

INTERNAL INTRIGUE AGAINST NICOLAE TITULESCU – IRREPRESSIBLE ENMITIES, HOSTILE FORCES, WAYS AND MEANS OF ACTION

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Rezumat. *La 29 august 1936, la capătul a 20 de ani de activitate politico-diplomatică, Nicolae Titulescu a fost demis din Guvernul României. Hotărârea nedreaptă și ignobilă a rămas definitivă.*

Studiul de față – Intriga internă împotriva lui Nicolae Titulescu – dușmăni irepresibile, forțe ostile, căi și mijloace acționale – analizează cauzele obiective și rațiunile subiective, de ordin intern, care au pus în mișcare forțele, grupările, partidele și personalitățile care au acționat pentru înlăturarea lui Nicolae Titulescu, căile și mijloacele folosite de acestea, modul cum a evoluat atitudinea lor în domeniul politicii externe în funcție de dezvoltările internaționale, cât și de procesele evoluției interne.

Sunt trecute în revistă momente de mare tensiune, sunt evocate atitudini publice, dar și acțiuni subterane, este relevat scopul înlăturării din viața politică, efectul imediat și de durată al demiterii lui Nicolae Titulescu.

Demers coerent, bazat pe un volum apreciabil de informații și exegeze, edite sau inedite, de articole, studii sau referiri specifice în lucrări dedicate în exclusivitate sau doar parțial lui Nicolae Titulescu, studiul de față deschide noi orizonturi, înlătură un mit îndelung întreținut, punând pe masă un dosar solid și concludent întru apărarea lui Nicolae Titulescu și chemarea la bara istoriei a celor ce l-au scos de pe scena publică.

Abstract. *On August 29, 1936, after 20 years of political and diplomatic activity, Nicolae Titulescu was dismissed from Romania's Government. The unfair and ignoble decision remained definitive.*

The present study analyses the objective causes and the subjective reasons, at home, that put into motion the forces, groupings, parties and personalities who acted for Nicolae Titulescu's dismissal, the ways and means used by them, the way their attitude progressed in the domain of foreign policy, function of international developments, and the processes of internal processes.

Moments of great tension are reviewed, public attitudes are evoked, but also subterranean actions, the aim of his dismissal from public life is revealed, as well as the immediate and durable effect of Nicolae Titulescu's dismissal.

A coherent demarche, based on a considerable volume of information and exegeses, edited or unedited, of articles, studies or specific references in works dedicated exclusively or only partially to Nicolae Titulescu, the present study opens new horizons, averts a long-kept alive myth, putting on the table a solid and conclusive file in defence of Nicolae Titulescu and the putting to the trial of history of those who evicted him from the public arena.

Keywords: Nicolae Titulescu, Hostile Forces

The political forces and personalities in Romania that acted against Nicolae Titulescu were, in their turn, very numerous. If King Carol IIⁱⁱ was indisputably Nicolae Titulescu's main adversary, it is not less true that against the Romanian Foreign Minister had acted politicians like Gheorghe Tătărescu,ⁱⁱⁱ Prime Minister; Ion Inculeț,^{iv} Deputy Prime Minister; Victor Antonescu;^v Richard Franasovici^{vi} and Valer Pop,^{vii} ministers; to them one should add other politicians head or not of political parties, diplomats, a.o., like Octavian Goga,^{viii} A. C. Cuza,^{ix} Alexandru Vaida-Voevod,^x Gheorghe I. Brătianu,^{xi} N. Iorga^{xii} Grigore Filipescu;^{xiii} Corneliu Zelea Codreanu;^{xiv} Constantin Argetoianu;^{xv} Mihail Manoilescu;^{xvi} Mihail Sturdza,^{xvii} Constantin Cesianu,^{xviii} V.V. Tilea,^{xix} Anton Bibescu;^{xx} Radu Lecca;^{xxi} Ștefan Tătărescu.^{xxii}

What is uniting and what is dividing – both from the point of view of the scopes that inspired them and the goals followed and the ways and means used – the forces that acted for Nicolae Titulescu's dismissal? This is a question which, in spite of difficulties, should be answered.

Conspirators

First of all, one should note the diversity of forces that had acted against the former Foreign Minister: parties, political groupings and politicians. They are forces and factors that had different political orientations, if we were to compare their programmatic orientations or refer to their very intimate evolution. They were forces and factors that were in opposition or participated, in some way to governance. A stricter, but imperfect, attempt to classify them should note, in our opinion, three distinct categories: the extreme rightist forces, the centre-rightist parties and groupings, the governmental forces.

In the ranks of the extreme rightist forces we must quote, before anything else the Iron Guard ("Everything for the Country"), the Agrarian National Party (after the unification in 1935 of the League for National Christian Defense with the Agrarian National Party), the National Party of Labour in Romania, the groupings and organizations of the German ethnical Group.

The Romanian Front (Alexandru Vaida-Voevod), The People's Party and the "Young Liberals" Grouping (Gheorghe Brătianu) outline the second category.

The governing forces and especially the royal camarilla define a third category.

Around these three great centers there gravitated politicians who, for various reasons, for different periods of time and with different means, have accomplished a more or less personal action.

It is mentioned from the very beginning that against the Foreign Minister had pronounced themselves and actioned – not from party stands, even if some of them were leaders of some groupings, organizations or parties, and they did it not by clear political and ideological reasons, leaving the impression that the subjective factor was the one that prevailed – personalities of the political, economic, or news world, some in good faith, others not, highly principled people, but also rascals of the lowest kind, opportunists or redeemers of the lowest kind, people inspired by convictions and aspirations or simple condotiere, often manipulated, both kinds, by occult forces from within or without de country.

What could they not forgive him

The attitude of these forces, groupings and parties in the field of foreign policy evolved in time, defining themselves both function of international evolutions, and function of internal processes and events, the generating factors being both objective and subjective.

The extreme-right groupings – born as a reaction to social and political evolutions in this country – adopted very rapidly in the field of foreign policy orientations which placed them in contradiction with the huge majority of the forces of the Romanian political scene. The doctrinaire similitudes and the durable links established by them with the fascist parties in Italy and Germany made them rapidly evolve on the way of abandoning national interests, as they had outlined themselves all along a whole historical evolution and as they were perceived by the huge majority of the Romanian public opinion. From assertions in principle they reached rapidly common actions aiming at scuttling the traditional orientations and the constant Romanian foreign policy objectives. The moving off from the traditional French-English system of alliances and the orientation of our country towards (in the beginning) and her alignment (later) to the policy of Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy looks like a defining note of their political stands. Subsequent to this orientation is their anti-Soviet attitude, expressed both in the opposition against de normalization of Romania's political and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and, under the conditions in which this process could not be prevented, the discrediting and blocking of all efforts meant to ensure

a normal evolution of these relations, of their development on a political, economic, cultural, tourist, etc., plane. The enrolment of these extreme-right parties into a doctrinaire system of foreign filiations, antinational anyway, resulted in their unreserved taking over foreign policy objectives from the fascist, totalitarian regimes. We have in view, in this framework, their action in favor of revising the peace treaties concluded after the First World War, this process being thought out in several components (territorially, in point of military obligations and of financial tasks). The main beneficiary of this action was undoubtedly Hitler's Germany, the great vanquished in the First World War and the most powerful and tenacious champion of revision and revenge. Taking over orientations and foreign policy objectives of the fascist regimes, these parties and political groupings focused, also, their main attack and their palpable actions against the efforts for constituting some regional security defensive bodies, meant to defend the territorial *status quo* recognized under the peace treaties concluded after the First World War. The Little Entente and the Balkan Entente became for them the target of an adverse generalized campaign. Pronouncing themselves and acting against the system of collective security they also attacked virulently the League of Nations. a.o. Essentially, one may say that these forces acted programmatically for the change of Romania's foreign policy, for the rejection of the system of collective security and the alignment of the Romanian foreign policy to that of Hitler Germany and Mussolini's Italy. The extreme-right parties and groupings had never forgiven Nicolae Titulescu's intransigent attitude adopted by him against the programmatic orientations and their palpable actions in internal policy and against their fierce fight against the democratic system, against the parliamentary regime, with a view to dismiss him and replace him with dictatorial structures. The sure role Nicolae Titulescu had in dismantling the Iron Guard in 1933 – disputable only if he was an inspirer or a co-author – exacerbated the legionnaires' fury, who appealed to the extreme formula of political madness: the condemnation to death of the Romanian foreign minister. The centre-right parties and groupings placed also Nicolae Titulescu at the centre of their critical approaches in matter of foreign policy. Their attitude became more virulent at the mid-fourth decade, under the conditions of the promotion of the Romanian foreign minister of new demarches on the line pf collective security. If his action for the normalization of the political and diplomatic relations with the USSR was generally positively received, his demarches for the consolidation of the system of collective security, of concluding a Romanian-Soviet pact of mutual assistance

have met with their fierce resistance, as they considered that such a treaty was not only dangerous but also damaging for Romania's national interests. They considered as dangerous the provisions of the draft treaty, a real menace for Romania's security, for her independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, they advanced the assumption – not ungrounded – that such an act would determine a total damaging of the relations with Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, but also with some of our traditional allies, who had an anti-Soviet stand, namely, Poland and Yugoslavia. Those parties and political groupings that reproached to the Romanian foreign minister his exclusively French-English stand, the lack of perceiving the new tendencies and evolutions on a European plane, ignoring the role of Germany and Italy in Europe and in the world. The leaders of those parties have shown a reprehensible understanding of the revisionist policy of those states and, subsequently, they incriminated the categorical condemnation by the Romanian foreign minister of their force acts, Italy's aggression against Ethiopia, Germany's trespassing of the provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty, by the occupation of the Rhineland demilitarized zone, the German and Italian implication in the civil war in Spain. It is not ignored – especially in the case of "Frontul Românesc" and of Alexandru Vaida-Voevod especially – the sympathy (in some cases even the direct support) for the legionnaires, which attracted, *ipso facto*, more severe or less severe condemnations against Nicolae Titulescu, who had consistently taken a stand against any extremism, be it rightist or leftist. Although they invoked questions of method – the interference in home affairs of a minister not allied to any party, responsible for foreign Affairs – the leaders of those parties and political structures were motivated by ideological options and political orientations who were in an obvious and irreconcilable contradiction with Nicolae Titulescu's ones. Personal adversities – especially in the case of Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, who could not forgive Nicolae Titulescu for his opposition to the conclusion of a Romanian-Soviet non-aggression pact, that had obliged him eventually to resign from his function of prime minister – vainglory and ambitions also played a very important part in the union of those forces and the intensification of their action. Concentrating those attacks against Nicolae Titulescu, the leaders of these structures – the same as those of extreme-right groupings – aimed not only to remove the head of the Romanian diplomacy – to whom they reproached in the last analysis his lack of patriotism –, but also, and there is no doubt, the reorientation of Romania's foreign policy. That those attacks against Nicolae

Titulescu were more violent than those against the foreign ministers who succeeded him – and who carried out, largely, at least for some time, the same foreign policy – is something else, the explanation being Nicolae Titulescu's strong personality, the consistency of his positions and political actions.

A summary attempt to delimit the causes of the anti-Titulescu action, carried out by the Romanian governmental forces leads to the conclusion that they inscribed themselves both in the perimeter of the general order reasons (general, not objective, we insist to stress it) and in the sphere of reasons of a particular order, personal, subjective.

The majority of the Romanian governmental circles (especially under the Alexandru Vaida-Voevod and Gheorghe Tătărescu governments) in the inter-war period adopted, at least for some time, an odd and sometimes a blamable understanding, often an ambiguous attitude, as to the appearance and development of right-wing and extreme-right political movements. The years 1932–1936 illustrated more than convincingly the contradictions and conflicts of public, internal and international notoriety, that opposed the foreign minister of Romania to the Romanian governmental circles (things should be taken differentiated and nuanced, the appreciation having sometimes in view the King, at other times prime ministers of that period, sometimes a significant part of the governmental team, at other time the government in its quasi-totality, especially concerning the appearance, manifestation, affirmation and encouragement the fascist-type parties (“The Iron Guard”, in the beginning, “Everything for the Country” later and, eventually, “The Crusade of Romanianism”; the stand and actions of the National Christian Party and of the League of Christian National Defense), that professed a policy of extreme reactionary stand at home, and an anti-national policy abroad. Exacerbation of anti-Semitism and anti-communism, on the one hand, and of anti-Sovietism and pro-fascism, on the other (of a pro-German or pro-Italian nuance), the multiplication of the violent confrontations between the structures and parties of fascist orientation or fascist properly and the democratic forces, resulting often with victims in the ranks of progressive politicians and democratic public opinion, a state of affairs the governmental circles considered with a blamable passivity and an even more blamable understanding was of a nature to determine Nicolae Titulescu's severe reactions, going as far as drawing their attention or reproaching them more or less confidentially, up to public condemnation and incrimination, through the large press inclusively. Nicolae Titulescu's intransigence in this

matter, permanently and indubitably proved, confronted the Bucharest governmental circles with an unacceptable position, considered in succession as insubordination to the government, lack of solidarity with the government, Semitic propensity or communist inclinations. The taking by the Romanian governmental circles of such positions and the preservation by Nicolae Titulescu of an indefectible principled attitude conferred to the confrontations and conflicts an irreconcilable character and content. The King and the Prime Minister, an obedient head of party and politician, did not understand to accept such a situation, the years 1933–1936 seeing numerous attempts made by both to eliminate the troublesome Romanian foreign minister, a marking politician, but who, unfortunately or not, did not dispose of a party support, for, as known, he did not belong to any political structure.

In the context of the fourth-decade international evolutions, bringing to the forefront of the great power politics countries like Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, the Bucharest governing circles reproached to him, directly or indirectly, that he did not take into account such realities, although they continued to be the partisans of the line of alliance with France and England. These circles tried to conciliate absolutely irreconcilable things: the collective security policy and the policy of territorial revisions. Nevertheless, accusations concerning imbalances in our foreign policy were still present. And this in spite of some gestures made by Nicolae Titulescu who, without cherishing illusions, tried to normalize the relations with these countries, advancing realistic proposals both in the case of Germany and in that of Italy, proposals rejected diplomatically, but firmly by them. Hard to understand is the concrete attitude of the Bucharest governing circles against Nicolae Titulescu's policy in the matter of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. Although he had been granted full powers to negotiate a pact of mutual assistance with Moscow – twice, in the summer of 1935 and in the summer of 1936 – the same circles sabotaged his efforts in this sense, invoking the dangers presented by such a pact – whose content they did not know, but incriminated it – for the independence, sovereignty and Romania's territorial integrity, for the stability of the country's political and social system. This attitude was even harder to understand as the same circles welcomed the conclusion of similar pacts, in the summer of 1935, by France and Czechoslovakia, two of Romania's main allies.

Nicolae Titulescu was not absolved of reproaches regarding his intransigent attitudes adopted by the League of Nations against Italy, whether the problem was the attitude of England as to the provisions of a new convention regarding the Black Sea straights, attitudes that placed him in a state of confrontation for which he was not responsible.

The deterioration of the relations with Poland and Yugoslavia was also attributed to Nicolae Titulescu's intransigence, although the slightest view of the foreign policy promoted by the diplomatic chancelleries of Warsaw and Belgrade, Josef Beck and Milan Stojadinović, was fully edifying as regards the new orientations that they imposed to the foreign actions of their countries – essentially an obvious departure from the principles of collective security, a chaotic balancing on the European arena and an obvious tendency to approach Germany – by Poland, and to approach Italy, by Yugoslavia.

They went so far as to reproach to Nicolae Titulescu – truly, *sotto voce* – the fact that they did not normalize the relations with Hungary and Bulgaria, ignoring deliberately the virulently revisionist positions of the two countries, their territorial claims from Romania, the huge campaign they carried out against the Versailles system and the hostile propaganda, beyond any admissible limits, against our country.

In spite of the growth of prestige brought to this country by the presence of her representatives in the leading bodies of numerous institutions of universal vocation, their participation in the debate of the more and more complex problems of the epoch, the Romanian governing people reproached to him a departure from the immediate and permanent interests of the Romanian people and state, a tendency to give world dimensions to Romanian foreign policy, a tendency considered by them non productive and even dangerous.

A personal policy?

It was said about Nicolae Titulescu, and not only once, that he was carrying out a personal policy. It is true that Nicolae Titulescu left his imprint like no one else on Romania's inter-war foreign policy. He conferred to it perspective, clear orientations and directions, coherence, stability, ensured to it individuality and personality. All this being said, we should remark the fact that he never deviated from the great directing lines of the foreign policy after 1918, which expressed the national necessities and desiderata. Indisputably, Nicolae Titulescu

was not a petty functionary, who would limit himself simply to the directives received from Bucharest, regardless of level (be it even the highest), indisputably, Nicolae Titulescu innovated so much that he made real creation in foreign policy. Thus, in public consciousness, to Nicolae Titulescu's name there was linked, rightfully, the success of some actions (in matter of initiating, elaborating the position, successfully carrying on negotiations), a fact which stirred jealousies in Bucharest, in the ranks of governmental circles, but also in the ranks of the opposition. The assertion regarding Nicolae Titulescu's personal policy, an insidious, far-reaching assertion was not motivated and publicly concretized. Repeated, more or less publicly, it tried to accredit an unacceptable situation for the Bucharest governing circles. Trying to decipher the reasons of such hawking, we are tempted to believe that by presenting him as the exponent and promoter of a personal policy, the Bucharest governing circles tried to discredit and weaken his internal and external political position, to accredit him abroad as a politician devoid in his attitudes and positions of the support of the constitutional and governmental factors (being parallel with or contrary to the interests and judgments of these factors), which we should admit, in good knowledge, that it is an unsustainable assertion (as well as incredible), because there was nowhere, in no country a foreign minister who could carry out a foreign policy action contrary to the positions and attitudes of those circles. This assertion is valid – and we want to stress it, in order to avoid confusions or ambiguities – for the directing lines of this policy, not for all its acts, in what the latter are concerned, between Nicolae Titulescu and the rest of the government, there appeared often contradictions ended in violent conflicts of positions. The affirmation of such a point of view had, paradoxically, contradicting consequences. Shared or not, the idea of promoting a personal policy by Nicolae Titulescu, by a Nicolae Titulescu attacked, but impossible to be dismissed, of a policy whose directing lines presented numerous points of coincidence with those carried on by the western democracies, by other states, was of a nature to increase – at Paris, London and Moscow, in the countries of the Little Entente or the Balkan Entente, in the Latin American countries, in many other countries – the credibility quota, the personal prestige, the authority of interlocutor not only well-informed, but also powerful, thus credible, for his country's foreign policy, for the problems of international policy. Such an attitude results, as we suggested before, from the simple logic of seeing that an attacked man, but not punished (not punishable), not replaced (irreplaceable) is a powerful man, thus a man who deserved all consideration and

who must be carefully cultivated. In Hitler's Germany and in Mussolini's Italy, states who were on hostile and adverse positions to Romania, but also in a Poland and in a Yugoslavia, "friendly", where the foreign policy in the beginning, and eventually the state itself fell under the influence and later under the leadership of some personalities with odd inclinations and warm spots to Hitler Germany and fascist Italy, like Josef Beck and Milan Stojadinović, such reproaches made by the Bucharest governing circles to Nicolae Titulescu had a large echo, being taken over, amplified and very largely disseminated. More than that, such reproaches of Romanian governmental origins were later used by those foreign forces as elements of pressure upon Bucharest, desolidarising Nicolae Titulescu from the government, these foreign sources tried to obtain the removal of the Romanian politician and diplomat, to offer to Bucharest, the "chance" to follow, in his absence, another policy, which in their absurd and blind hope, would have been totally different to the one promoted until then. In what the Bucharest governing circles are concerned, to go back to them again, one should stress that if up to August 29 1936, they did not refrain to reproach to him a personal policy, after that date, under the pressure of anxiety and suspicions created in the country and abroad by Nicolae Titulescu's removal, they formally renounced to circulate such an argument, not shrinking from affirming, officially, that the whole political action carried out by Nicolae Titulescu during his mandate of foreign minister was nothing else than an expression of the will and decision of the country and the government. In such an attitude, one could find, besides many others, the whole meanness of the Bucharest governing circles, which tried, in this way, to rob, *post factum*, Nicolae Titulescu of all his merits for the personal actions, for his own initiatives and demarches engaged in the materialization and fulfillment of a political line. Such an argument – "personal policy" – was manipulated function of interests. It could be invoked in order to mark (in condition of crisis, especially) the distance between the government and the foreign minister (advancing such an appreciation both for the interior, and for the exterior), and to refuse responsibilities under circumstances which they thought if not delicate, at least confused. Far from exhausting the notations which normally such accusations would determine, the above-mentioned observations document, up to elucidation, the formal nature and the interested content of such a reproach, manipulated as far as ridicule, from one extreme to the other, function of the reactions determined at home and abroad in some conjectures or in the ranks of some interlocutors.

Art for art's sake?

Nicolae Titulescu was not spared the reproach of not knowing the essence of some questions highly interesting Romania and of superficially supporting Romanian interests before of the international for a of the time, first of all at the League of Nations.

From such a perspective, Nicolae Titulescu was not spared the reproach of not knowing the essence of some questions of utmost interest for Romania, as well as that of giving superficial support to Romanian interests at the great international forums of the time, first of all within the League of Nations.

From such a perspective, Nicolae Titulescu was accused that he had used the international rostrum not so much to defend Romanian interests, but rather to propel into debate some problems having too little contingency with Romanian interests. More than that, the Romanian politician and diplomat was accused that he had acted at the League of Nations especially for his personal affirmation, to satisfy his vanity and ambitions, for a publicity able to satisfy his ego. A lot of people reproached to him a certain political exhibitionism, a temptation of a gratuitous show, a departure from the real, “an art for art's sake” in politics and diplomacy.

Accused of abstract and generalizing approach, in which Romanian interests could not find their place and their satisfaction in the real terms of their political, national, economic, financial data – some would say the he was rather the representative of Geneva in Romania, than the representative of Romania at Geneva – Nicolae Titulescu ended by being accused by some, while he was still alive, or after his death, that he had not made a real contribution to Romania's home and foreign policy, to international policy. Recognizing nevertheless a part played at the League of Nations, his enemies had stressed his position of orchestra conductor, but denied the position of composer, interpreter or critic.

Avoidance or refuse of parliamentary control?

Quite often, the Bucharest governing circles reproached to Nicolae Titulescu that he avoided as far as refusing the control of the constitutional factors of the lines and actions of Romanian foreign policy. The reproach was made only in an undertone, as it would have been profitable, first of all, to the opposition forces, which would have used it not only for attacks against Nicolae Titulescu,

but also for incriminating the government as a whole. Reproaching this fact to Nicolae Titulescu – and we cannot avoid the finding that the foreign minister was very rarely in the years 1932–1936 before the Parliament, the foreign policy Commissions of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies – attacking him more or less virulently, for reasons already presented, the Bucharest governing circles – concerned, as a matter of fact, much too little of parliamentary democracy – tried to sabotage as far as scuttling Nicolae Titulescu’s position, to obtain and in this plan if not unanimously, at least by a governmental majority (because not all the cabinet members really believed such a reason and, even if they thought of such a thing, they did not understand from complex and diverse reasons, to turn him an object of attack), to unite, if such a thing would not harmed their group, governing forces positions, the very opposition forces, which they hoped to channel only against Nicolae Titulescu, using such a pretext or others of the same kind. It is true – and we do not intend to insist on this thing – that Nicolae Titulescu stayed for a long time abroad, engaged in numerous complex, difficult, and long struggles and political and diplomatic demarches and economic and financial. Not that he did not like the country, not out of fashionable or extravagant attitude, for few people like him were those to love so much Romania, for few people like him felt such a great joy and satisfaction to come back to his motherland. But because, at the level of general thinking, Nicolae Titulescu was convinced that the defense of the permanent interests of the Romanian people, of our country, the deep knowledge of the evolutions and representative positions, both of the great capitals, and of the smaller ones, but especially the possibility to intervene promptly and efficiently in the game of interests going on in the great centers of the world policy of his time, imposed to a Romanian foreign minister not to stay afar of these centers, but to be constantly present, to visit them periodically, to have frequent contacts with the leading political personalities in the respective countries, a permanent dialogue regarding the Romanian interests, as well as concerning the problems of collaboration, security and world peace. If Nicolae Titulescu was not in the 1932–1936 years only seldom before the united Parliament, a the commissions of foreign policy of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, we should stress that in al key-moments of adopting some major decisions of foreign policy, the Romanian foreign minister wanted to present, explain and argue himself in front of the Romanian Parliament the stand adopted or which had to be adopted, making a proof of his discipline and responsibility. A rigorous research and an objective appreciation make us see that only seldom,

very seldom, Nicolae Titulescu, avoided, deliberately, to come before the Romanian Parliament. He explained himself this attitude, stating that – and one cannot but say he was right he could not answer some interpellations, so that he could avoid discussions about negotiations in process, complex negotiations, delicate and difficult, which a premature public debate could have compromised him. In those nearly 25 years of active parliamentary presence, in contact with everything that the western parliamentary activity of his time could offer more advanced in the system, Nicolae Titulescu manifested a genuine respect for the Romanian Parliament, not for those who composed it, but for the symbol which it had to represent in political life, as an exponent of the country's general interests.

Scuttling the prerogatives of representative of the foreign policy and head of Romanian diplomacy.

A direct reflex of the wish and determination of Carol II and of the prime minister (Alexandru Vaida-Voevod first, Gheorghe Tătărescu later) to play a more and more important part in the country's foreign policy affairs, their attitudes, positions, initiatives and demarches determined manifestations of irritation and reactions of condemnation by Nicolae Titulescu, who could not accept, according to the practice generally observed in his epoch, intrusions in a domain in which his own competence had to be unconditionally respected or, at least, consulted formally every time the acts having another source and vehicle than the minister for Foreign Affairs would have avoided him. Such conflicts of competency appeared in various variants and situations, Nicolae Titulescu being obliged to reproach to the Romanian monarch (either in his capacity of foreign minister, or only as a diplomat, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania in London or as first delegate of Romanian to the League of Nations), or as prime minister: the contents or opportunity of some political statements; initiation without his knowledge of some political and diplomatic demarches or the launching, in the same conditions, of some political and diplomatic initiatives; their attempt to use directly and, sometimes, even to manipulate them, some Romanian diplomats, even at the level of head of office, sent on mission abroad. How could have Nicolae Titulescu stay passive as to such state of affairs? How could accept Nicolae Titulescu accept such a state of affairs which meant, indisputably, not only assaults upon the personality and his prerogatives, but more than that, prejudices to the country's general interests? The questions are quite rhetorical. Nicolae Titulescu did not accept them. Making only assumptions, we

may state that, if Nicolae Titulescu would have accepted such things, he could have preserved his portfolio, without any problem, but also without brilliance like other of his predecessors or followers, in a state of total subordination to the King or to the prime minister or to both of them at the same time. Making simple hypotheses, it is not impossible that the King and the prime minister had thought also that Nicolae Titulescu refused to accept an abnormal system of relations, a refuse for which they had prepared the labels of appreciation and the respective countermeasures. A victim of all intrusions, going from inopportunity to blunder, rejected one by one with consistency and firmness, Nicolae Titulescu not only that he did not succeed to clarify and normalize his situation, but he aggravated it, being declared by the King and by the prime minister as *persona non grata*.

Indiscipline or intransigence?

Several heads of government and we would quote here only Alexandru Vaida-Voevod and Gheorghe Tătărescu, reproached quite often to Nicolae Titulescu his lack of governmental discipline. In most cases, these were positions and attitudes divergent from those of the government (or only from those of the heads of government) which Nicolae Titulescu expressed in public, either in his capacity of foreign minister or of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania in London, or regarding political and economic questions (external, of course), or about questions of another nature. Presenting him as a politician who does submit to governmental discipline, or even worse, he is sabotaging it and treats it violently, the Romanian governmental circles tried to accredit the idea that he was a disintegrating, dissolving, disturbing factor, with whom one could not collaborate normally within governmental formation according to the norms unanimously accepted, as a factor who placed himself – by his very activity – outside the rules and the style of a democratic, ordered, rigorous, responsible government. There were also innuendos – so that the effect might be if not total, at least more powerful – that Nicolae Titulescu aimed at obtaining, directly, a dictatorial position in Romania's political life, his detractors subtly speculating about the disagreements between the foreign minister and King Carol II, in order to draw the conclusion, no more, no less, that Nicolae Titulescu has republican convictions and that, in this context, he aimed at obtaining the function of president of the future republic. Analyzing with full objectivity the facts, the ensemble of positions and attitudes that opposed at a given moment Nicolae Titulescu to the Romanian government (as a whole or only

to the head of the cabinet) we can assert without reserves that the reproaches addressed to him in this sense were totally unjustified. According to their own way of understanding the laws of governmental solidarity, as they were conceived by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod or by Gheorghe Tătărescu, Nicolae Titulescu could often seem undisciplined. We do not intend, in no way, to enter a petty casuistry. We limit ourselves to ascertain that almost always the conflicts were generated by the equivocal attitudes of the government, by unprincipled positions, that expressed often petty games of interests, most often opportunistic, in the sphere of internal policy; as for the foreign policy, Nicolae Titulescu confronted himself in the government, in spite of a relatively clear orientation regarding the directing lines of the foreign action, quasi-generally accepted by the Romanian governing circles, with sometimes equivocal positions, generating ambiguity, confusion, which, deriving from a synchronism wrongly understood with the position of the Great Allies, could not be but harmful to Romania's foreign position, to the action she was interested in and called upon to promote internationally. One cannot deny that Nicolae Titulescu had sometimes strictly subjective attitudes, manifestations of vainglory, exacerbated sometimes. A severe X-ray of the zones and conflicting events proves nevertheless that Titulescu consciously risked appearing as undisciplined and disintegrating in order to be able to affirm and manifest, without reticence, his firm convictions and his trenchant points of view concerning the problems under discussion. This being said, we might add that the whole ensemble of positions and public manifestations of Nicolae Titulescu, but also his intimate thoughts, laid down in his memory-like notations, let us decipher a man animated in the greatest degree by the team spirit, by the spirit of cooperation, of a manly cooperation, straightforward, without prevarication and ambiguity, of a cooperation devoid of any imponderables that could be introduced by the unprincipled games of interests. More than that, one should say that Nicolae Titulescu, as a highly lucid politician was deeply convinced that the success of his foreign action depended greatly on the full solidarity of the government around the positions he was affirming abroad, on the impression of governmental unanimity which Bucharest was manifesting in front of the western political circles, or in front of other countries. Thus, Nicolae Titulescu was placed in the situation of not rejecting, the less so of sabotaging, the governmental unity, but to look for it expressly, renouncing in its name to numerous vainglories and passing, sometimes, with great humor, over the reproaches absolutely undeserved, if not even gratuitous.

Playing the victims card

Not rarely, on one occasion or the other, the heads of Bucharest governmental bodies, with which Nicolae Titulescu had cooperated in one capacity or the other, played the card of victims of the impulsive and dictatorial minister, who not being member of any party, tried to be above all of them, to impose his own law, his own vision, his points of view and his ambitions. Useful, but troublesome, esteemed but disapproved, Nicolae Titulescu would become an object of attack by his own team fellow members. Trying to get rid of him, heads of government like Alexandru Vaida-Voevod or Gheorghe Tătărescu, did not shrink from accrediting the idea – both in front of Carol II, and in front of the other members of the governmental team – that the right of decision-making was altered, affected, eroded, as a result of such attitudes and of such a behaviour, that it could not be fully exercised, that in the last analysis, the government could not fully assume the responsibilities of elaborating, promoting and controlling the ensemble of the country's home and foreign policy, that he cannot be made fully responsible for the failures registered in one or the other of the two directorates. We must admit that the procedure was devoid of any altitude and of any originality, that it was in no way meant to save the prestige of the government and that it could not absolve it of the responsibilities which, normally, it had to assume. Such an attitude certified, once more, a weakness and some politicianism, trying to obtain the sacrifice of a remarkable politician not on the altar of public, general interest, but on the altar of some group interests. We cannot affirm that Nicolae Titulescu was an easy-going person. His exceptional intelligence, his ample vision, his huge political experience, the immense prestige he enjoyed were not in Bucharest – and we refer here to the governmental circles – elements who could entertain or increase his sympathy quota. Indisputably, all along the years of collaboration with various governmental formations, Nicolae Titulescu's firmness and intransigence could acquire vehement accents. It is fully proven that the head of the Romanian diplomatic Chancellery manifested himself like that only when he did not meet the expected receptivity and availability. Convinced as he was of the judicious nature of his points of view, formulated on the basis of a profound and comprehensive analysis, Nicolae Titulescu had been often obliged – faced by ignorance, obtuseness and opportunism – to try to impose his points of view to a heterogeneous governmental team, not very well trained in foreign problems and not very well abreast of European and world political evolutions.

He used the trumps ensured to him by the personal political prestige, the direct and close links cu French and English influential political circles, his position of concert-master, that he had within the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, the close relations with great personalities of the political, economic, scientific, cultural world. In order to impose his points of view, Nicolae Titulescu argued, insisted, replied. When he did not succeed by persuasion, he used – we must admit – subterfuge, political or psychological pressure. In this matter, Nicolae Titulescu resorted quite often to resignation (or threatening with resignation) or to “indiscretions” (slipped to the Romanian, and especially, foreign press), which, by their echo, were destined to make him gain the day. We have said it and we are now repeating it: although he was a man with a powerful personality, Nicolae Titulescu behaved absolutely reasonably in most cases, trying to impose his point of view only after listening to other opinions and after being convinced that his position was not only correct, but also unalterable.

Pro domo or pro Patria?

In the name of a modesty in which nobody ever believed, the Bucharest governing circles reproached to Nicolae Titulescu the ample personal advertisement that he had made about himself and his action abroad. It is true that Nicolae Titulescu was not a modest man, in the current (restrictive) meaning of the word, that he was not a lonely and a singular person, that he was a worldly-minded man, a person with relations, without any inhibition at the university lecturing desk or at the public rostrum (parliamentary or not, national or international), in the political, diplomatic, economic and financial, scientific, cultural, artistic, circles and in mass media. It is no exaggeration when we declare that no Romanian politician up to him benefitted, in the country’s advantage, of such a great stock of relations from all the social environments. One day maybe, when the evolution of Titulescian researches would permit us to pass from essential questions to collateral questions, when they are solved, there would be some people who would attempt to draw an inventory of his relations with the world; convinced as we are that they would find in his huge political and diplomatic correspondence, in his memorialistic notes and in the information, notes and newspaper articles and reviews of the time very numerous landmarks, convinced as we are that the memory of archives did not preserve for the posterity the proofs of all his contacts, we think that those who would embark on such a demarche – so useful for the knowledge of the dynamics of Romanian projection

towards the world and in the world – would see that, with Nicolae Titulescu, Romania achieved in the most direct way a contact with the whole world and that the world found out about Romania, through the intermediate of Nicolae Titulescu, in 20 years, more than in the former 100 years. Nicolae Titulescu appeared and he wanted to appear everywhere, where there was something to be defended, even indirectly, the positions and interests of Romania; Nicolae Titulescu appeared and he wanted to appear everywhere, in political, diplomatic, economic, financial, scientific, cultural artistic and press circles, there where there were debated the ideas of security, disarmament and cooperation, of doing away with force and enthroning the law, everywhere the idea of knowledge, understanding, progress and peace has a chance to win over new adepts, new advanced positions, on the hard and toilsome way towards aspiration of reality. It is really true that he manifested himself broadly, diversely and spectacularly, through speeches, conferences and public interventions like no other foreign minister of Romania. Equally true is also the fact that all these acts of presence, Romanian presence before anything else and only afterwards personal pleas for the generous causes of humanity, pleas for understanding, cooperation and peace. All these manifestations of independence in action of a great and powerful personality, so as he was and will remain forever projected by history Nicolae Titulescu, effaced, of course the figure of a buffoon king and of an obedient prime minister, who pretended for themselves more than they knew to do and to whom, Nicolae Titulescu was decided not to accept their intrusion in a political arena infinitely more complex and more delicate than the internal one, an arena in which responsibilities were infinitely greater and more serious and where ignorance and diletantism could have consequences if not altogether disastrous, at least deeply detrimental. The reproaches addressed on the above-mentioned terrain aimed at his manifestation within the organisms, conferences and international gatherings; they multiplied and became more and more acute after the top moments of his international consecration, 1930 and 1931, the years of his successive election, contrary to usual rules, as president of the 11th and 12th ordinary sessions of the Assembly of the League of Nations, when Nicolae Titulescu, even if not liked by all diplomatic chancelleries, he was sought after by all diplomatic chancelleries, being also, and beyond everything else, pampered by public opinion. The reproaches addressed on the above-mentioned terrain aimed at his manifestation through the intermediate of Romanian and foreign press, written and spoken, of newsreels of his time. Together with Nicolae Titulescu, the questions of

Romanian foreign policy considered absurdly so long as pertaining to the domain of questions reserved to specialized and limited circles, entered more than ever before in the pages of internal press, benefitting, at the same time, as events and protagonists, of a generous presentation and illustration. The essence of Nicolae Titulescu's activity and the prodigious forms of manifestation of the Romanian foreign minister offered to the press a very generous and fertile territory for demarches and publishing actions, a territory exploited, as a matter of fact, intelligently, diversely and consistently. It would mean that we do not see the question in its whole complexity if we would not mention here that the great newspapers and magazines published abroad in his time were considering a fact of professional pride to disseminate and broadcast promptly the points of view of the Romanian foreign minister and to obtain exclusively his cooperation. Reproaching to Nicolae Titulescu that by everything he was achieving he was making a broad personal publicity – and only the exact knowledge of the vainglory of Carol II and of Gheorghe Tătărescu may suggest the precise dimension of this reproach – the Romanian governmental circles tried to bring him back at the common denominator of the lack of relief given by his capacity of a common member of the governmental team, to rob him of the right to a position of exponent, to dispossess him of the success and the echo this would have meant. In this action the Romanian governmental circles tried to sensitize both Carol II and the prime minister (the ministers tried to sensitize the prime minister; the prime minister tried to sensitize the king). Both tried to sensitize from such a position the members of the opposition. The fact, only apparently paradoxical seems uncomprehensible at a closer view. Such an action made by the opposition against Nicolae Titulescu, seen as having an exclusively personal keenness was not in their vision of a nature to affect and erode the foreign political platform of the National Liberal Party, a governing party, the reflex being meant to be borne exclusively by Nicolae Titulescu, the government trying eventually to insinuate that it manifests exigencies also towards the members of its own team.

False accusations of favoritism

He was accused of favoritism and nepotism, by reproaching him the fact he brought various persons to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such reproach seems preposterous in a society in which nepotism and favoritism was also practiced by some politicians who were not in a position to reject the reproaches and accusation in this sense. The accusations in this direction were generated

particularly by the discontents with the structural changes in the central of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the criteria of selecting and promoting its personnel, of its rejuvenation and refreshing. Nicolae Titulescu did not exclude any valuable officer from the ministry, but he renounced to the long faces which are in and are cultivated by any bureaucracy, he dispensed with all those who had no other merit than being of boyar origin or having a special material situation, with all those who invoked a university title obtained in some western capital city, but could not prove the ability to introduce themselves in an actional system proper to the new political openings. One should note that such reproaches came mainly from some persons working in the Central of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – like Constantin Cesianu, Anton Bibescu, Victor Cădere a.o. – adversaries of Nicolae Titulescu in political matters (internal or external), but also from political figures like Grigore Filipescu, Gheorghe Tătărescu. At a close research, made in all objectiveness, the reproach in this matter looks totally gratuitous. Savel Rădulescu was not his relative, and his training, experience and authority were beyond any doubt. Constantin Vișoianu was truly one of those brought by Nicolae Titulescu, but we cannot ignore the fact that he continued to play a major part in our diplomacy even after his Patron had left this position, becoming a foreign minister himself. Mihail Arion, secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not need by tradition and training to be made a filantropic act, his presence in the ministry being fully justified by his exceptional personal data. The fact that on August 29, 1936, he left the ministry, was not the result of losing the support of the foreign minister, but was due to his refusal to accept what seemed to him – and he was right – an attempt no only against one man, but against a foreign political course to which he had dedicated himself. Ion Lugoșianu – who would become his godson – entered diplomacy after several years of ministerial functions, the new duties being not a favour, but a transfer of capacities. We would not insist on the names of Ion (Ionel) Christu and Nicolae Raicoviceanu, who owed their entry in diplomacy to Nicolae Titulescu. Their kinship with Nicolae Titulescu – and especially of Gheorghe and Sergiu Nenișor – in turn private secretaries of Nicolae Titulescu does not support the allegation of a policy of nepotism and favoritism along the two mandates of Nicolae Titulescu, in spite of any propensity he could have had for them. One can affirm that Nicolae Titulescu operated before anything else with the criterion of value, and when they did not confirm it, they left soon the posts to receive other duties. The accusations of favoritism and nepotism do not succeed in Nicolae Titulescu's case to be a

fundamented incrimination, illustrating only the large gamut of calumnies to which – by seeking arguments, beyond the doctrinaire plan – Nicolae Titulescu’s adversaries resorted without shame, even if they were outrageous whopping lies.

The legend of the “prodigal son”

Nicolae Titulescu was reproached his prodigality, the exaggerated financial claims and the huge unjustified expenditures. The Romanian minister (the reproaches are dating also from the periods he was a minister of Finances, and the periods when he was a foreign minister, when he was Romania’s permanent representative at the League of Nations, and when he was envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania in London) was accredited as “prodigal son” who is spending like a nabob the country’s money in Europe’s capital cities. Made persistently, such an “advertisement” – having as main authors politicians who used to resort, in whatever post they had, to all manipulations and financial malversations was, in the old run meant to be successful, if not in the ranks of public opinion, at least in the ranks of the opposition, and consequently, able to stimulate and focus the demagogical attacks against Nicolae Titulescu. Did Nicolae Titulescu spend a lot, did he spend a little? This is a question to which – even with all the information we have at present – we can answer with affirmations that do not risk to be contradicted by the appearance in circulation of new information or documentary proofs whatever they might be. Surely all the expenditures (ordinary or extraordinary) were under strict control, being approved by the budget or by special dispositions from the budgetary reserve. There were not other possibilities, and there are not, either in this country or elsewhere. In the reproach addressed to Nicolae Titulescu, abstraction was made deliberately of the fact that the development of activities abroad (opening of new diplomatic missions in other European states and in countries on other continents in Latin America, Asia and Africa; joining to new and new international organizations and bodies; participation in the organization of international conferences, with a sub-regional, regional and continental character on various problems) and the devaluation of the Leu, under the conditions of the economic and financial crises that shattered periodically international life, that led to the growth of the expenditures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, appreciate in absolute figures, As to the piece of information conveyed that Nicolae Titulescu had some secret funds, great sums of money, in cash or cheques, in his own possession or in that of his close collaborators, about

whom he got his own way, we must specify that all the expenses were accounted regularly, and we must also specify that any foreign minister, with such an active international presence needed some cash to bear up the numerous protocol duties, and to the duties deriving (or better to say implied in) from the relations with the press and the newsmen. Understanding very well the sense, the weight and the importance of diplomatic representation (amplitude and level of representation, the manning and the statute of the personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), as a condition of dignity (not of luxury), as a conditioned efficiency (not of money spent driftlessly and without justification), as a condition of a piece with international standards, which might assure to Romanian representatives an equal position, a similar statute, to cast away any inhibitions and inferiority complexes. All the expenditures made by Nicolae Titulescu in the high leadership or representation offices he had had were placed under the sign of necessity, efficiency and legality.

As for the action of the governmental factors against Nicolae Titulescu, a larger analysis along time, extended at the level of the 1932–1936 years, allow the remark that the public positions taken against Nicolae Titulescu were extremely-extremely rare, even if not absent. This fact can be explained not as a perfect agreement with the positions, initiatives and demarches of the Romanian foreign minister, not in full governmental solidarity as one might think at a first view, not in the decency of the members of the governmental team, not in the intention to spare Nicolae Titulescu's feelings, but in the interest of the government to preserve and defend its positions in the confrontation of interests on the home internal arena, in its desire to present itself as homogenous, united and well-welded in matters of principled positions and concrete initiative in everything that meant internal and external problem-matters. In order to avoid all doubtfulness or ambiguities we must say, when we affirm that such pieces of criticism were not publicly disseminated, we have in view that they did not appear in acts emanating from the government or from the head of the government (communiqués of the Council of Ministers, statements, interviews), that they were not expressed either in the Parliament (the Chamber of Deputies, or the Senate) or in the Press. This does in no way mean that the critical appreciations formulated by King Carol II, the prime minister Gheorghe Tătărescu, by other members of the governmental team would have had as resonance chamber only their own circles, that they would not surpass their perimeter, but to specify that the criticisms against

Nicolae Titulescu were not oficialized and had not become known to the public at large. By not resorting publicly to any personal attack, Carol II and Gheorghe Tătărescu, the first in his traditional messages of the throne, the second in his occasional statements or interviews on home and foreign policy expressed positions and appreciations, which for any initiate, seemed to be clear delimitations from Nicolae Titulescu, if not indirect critical and dissimulated references to him. Such a manner of “washing their dirty linen at home” did not block indiscretions, did not deter the opposition forces and personalities to get into possession of information and to exploit information that attested to discordances, differences and confrontations within the governmental team, which facilitated their own political game, both generally and in particular.

As for the means used against Nicolae Titulescu both by the King and by the prime minister we should remark, especially, that he was permanently prosecuted; it is not impossible, we even assume it, that the opposition political forces, their responsible factors had created for themselves in their turn a system of information regarding Nicolae Titulescu’s projects and actions. A necessary definition of the terms requires us to say that, in fact, Nicolae Titulescu was continuously spied by his adversaries at home. An when we say “adversaries”, we do not mean only the forces and politicians from the opposition but also those belonging to the same governmental team, who manifested for very different reasons, most often subjective, a hostile attitude against the Romanian foreign minister. Carol II created (we suspect that the initiative was his) and he used a spying system against Nicolae Titulescu, a system active all along his reign, in the 1930–1940 years; such a system regarded the former head of the Romanian diplomatic chancellery, the beneficiary being until September 1940 Carol II, and afterwards Ion Antonescu. Among the instruments used we should mention before anything else the listening and recording of Nicolae Titulescu’s phone conversations made abroad with various Romanian political personalities in Romania, even with his own closest collaborators from the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the one hand, and the phone conversations of the Romanian dignitary with various persons when he was in Romania, on the other hand. The evidence found in Romanian archives, in the fund of the former Royal Family, proves, incontestably, such an affirmation. To this one should add the retrenchment of his correspondence. It is true that the proofs we have regarding this aspect concern only the period after Nicolae Titulescu’s removal from the

government, but we have no reason to doubt – especially under the conditions of the existence of some evident and long-standing misunderstandings and of some state of things of suspicion and confrontation –that such practices were also used before. A whole chain of informers in the service of Carol II and of the Camarille actioned at home and abroad in order to identify and investigate everything that generally and on a particular level could nbe unfavourable to the Romanian foreign minister. The datas which are at our disposal allow us to affirm today peremptorily that such informers had been designated and used (paid or not) in the political circles, in the political-diplomatic, economic-financial circles of the army and of the police, of the press. Loved up to adulation, esteemed up to veneration, both at home and abroad, Nicolae Titulescu was surrounded, at the same time, by real cohorts of adversaries and spies, who did not shrink from going into in the most intimate corners of his private life. Their reports, sometimes intelligent, at other times examples of stupidity, have all, in spite of the existence or inexistence of some intellectual qualities, a common note; the genesis and their aim was to find and demonstrate the guilt of a man who served the interests of his country. In this action, seen only under the aspect of spying Nicolae Titulescu, Carol II did not shrink from implying heads of Romanian diplomatic missions abroad, to whom he imposed a system of information parallel with the one determined under the functioning rules of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The proportions of such a procedure are difficult to establish, given the little evidence we have at hand in this sense; but sure is the fact that at least at two Romanian legations abroad (Paris and Warsaw) it was consistently and fervently practiced, the information destined to the king, which have by-passed the normal diplomatic channels, having as finality the outlining of Nicolae Titulescu's guilt. Carol II no only accepted, but even stimulated the elaboration and sending of some periodical information by some politicians like Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, Octavian Goga, Grigore Filipescu, Armand Călinescu a.o. All this evidence, put together, constituted for Carol II and for the camarilla a voluminous file on Nicolae Titulescu, which wanted to be in equal measure an evidence and justification for the measures taken later against the Romanian foreign minister. Carol II's wish to have such a file, and the actions and demarches made to this aim being known in the foreign political and diplomatic circles in Bucharest and abroad, fuelled it continuously and completed it with everything that the

adversaries of Nicolae Titulescu could identify, collect and supply, directly or through intermediaries, to Carol II and to the prime minister.

NOTES

ⁱ Ioan Scurtu, *Poziția partidelor politice față de activitatea diplomatică a lui N. Titulescu (1932–1936)*, (Position of the political parties as to Nicolae Titulescu's diplomatic activity, 1932–1936), in *Titulescu și strategia păcii* (Titulescu and the strategy of peace (coordinator Gh. Buzatu), Junimea Publishing House, Jassy, 1982, pp. 233–235; I. Chiper and Fl. Constantiniu, *Din nou despre cauzele înlăturării din guvern a lui N. Titulescu (29 august 1936)*, (Again about the cases of N. Titulescu's removal from the government) in RRSI, Year III, No. 2 (6), 1969, pp. 37–53; George G. Potra, *Titulescu – victima unei conspirații*, (Titulescu – victim of a conspiracy) in „Almanahul revistei Lumea 1985”, (“Almanach of the Lumea magazine”), pp. 75–92.

ⁱⁱ George G. Potra, *Din culisele demiterii lui Nicolae Titulescu. Treptele dizgrației (I–III)*, (From the backstage of Nicolae Titulescu's dismissal. The stages of disgrace, I–III, in MI, Year XXI, No. 3 (240), March 1987, pp. 22–26; No. 4 (241), April 1987, pp. 22–26, 32; No. 5 (242), May 1987, pp. 28–32.

ⁱⁱⁱ R., [s. l], July 11, 1936, Gheorghe Tătărescu către Carol al II-lea (Gheorghe Tătărescu to Carol II – ANIC, Royal House Fund, Home Affairs Cabinet, file No. 29/1936 – *apud* Nicolae Titulescu, *Documente diplomatice* (Diplomatic documents) (edition edited by Dinu C. Giurescu, Gheorghe Ploșteanu, George G. Potra, Constantin I. Turcu; introductory study by George Macovescu), Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1967, doc. No. 470, pp. 797–799 or Gheorghe Tătărescu, *Mărturie pentru istorie* (Evidence for history) (edited by Sanda Tătărescu-Negropontes; introductory study by Nicolae Șerban Tanașoca), Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996, pp. 165–168; cf. also Constantin I. Turcu, *Dialog diplomatic Titulescu–Tătărescu. 1936. Geneva–București* (1, 2, 3), (Diplomatic dialogue Titulescu–Tătărescu. 1936. Geneva–Bucharest (1, 2, 3) in “Lumea”, Year XXX, No. 30 (1 497), 23–29 July 1992, pp. 26–27; No. 31 (1 498), 30 July–5 August 1992, pp. 22–23; No. 32 (1 499), 6–12 August 1992, p.38. See also, C. I. Turcu, I. Voicu, *Nicolae Titulescu în universul diplomației păcii*, (Nicolae Titulescu in the universe of diplomacy of peace), Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1984, pp. 116–118 and Nicolae Titulescu, *Politica externă a României (1937)(Romania's foreign policy)* (edited by George G. Potra, Constantin I. Turcu, Ion M. Oprea), Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1994, *passim*.

^{iv} We intend to publish in the next period a volume that would present in extensor the attitude and intrigue of the home political focus against Nicolae Titulescu. A special chapter – *Subminat în chiar interiorul Cabinetului* – (Undermined within the cabinet) will be focussed on the subversion of the team colleagues.

^v *Ibidem*.

^{vi} *Ibidem*.

^{vii} *Ibidem.*

^{viii} *Bref „Compte Rendu de l'activité“ du Bureau des Affaires Étrangères de la NSDAP, de 1933 à 1943 (doc. nr. PS 007), în Procès des grands criminels de guerre devant le Tribunal Militaire International, Nüremberg (14 novembre 1945–1-er octobre 1946), tom XXV (documents et autre materiel de preuve) (numero PS 001 à PS 400), Edité à Nüremberg, Allemagne, 1947; cf. also Octavian Goga, *Jurnal politic* (Political Diary) (text established and presentation by Ioan Șerbu; arguments and historical notes by Mircea Mușat), in RITL, Year XXXIII, No. 2/1985, pp. 155–160; No. 3/1985, pp. 161–168; No. 4/1985, pp. 161–168; Year XXXIV, No. 1/1986, pp. I–VIII and 159; No. 2–3/1986, pp. I–VIII; No. 4/1986, pp. I–VIII; Year XXXV, No. 1/1987, pp. I–VIII; No. 3–4/1987, pp. I–VII, but especially S., Bucharest, 22 February 1936, Octavian Goga to Carol II and M., Vittel, 14 July 1936, Octavian Goga to Carol II – both in ANIC, Royal House Fund, Foreign Affairs Cabinet, File No. 7/1936. For information see also Gheorghe T. Pop, *Caracterul antinațional și antipopular al activității Partidului Național Creștin*, (The anti-national and anti-popular character of the activity of the National-Christian Party), Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1978, *passim* and Mihai Fătu, *Cu pumnii strânși (Octavian Goga în viața politică a României. 1918–1938)* [With close fists (Octavian Goga in Romania's political life, 1918–1938)] Globus Publishing House, Bucharest, 1993, *passim*.*

^{ix} A.C. Cuza, *Îndrumări de politică externă (Desființarea „Ligei Națiunilor“. Revizuirea tratatelor. Alianța României cu Germania)*, (Directions of foreign policy [Liquidation of the League of Nations. Revision of Treaties. Romania's alliance with Germany]) Cugetarea – Georgescu-Delafraș Publishing House, Bucharest, 1941, *passim*. Also, Gheorghe T. Pop, *op. cit.*, *passim* and Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu. Die deutsch-romänischen Beziehungen. 1938–1944*, Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH., Wiesbaden, 1965, *passim* (and the Romanian edition: *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu. Relațiile germano-române. 1938–1944*) (Hitler, King Carol and Marshal Antonescu, German-Romanian relations. 1938–1944) (edition and biographic study by Stelian Neagoe), Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1994, *passim*.

^x M., Sinaia, 14 October 1932, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod to Carol II – ANIC, Royal House Fund, Home Affairs Cabinet, File No. 38/1932. See also Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, *Memorii* (Memories) (preface, edited., notes and comments by Alexandru Șerban), Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, vol. II, 1995, *passim*; vol. III, 1997, *passim*.

^{xi} Gheorghe I. Brătianu, *Problemele politicii noastre externe* (The problems of our foreign policy), Bucharest, 1934; Idem, *Problemele politicii noastre de stat* (The problems of our state policy), Bucharest, 1937; Georges I. Bratianu, *La Roumanie et la crise du systeme politique*, Bucarest, 1937; *Bref „Compte Rendu de l'activité du Bureau des Affaires Étrangères de la NSDAP de 1933 à 1943 (doc. PS 007), în Proces des grands criminels de guerre devant le Tribunal Militaire International, Nüremberg (14 novembre 1945–1-er octobre 1946), tome XXV (documents et autre materiel de preuve) (numero PS 001 à numero PS 400), Edité à Nüremberg, Allemagne, 1947; Procesul marii trădări naționale* (The trial of the great national treason) (stenograms of the debates at the People's Tribunal on the Antonescu Government), Eminescu Publishing House, [Bucharest], 1946, *passim*; Andreas Hillgruber, *op. cit.*, *passim* (see also Romanian edition: Andreas Hillgruber, *op. cit.*, *passim*).

^{xii} N. Iorga, *Memorii*, (Memories) VI–VII, Vălenii de Munte, 1939, pp. 414–463; Idem, *Orizonturile mele. O viață de om așa cum a fost* (My Horizons. A Life of a man as it was) (edited by Valeriu and Sanda Râpeanu; introductory study, notes, commentaries, index by Valeriu Râpeanu), Minerva Publishing House, Bucharest, 1972, *passim*; cf. also the numerous articles published by Nicolae Iorga against Titulescu in “Neamul Românesc” (some new quotations in the present work).

^{xiii} S., Paris, 17 September 1931, Grigore Filipescu către Carol al II-lea (Grigore Filipescu to Carol II– ANIC, Royal House Fund, Foreign Policy Cabinet, File No. 120/1931).

^{xiv} Nicolae Titulescu, *Eu și Garda de Fier* (I and the Iron Guard), „Universul“ newspaper press, [Bucharest, 1937]. Horia Sima, *Antologie legionară* (Legionary anthology), VI, „Omul Nou“ collection, Miami Beach, 1994; Idem, *Pentru ce am pierdut Războiul din Răsărit și am căzut în robia comunistă* Why did we lose the war in the east and fell in communist bondage) (excerpt from „Buletinul Comitetului Național Româno-American“, Year XV, 20 April 1972, with revisions and additions), „Generația Nouă“ Documentary Library, Madrid, 1973; Idem, *Istoria Mișcării Legionare* (History of the Legionary Movement), Gordian Publishing House, Timișoara, 1994; cf. also Mihail Sturdza, *România și sfârșitul Europei. Amintiri din țara pierdută*, (Romania and the end of Europe. Memories from the lost country), Dacia Publishing House, Rio de Janeiro / Madrid, 1966 (first part entitled *Titulescu: ministrul dușmanului* (Titulescu, the minister of the enemy), pp. 11–105). Also, Mihai Fătu, Ion Spălățelu, *Garda de Fier – organizație teroristă de tip fascist* (The Iron Guard – organization of fascist type, first edition, Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1971, Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1980, *passim*; Francisco Veiga, *Istoria Gărzii de Fier. 1919–1941. Mistica ultranaționalismului* (The history of the Iron Guard. 1919–1941. The mystique of ultra-nationalism) (translation by Marian Ștefănescu), Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1993, *passim*; Ștefan Palaghiță, *Garda de Fier spre reînvierea României* (The Iron Guard and the Renaissance of Romania), Roza Vânturilor Publishing House, 1994, *passim*; Dragoș Zamfirescu, *Legiunea Arhanghelul Mihail de la mit la realitate*, The Legion of Archangel Michael from myth to reality), Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997. To these there are added *Împotriva fascismului* (Against fascism) [papers presented at the scientific session on the critical analysis and unmasking of fascism in Romania, organized in Bucharest, 4–5 March 1971, under the auspices of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences of the Socialist Republic of Romania and of the Institute of Historical and Social Political under the C.C. of the RCP], Bucharest, 1971; Ion Popescu-Puțuri, *Nicolae Titulescu și epoca sa* (Nicolae Titulescu and his epoch, in MI, Year XVI, No. 5 (182), May 1982, pp. 8–9).

^{xv} Constantin Argetoianu, *Pentru cei de mâine. Amintiri din vremea celor de ieri* (For the people of tomorrow, memories from the time of the people of Yesterday) in *Monarhia de Hohenzollern văzută de contemporani*, (The Hohenzollern monarchy seen by contemporaries) Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1968, pp. 346–563.

^{xvi} Mihail Manoilescu, *Memorii* (Memories), vols. I–II (edited, preface, notes and index by Vasile Dinu), Library of the National Bank collection, Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1993, *passim*.

^{xvii} Mihail Sturdza, *România și sfârșitul Europei. Amintiri din țara pierdută*, (Romania and the end of Europe. Memories from the lost country), Dacia Publishing House, Rio de Janeiro / Madrid,

1966 (first part, entitled *Titulescu – ministrul dușmanului* [Titulescu the minister of the enemy], pp. 11–105).

^{xviii} S., Paris, 2 December 1934, Constantin Cesianu to Carol II – ANIC, Royal House Fund, Foreign Affairs Cabinet, File No. 112/1934; cf. also George G. Potra, *Șampanie Pommery și cuvinte otrăvite* (Pommery Champaign and envenomed words), in *MI*, Year XV, No. 8(173), August 1981, pp. 50–53.

^{xix} George G. Potra, *Destăinuiri senzaționale. Arhive până acum inaccesibile vorbesc: Tilea, agent al Legației germane din București? Destăinuiri*, (Sensational disclosures. Archives up to now inaccessible are speaking: Tilea an agent of the German Legation in Bucharest? Disclosures) in „Conflict“, Year I, No. 1, 1990, pp. 13–15.

^{xx} See the telegrams exchanges between Anton Bibescu and I.G. Duca and between Nicolae Titulescu and I.G. Duca in the October–December period – AMAE, Fund 71, 1920–1944, USA, Relations with Romania, 1922–1927, Vol.36.

^{xxi} Radu Lecca, *Eu i-am salvat pe evreii din România* (I saved the Jews from Romania (edited, introductory study and notes by Alexandru V. Diță; with a preface by dr. Dan Zamfirescu), Roza Vânturilor Publishing House, Bucharest, 1994, *passim*. See also the chapter *Mercenari și fonduri pentru propaganda anti-Titulescu* (Mercenaries and funds for the anti-Titulescu propaganda) in the present book at prezentei lucrări.

^{xxii} Radu Lecca, *op. cit.*, *passim*.
