

DISMISSAL OF NICOLAE TITULESCU. EXTERNAL PLOT

GEORGE G. POTRA¹

Rezumat. *Cauzele demiterii lui Nicolae Titulescu, la 29 august 1936 – punct final al unei îndelungate campanii de intrigi și manevre desfășurate de cercuri interne și externe – rezidă, în esență, în ostilitatea înverșunată a acestor cercuri față de principiile politicii externe promovate cu luciditate, realism și consecvență de ilustrul diplomat și înflăcăratul patriot care a fost Nicolae Titulescu, politică care l-a plasat într-o opoziție ireductibilă față de curentele fasciste și extremiștii de dreapta din țară și din afara ei. Regimurile fasciste și profasciste din aceste țări vizau o nouă geografie politică, militară și economică, prin modificarea și răsturnarea echilibrului realizat prin tratatele de pace încheiate la sfârșitul Primului Război Mondial. Împotriva lui Nicolae Titulescu au acționat cu toată energia Germania hitleristă și Italia mussoliniană, care au beneficiat de un larg concurs din partea regimurilor fasciste din Ungaria și Bulgaria, precum și a regimurilor profasciste din Polonia și Iugoslavia. Campania împotriva lui Nicolae Titulescu a avut un caracter organizat. O dată stabilit adversarul, conducătorii regimurilor respective au antrenat în acțiunea anti-Titulescu instituții centrale ale statului respectiv, oficii și servicii guvernamentale și progubernamentale sau de partid. Această campanie împotriva lui Nicolae Titulescu – potențată de instaurarea hitlerismului în Germania, a regimurilor profasciste în Polonia lui Beck și Iugoslavia lui Stojadinović – va deveni mereu mai complexă, mai diversificată și mai ramificată, mai activă, mai coerentă. Obiectivele precise, conținutul și amploarea acțiunilor, fixarea de responsabilități precise – în ciuda concurenței neloiale între toate aceste organisme – justifică aprecierea că s-a urmărit un adevărat program.*

Abstract. *The causes of Nicolae Titulescu's dismissal, on August 29, 1936 – a final point of a long campaign of plots and manoeuvres concocted by internal and external circles – rely, essentially, in the fierce hostility of those circles against de principles of foreign policy promoted with lucidity, realism, and consistency by the illustrious diplomat and the passionate patriot who was Nicolae Titulescu, a policy which placed itself in an irreducible opposition against the fascist currents and the right-wing extremists in this country and outside it. The fascist and pro-fascist regimes from these countries aimed at a new political, military and economic geography, by altering and subverting the equilibrium established by the peace treaties after the end of the First World War. Against Nicolae Titulescu actioned with all their energy Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, which benefitted of a large support from the fascist regimes in Hungary and Bulgaria, as well from the pro-fascist regimes in Poland and Yugoslavia. The campaign against Nicolae Titulescu had an organized character. Once the truth established, the leaders of the respective regimes have drawn into the anti-Titulescu action some central institutions of the respective state, governmental, or pro-governmental or party, offices and services. This campaign against Nicolae Titulescu – intensified by the instauration of Hitlerism in Germany, of Beck's pro-fascist regime in Poland and of Stojadinović's pro-fascist regime in Yugoslavia – would become more complex, more diversified and branched out, more active, more coherent. The precise aims, the contents and amplitude of the actions, the establishment of precise responsibilities – in spite of the unloyal competition between all these organisms – justifies the appreciation that a real program was aimed at.*

Keywords: Nicolae Titulescu; Hitler; Mussolini; Beck; Stojadinović.

¹Director Executiv al Fundației Europene "Nicolae Titulescu", Membru al Comitetului Director al Asociației Române de Politică Externă

The causes of Nicolae Titulescu's dismissal, on August 29, 1936 – a final point of a long campaign of plots and manoeuvres concocted by internal and external circles – rely, essentially, in the fierce hostility of those circles against the principles of foreign policy promoted with lucidity, realism, and consistency by the illustrious diplomat and the passionate patriot who was Nicolae Titulescu, a policy which placed itself in an irreducible opposition against the fascist currents and the right-wing extremists in this country and outside it.

Nicolae Titulescu, and especially his consistent action for peace, against the use of force, of aggression, for the creation of a climate of understanding and international cooperation, for the building of a system of security and the achievement of some palpable steps towards disarmament, for the safeguarding of sovereignty and national independence, have generated the hostility of right-wing extremists circles at home in those countries, whose international program aims at aggressive objectives.

On hostile positions against Nicolae Titulescu were also a series of parties and politicians, reviews and newspapers, both at home and abroad, which had nothing to do with the extreme right, and so much the less with fascism, acting only as motivated by group interests or out of opportunism, scurviness or out of personal aversion.

There were also enemies coming from parties in power (in the case of Romanian governments) and from allied countries or only friendly countries in the European space.

We must underline that there were a lot of coincidences from anti-Titulescu reasons, either caused by internal or external forces, as it stands equally true that there were a lot non-coincidences of anti-Titulescu reasons, which, in the case of extremely great diversity of methods and means – political denunciation, intrigue, subversion, calumny, hostilely persistent actions of some press circles and of some groupings, formations and political parties, blackmail, menace with physical elimination. a.o. – complicated the configuration of the plot, turning Nicolae Titulescu into the “Enemy No. 1”.

We have got today an appreciable volume of information and exegeses about the internal intrigue and the external plot, already published or not published, of articles, studies or specific works dedicated exclusively or partially to Nicolae Titulescu. On this basis, we might begin, anyway we may try, to write this special chapter of the 20th century political conspiracy.

The anti-Titulescu demarche was the object of several researches, in Romania and in other countries, which materialized into articles, studies and parts of some works dedicated to the life and activity of Nicolae Titulescu, to Romanian foreign policy or to international inter-war relations.¹

Against Nicolae Titulescu actioned with all their energy Hitler Germany² and Mussolini's Italy³, which benefitted of a large support from the fascist regimes in Hungary⁴ and Bulgaria⁵, as well from the pro-fascist regimes in Poland⁶ and Yugoslavia⁷.

We do not intend to present in the present work the whole external conspiracy – as much as it could have been reconstituted – against Nicolae Titulescu – against the Romania's inter-war foreign policy, against Romania itself. This would form the object of a separate volume, which we intend to commit to a publishing house.

We reduce ourselves to some general considerations regarding the grounds that motivated the actions of those regimes, forces and external circles, the ways and means used.

Nicolae Titulescu's thinking and action placed the Romanian politician and diplomat in an irreducible opposition against the foreign policy programmes and actions of the fascist and pro-fascist regimes that aimed at a new political, military and economic geography, by altering and subverting the equilibrium established by the peace treaties after the end of the First World War.

Defending the peace treaties concluded after the First World War; enrolling himself among the most devoted servers of the newly created League of Nations; imagining new and new measures and instruments for the consolidation of international law, of the norms and democratic principles of the inter-state relations; making a determining contribution to the creation of regional security bodies, as for instance the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente; having a major part in the orientation of the policy and action of these bodies for combating all the revisionist and revenge-seeking projects and actions of the fascist and pro-fascist regimes; participating in all the demarches dedicated to security and disarmament; severely condemning all the attempts made by Italian fascism, German Hetaerism and Japanese militarism against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of some states in Europe, Africa and Asia; acting for the consolidation of Romania's international situation, for the normalization and development of the relations with the Soviet Union, for the enlargement and consolidation of the relations with France and England, with the member-states of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, with a view to consolidating the front of peace and security; opposing firmly to all intrusions, pressures and political, military, economic blackmails of the fascist regime and their acolytes, Nicolae Titulescu was a live consciousness of the first half of the twentieth century. Nicolae Titulescu represented a major obstacle for the policy of Hitlerite Germany and Mussolinian Italy. Therefore, they launched against him the most ample, complex and long campaign known in history for the elimination of a politician. His proverbial intransigence and principality inconvenienced both the diplomatic

chancelleries of Paris and London, more and more disposed to engage themselves on the lines of a conciliatory policy.

In the given international conjunctures, in which collective security had been seriously hit, due to the conciliatory positions of France and England, positions that would grow for worse and multiply, the external pressures of Hitler Germany and Mussolinian Italy, of their irresponsible fellow travellers, the Warsaw and Belgrade regimes, would have finally got effects in Bucharest.

There were, indisputably, several centres of action hostile to Romania and to Nicolae Titulescu. And if this stands fully true – even if the present volume does not intend to present the action of the whole range of forces which pronounced themselves and conspired in this sense – it is not less clear that all these have implied and affirmed themselves differently in point of weight and surface in various periods, the immediate spheres and the specificity of the action requiring a change of emplacement, an alternance of roles. Thus, beyond any reserves formulated on the basis of actions at a given moment, we can state without any fright to be wrong that Berlin represented – by the very reasons of its action against Romanian's foreign policy and against Nicolae Titulescu, by its general potentiality, by political, economic, military and other arguments which it disposed of and used, by all sort of institutions and specialist organisms engaged in this action, by the human forces and outstanding financial forces, by the organizational know-how and the coordination capability – the main action centre. It assumed the tasks of ordinating and coordinating factor of the actions against Nicolae Titulescu. This centre, having, as we already mentioned, the main weight in the anti-Titulescu front, assumed the task to designate both general and particular objectives, to designate the directions of action, to facilitate the establishment of connections between the main forces of action, of centralizing and systematizing information in the given problem, of corroborating, processing and analyzing the data obtained, to elaborate – on the basis of all elements obtained by the evaluation of the respective information – new programmes of action, be their official, or subversive.

We should underline before anything else the very early character of this campaign. We should note that it began when the problem of establishing Romanian-Soviet relations and of a treaty of mutual Romanian-Soviet assistance (questions that would push to paroxysm the campaign of Germany, Italy, Poland and Yugoslavia against Nicolae Titulescu) had not been raised yet.

Paradoxically, the adverse attitudes are manifested by an ally, Poland, to be more precise, that would prove – in the conditions of the normalization of its relations with the Soviet Union – a total lack of understanding of Bucharest exigencies in the same direction, exigencies among which the recognition of Romania's rights on Bessarabia, the consecration of the fact that it could not be considered a litigious territory was first and foremost. The creation of the Little

Entente (1933) and of the Balkan Entente (1934) would highly irritate both Rome and Berlin that would see themselves confronted with two regional security organizations whose aim and action were in flagrant contradiction with their revisionist and expansionist interests in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

The opposition which Romania – through its foreign minister, Nicolae Titulescu – had manifested against the project of a Four-Power pact (Italy, Germany, France, England), the action carried out in Bucharest for the creation of a large front of refusal, which aimed at integrating not only the states of the Little Entente and of the Balkan Entente, but also of other small and middle-sized states of Europe, potentially menaced by the projected European directorate of the Great Powers and, finally, the insistent demarches made at the Paris and London cabinets had increased the adversity of the fascist, German and Italian regimes against Nicolae Titulescu generating some irritation by the French and British governments, that saw themselves thwarted in a demarche which, at least for some time, they had considered as convenient to their own interests. In spite of the fact that against the Four-Power Pact have been united numerous forces, Nicolae Titulescu was considered – rightfully – the main catalyser and, consequently, the main “culprit” for the miscarriage of the Italian and German intentions. The establishment of Romanian-Soviet relations in 1934 and the wish of the two parts to impart to the bilateral relations added content generated adverse reaction in Berlin and Rome, in Warsaw and Belgrade. As for the two capital cities, we want to say it now, the anti-Soviet and pro-German orientation imposed to the foreign policy of the two countries by Joseph Beck and Milan Stojadinović made that the positions, actions and initiatives of Bucharest be blamed and virulently disproved. If Warsaw disproved Nicolae Titulescu’s concern to go further in the Romanian-Soviet relations, Belgrade formulated a categorical refusal to all the insistences of the Romanian foreign minister concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Moscow. The categorical positions adopted by Romania, on the one hand, and by Poland and Yugoslavia, on the other, the emphasis laid by Bucharest on the wish to mark palpable steps on the line of consolidating Romanian-Soviet relations and the adversity and anti-Soviet intransigence shown by Warsaw and Belgrade generated situations of tension and conflict between those countries.

The full powers received by Nicolae Titulescu in the summer of 1935 for the conclusion of a Romanian-Soviet pact of mutual assistance and his palpable actions in the second half of the same year and the first half of 1936 would coincide with an escalation of the adversity of Berlin, Rome. Warsaw and Belgrade, which would not cease to combat only Nicolae Titulescu, acting directly and on multiple planes for the elimination of the intractable and powerful Romanian politician and diplomat.

The years 1935–1936 would add new moments of tension in the relations with Hitler Germany and fascist Italy. The campaign of Mussolinian Italy against Ethiopia found Romania at the helm of the countries that condemned without reserve the aggression that pronounced for and adopted economic sanctions. Nicolae Titulescu became for the Mussolinian regime the public enemy No. 1.

Nicolae Titulescu's attitude in the matter of non-intervention in the civil war in Spain was not of a nature to lessen in any way the adversity of Berlin and Rome that saw themselves condemned for the brutal intervention in the internal affairs of a country taking the side of the putschists.

Adding to all those stated above, the severe condemnation by Nicolae Titulescu of the invasion by Hitler's troops of the demilitarized Rhenan zone we would have a complete picture – far from being exhaustive, which we do not intend to do in this framework – of the events in connection with which – through its foreign minister – was obliged to confront itself with Germany, Italy, Poland and Yugoslavia.

As for the high tides and ebb-tides recorded in the external action against Nicolae Titulescu, one can say that in the 1932–1936 years there was an uninterrupted campaign against the head of the Romanian diplomatic chancellery. The action against Nicolae Titulescu continued even after his dismissal, on August 29, 1936, in other forms, of course, the prospects – however uncertain of his return on the Romanian political scene and on the European political scene – calling up further the energies of his adversaries. The fact that this campaign continued even after Nicolae Titulescu's dismissal proves indubitably that Nicolae Titulescu was no the central target, but a target of the respective regimes. Having an eye to the change of Romania's foreign policy, they had been naïve enough to believe, at a certain moment, that Nicolae Titulescu's dismissal would determine a change of the bases of Romania's foreign policy, which proved absolutely wrong. This very fact – and we are anticipating when saying that the changes were those expected by the adversaries – made the anti-Romanian action to continue, at least as Berlin and Rome were concerned, which will not cease to reproach, it is true with changes of tone, the foreign action promoted by also by Victor Antonescu and Grigore Gafencu.

The external plot against Romania, in general, and of Nicolae Titulescu, in particular, was facilitated by the internal political configuration, by the radicalization of political life and by the appearance and development on the political life a large and larger gamut of political formations, by the appearance of right-wing and extreme-right formations, by the game of interests practiced by various formations, organizations and persons. An important part was played in all these development of forces and in the outlining of a favourable contour to their action the fact that in an ideological and an actional field there asserted themselves more and more powerfully pro-fascist and anti-Soviet trends.

There are, undoubtedly, some common notes to the anti-Titulescu action centres, inclusively in their relations with their relations with the political personalities and forces in Romania. But, it is also true that there are also important distinctive notes even when it it was about fascist, Hitler's of Mussolini's regimes, their cooperation not deterring them from, beyond common targets, to aim also to particular objectives.

As for Berlin, we should mention that in spite of the virulent anti-Titulescu attitude – he acted somewhat prudently, as not all the Romanian politicianism who pronounced themselves against the Romanian foreign minister – before anything else due to his policy as regards the Soviet Union – were for a rapprochement to Hitler's Germany. If politicians like A.C. Cuza, Octavian Goga and Ștefan Tătărescu were cultivated without reserves, not that same thing could be stated about Gheorghe Brătianu, Alexandru Vaida Voevod or V.V. Tilea. The Berlin leaders distinguished clearly those who wanted Nicolae Titulescu's dismissal in order to obtain the alteration of Romania's foreign policy, that is Romania's alignment alongside Hitler's Germany, and those who wanted only Berlin's help to knock out Nicolae Titulescu from the political game and to stop an evolutionary process in the Romanian-Soviet relations. Thus, the frequency of contacts, the contents and level of discussions, the palpable nature of decisions, the continuity of relations were always used by Berlin to influence the interlocutor, to strengthen – by a plus of information and by furnishing the conclusions of their own analyses – their anti-Soviet and pro-German feelings (at least), to perfect new directions of action and for the identification the adequate means to outline short-term directions of action, as well as longer-term ones. There are sufficient reasons to say that Romanian politicians, maybe only some of them, asked directly for financial means for the propaganda of their own party through the intermediate of the press (Ștefan Tătărescu); it it not impossible that the same thing was done (or obtained without even asking for them) also by Octavian Goga and A.C. Cuza, leaders of the National Christian Party, or Gheorghe Brătianu, leader of the “young liberals”. The reception they were offered in Berlin – meetings with Hitler, Rosenberg, Goering, Goebbels, a.o., – the favourable comments of the press strengthened their trumps (they thought so at least) on the Romanian political arena, multiplying their factional stock, the organizational experience the material means and the resonance chamber. The decoration of one of them (A.C. Cuza's son) was not wished as a reward for some merits, but as a first encouragement for what they had and wanted to do.

Rome – whose aversion against Nicolae Titulescu dates back to at least 1922 – had also a lot of difficulties in stimulating the Romanian politicians. If the colonial policy of Italy was appreciated and considered differently in some Romanian political circles, being, paradoxically, by Nicolae Iorga, Octavian Goga, Gheorghe Brătianu, Mihail Manoilescu, the same thing cannot be said

about the clearly favourable stands adopted by Italy in support of Hungarian revisionism, about the violent and pathetic plea in favour of the territorial appetite of Budapest, categorically rejected by the huge majority of the Romanian political spectrum.

The campaign against Nicolae Titulescu had an organized character. Once the truth established, the leaders of the respective regimes have drawn into the anti-Titulescu action some central institutions of the respective state, governmental, or pro-governmental or party, offices and services.

The combating and (political and physical) elimination of Nicolae Titulescu was the subject of some complex and minute inter-departmental analyses, of some plans of action that united transnational forces and some exceptional financial and technical means.

This campaign against Nicolae Titulescu – intensified by the instauration of Hitlerism in Germany, of Beck's pro-fascist regime in Poland and of Stojadinović's pro-fascist regime in Yugoslavia – would become more complex, more diversified and branched out, more active, more coherent. The precise aims, the contents and amplitude of the actions, the establishment of precise responsibilities – in spite of the unloyal competition between all these organisms – justifies the appreciation that a real program was aimed at.

NOTES

¹The first results of the investigations done and the conclusions brought into relief by them were made known to the public on August 31, 1966, under the auspices of the Association of International Law and International Relations in Romania, Department of History of International Relations and of Romanian diplomacy: George G. Potra, *Înlăturarea lui Nicolae Titulescu din guvern – 29 august 1936* – (Nicolae Titulescu's Removal from the Government – August 31, 1936 – cf. "România liberă", September 1, 1966. Three years later, MI (Historical Magazine) put it at disposal its pages for the presentation, in a publicistic way, of some data and considerations connected with the removal of Nicolae Titulescu from Romania's political life: George G. Potra, *28–29 august 1936. În culisele „cazului” Titulescu* (August 28–29, 1936. Behind the scenes of the Titulescu case, in MI, Year III, No. 9 (30), September 1969, pp. 50–54. As for us we continued all along 1966–2000 to fructify the results of our researches on the causes and factors that contributed to Nicolae Titulescu's removal from Romania's political life, on the echoes and consequences of this event, publishing more articles and studies which constitute themselves, we hope, into unpublished yet contributions to the file of the political act of August 29, 1936.

At the 25th commemoration of Nicolae Titulescu's death, the works *Nicolae Titulescu*, Scientific Publishing House, Bucharest, 1966 and *Nicolae Titulescu's Diplomatic Activity*, Publishing House of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Bucharest, 1968 – signed by Ion M. Oprea – have brought, by the pages dedicated expressly to these subjects, new data (even if succinct) on this subject and contributed to the deeper explanation of some or other of multiple facets of the subject.

The study signed by I. Chipur and Fl. Constantiniu, *Din nou despre cauzele înlăturării din guvern a lui Nicolae Titulescu (29 august 1936)*, (Again about the causes of the removal from the

Government of Nicolae Titulescu, in “Revista Română de Studii Internaționale” (further RRSI), Year III, No. 2 (6), 1969, pp. 37–53 inscribes itself in the historiography of the matter until the end of the seventh decade as the most valuable contribution.

In 1982, the year of celebrating the centennial of Nicolae Titulescu’s birth, there appeared some notable studies concerning various aspects linked to the causes, means, echoes and consequences of the removal of the Romanian politician and diplomat: George G. Potra, *Certitudine și probabilitate privind elementele declanșatoare ale crizei de guvern din 29 august 1936* (Certitude and Probability regarding the elements that triggered the government crisis of August 9, 1936); Gh. Buzatu, „*Dosarul Titulescu*“ *de la Ministerul de Externe de la Berlin* (The “Titulescu File” from the Berlin Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Gh. Buzatu, Valeriu Dobrinescu, *Responsabili și martori ai demiterii* (Responsible for and Witnesses to the Dismissal); N. Dascălu, *Demiterea lui N. Titulescu în presa internațională* (N. Titulescu’s Dismissal in the International Press), in *Titulescu și strategia păcii* (Titulescu and the Strategy of Peace), coordinator Gh. Buzatu, Junimea Publishing House, Jassy, 1982, pp. 275–293; 293–300; 300–304; 304–326.

Several studies dedicated to the same problem were published along times by the historians S. Mikulicz – Poland; Ž. Avramovski and M. Vanku – Yugoslavia; M. Teichman – Czechoslovakia; A. Kuzmanova – Bulgaria. Indispensable contributions are S. Mikulicz, *Wpływ dyplomacji Sanacyjnej na obalenie Titulescu*, in “Sprawy Międzynarodowe”, 1959, No. 7–8, pp. 104–123; Živko Avramovski, *Le Gouvernement yougoslave, les négociations du traité soviéto-roumain d’aide mutuelle et la chute de Titulescu*, in “Revue d’Etudes Sud-Est Européennes” (further RESEE), tome IV, 1966, Nos. 3–4, pp. 491–512; Živko Avramovski, *Pitanje sovjetsko-rumunskog pakta, pad Tituleskua i posledice za rumunsku spoljopolitičku orijentaciju*, in *Istorija XX veka*, Zbornik radova, VII, Institut Drustvenih Nauka, Odeljenje za istorijske nauke, Belgrad, 1965, pp. 5–77; Mirosław Teichman, *Titulescu a rumunská zahraniční politika. 1933–1936*, in “Československý Časopis Historický, tome XIV, 1966, No. 5, pp. 667–684; Antonina Kuzmanova, *Le Limogeage du ministre des affaires étrangères de Roumanie – Nicolae Titulescu (le 29 août 1936)*, in “Etudes Balcaniques” (Sofia) (further EB-Sofia), No. 2, 1982, pp. 33–47; Milan Vanku, *La Guerre du pétrole. L’attitude de Nicolas Titulescu dans la guerre froide entre la Roumanie et les puissances totalitaires (1935–1936)*, in *Nicolae Titulescu. Précurseur de l’unité européenne*, Publishing House of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, 1993, pp. 123–139. Remarkable is that the majority of those studies have appeared before the articles and studies on this problem of the Romanian authors.

²George G. Potra, *Politica asasinatelor politice* (The Policy of Political Murders), in *MI*, Year XII, No. 12 (141), December 1978, pp. 41–44; Idem, *Proiectele diplomației hitleriste vizează România* (The Projects of Hitler’s Diplomacy aim at Romania), in *MI*, Year XIII, No. 4 (145), April 1979, pp. 36–41; Idem, *14 august 1936. N. Titulescu – Pierre Cot. Multiplele consecințe ale unui demers personal* (August 14, 1936. N. Titulescu – Pierre Cot. The Multiple Consequences of a Personal Demarche), in *MI*, Year XIII, No. 10 (151), October 1979, pp. 42–45; Idem, *Ratatul pseudoprofet din Wilhelmstrasse nr.70 A* (The Fizzled out Pseudo-prophet in Wilhelmstrasse No. 70), *MI*, Year XIV, No. 2 (155), February 1980, pp. 42–46; Idem, *Politik und Mord*, in “Rumänian Heute”, No. 11, November 1981, pp. 43–44; Idem, *Titulescu – victima unei conspirații* (Titulescu – the victim of a Conspiracy), in “Almanach of «Lumea» review 1985”, pp. 75–92; Živko Avramovski, *Pitanje sovjetsko-rumunskog pakta..., passim*; Mirosław Teichman, *Titulescu..., passim*; Milan Vanku, *La Guerre du pétrole..., passim*.

³George G. Potra, *Romania’s Foreign Policy (1932–1936) and Mussolini’s Regime*, in “Romania–Pages of History” (further R-P of H), Year XI, Nos. 2–3, 1986, pp. 190–219 (also, in French, German, Russian and Spanish); Idem, *La politica estera della Romania (1932–1936) e il*

regime mussoliniano, in “Balcanica” (istoria, cultura, politica), Year VII, Nos. 3–4, December 1990, pp. 38–57. See also Milan Vanku, *La Guerre du petrole...*, *passim*.

⁴The documents of foreign policy of Hungary, as many as they were published for the inter-war period, contain numerous testimonies regarding the principled attitude of the Hungarian diplomatic chancery to Nicolae Titulescu and the actions of its representatives in various capitals in the world. The firm attitude adopted by Nicolae Titulescu against the claims of Hungary concerning frontiers, minorities, optants, a.o. explains sufficiently the morbid hate of the official circles and of the governmental press from Budapest against the Romanian foreign minister.

⁵The references to the attitude of the Bulgarian political circles against Nicolae Titulescu, although not very numerous, and making not, as far as we know, the object of special studies, edifie as concerns the fund, Sofia placing itself constantly on an inimical position against the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, who, by initiating and signing the Balkan Agreement, was giving a terrible blow to Bulgaria’s revisionist plans. Even if it does not contain substantial elements regarding the position of the diplomatic chancellery in Sofia, the article signed by Antonina Kuzmanova, *Le Limogeage...*, *passim*, is worth reading..

⁶S. Mikulicz, *op. cit.*; George G. Potra, *Cercul se închide. România înaintea celui de-al doilea război mondial. Sanația în acțiune (I)* (The Circle closes up. Romania before the Second World War. Sanacja in action), in “Istorie neelucidate. Almanah estival ’85 Luceafărul”, pp. 58–66; Idem, *Cercul se închide. România înaintea celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Sanația în acțiune(II)* (The Circle closes up. Romania before the Second World War. Sanacja in action), in “Istorie neelucidate. Almanah estival ’85 Luceafărul”, pp. 58–66; Idem, *Cercul se închide. România înaintea celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Sanația în acțiune(II)*, in “Almanah Luceafărul”, 1986, pp. 107–126; Idem, *Die Aussenpolitik Rumäniens (1932–1936) und das Sanacja Regime*, in “Rumänien–Blätter der Geschichte” (further R-B der G), Year XII, No. 1–2, 1987, pp. 156–178 (also in French, English, Russian and Spanish).

⁷Živko Avramovski, *Le Gouvernement yougoslave...*, *passim*.
