

## THE TURKISH-SOVIET COOPERATION AND THE RELATION WITH ROMANIA AT THE BLACK SEA IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Ionuț COJOCARU\*

**Abstract.** *The first Romanian-Turkish contacts took place on the occasion of the Lausanne Conference (November 20, 1922 – July 24, 1923), the Turkish delegation appealing to the good diplomatic Romanian delegation services<sup>1</sup>. Romania witnessed the arrival at the meeting, "arm in arm", of the National Assembly from Ankara – represented by General Ismet Pasha, who became foreign minister – with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – represented by Gheorghii Vasilievichi Cicerin, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in the bolshevik-communist government - of Moscow. The expression belongs to the Romanian diplomat, Constantin Diamandy, member of the Romanian delegation, led by I.G. Duca, Minister of Foreign Affairs and was expressed in a conference held in Bucharest on the topic of the "Straits Problem" in 1924<sup>2</sup>. At that time, the Turkish-Soviet alliance was quite threatening for the young states of Central Europe and the Balkans. At Lausanne, on one side are present the Allied and Associated Powers, on the other side is Turkey alone. However, according to the statements of C. Diamandy, "behind Turkey loomed the enigmatic shadow of its alliance with the Soviets"<sup>3</sup>, the great absentee from Versailles. Also, Turkey presented itself twice victorious in Switzerland - in external military terms, through the victory over the Greek army, achieved by Mustafa Kemal - Ismet Pasha tandem after a tough war – led by massacres and massive displacement of the population – and through the internal victory, the overthrow of the Sultanate, as well as the desire to completely break the ties with the Ottoman past. From the Turkish point of view, the Treaty of Sèvres represented a thing of the past. The Allies were no longer in Lausanne facing a defeated enemy, but a victorious one, and the negotiations had many compromises and concessions.*

**Keywords:** Ottoman Empire, Turkey, Lausanne, USSR, Balkan Pact, Romania

**DOI** [10.56082/annalsarscihist.2024.1-2.41](https://doi.org/10.56082/annalsarscihist.2024.1-2.41)

---

\* Corresponding member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists

<sup>1</sup> Ionuț Cojocaru, *România și Turcia actori importanți în sistemul de relații interbelice (1918-1940)*, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2014, p. 34.

<sup>2</sup> Constantin Diamandy, *Problema Strămtorilor*, în „*Politica Externă a României*”. 19 prelegeri publice organizate de Institutul Social Român (1923-1924), București, 1924 – [www.digibuc.ro](http://www.digibuc.ro), p. 205-223

<sup>3</sup> On March 16, 1921, the Soviet Union and Turkey signed a friendship treaty in Moscow, establishing the Soviet-Turkish border in Transcaucasia. For details, see Ionuț Cojocaru, *Romania and Turkey*, p. 72

At the end of the First World War, the Romanian nation managed to achieve the complete unity of its territories that were under foreign domination. The military actions of the Romanian army, in the east and in the west, carried out in 1918-1919, had to be doubled by intense political and diplomatic efforts alongside of the great powers of the Entente, victorious in the Great War, gathered in the Paris Peace Conference. In Versailles - especially through the Treaty of Saint-Germain, with Austria (1919) and then through the Treaty of Trianon, with Hungary (1920) - Romania achieved the international recognition of the union decisions made in Cernăuți (Bucovina) and Alba Iulia (Transylvania). Also in Paris, on October 28-th, 1921, was signed the Treaty between Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Romania, recognizing Romania's sovereignty over Bessarabia. Three days after, on November 1, 1921, the Soviet government in Moscow declares that it does not recognize this treaty, triggering what will be called the contentious between Romania and the Soviet Union, regarding Bessarabia.

The Peace Conference in Paris (1919-1920) treated the Ottoman Empire as a defeated state. Its dismemberment was sealed. The Ottoman Empire had no one on his side to defend him. The unity of Islam had fallen apart during the First World War, when Muslims fought against each other, alongside the Christians<sup>4</sup>. At that time, Romania was included among the states that obtained victory in the war, but the government in Bucharest had a loyal, non-interventionist attitude in the matter of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire<sup>5</sup>. Consequently, the Sèvres Peace Treaty in August 10-th, 1920, signed by the Allied and Associated Powers with the Ottoman Empire, treaty which transformed Turkey into a state without an identity, triggered a broad Turkish national movement in Anatolia, led by Mustafa Kemal the leader of the military elites. The Kemalist revolution led to the emergence of the Republic of Turkey<sup>6</sup>. Mustafa Kemal and the soldiers around him had fought, in 1915, on the Gallipoli front, alongside the German general Liman von Sanders, against the British and French troops. The defeat of the allies determined at that time the replacement of the young English officer, Winston Churchill, from the position of First Lord of the British Admiralty and at the increase of the military prestige of Mustafa Kemal, who was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel. The war experience made him latter to assume the responsibility of saving the Turkish nation.

Regarding the upheavals in Russia, the Revolution of 1917 led to the fall of the Romanovs and tipped the balance of power on the Anatolian front in favor of

---

<sup>4</sup> Ionuț Cojocaru, *România și Turcia, actori importanți în sistemul de relații interbelice (1918-1940)*, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2014, p. 187

<sup>5</sup> Tasin Gemil, *Legăturile româno-turce de-a lungul veacurilor (până în 1981)*, în Tasin Gemil, Gabriel Custurea, Delia Roxana Cornea (coord.), *Moștenirea culturală turcă în Dobrogea*, Muzeul de Istorie Națională și Arheologie, Constanța, 2013, p. 56.

<sup>6</sup> Radu Safta, Călin Felezeu, *Turcia contemporană între moștenirea kemalistă și Uniunea Europeană*, CA Publishing, Cluj Napoca, p. 12

the Ottoman troops. The signing of the Peace Treaty with Germany by V.I. Lenin at Brest-Litovsk (March 1918) determined the withdrawal of Russia from the war and the total collapse of the Russian troops in Anatolia. In these conditions, the revolt of the Turkish army, led by Mustafa Kemal, against the provisions of the Armistice of Mudros, in October 30-th, 1918 (respectively the occupation by the Entente forces of the Straits and the city of Istanbul, with the right of passage through the Straits for the allied war fleets ) and especially of the Sèvres Peace Treaty in August 10, 1920 (which legitimized the conditions imposed), had as consequence the radical reformation of the Ottoman Empire. The changes in the balance of forces in Eastern Anatolia and the pressure of the Anglo-French Allies in Mesopotamia and Palestine, determined a rapprochement between Mustafa Kemal and the new Soviet leader, V.I. Lenin. For these reasons, the Turkish-Soviet collaboration will take place within certain limits, but it will mark and deeply influence the relations between Romania and Turkey throughout the interwar time, but also in the beginning of the years of the second world conflagration.

The Turkish-Soviet relations, as well as the relations between Romania and Turkey, need many studies, and different approaches, based on document analysis and interpretation. For the time being, we do not possess a large bibliography in the Romanian language which could be easily consulted; that is why the present study intends to use unpublished documents from the archives in order to illustrate an episode in the history of Turkish and Soviet cooperation, as well as the consequences of these relations on diplomatic and especially military contacts between Turkey and Romania.

From the cable sent by Filotti, the Romanian plenipotentiary minister to Turkey, we learn that on November 7, 1935 (anniversary of the Russian revolution), the Turkish minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rustu Aras and Leon Karakhan, USSR's ambassador in Turkey, signed a protocol meant to extend on a ten year period the *Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality*, signed in Paris on December 17, 1925, the additional protocol signed in Ankara on December 17, 1922, and the Naval Agreement of March 7, 1931. The Turks were those who took the initiative of prolonging these agreements, the minister Aras declaring: "Why should we have recourse to brief delays and successive prolongations, since neither of the two states has any doubt as to the perenniality of their friendship and is undoubtedly interested in maintaining the respective agreements."<sup>7</sup> The Russian ambassador Karakhan declared to the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*: "The fact that the prolongation protocol was signed must surprise no one, as it is the natural consequence of the ever closer relations existing between the two countries since the USSR's and new Turkey's foundation. It is a manifestation of friendship built on solid bases. We have always

---

<sup>7</sup> Romanian Military Archives (RMA) fond no. 5418, file no. 1151, f. 29

been united and we shall always remain united both in difficult moments and in periods of prosperity. This is the significance of the protocol we have signed”<sup>8</sup>.

Romania was wondering what these agreements meant, as besides these agreements, Turkey’s foreign politics was following the trail of the Soviets’. The collective agreements in which Turkey and the USSR took part together were: the Litvinov Pact, the Briand-Kellog Pact, the London Convention for the Definition of Aggression. These were the sole political instruments that define publically the mutual political obligations existing between the USSR and Turkey.<sup>9</sup>

The treaty concluded in Moscow on March 16, 1921 between the Soviet government and the revolutionary government of Ankara, through its mandatory Yusuf Kemal laid for the first time on solid grounds the relations of the two states, the Soviet and the Kemalist one. This treaty was concluded at a time when the Soviets were in conflict with the Great Western Powers, and nationalist Turkey was fighting against England and her allies in order to conquer her independence. In fact, this treaty laid the psychological bases of the future cooperation and friendship of the two countries. Two revolutionary regimes unrecognised as yet abroad and even fought against shook hands in order to express their mutual respect for their rights and interests, on a basis of full equality. The Soviets aimed essentially to secure Turkey’s collaboration and support regarding the regime of the Straits and to prevent their fall under the influence and control of the other powerful states. Turkey wanted to protect her flank towards Russia.<sup>10</sup>

This treaty attracted the public attention also because of the fact that its validity was dateless, having no terminus in time, it established no further prolongations, therefore formally establishing peace, and proclaiming the friendship and fraternity of the two states. This treaty also shows that each party pledged itself not to recognise any treaty imposed by force to the other party (Sevres), it established for good and all the Turkish-Russian frontier, and indicates that both states pledged themselves not to tolerate on their territories any actions directed against the other country’s territory or government. It is worth mentioning that Russia now gives up the capitulations and declares null all the previous Turkish-Russian conventions.<sup>11</sup>

As to the Straits, the treaty stipulates that: “In order to grant the access to and passage through the Straits of all peoples’ commercial transactions”, Turkey and Russia agree to assign the elaboration of the final statute of the Black Sea and the Straits to a subsequent conference composed of the delegates of the neighbouring

---

<sup>8</sup> *Idem*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, f.30

<sup>10</sup> *idem*,

<sup>11</sup> *idem*

states, “excluding the possibility that the ensuing decisions jeopardize Turkey’s absolute sovereignty, Turkey’s and Constantinople’s security<sup>12</sup>”.

We may infer from all this the Russians’ intention of closing and controlling the Black Sea, for Russian diplomats had frequently referred to closing the Straits to foreign warships and to entrusting their defense to Turkey. This thesis was also asserted in Lausanne, but it was not admitted in the Straits Convention, and determined the USSR not to ratify this convention. On the other side, Turkey was compelled to accept the regime established at Lausanne, but presently she evolves towards the aspirations materialized in the treaty of Moscow, due to the positive signals coming from Kremlin on this matter<sup>13</sup>.

This treaty, concluded on an indefinite period of time, underlines chiefly the two regimes’ intention to cooperate and to have close relations. Signed on March 16, 1921, the treaty had also consequences on the states of the Middle East. Article 4 of the Treaty stipulated that: “The two contracting parties, observing the continuity that exists in the national and liberating movements of the peoples in the East and the Russian workers’ struggle to establish a new social order, formally assert the right of those peoples to liberty and independence, as well as their right to chose their own form of government and to govern themselves by it”.<sup>14</sup> In other words, both states supported the socialist movements in the East and were solidary with a certain social class in those states. As far as our attempt to analyse the cooperation and friendship treaties signed by Turkey and the Soviet Union, starting with the Treaty of March 1921, in order to strengthen the collaboration of the communist and Kemalist regimes, let us mention that three other agreements were concluded which we shall briefly examine:

1. The friendship and neutrality treaty, signed on December 17, 1925, in Paris, for a period of 3 years, by Cicerin și Rüstü Aras, appeared after the cooling of the Turkish-Russian relations caused by the signature of the Lausanne Treaty, at a moment when Turkey was engaged in a conflict with England over the frontier of Iraq (Mosul).

This treaty referred to the strengthening of the friendship ties through neutrality, non-aggression, non-participation obligations to actions undertaken by other states against one of the parties, as well as through conciliation. The treaty also contained two appendixes stipulating the liberty of action in the relation with other states, but of non-participation in political agreements against one of the parties, accompanied by the interdiction of concluding economic and financial agreements. By this treaty, Russia intended to prevent Turkey from adhering to the

---

<sup>12</sup> *ibidem*, f. 31

<sup>13</sup> *idem*

<sup>14</sup> *idem*

League of Nations. (At that moment Russia considered that the League of Nations was an assembly directed against her). The treaty came into force on July 1, 1926.<sup>15</sup>

2. The protocol of December 17, 1929, signed by the Turkish foreign minister, Tevfik Rüstü Aras, and by Russia's ambassador in Turkey, Karahan. The treaty of 1925 is thus prolonged for 2 more years, and includes a tacit prolongation clause for one more year. The novelty of this agreement consists in the fact that: "... between them and other states neighbour to the other party there was no other pledges except the already published documents, that they commit not to enter in negotiations and not to sign political agreements with such states without the consent of the other parties"<sup>16</sup> - excepting those public accords or agreements meant to preserve normal relations with the neighbouring states. The introduction by the Russians of this phrase in the accord had a well-defined purpose, namely that of preventing Turkey from signing a political agreement with Poland or Romania. According to this amendment, Turkey could not negotiate and conclude the friendship treaty with Romania or of adhering to the Balkan Pact without previously informing the Soviet government and securing its consent.

A delicate problem that intervened between the Turkish and the Soviet governments referred to the fact that Turkey had to inform the USSR and obtain its consent in order to become a member of the Balkan Pact. Filotti, Romania's minister plenipotentiary in Turkey, sent a cable to the Romanian government to inform it about the meeting he had had with the Turkish foreign minister. The latter showed to the Romanian diplomat the text of the confidential letters exchanged by the Turkish official and the Russian ambassador, Karakhan. The letters evinced that Turkey had notified the Soviet Union about the existence of a Military Convention between Turkey and Romania within the Balkan Pact. According to Filotti, Rüstü Aras wanted to test the Soviets' attitude regarding the Turkish-Romanian alliance. The fact that the ambassador Karakhan consented without making any objections deeply satisfied the Turkish foreign minister and convinced him that for the Soviets their cordial relations with Romania were as important as their relations with Turkey<sup>17</sup>.

On October 30, 1931, the friendship and neutrality treaty signed in 1925 and the protocol of 1929 were protracted for a period of five years starting from their expiry date, till July 1, 1936. The same protocol also protracted for the same period the naval agreement of March 7, 1931. The protocol of November 7, 1935 stipulated the prolongation of these three accords for ten years starting with the protocol date, namely till November 1945, which finally equated with their merging.

---

<sup>15</sup> *ibidem* f. 32

<sup>16</sup> *ibidem* f. 33

<sup>17</sup> RMA, fond. No 5418, Cable no 64969 of November 11, 1935, f. 35-37

3. The naval agreement of March 7, 1931 was signed in Ankara by the Turkish foreign minister, Rustu Aras, and by the Soviet ambassador, Suritz. The content of the agreement stipulated that neither party was to increase its fleet in the Black Sea and the neighbouring seas without informing the other party 6 months beforehand.<sup>18</sup>

### **The Titulescu – Menemencioglu Agreement**

According to the military attaché in Turkey, lieutenant colonel Gheorghe Ion, “They (the Turks) are interested in bringing as many forces as possible in Thrace, for the preservation of this province is of the utmost importance for the security of the Straits. And to do more than they are able to do, as their interests dictate them to do, they will not be able to do”<sup>19</sup>.

The Romanians did not agree that the understanding referring to the Turkish Note of April 1936 (sent to the states surrounding the Black Sea by which the Turkish government intended to re-discuss the treaty of Lausanne) should be discussed before the reunion of Belgrade, held within the Council of the Balkan Pact. The discussions between Titulescu and Numan Menemencioglu which took place in Bucharest, verbally confirmed by Tefik Rüstü Aras, were denied by the Turkish General Staff, which issued an official statement invalidating the understanding concluded by the Turkish foreign minister and the general secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey with Titulescu: “The Turkish General Staff knows nothing about the arrangements made by Numan in Bucharest, who, in order to calm down the Romanian foreign minister, promised to postpone the discussions until the reunion of the Balkan Pact which was to be held in Belgrade in order to debate the reserves mentioned in the Military Convention”.<sup>20</sup> From the report of colonel Rozin, the military attaché to Ankara, it results that the General Staff consulted the prime minister in this matter, to find out whether the respective commitments were made with the government’s approval. The Turkish prime minister declared that he knew nothing about this understanding. Therefore, the Turkish General Staff concluded: “The Turkish General Staff cannot invalidate the viewpoint asserted in Belgrade”<sup>21</sup>.

After Romania stated her position as to the Note of the Turkish government regarding the remilitarization of the Straits, the Soviet Union expressed her protests to Ankara’s government: “The Soviet ambassador, Karakan, protested at the Turkish government against the commitment it made by the notification of the

---

<sup>18</sup> idem

<sup>19</sup> Romanian Military Archives, Fond no. 5418, note of the military attaché in Turkey, Cable no. 4335 A of February 28, 1936, f. 3

<sup>20</sup> RMA, fond no. 5418, Cable no. 4401, of May 21, 1936, p. 43

<sup>21</sup> idem

receipt of the Romanian government's answer".<sup>22</sup> The Romanian government's answer to the Turkish Note specified: "Turkey has never questioned Romania's current frontiers and she will never do that"<sup>23</sup>. Since in the Turkish notification of receipt of this answer Turkey declared that she agreed with the content of Romania's answer, "Karakan saw in all this an interference of Turkey in the old conflict between Romania and Russia over Bessarabia"<sup>24</sup>.

The Romanian foreign minister, Nicolae Titulescu, instructed by cable the Romanian military attaché in Turkey, colonel Rozin, to engage no discussions with the Turkish General Staff before Rüstü Aras', the Turkish foreign minister, arrival in the country: "Since Fevzi Pasha, the chief of the Turkish General Staff, accepted the new propositions, he will keep his course. All our force consists in the confrontation of colonel Rozin, armed with my cables and Savel Rădescu's writ, with Rüstü Aras."<sup>25</sup>

The situation of the political and military agreements between Turkey and Romania was dominated by distrust, for, as we have already mentioned, the Turkish foreign minister and the general secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey agreed with the Romanian foreign minister's requirements, while the Turkish General Staff and the head of the Ankara government pretended not to know what the Turkish officials had declared in Bucharest. As to the Romanians, by a cable of May 27, 1936, Filotti informed Bucharest that the military attaché, colonel Rozin, accepted no proposition exceeding his instructions, but he tried to demonstrate to the Turks the flagrant contradiction between the state of the affairs in Ankara and the situation in Bucharest, where T. Rüstü Aras had made certain commitments to the Romanian foreign minister. Moreover, the military attaché declared that he came to Ankara according to the engagements assumed in Bucharest and refused any proposition of changing them. The Romanian ambassador in Turkey ended his note by stating that the Romanian military attaché left Ankara only after having consumed all military arguments in advocating our thesis and only after the Turkish General Staff and the president of the Council of Ministers declared not to recognise the validity of T. Rüstü Aras' commitments.<sup>26</sup>

One of the major objectives of Turkey's domestic politics, which could be solved only with an external help, consisted in the preservation of the Straits. From the regional alliances standpoint, the officials of the Ministry of Defense of Turkey considered that Turkey's most dangerous enemy was Bulgaria: "An Italian action in the Dardanelles can be successful only with Bulgaria's support."<sup>27</sup> Bulgaria was

---

<sup>22</sup> RMA, fond no. 5418, Cable no. 4419 of May 27, 1936, p. 57

<sup>23</sup> *idem*

<sup>24</sup> *idem*

<sup>25</sup> *ibidem*, f. 59

<sup>26</sup> *ibidem* f. 60

<sup>27</sup> RMA, Fond. no. 5418, MSM, iii section, f. 76

becoming the most important pillar also under the following circumstances: “Therefore, even if Turkey were to fear Italy, it would be the same Bulgaria that, due to her immediate vicinity with the Straits, would decide the issue in Thrace and in the region of the Straits. Consequently, the Straits can be defended only by keeping the Bulgarians as far as possible from them. Not even a kilometer should be yielded to them in the South-East”.<sup>28</sup>

The military strategists of the Balkan Pact reckoned that Turkey could gather against the Bulgarians as many forces as necessary in order to check them, until the action of the Romanians and Yugoslavians against Bulgaria would produce its effect. When the action against Bulgaria is over, entailing the control of the Straits and of the North-Western region, only then would Turkey be able to lead all her forces, directed initially against Bulgaria, against Italy or towards any other region of her territory.<sup>29</sup>

At the Belgrade reunion of the member states of the Balkan Pact the discussions dealt with the Turkish government’s demarche concerning the Note it had sent to the states which had taken part in the Lausanne conference. In the long run, Ankara’s officials succeeded to convince their peers of the necessity of that Note having been sent and of the necessity of changing the treaty of July 1923. On the other hand, the officials of the Romanian and Turkish General Staffs sealed a military convention displaying Turkey’s strategy in the event of her being attacked by Italy and Bulgaria. According to the Turkish General Staff, the most important theater of operations for the Turks were Thrace and the Straits, since their loss meant for the Turks their confinement in the desert of Anatolia and implicitly their exclusion from the European sphere of interests, which was so dear to Turkey.

As to Italy, the officials of the Defense Ministry stated that an Italian penetration in Western or South-Western Anatolia could not lead to as an important result as a conquest of Turkey and implicitly of the Straits, for they considered that such an Italian action could not be undertaken without a great display of forces over a long period of time\*. The hypothesis of the cooperation of Italy with Bulgaria against Turkey would create serious problems to Turkey, since a sustained

---

<sup>28</sup> idem

<sup>29</sup> ibidem f. 77

\* The Romanian General Staff estimated that Turkey needed 120 battalions and 150 batteries to check the Bulgarian tide until it would be stopped or destroyed by the Romanian and Yugoslavian forces. The Romanian General Staff rested its assertions on two arguments, i.e. the amount of the Bulgarian forces (about 10 to 15 infantry divisions, plus 1 to 2 cavalry divisions) and the limited space that was separating the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier from the Straits (about 110 to 150 kilometers.)

• According to Ankara’s military specialists, an Italian attack in Anatolia would last for a long time, as the landings, the purveyance by sea, the mountainous terrain deprived of communications constituted as many obstacles, which could not be easily overrun.

••The Gulf of Xerex and Gallipoli Peninsula.

Bulgarian action in Thrace, supported by an Italian operation in Southern Thrace<sup>30</sup>, was quite dangerous for Turkey. According to these hypotheses, the Turkish General Staff had to consider Thrace and the Straits the most important theater of operations.<sup>30</sup> Taking into account the political situation preceding the outbreak of the second world conflagration, the relations of Turkey with Italy and Bulgaria, their affiliation to German politics, the Turkish General Staff was entitled to worry about the revisionist policy of these states.

At the reunion held in Belgrade, the Romanian General Staff asked the Turkish one to increase its armed forces in case Yugoslavia and Romania found themselves engaged in a conflict against Bulgaria. The Turks argued they could not increase their armed forces as the Romanians asked, because they had to send a greater number of soldiers to defend without any delay the Straits, which were at that time demilitarised, but if they were to be militarised, Turkey would consider an increase of her intervention forces against Bulgaria.<sup>31</sup>

The context in which the Turkish state succeeded to strengthen its position in the area was not void of problems. Turkey's strategic role, as bridge between Europe and Asia, the Straits, the vicinity with states as Syria, Iraq and Iran, where the French and English influences were very powerful made it quite difficult for the Turkish state to hold up.

Caught at a certain moment between Soviet Russia and Europe, having undergone an independence war, 1919 – 1922, the Turks succeeded to come through all this united and more consolidated; and after they declared their independency, on October 29, 1923, they advocated the respect for the territories and frontiers and led a defensive policy. Romania numbered among the states that shared the same ideals, namely the respect for the Paris peace treaties of 1919-1920. The Romanian-Turkish relations entered a new form of manifestation since 1922 and were generally positive. The incident of the Turkish Note was hushed up at the Conference of the Balkan Pact held in Belgrade, in 1936. Moreover, Romania sought to improve her relations with the Soviet Union with the help of Turkey.

### **Bibliography:**

#### **Archives:**

Arhivele Militare Române, Fond Marele Stat Major, Biroul Atașăți Militari 1896 – 1941  
Arhivele Militare Române, Fond Marele Stat Major, Biroul Atașăți Militari 1896 – 1941,  
Dosar nr. 20, Organizarea armatei turce,  
Arhivele Militare Române, Fond Marele Stat Major, Biroul Atașăți Militari 1896 – 1941,  
Dosar nr. 67, Rapoarte informative ale Atașatului Român în Turcia,

<sup>30</sup> RMA, fond 5418, MSM, III section, f. 166.

<sup>31</sup> *ibidem*, f.167.

Arhivele Militare Române, Fond Marele Stat Major, Biroul Atașai Militari 1896 – 1941, Fond 5418, Secția a II-a Informații, 1876 – 1949,  
Arhivele Militare Române, Fond Marele Stat Major, Biroul Atașai Militari 1896 – 1941, Dosar nr. 748, Sinteza informativă asupra Turciei și a organizării armatei,  
Arhivele Militare Române, Fond Marele Stat Major, Biroul Atașai Militari 1896 – 1941, Dosar nr. 878, Organizarea armatei turce,  
Arhivele Militare Romane, Fond Marele Stat Major, Secția III-a, Operații 1896 – 1950, AMR, Dosar nr. 1151, Convenție privind hotarul Turciei încheiată la 24 iulie 1923 între Marea Britanie, Franța, Italia, Japonia, Bulgaria, Grecia, România, Serbia și Turcia.

**Books:**

Ionuț Cojocaru, *România și Turcia actori importanți în sistemul de relații interbelice (1918-1940)*, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2014  
Constantin Diamandy, *Problema Strămtorilor*, în „*Politica Externă a României*”. 19 prelegeri publice organizate de Institutul Social Român (1923-1924), București, 1924  
Radu Safta, Călin Felezeu, *Turcia contemporană între moștenirea kemalistă și Uniunea Europeană*, CA Publishing, Cluj Napoca, 2011  
Tasin Gemil, *Legăturile româno-turce de-a lungul veacurilor (până în 1981)*, în Tasin Gemil, Gabriel Custurea, Delia Roxana Cornea (coord.), *Moștenirea culturală turcă în Dobrogea*, Muzeul de Istorie Națională și Arheologie, Constanța, 2013.