover, as the "chances of a Franco-Russian agreement" diminished, the position of the "Tsarist court" towards the Principalities became colder and colder and, from 1863, it became extremely hostile to maintaining their union⁸⁶.

In notorious rivalry with Russia over pretty much everything to do with the "Oriental matter" and blaming France's apparent distancing from "the essential stake of the War of 1854-1856", that of countering "the hegemonic ambitions of the Tsarist court"⁸⁷, Britain did not show any signs of favouring Cuza's "double

⁸¹ Albert Pingaud, *Un projet d'alliance franco-russe en 1858*, Paris, 1928; A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 106 ff.

⁸² Kantsler A. M. Gorchakov. *200 let so dnja raždenija* (Minister Meždunarodnaja Otnoshenija), Moscow, 1998, p. 225 (Gorceacov v. Alexander II 30 December 1858/ 11 January 1859), 226 ff., 237-240 (Gorceacov v. Kiselev, Petersburg, 17/29 January and 21 February/5 March 1859); on the Russian-French "agreement", see also I. I. Rubinski, *Otnoshenija Rossi s Frantsiei v politike A. M. Gorchakova*, in vol. Kantsler A. M. Gorchakov. *200 let...*, p. 150-166.

⁸³ N. I. Hitrova, A. M. Gorchakov i otmjena neutrali zatsii Chernogo Morja. 1856-1871 gody, in vol. Kantsler A. M. Gorchakov. *200 let...*, p. 123-135.

⁸⁴ Oleg V. Anisimov, *La lutte pour les Lieux Saints de Palestine/Boriba za Svjatye Mesta Palestiny*, Moscow, 2014, p. 237-256.

⁸⁵ Ion Varta, *works cited*, p. 666-717 (memoirs on the Principalities, communicated by Gorceacov to Kiselev, Petersburg, 29 December 1858).

⁸⁶ Mihai Dimitrie Sturdza, *La Russie et la desunion des Principautés Roumaines (1864-1866)*, in "Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique", vol. XII, 3^e cahier, 1971, p. 247-285.

⁸⁷ A. J. P. Taylor, *works cited*, p. 99-106.

election" immediately after 24 January/5 February 1859⁸⁸. Even the "election" to the throne of Iași was not "regarded" with warmth or understanding by British diplomats, Ambassador Bulwer at the Porte, taking the Ottoman view that the vote of the Moldavian Assembly of 5/17 January 1859 was "illegal" by reference to the Paris Convention and its 'electoral annexes', so that the High Porte was entitled to refuse Cuza investiture as a prince and to demand approval of such a position from a diplomatic conference in London...and certainly not in Paris...⁸⁹. Although he was informed by Consul H. A. Churchill and given "details' about the election in Iași, with a majority of votes from the deputies of the 'national party', as well as about Begzada Grigore Sturdza's plot, allegedly connected to "Russian intrigues"⁹⁰, Bulwer maintained his "criticisms" of Cuza's "person" and his "accession to the throne" ("*Cuza is repudiated by all the chief families, and is not qualified by the rules of the Convention to be Hospodar*")⁹¹; and he maintained them even though he was "instructed" by the *Foreign Office* to prefer the "new administration" of Moldavia and to avoid a "revolution", incited by the imminent Franco-Sardinian-Austrian conflict⁹²; he did not change them much when he was "informed" in a rather "detailed" way by Consul Colquhoun in Bucharest about Cuza's "election" as ruler of Wallachia as well⁹³, event which, according to H. Churchill's accounts for Malmesbury, "created great enthusiasm in Iași"⁹⁴, where the "double elected" gave, "before the Assembly of Moldavia", the reading of an address in which he reconfirmed to the Great Powers "the general pro-unionist sentiment of the Romanians" and officially expressed his "readiness" to renounce the throne "in favour of a foreign prince", so that Europe could satisfy "a living hope of the country"⁹⁵. As Cuza himself expressed such a "hope", the British cabinet's "suspicion that the double election of a ruler, in Iași and Bucharest was the fruit of

⁸⁸ Beatrice Marinescu, *La position des diplomates et ministres britanniques envers le mouvement unioniste des Principautés*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", XI (1972), no. 2, p. 265-279; idem, *Roumanian-British Political Relations 1848-1877*, București, 1983, p. 110-124; Diana Dumitru, *Marea Britanie și Unirea Principatelor Române (1856-1859)*, Chișinău, 2010, p. 106-123.

⁸⁹ *Documents on the Union of the Principalities*, vol. VII, pp. 875 et seq., 878, et seq., 881 et seq. (Bulwer v. Malmesbury, Constantinople, 21, 23, and 26 January 1859; two documents from the first mentioned 21 January); see also *Romanians at 1859*, vol. I, pp. 307-309 (first of Bulwer's two reports of 21 January 1859).

⁹⁰ *Documents on the Union of the Principalities*, vol. VII, p. 884-887 (H. Churchill v. Bulwer, Iași, 27 January 1859); *România la 1859*, vol. I, pp. 328-331 (same doc.), 394 et seq. (Churchill v. Bulwer, Iași, 18 February 1859).

⁹¹ *Documents on the Union of the Principalities*, vol. VII, p. 879 (Bulwer v. Malmesbury, Constantinople, 23 January 1859).

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 901 (same c., Constantinople, 1 February 1859).

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 902 ff, 905, 906 ff, 908, 913-915 (Colquhoun v. Bulwer, București, 3, 4, 5 and 6 February 1859; two documents dated 5 February 1859, the "election of a prince" in București).

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 912 (Churchill v. Malmesbury, Iași, 6 February 1859).

⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 920 (same c., Iași, 7 February 1859).

Russian influence or the result of a Russian-French arrangement” was somewhat diminished, perhaps even erased, since 'the whole diplomatic world' knew of the refusal of the 'court' of Petersburg to accept the union of Principalities "under a foreign prince". That is why Bulwer's "instruction from the *Foreign Office*, was to continue the "good influence" of the High Porte for the "future conference", concerning that "double election"⁹⁶, a diplomatic forum to consider the validity of Cuza's quality "as a prince of at least one Principality, if not of both"⁹⁷. By urging Cuza to maintain "a line of moderation"⁹⁸, the British covered their repositioning in a position of balance, with an inclination towards admitting the legitimacy of the Romanian representative pronouncements of 5/17 January and 24 January/5 February, over the "letter" of the Paris Convention and the excessive "claims of suzerainty" of the Ottoman Porte. It was more than the internuncio Prokesch-Osten "claimed" "to know", namely, the "recommendation" made by Malmesbury to Fuad Pasha through the Ottoman ambassador in London, Musurus, and the British ambassador to Constantinople, Bulwer, that the High Porte "recognise Cuza's double election as a personal union" or at least the "chosen" title of ruler of Moldavia with the possibility of admitting him also as "Kaymakam of Wallachia"⁹⁹

Austria has called for the invalidation of the unionist achievements of the Romanians with even greater insistence than the High Gate¹⁰⁰. Regarding the "unionist vote" in Iași of 5/17 January, Gödel Lannoy did not focus on a national pronouncement, but a "character", Cuza, by exaggerating certain habits from his private life and challenging his 'qualifications' and qualities for the position of prince ('.../ *er ist ein Mann von mangelhafter Bildung und geringer Neigung sich mit ernsten Dingen zu beschäftigen*')¹⁰¹, although he admitted that, under the reign of the 'chosen one', the suzerain power would lose all influence over Moldavia, now oriented towards Union with Wallachia and about to show "less respect for the great powers"¹⁰². From Constantinople, Prokesch-Osten described, in a discussion with Ottoman dignitaries, the "election of Cuza by the Moldavians" as "very stupid and impertinent" ('.../ *die freche und ganz schlechte Wahl*')¹⁰³. None of the other great powers rallied though behind the Austro-Ottoman comment on the "invalidity" of

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 923 et seq. (Bulwer v. Malmesbury, Constantinople, 8 February 1859, on the "advice" which, according to "instructions received", he gave to the High Porte).

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 924 et seq. (929 (same c., Constantinople, 9 and 10 February 1859).

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 929 et seq. (Churchill v. Bulwer, Iași, 10 February 1859).

⁹⁹ R. V. Bossy, *works cited*, p. 225 et seq. (Prokesch-Osten v. Buol, Constantinople, 9 March 1859).

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p. 7-22; Dan Berindei and Emil Cojocaru, *La double élection d'Alexandre Ioan Cuza à la lumière de la correspondance diplomatique autrichienne*, in *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, V (1966), no. 1, pp. 13-34.

¹⁰¹ R. V. Bossy, *works cited*, p. 195 (Gödel-Lannoy v. Buol, Iași, 23 January 1859).

¹⁰² *Ibid*, p. 194 et seq. (same doc.), 104 et seq. (for comments).

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, p. 191 (Prokesch-Osten v. Buol, Constantinople, 19 January 1859).

Cuza's election as ruler of Iași. From Paris, Baron Hübner reported that this election "caused great satisfaction" to the cabinet of Emperor Napoleon III and the French public¹⁰⁴. In Petersburg the Austrian chargé d'affaires Szechenyi, has got from Gorbachev the opinion that the elected ruler of Moldova "could not be refused the investiture"¹⁰⁵. From Berlin, as we have shown above, one could no longer expected an official Prussian rallying to the Austrian point of view, hostile to "the election of Cuza"¹⁰⁶. And in London, having "weighed in" on Bulwer's account from Constantinople and taking into consideration the position of the "other European cabinets" towards the "unionist vote" of Iași, Lord Malmesbury, wishing 'to appear at least neutral', invited the Ottoman Porte - for Austria to take notice! - to comply with the stipulations of the Paris Convention, permissible to the "free choice of the prince of each Principality"¹⁰⁷. But it was difficult to divert the Austrians from "warning" the Ottomans that if they waited for events to "flow" without eradicating the "evil" embodied by the "election of Cuza", they would have to bear "the decisions of a conference meeting in the capital of France and presided, "like a court", by Count Walewski surrounded by a jury of jurors"¹⁰⁸.

And even more vigorous was to be Vienna's diplomacy in "warning" the Ottoman Porte of the "dangerous course of the Principalities matter" when the "news" of Cuza's "double election" would have "a real echo" in Europe. The "impressions" of the Austrian consuls in Iași and Bucharest, Gödel-Lannoy and Eder, respectively, that the vote of the Wallachian Assembly on 24 January had been "inspired" or "encouraged by French and Russian agents"¹⁰⁹, were "circulated" diplomatically by *Ballplatz*¹¹⁰ and, over time, were "believed" by some historians¹¹¹. The Austrian cabinet was the first, among the "great, European" ones, to ask the High Porte to condemn the "crime" committed by the Romanians and to demand "even armed

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p. 191-193 (Hübner v. Buol, Paris, 19 January 1859).

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p. 11 (Szechenyi v. Buol, Petersburg, 20 January 1859), 199 (Prokesch-Osten v. Buol, Constantinople, 28 January 1859, after "discussions" with the Russian chargé d'affaires at the Porte, Lobanov).

¹⁰⁶ *Români la 1859*, vol. I, p. 307 (Koller v. Buol, Berlin, 20 January 1859).

¹⁰⁷ R. V. Bossy, *works cited*, p. 193 et seq. (Apponyi, Ambassador of Austria, v. Buol, London, 22 January 1859); *Români la 1859*, vol. I, p. 311 (same doc.).

¹⁰⁸ R. V. Bossy, *works cited*, p. 196 (Buol v. Prokesch-Osten, Vienna, 23 January 1859), 196 et seq. (Koller v. Buol, Berlin, 25 January 1859).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, p. 202 ff, 209 (Gödel-Lannoy v. Buol, Iași, 6 and 11 February 1859), 203 et seq. (Eder v. Buol, București, 8 February 1859).

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 201 (Buol v. Prokesch-Osten, Vienna, 6 February 1859), 201 et seq. (Buol v. Hübner, Paris, and Apponyi, in London, 6 February 1859) etc.

¹¹¹ A. Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe, depuis l'ouverture du Congrès de Vienne jusqu'à la fermeture du Congrès de Berlin, 1814-1878*, vol. II, *La Révolution*, Paris, 1891, p. 182; W. G. East, *The Union of Moldavia and Wallachia – 1859*, Cambridge, 1929, p. 164.

intervention", assisted by commissioners of the guarantor powers, to eradicate it¹¹². A sensitive issue for Austria came from the High Porte, which, probably "advised" by the French Embassy, requested a diplomatic conference "on the subject of the Principalities"¹¹³. Some "hopes" for the "amendment" by the future conference of Cuza's "illegal double election" as a *fait accompli*, signalling the circumvention of the convention of 19 August 1858, were given to the Austrian cabinet by, interestingly, the Russian one. Gorceacov declared in Petersburg, for the "benefit" of the Austrian representative Count Szechenyi that "he did not think it possible for any power to support the validity of this double election"¹¹⁴, and in Berlin, Baron Koller held the "opinion" of the Russian ambassador Budberg, "known" also by the Prussian minister Schleinitz, about the Union of the Principalities, which he "saw as dissolvable within a few years"¹¹⁵. Contrary to the "expectations" of the Austrians, the Prussian cabinet, through Schleinitz, was "somewhat resolute" on the side of the French cabinet in assessing the *legitimacy* of the Union of the Principalities, "under Cuza" or, after "a temporary period as a kayman" of the latter in Bucharest and Iași, "even under a foreign prince"¹¹⁶. The total disorientation of the Austrian cabinet was exacerbated when the cabinets in Paris and London agreed, with positive effect in Berlin, Turin and Petersburg, that the recognition by the "future conference" of the *accomplishment of the Romanians* would be "a solution" preferable to "an inflaming of the moods in the Principalities"¹¹⁷. It was what was also given to the Ottoman ambassador in London, Musurus, to take from Lord Malmesbury's "frank words", to the astonishment of Count Apponyi "as he heard them", including the confirmation of the British cabinet's preference for "the conference meeting in Paris and not in Constantinople"¹¹⁸. The "hope" of the cabinet in Vienna that the 'memory' of the 'exclusion of the possibility of the union of the Principalities' with the occasion of the 'meeting' of the French and British sovereigns at Osborne in the summer of 1857 would still linger in the *Foreign Office* thus also melted away; Count Apponyi "heard" from Lord Malmesbury himself, in February 1859, that at that "meeting" of Queen Victoria with Emperor Napoleon III the 'solution of the Union of the Principalities under a foreign prince' was rejected, not the possibility of the Union of the two small states of the Lower Danube¹¹⁹. Therefore, although initially surprised by Cuza's "double election", which they had

¹¹² R. V. Bossy, *works cited*, p. 203 (Buol v. Prokesch-Osten Vienna 7 February 1859).

¹¹³ *Ibid*, p. 203 (Prokesch-Osten v. Buol, Constantinople, 6 February 1859).

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 15 (with "reference" to two reports of 7 and 10 February 1859 sent by Szechenyi from Petersburg to Buol).

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 211-213 (Koller v. Buol, Berlin, 12 February 1859).

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 208, 211 et seq. (Koller v. Buol, Berlin, 10 and 12 February 1859).

¹¹⁷ T. W. Riker, *works cited*, p. 216.

¹¹⁸ R. V. Bossy, *works cited*, p. 210 et seq. (Apponyi v. Buol, London, 12 February 1859).

¹¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 220-223 (same c., London, 26 February 1859); *Românii la 1859*, vol. I, pp. 413-416 (same doc.).

also formally considered to be "a violation" of the Paris Convention, five "great cabinets" announced, to the dismay of the Austrian cabinet and the High Porte, that, through their representatives in the "future conference", they would consider the European opportunity of recognising the *fait accompli* of Cuza's "double election"¹²⁰.

¹²⁰ *Documents on the Union of the Principalities*, vol. VII, p. 453 ff. (Walewski v. Lallemand, Paris, 18 February 1859); *România la 1859*, vol. I, p. 397 et seq. (same doc.).