

THE MORAL CONCEPT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT

Gheorghe DĂNIȘOR*

Abstract. The fundamental works in which Kant expounds his theory are *The Critique of Pure Reason* and *The Critique of Practical Reason*, and in addition *The Critique of the Power of Judgement*. In the first of the three, Kant does nothing more than demonstrate the limits of speculative knowledge, that which bestows access to the world of the phenomenon, but which can circumvent the element in itself. Theoretical knowledge is limited to patterns of sensitivity, diversity, placing it under categories enabling the apparatus through which we think. In order to eliminate any confusion regarding the abovementioned elements, Kant, using a footnote, clarifies the connection between morality and freedom: freedom is without a doubt the *ratio essendi* of moral law, but that the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom. Kant deliberately draws attention to the fact that freedom and, as a consequence supreme Good, cannot be conceptualised. The so-called Kantian constructivism relies on this pattern of devising freedom as a principle which cannot be demonstrated, the pillar of the entire construction. Good will is what makes *duty*, *categorical imperative*, and even *freedom* possible. Good will has no connection to human sensitivity, it is a concept based on pure reason. This idea leads us to emphasize that Kant wants to demonstrate in his work regarding morality that man becomes free through a detachment from his bodily inclinations. This is a modern perspective. Modernism is dominated by the novelty of founding principles within the subject. Thus, subjectivity becomes the dominant force. But modern subjectivity produces as well the concept of relativism. There is no single or absolute truth, but rather truths individually manufactured that interfere from birth onto a space which exists based on a horizontal arrangement. Last, but not least, there is a modern subjectivity of freedom which is associated to the concept of autonomy.

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* Correspondent Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists, University Professor PhD, University of Craiova, diana.danisor@yahoo.com.